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ABSTRACT 
Tins thesiS exammes the effiCiency and productlVlty effects of mergers among Scheduled 
Commercial Banks m Jmha over the post economic reform period 1991 - 2005. It does so usmg the 
dual methodologies of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analys1s (SFA) 
applied to two datasets - the first, comprismg retail commercial banks and the second, encompassmg 
the entrre commercial banking system. Under the DEA methodology, the potential for pre- merger 
efficiency gams IS assessed usmg the Bogetoft and Wang (2005) approach and a comparanve analys1s 
w1th the realiSed post merger efficiency IS undertaken. A me1nc to judge the success or failure of a 
merger along effic1ency cnteria IS also provided Under the latter methodology, an insight into the 
rrnpact of the merger on the effiCiency of the merging banks, the detennmants of mefficiency and that 
of the vanance of meffic1ency IS proVided usmg a range of SFA models In addition, by usmg three 
panels, one of winch mcorporates an observatiOnally reconstructed merged bank obtamed 
by treating the parents of the merged banks add1t1vely as a smgle data pomt m each year 
precedmg the merger year, an ms1ght mto the potential for temporal concentrations m 
merger related effic1ency change is gained Fmally, productivity decompOSitions are 
obtained using a discrete approx1mat10n to Bauer's (1990) cost based total factor 
productlVlty approach (Coelli et a!, 2003, Orea, 2002) Post merger productlVIty changes 
are traced to 1ts source components, mcludmg mput and output rmx allocatlve efficiency 
changes The analyses are earned out for both market dnven and rescue mergers and are 
compared w1th a control group of non-mergmg banks. 
Overall, the results suggest that the Central Bank pohcy of mergmg healthy and ailing 
bankmg units appears to have successfully contamed the meffic1ency of the latter Bank 
mergers m the post reform penod possessed considerable potential efficiency gams stenuning from 
harmony gams 
Keywords: Data Envelopment Analysis, Efficiency, Indian Banking Industry, Mergers, 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Total Factor Productivity 
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Chapter 1 lntroductwn 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The Indian Fmancial System, accounts for 15% of the GDP of India and the ratio of 
commercial bank assets to GDP stood at 92.5% at the end of the fiscal year 2007 Over that 
same year, real GDP growth rate reached 9 4% I These figures, taken from the Reserve 
Bank of India's Report, the Trend and Progress of Commercial Bankmg m India (2007), 
evmce a dynamic, market onented system that owes It roots to the econorruc reforms and 
hberahsatwn package mstituted m the mid 1980s and early nmeties, with renewed vigour. 
The financial system of India today is a far cry from Its centralised avatar of the pre-
liberahsatwn penod between 1960 to 1990 Tlus difference m the nature of the banking 
system between the two penods, IS arguably, a testament to the central role played by banks 
m an economy This is explamed m greater detail below 
Between the years 1960 to 1985, the Indian bankmg system was subJeCt to lnghly 
mterventiorust policies both on the asset and habihty side of Its balance sheet The rationale 
behind these pohcies flowed from the recognition that banks were crucial m the charmelling 
of resources from savers to borrowers. Indeed, tins IS reflected m the followmg defirut10n of 
banks - "A bank IS an mstitut10n whose current operations consist in grantmg loans and 
recelVlng deposits from the public "Tins definition, taken from Freixas and Rochas (2008) 
identifies the core activities of banks Its simplicity behes the VItal role played by banks m 
econorruc systems By mtermedtating between the borrowers and savers, banks can 
mobilise current savmgs and savmgs that were prevwusly locked into intangible assets and 
direct them to productive econorruc sectors (Panaganya, 2008) It is tins role as condmts for 
resource allocation that make banks vital to econorruc development And It IS the 
recogrution of this role that thrust the Indtan Bankmg System onto the receiVIng end of 
directed lendmg and adtnmtstered mterest rate regimes m the pre-econorruc reform era of 
1 As a companson, over the decades pnor to the 1990-91 when economiC reforms were mtroduced, the 
average per annum GDP growth rate lay between 3%-4% 
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India By closely dtrectmg the activities of banks, the regulatiOns sought to dtrect the flow 
of cred1t to Identified weaker econmmc sectors such as the agncultural and small scale 
mdustnes sector with the ultimate a1m of ensunng eqmtable socio-econonnc development. 
Insofar as the flow of cred1t to pnonty sectors mcreased, the pohc1es were deemed a 
success However, by restnctmg the actiVities of banks to regulatiOn Identified ruches and 
requiring banks to attam regulatiOn dnven quantitative deposit absorption and credit 
allocatwn targets, the selfsame policies effectively eroded the incentive for banks to engage 
in active pursuit of credit disbursement pohc1es and encouraged moral hazard In the 
process, they thus begat a bankmg system whose sahent feature came to be widespread 
operatwnal mefficiency The allocatiOn of credit was dnven by the need to attain the 
regulatiOn Identified targets rather than the nsk-return profiles of credit disbursement 
opportumtles In an effort to strengthen the bankmg system and enhance the efficiency and 
productlVlty w1th which It discharged 1ts mtermed1ary role, the reforms package brought 
w1th 1t changes m the structure of the bankmg mdustry Greater competition was InJected 
into the system through relaxed entry requrrements for new banks, the relaxatwn of branch 
hcensmg pohcy, the d1smantlmg of adm1rustered mterest rate and directed lendmg regimes, 
the mtroduct10n of prudential norms and the encouragement of mergers The precedmg 
paragraphs proVide a synopsis of the evolutionary path of the Ind1an Bankmg Industry A 
deeper d1scuss1on of the same IS prov1ded m Chapter 2 
Agamst the backdrop of the VariOUS pohcleS rughhghted above persists the question 
of bankmg efficiency and productivity In other words, how d1d bankmg efficiency and 
productivity respond to the regulatory regime pre- and post- 1990? Answenng tins question 
reqmres an understandmg of why an assessment of bankmg efficiency 1s so VItally 
Important The answer hes m the defnnt10n of bankmg provided in the precedmg 
paragraphs Efficient banks can be expected to intermediate more funds, enJOY greater 
profitabihty and prov1de services at better quahty and prices (Berger et a1, 1993) The 
relevance of empirical research mto the Identification of causal factors that impact the 
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realised efficiency of a bank IS thus denved from the repercussions ofbankmg efficiency on 
the overall profitabthty and stabthty of the bankmg system In the case of the Indtan 
bankmg system, as assessment of tts efficiency pre and post reforms serves to not only 
assess the success of the reforms in raismg the overall health of the bankmg system, but m 
htghhghtmg potential regulatory mechanisms that could aid ( e g , lower statutory pre-
emptiOn of funds) or htnder ( e g , restnction of competition) in the attainment of greater 
banking efficiency Empmcal research rnto thts issue, detailed m Chapter 3, has found 
evidence of greater bankmg effictency post-reforms 
In fact, in response to the reforms and the resultmg changes m the operational and 
competitive landscape of the banking system, incumbent banks underwent a process of 
restntctunsations in order to better adapt to their altered operational environment. The 
bankmg system thus bore wttness to a senes of mergers. These mergers came in two 
flavours In addition to the plam varulla market dnven mergers, banks that were unable to 
onent themselves to therr new envrronment, were merged wtth stronger banks at the behest 
of the Central Bank thereby gtvmg nse to rescue mergers How do mergers, in general, and 
these mergers in particular, influence the effictenctes of the concerned banks? A review of 
hteratllfe pertamrng to mergers and therr effictency fallouts ts provtded in Chapter 4 The 
literatllfe revtew, while htghhghtmg the pnmary fmdings of research to date on mergers 
and therr efficiency and productlVlty effects, reveals the dearth of stmtlar emptrical studtes 
m the cases of emergmg econorrues such as lndta. These studtes on developed economies 
thus form the launch pad for further mvestigation mto the intpact of econorruc reforms on 
the effictency and productlVlty of lndtan commercial banks thus formmg the topic of thts 
thesis 
Methodologically, the assessment of merger related effictency changes proceeds 
along two avenues, the non-parametnc and the econometnc Thts thests presents results 
from both approaches Beginning with the former m Chapter 5 the Data Envelopment 
Analysts methodology ts used to assess the efficiency effects of mergers among Indtan 
commercial banks over the post reform penod The chtef advantage of domg so ts that it 
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enables the utilisatiOn of the Bogetoft and Wang (2005) approach to 1dent1fy the potential 
for efficiency gains pnor to the merger The Identified efficiency potential can then be 
sourced to three components related to the technical productiOn process, the changes m the 
output rmx of the merged entity and the changes in the scale of the same Reahsed 
efficiency can then be assessed usmg the standard the Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) 
and the Banker, Chames and Cooper (1984) Data Envelopment Analys1s models thereby 
prov1ding a comprehensive assessment of the impact of the merger on the efficiency of the 
merged entity This chapter appeared in prelinlinary form in Gourlay et a! (2007). 
Briefly, the analysis reveals a high level of techrucal efficiency among the banks 
that engaged in the mergers More importantly, it brings to the forefront the importance of 
analysmg changes m the output rmxes of the merged ent1ty as these are found to be a 
significant source of post-merger efficiency gains From a policy perspective, this study 
suggests that the "rescue" mergers pohcy adopted by the Ind1an Central Bank, wherein, it 
arranges the merger of an ailmg banlang unit with a health1er one in order to "rescue the 
former" and protect its depositors, successfully contained the inefficiency of the ailing umt 
Building on the results of Chapter 5, Chapter 6 attacks the analysis of merger 
related efficiency gams on two fronts (I) 1t assesses the effic1ency and productivity effects 
flowing from the mergers wh!le simultaneously accountmg for the stochastlc nature of the 
operating environment of the banks and (2) by assessing the impact of the merger re-
constructiOn methodology on the efficiency and productivity results obtamed. This IS 
accomphshed usmg the Stochastic Frontier Analys1s methodology A further advantage of 
usmg this methodology IS that of 1ts abil1ty to enable Identification of the determmants of 
meffic1ency and the 1mpact of exogenous factors on the vanance of inefficiency The latter 
is important g~ven 1ts ability to identify the sens1tiv1ty of bankmg effic1ency to vanous 
factors In the context of mergers, coupled w1th the overall !IDpact of the merger on 
efficiency, 1t captures the ab1lity of the merger to help the merged bank cement 1ts 
effic1ency status across time A bank whose merger related efficiency shows greater 
vanat10n post-merger would be more sensitive to Identified exogenous vanables and 
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therefore would be unable to maintam 1ts post-merger effic1ency over time Dependmg on 
whether the merger bestowed efficiency gams or not, an mcreased vanance will be v1ewed 
as bemg unfavourable or favourable to the bank G1ven the mcluswn of rescue mergers m 
this thesis, the assessment of effic1ency variances IS particularly mterestmg The results 
from the reconstructiOn analysis also possess the advantage of assessmg the existence, 1f 
any, of a temporal concentratiOn of merger related efficiency gains Tlus chapter appeared 
m prelmnnary form m Gourlay et a! (2007). 
Chapters 5 and 6 mcorporate the ab1hty of the merged banks to reonent their 
productwn processes in a more efficient marmer, e1ther through controlling therr output 
levels and I or changmg the rrux of the outputs However, one of the oft quoted reasons for 
merging 1s that of therr cost alleviating properties. Chapter 7 thus assesses the efficiency of 
the mergers from a cost perspective. The scope and extent to winch cost efficiencies are 
realised IS assessed usmg a range of Stochast1c Frontier Analysis models. Incorporatmg an 
assessment of productivity changes linked to the mergers traces the genes1s of post merger 
alterations m the cost profile of the merged ent1ty Usmg a d1screte approxnnat10n to 
Bauer's (1990) cost based Total Factor ProductlVlty Change formula, post merger 
productivity gams are sourced to effic1ency changes, frontier slnfts, returns to scale changes 
and, nnportantly, efficiency changes emanatmg from modlfications to the mput and output 
m1x of the merged bank. Thus wlnle, allocative effic1ency changes are not drrectly 
estimated, the impact of changes on the allocative effic1ency profile of the bank IS still 
assessed Tlus chapter appeared m preliminary form in Gourlay et a! (2008) 
Chapter 8 synthesises the pnmary results of the aforementiOned chapters and 
concludes tlus thes1s 
The process of wntmg tins thesis and conductmg the research that 1t embodies has 
given me tremendous pleasure. I hope you enJOY reading 1t! 
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CHAPTER 2: EVOLUTION OF THE INDIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
2.1 Introduction 
The pnor chapter began with questiOns on the nature of the financial system m 
India What are Its mam features? Who are Its partiCipants? How has the system evolved 
over the past decades? This chapter seeks to answer these questions by prov1dmg a bird's-
eye view of the Indian financial system 
The financial system of India evolved from a centralized and lnghly regulated 
system to one that is now more liberal and diversified. It has received a boost m Its 
efficiency and strength through the economic reforms instituted by the Government of 
India 
Tins chapter seeks to provide an introduction to the Indian financ1al system by 
chartmg its evolutiOnary traJectory and deta1lmg Its maJor players It therefore begins with a 
topographical guide to the system and details the major participants of the same with 
particular emphasis on the Commercial Bankmg Sector. It then discusses the ongomg 
hberahsatwn process detailmg the rationale for hberahsatlon and the Impact of econom1c 
reforms on the fmanc1al system The chapter then ends with the conclusiOn 
The publications of the Indian Central Bank, viz., the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), 
m the form of the Trend and Progress of Banking m India, the Basic Statistical Returns of 
Commercial Banks m India and Statistical Tables Relatmg to Banks m India, for various 
years and Panagariya (2008) form the main references for this chapter These publications 
are available at the RBI's webs1te at http·//www rb1.0rg m/scnpts/pubhcatlons aspx. 
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2.2 Overview of the Indian Banking System: Its Major Participants 
The mam partiCipants of the lndtan financial system are the Reserve Bank of India, 
Scheduled Commerctal Banks, Financial lnstitutwns and Credit and Co-operative SoctetJes 
Each of these mstltutwns IS dtscussed m detail below. 
2.2.1 The Reserve Bank of India 
At the apex of the Indian fmancial System is the Reserve Bank of Indta (RBI), the 
country's central bank. The RBI was established on Apnll, 1935 and 1t draws its power 
from the Reserve Bank of lndta Act, 1934 and the Bankmg RegulatiOns Act, 1949 
The bank was mitJally established as a Shareholder's mstJtutwn (Agarwal, Chapter 
1, 1996) w1th a mmonty shareholdmg by the Government of India The bank was 
subsequently natiOnalised and acqmred by the Government m 1949. 
The charter of the bank encapsulates 1ts main functions It reads, " .. to regulate the 
1ssue of Bank notes and keeping of reserves With a v1ew to securing the monetary stability 
of India and generally to operate the currency and credit system of the country to 1ts 
advantage". The functions of the RBI are thus, m general, the conduct of monetary policy, 
regulatiOn and superviSIOn of the financtal system and acting as the Government's bank and 
as a Bankers' bank. 
In addttJOn, one of the most cntJcal aspects of the bank's functiOns has been to aid 
in the development of the country's rural and agncultural sector and Small Scale Industnes 
sector The bank maintains a Rural Plannmg and Credit Department to a1d in the progress 
and development of these sectors. Its functwns centre around the momtonng and 
facilitation of the flow of credit to the rural, agncultural and Small Scale Industry sectors, 
provtdmg policy frameworks for priority sector lending, proviSion of financial support and 
policy support to the National Bank for Agncultural and Rural Development, actmg as 
regulators for Regional Rural Banks, State I Central Co-operative Banks and Local Area 
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Banks and momtonng the implementatiOn of Government sponsored Poverty Alleviation 
Schemes. 
Another important aspect of the RBI' s functiOns IS highlighted through Its Board of 
Fmanc1al Supervision, which was established m 1994 as part of the econolTilc reforms The 
Board of Fmanc1al Supemsion is composed of a Committee of Central Board of Directors 
of the RBI and has as Its aim, comprehensive superviSIOn of commercial banks, financial 
ms!J!JI!Jons and non-bankmg fmance compames Restruc!Jlnsatwns of the bank mspection 
system and strengthemng of the mternal defences of supervised mstirutions represent some 
additional!IDtiatives of the Board 
In addition, the BFS oversees the functiOning of other supervisory departments 
within the RBI such as the Deparl!nent of Banking Supemswn wlnch was established in 
order to supervise the commercial banking and financial mstJ!Jitions sector Some of the 
functions of the Department mclude conductmg scheduled and special on-site bank 
mspectwns, dealmg with fmanc1al sector frauds and complrunts against banks and fmanc1al 
msti!Jitions from the public, the Government or other banks and actmg as secretanat for the 
Board ofFmancial SupervisiOn 
Pnor to the mtroductwn of economic reforms, micro-regulatiOn (Agarwal, Chapter 
1, 1996) was the hallmark of the RBI. In other words, the RBI laid down detailed 
regulatiOns on various aspects of banking operations For example, banks were requrred to 
drrect a fixed proportiOn of therr lendmg to designated prionty sectors at specified 
concesswnal mterest rates The RBI also prescnbed vanous mterest rates for loans 
dependmg on their ma!Jlnty, sector of deployment and borrower type It thus established a 
system of adffilffistered interest rates and mandated positive bms m the allocatiOn of credit 
to specified pnonty sectors The overarchmg obJective was to ensure that adequate finance 
was channelled to identified weaker sections of the economy such as the rural and 
agricultural sectors and the small scale mdustnes sector. In domg so, the bank moved m 
complete alignment with the 5-year plans and thm socw-developmental goals. 
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Today, the focus has shifted from rrucro-regulation to macro-management with the 
RBI providmg broad pohcy mitiatives and comprehensive supervisiOn of the fmancml 
system to ensure the development and strengthening of the same. The bank has decoupled 
the administered interest rate regime, relaxed the regulatiOns on pnority sector lendmg, 
provzded greater autonomy to banks to detennine their operatiOnal drrectwn and focused on 
rrnprovmg transparency in the fmancial system (Arun and Turner, 2002; Agarwal, 1996) 
through, for example, the establishment of the Board of Fmancial Supervision and the 
Department ofBankmg Supervision. 
An zdea of the remammg partzczpants of the banking system in Indza can be gamed 
from the followmg defrmt10n of"Banking System" provided by the RBI and taken from the 
RBI website The RBI defines the Bankmg System (or Banks) as, "(a) the State Bank of 
Indza and Its Assoczates (b) Natzonalised banks (c) Banking companies as defmed in clause 
C of Section 5 of the Banking Regula!ion Act, 1949 (4) Co-opera!ive Banks (as far as 
Scheduled Co-opera!ive Banks are concerned) (e) RegiOnal Rural Banks and (f) any other 
fmanczal institu!ion notified by the Central Government m this behalf" 
However, for practzcal purposes, the vanous participants of the banking system m 
Indza can be classified as Co-opera!ive Banks, Scheduled Banks, Fmancial Institutions and 
Non Banking Fmance Companzes Each of these are discussed, in turn, below 
2.2.2 Co-Operative Banks 
Co-opera!ives are essentially orgamzatwns formed by groups of people for the 
purposes of meetmg the needs of therr members They are run along the pnnczples of self-
help, self-responszbihty and self-adrrunistra!ion Co-opera!ives are run on a non-profit basis 
(Agarwal, 1996) Therr mam area of operation zs the rural and the agncultural sector and 
they specialise m the proVIsion of medmm to long term credzt to the rruddle and lower 
mcome segments In fact, until 1961, they were the only ms!itutwnal source of rural I 
agricultural credzt (Agarwal, 1996) 
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Co-operative banks can be broadly divided mto urban and rural co-operatives. Each 
IS, in tlirn, further classified as shown m the following diagram, taken from Trends and 
Progress ofBankmg m India (2002), RBI 
Figure 2.1 Organisation Structure ofCo-operatzve Credit Institutions 
Ot gam .. atloual Strn.rttrrP of Co-o!!eoratlVE' Ct E"dJ.t In .. ntutJ.on'l 
I Co-operallve Credtt Inst:tllllons 
I Rural Co-operabve Credrt Instrtub.ons I I Urban Co-operatrve Banks 
I 
I Short-Term Structure I I Long-Tenn Structure I 
State Co-operative Banks State Co-operative 
-
Agnculture and Rural 
Development Banks 
D!stnct Cenb"al 
Co-operative Banks 
Pnmary Co-operative 
-
Agnculture and Rural 
Pnmary Agncultural Credlt Development Banks 
SoClelles (P A CS) 
Source Reports on Trends and Progress of Ban/ang zn Indw, 2004, RBI 
SupervisiOn of Co-operatives falls under the JUTISdJCtion of the RBI, the State 
Governments and theN atwnal Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development 
Urban co-operatives serve the fmanc1al requrrements of urban3 and semi-urban2 
areas in the non-agncultirral sector They are required to lend 60% of their total loans and 
3
•
2 Population groups of the centers are based on the 1991 census The population groups are defined as under 
(Source RBI Database on the Indzan Economy, http 1/www rb1 org m) (a) 'Semi-urban' group mcludes 
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advances to priority sectors Of the total pnonty sector lendmg, at least 25% must be m aid 
of 1dent1fied weaker economic segements (RBI, Trend and Progress of Bankmg m India, 
2004). In tins respect, they face higher lending restnctions than SCBs. They are also 
requrred to mamtam a m1rumum statutory hqmd1ty ratiO and cash deposit ratio though at a 
lower rate than that of SCBs. 
Rural Co-operat1ves are div1ded into short-term and long-term Co-operatives. The 
former mclude state Co-operative banks, central Co-operative banks and Pnmary 
Agncultural Co-operative Societies which help meet the short-term fmance requirements of 
the rural sector The latter, in particular, operate at the "grass root" level, prov1dmg credit to 
the rural and agricultural sector workers 
The Co-operative system m India was plagued w1th many problems emanatmg from 
lugh levels of default, lack of professwnahsm m management and non-adherence to 
prudential norms resultmg in h1gh levels of inefficiency and structural weaknesses (Trends 
and Progress of Banking in India, 2004) To overcome these problems vanous measures 
such as the mtroductwn of prudential norms for reportmg and stncter superviSIOn have 
been instituted The remedial measures have resulted m llllproved operatiOnal performances 
among Urban and State Co-operatives However, that of Rural and Central Co-operatives 
remamed below potential w1th lugh levels of non performmg assets (NPAs) (Trends and 
Progress of Bankmg m India, 2004) In an attempt to restructure and remedy the fmanc1al 
health of co-operatives, the RBI m conJunCtiOn w1th the Govenllllent established a Viswn 
Document and a Task Force to identify areas of structural weakness and propose remed1es 
to rectify the Situation These mclude, greater consultatiOn with md1vidual state 
governments on the operations of Co-operatives located in the respective states, 
development of Human Resources and InformatiOn Technology Infrastructure, corporate 
centres With populatiOn of 10,000 and above but less than 100,000 and (b) 'Urban' group mcludes centres with 
populatiOn of 100,000 and above but less than 1 million 
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governance reforms and relaxation of merger regulations to provide an exit strategy for 
ailmg co-operative uruts 
2.2.3 Financial Institutions 
Financial InstitutiOns were set up initially as Development Financial Institutions and 
therr primary obJective was to promote balanced econolDlc development by acting as a 
source of medmm and long-term finance, undertaking market and mvestlnent research 
related to the development of an mdustry and providmg technical and adlDirnstra!Jve 
assistance If necessary to aid m the promotiOn, management or expansion of an industry 
(RBI, Trend and Progress ofBankmg In India, 2004; Agarwal, Chapter 3, 1996) 
Financial InstitutiOns m India are classified into All India Fmancial Institutions, 
State Level Financial Institutions and other Financial InstitutiOns. These broad categones 
are further divided as mdicated in Figure 2 2 
Of late, regulatory changes and competitive pressures have led to a dechne in the 
stgrnficance of Fmancial Institutions as an Important provider of development finance 
Gradual phasmg out of government support m the form of long term concessional funds 
and the rise of the capital market as an important source of funds has further contributed to 
their declme The situatiOn, compounded by nsmg levels of Non Perfomiing Assets (NP As) 
ultimately resulted m an erosiOn oftherr financial health The Report of the Workmg Group 
on Development of Fmancial InstitutiOns, 2003-04, recommended phasmg out of State 
FmancJal Corporations, transformation of relatively healthy Fmancial InstitutiOns mto 
banks and strengthernng of the Development Fmancial InstitutiOns' regulatory and 
supervisory system m order to Improve the fmancJal health and viability of this sector of 
the Indtan Bankmg system 
Figure 2.2. Orgamsatzonal structure of Fmanczal Instltutzons 
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Orgmuo;at:J.oual Stntrtm eo ofFmannal In~btnttono; 
I FmanClal Inst!tutlons (Fls) I 
I 
1 All Indla Fis 1 State Fis I I Other Inst!tutlons I 
All Indla State FmanClal Export 
Development Banks - Corporat:tons Credlt 
(SFCs) - Guarantee 
Corporab.on 
I Spee1ahsed Fis Small Industnes (ECGC) 
I Corporat:Lon 
- (SDC) 
Investment Instrtutlons I Deposlt 
Insurance and 
Credlt 
Refinance Inst1tut1ons I - Guarantee 
Corporatlon 
(DICGC) 
Source Reports on Trends and Progress of Banlang zn Indza, 2004, REI 
2.2.4 Non Banking Financial Companies 
With effect from December 2006, Non Bankmg Fmancial Companies are classified 
into Asset Finance Companies, Investment Compames and Loan Compames The former 
refers to fmancial mstltutwns that specialise m the provisiOn of physical assets in support of 
economic activities 
2.2.5 Scheduled Banks 
Scheduled banks form a maJor component of the fmancml system of India 
Accordmg to the RBI," A banking company registered under the Compames Act 1956, 
wluch conducts the busmess of bankmg in India and wluch (a) has paid up capital and 
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reserves of an aggregate and real exchangeable value of not less than Rs 5 lakhs4 and (b) 
satisfies the Reserve Bank of Ind1a that theu affaus are not bemg conducted m a marmer 
detrimental to the mterests of their depositor, IS eligible for inclusion m the Second 
Schedule to the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, and when mcluded IS known as a 
'Scheduled Bank"'. 
Scheduled banks are thus those banks that are mcluded m the second schedule of the 
Reserve Bank of India Act of 1934. InclusiOn in the schedule affords them certam 
privileges such as assistance from the RBI durmg times of fmanc1al distress They also 
have certain obhgatwns such as maintenance of the reqmred Cash Reserve Raho (CRR)5 
and Statutory Liqmd1ty RatiO (SLR)6• Scheduled banks are composed of Scheduled 
Commercial Banks (SCBs) and Scheduled Co-operative Banks 
SCBs play an important role m the development of the bankmg system m Ind1a. 
Followmg hberaliza!ion, their growth m terms of s1ze and sophisticatiOn has expanded 
rapidly For example, aggregate growth rate of depos1ts of SCBs mcreased by 24.6% in 
2007, up from 17 8% the prevwus year. Across bank groups, the expansiOn was greatest for 
new pnvate sector banks (38.8%) followed by fore1gn banks at 32 6%, 22 9% for public 
sector banks and 6 0% for old pnvate sector banks (RBI, Trends and Progress of Banking 
m Ind1a, 2007). 
4 Rs 500,000 
5 As per sectwn 42(1) of the Reserve Bank of lndta Act 1934, every bank mcluded m the Second Schedule 
shalJ mamtam wtth the RBI an average daily balance the amount of whtch shall not be less than 3% of tts 
demand and ttme habilt!tes RBI pays mterest on that portiOn of cash reserves whtch ts the dtfference between 
the prescnbed CRR and the mmtmum CRR of 3% No mterest ts patd on excess reserves Non Scheduled 
banks are also requtred to mamtam mmtmum CRR under the Bankmg Regulation Act 1949, wtth Itself, the 
RBI or other banks (RBI Database on the Indtan Economy, 
http //www rbt org m/scnpts/Stattsttcs aspx ) 
6 In addt!ton to the CRR, a scheduled bank or a non-scheduled bank under Sectwn 24(2A) of the Bankmg 
Regulations Act, 1949, shall mamtam m Indta at least 25% oftts net demand and ttme habthttes Ltqmd assets 
compnse (a) cash (b) gold (c) net balances m current accounts mamtamed wtth the State Bank oflndta and tts 
Assoctates and natwnahsed banks (d) excess CRR mamtamed and (e) unencumbered approved secunltes 
(RBI Database on the Indtan Economy, http //www rbt org m/scnpts/Staltsltcs aspx) 
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Scheduled commercial banks are broadly classified on the basis of ownerslup as 
follows 
Figure 2.3 Structure of Scheduled Commerczal Banlang Sector m Indza 
SC"bedtdl(lotl Bmlld.ng StrnC"hUI(> inli.uha 
Scheduled Banks m !ndJ.a I 
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I I I I 
I Pubhc Sector I Pnvate Sector IFore>gn Banbl I ~:.na!Rural I Banks Banb 
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Source Report on Trends and Progress of Bankzng, REI 
Public Sector Banks (PSBs ), which, pnor to the introduction of econonuc reforms 
were wholly owned by the Government (Das et a!, 2004, Sarkar et a!, 1998) were 
established to aid in the eqUitable development of all sectors of the economy. Tins 
government support coupled with therr extensive branch network propelled them to the 
forefront of the deposit and credit market and made them the frontlme mstruments m the 
acluevement of the Government's economic aims This is evident from Table 2.1 wherem It 
can be observed that the PSBs m the form of the State Bank of IndJa and its Associates and 
the NatiOnalised banks represent well over 50% of the deposit and credit market 
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Histoncally, the SCBs played a maJOr role m mob1hzmg deposits, charmellmg funds 
to the rural sectors, and m general, promotmg the diffusiOn of banking services to the rural 
sectors of the economy This is evident from Tables 2.1-2 3. The number of branches of 
SCBs m rural regions went up from approximately 1,800 m 1969 to approxrmately 30,000 
m 1990 JUSt before liberalizatiOn The number of banks themselves showed an mcreasing 
trend over that time penod. The share of total credit disbursed to the rural and urban 
regiOns also shows an mcreasing trend between 1969 and 2005 An analysis of the sectoral 
deployment of funds (Table 2 3) reveals that the industrial sector was the greatest 
beneficiary of credit disbursements by SCBs While th1s remains so even currently, the 
share of total credit allocated to the agncultural sector, which forms a component of the 
pnonty sectors, shows a nsmg trend The pnonty sector advances which stood at 14% of 
total credit disbursed by SCBs in 1969 mcreased to tiJe legal hm1t of 40 7% m 1990 While 
tiJe maJor players of the fmancial system have now been accounted for, the policy 
framework wluch shaped tiJe fmanc1al system remams to be explored. This IS dealt witiJ m 
detail in the next section. PSBs have retamed the hon's share of the Ind1an Banking market, 
accountmg for roughly 70% of tiJe assets of SCBs m 2007 These figures provide a hint as 
to tiJe nnpact of tiJe regulations governmg the banking system prior to and post reforms 
These are discussed in more detail m the next section. 
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Table 2.1: Scheduled Banking Group-wise share(%) of Deposit and Credit 
(percentages) 
Year/ State Bank of 
Bank Indta and its Nationahsed Foretgn Banks RRB Other SCBs All SCBs 
Group Associates Banks 
Deposzts Credzt Deposzts Credzt Deposzts Credzt Deposzts Credzt Deposzts Credzt Deposzts Credzt 
1969 27.0 33 3 56 5 50 8 16 5 15 9 1000 100 0 
1980 28.5 32 0 62 3 58 4 05 08 8.7 8.7 100.0 1000 
1985 28 8 31 2 61 4 57.9 I 4 2.3 84 86 1000 1000 
1990 26 6 272 61 9 59 6 50 62 23 3.2 41 3.7 1000 100.0 
1995 25 3 29 2 57.3 53 4 75 76 30 29 69 69 100.0 1000 g 
2000 24.7 27.6 53 9 48 7 5.7 84 39 29 11 8 12 4 1000 1000 {l 
-
2005 24 3 23.1 499 47.8 44 66 35 28 17 9 19 7 1000 100 0 
~ 
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2007 23 3 23 I 48 5 47.9 53 66 34 24 19 4 200 1000 1000 ~ 
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2.3 Financial Liberalization: Before and After 
The penod 1991-92 saw the mtroduct10n of econormc reforms m the Indian 
financial system. Tlus sectiOn of the chapter begins with an overview of the Indian financial 
system prior to the mtroduction of economic reforms. It then highlights the mam features of 
the reforms package mtroduced and the impact of those reforms on the fmancml system. 
Based on the econormc growth rates, Panaganya (2008) identifies 4 phases of 
development m the mdustnal and fmancial sector in Indm. These are as follows· 1951-65, 
1965-81, 1981-88 and 1988-2006 The average growth rates correspondmg to these years 
were respectively, 4.1 %, 3.2%, 4.8% and 7.8%. Over the first phase, the econormc pohcy 
was hberal with rmnimal restnct10ns on foreign mvestment Over the course of Phase 2, 
mdustnal and economic pohcy became progressively tightened, for example, with 
restrictions on the productive activities of industnal houses, reservation of industries, and 
the mtroduct10n of distnbut10n and pnce controls whereby the Government would retam 
control to distribute and price specific sectoral output at prices below the prevailing market 
price Phase 3 saw the mtroduct10n of piecemeal reforms aimed at resuscitatmg growth and 
Phase 4 saw the introduction of more systematic reforms These phases and their 
respective economic policies, with particular emphasis on the financial sector, are detailed 
next 
Industnal policy m Phase 1 was characterised by the strong presence of the Public 
sector in heavy industnes, establislunent of an mdustnal licensing pohcy to regulate pnvate 
sector investment and the estabiislunent of a distributiOn and pricing control regime These 
policies reflected the prevailmg ethos of the tune - one of the inunediate need for self-
sufficiency These features were mcorporated mto various Industrial Policy ResolutiOns 
that were enacted over that time period. Industnes such as Shipbmldmg, Mmeral Oil, 
telecommumcat10ns and rron and steel remained exclusive to the public sector. Industnes 
that did not fall mto these categories were open to pnvate sector participation, however, the 
State reserved the right to enter these sectors if It was deemed necessary With respect to 
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the pnvate mdustnal sector, the necessary regulatiOns were embodied m the vanous 
Industnes Development and Regulation Act which fell w1thm the broad rem1ts of the 
Industnal Pohcy Resolutions Acts The primary objective of the IDRAs were to ensure that 
mvestment was duected to sectors and areas Identified by the F1ve Year Plans In additiOn, 
1t specified the cntena for licensing reqmrements m the mdustnal sector and the reservatiOn 
or subsuhzatwn of certam mdustnes by the State. 
Phase 2 was charactensed by a t!ghtenmg of the existing regulations One of the 
mecharusms through wluch th1s was achienved was the enactment of the Monopolies and 
Restnctive Trade Practices Act (MRTP) wh1ch provided the State With powers to regulate 
the actlVltles of identified large industnal houses New productiOn actlVltles of the same 
were severely restricted. Fore1gn exchange regulation was restncted w1th the enactment of 
the Foreign Exchange RegulatiOn Act and the settmg up of the Foreign Investment Board. 
Thus, all new projects that were set up w1th fore1gn collaboratiOn exceedmg 20% required 
the approval of the FIB In add1tion, a schedule detailmg the products m which foreign 
mvestment and teclmology imports were and were not penmtted was drawn up In add1tlon, 
under the Foreign Exchange RegulatiOns Act (1973) under wh1ch all non-bank fore1gn 
branches and comparues mcorporated m lnd1a that had a foreign eqmty share exceedmg 
40% were reqmred to obtam pernuss10n form the Reserve Bank of India to continue 
operatiOns in India Approval was granted upon dilutiOn of foreign eqmty to 40% The 
companies were treated as national comparues. In additiOn, a small scale mdustry 
reservatiOn pohcy was mtroduced whereby production in the identified sectors were lliDlted 
to small scale productiOn uruts. With the enactment of the Industnal Disputes Act, the 
mdustnal sector's ability to retrench workers was severely curtailed. 
The financial system durmg tlus penod was viewed as a means for achieving socio-
econorruc development In order to do so, a system of directed lendmg m the form 
mandatory pnonty sector lendmg, adrrunistered mterest rates and restnctions on foreign 
mvestment and branching restnctwns was adopted 
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It IS mterestmg to note that the first decade followmg mdependence in 194 7 saw a 
fmanc1al system that was considered fmrly liberal For example, the Cash Reserve Rat1o 
stood at 2% over the pnod 1962-1973. the Statutory Liquidity Ratio, meanwhile, stood at 
20% until 1964 when 1t was ra1sed to 25% It then rema!lled at that level until 1970. m 
addition, the lendmg and depos1t rates were not subject to the many mterventwns that 
would come to charactense them m the immediate pre-reform penod However the first of 
two waves of nationalizatiOn occurred m 1969, followmg the fmdmgs of the All India Rural 
Credit Survey and Rev1ew Committee, and subsequently, the aforementiOned measures 
were adopted 
Bnefly, the Committee found that agricultural credit reqmrements were not being 
met by the then ex1stmg Co-operative banking sector For example, as noted m Panaganya 
(2008), m 1969, rural areas which accounted for three-fourths of the populatiOn accounted 
for one-fifth of the bank branches The share of credit allocated to the rural regwns and the 
agncultural sector were substantially lower than that of metropolitan areas and the 
mdustnal sector. Consequently, it urged that commerc1al banks play a complementary role 
along side co-operative banks in the proviSIOn of agncultural cred1t To comply w1th the 
fmdmgs of the Committee, the Government sought to mtroduce strict regulatiOns govemmg 
the operatwns of banks The CRR was stead1ly rmsed to 15% wh1ch was the legal 
maximum. The SLR was, over time, raised to 38.5%, which was almost the legal max1mmn 
of 40% The returns on the secunties that the banks were reqmred to hold as part of their 
SLR commitments was fixed to a level well below the market rates Of their remammg 
funds, banks were required, m1tially to lend 33 1/3% of therr total advances to pnonty 
sectors at concesswnal rates Subsequently, tlus was ra1sed to 40% of total advances (RBI, 
2005c) In addition, the banks were reqmred to ensure that a minimum of 16% of the net 
bank cred1t targeted the agricultural sector While these targets were 1mtially, reqmred for 
national banks, by the time econormc reforms were introduced in 1992, their ambit 
encompassed foreign banks 
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Further, a system of ad!mmstered m teres! rates was introduced whereby deposit and 
lendmg rates were prescribed by the RBI accordmg to borrower type, purpose of the loan 
and matunty period. Interest rates on deposits of matunty rangmg from 1-3 years stood 
between 8 and 9percent. With mflatwn averag~ng 8 2%, however, the real return was barely 
positive In addition, restnct10ns were 1mposed on the ability of banks to open new 
branches For example, a bank was allowed to open a branch in a metropolitan or urban 
area only 1f 1! opened forty branches in rural areas. Bank branclnng policy was thus 
mtrmately tied w1th the State Poverty AlleviatiOn schemes. 
Table 2.2: Region-wise Progress of Commercial Banking 
Indicator I Year 1969 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 1995 2000 2004 2005 
No of 
Commerc1al 
banks 89 83 153 268 274 276 284 298 290 288 
Scheduled 
Commerc1al 
Banks 73 74 148 264 270 272 281 297 286 284 
Non-Scheduled 
Commerc1al 
Banks 16 9 5 4 6 4 3 4 4 
Number of Bank 
Offices m lnd1a 8262 16936 32419 51385 59752 60220 62367 67868 69071 68355 
Rural 1833 6166 15105 30185 34791 35206 33004 32852 32227 32082 
Sem1 
Urban 3342 5116 8122 9816 11324 11344 13341 14841 15288 15403 
Urban 1584 3091 5454 6578 8042 8046 8868 10994 11806 11500 
Metropohtan 1503 2563 4126 4806 5595 5624 7154 9181 9750 9370 
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As can be seen from the above table, the number of scheduled commercial banks 
doubled over the penod 1969 - 1980 and subsequently continued on an upward trend. 
Among these, the number of rural branches, whiCh stood at 22% of total branches m 1969 
reached a peak of 59% m 1985 before ending at 4 7% m 2005 all m all, a doublmg of the 
total from the period when severe restnctions were mtroduced on the operatiOnal actJVJtJes 
of the banks 
The Government's v1ew in 1mposmg the aforementiOned regulations was that banks 
should ahgn themselves w1th the socio-econonuc development goals of the five-year plans 
m order to allow for the development and growth of weaker sectiOns of the economy. It was 
felt that the ex1stmg banks catered more to the needs of large fmns leadmg to ineqmtable 
cred1t allocatiOn Vital areas of the economy such as agricultJJre and infrastructlire 
development proJects were ignored as they were perce1ved to be of lngher nsk and did not 
offer attractive retlirns In 1969, when the first set of pnvate banks were nat10nahsed, the 
amount of credit rece1ved by the rural sector was 1.5% of the cred1t d1sbursed by the SCBs 
In stark contrast, metropolitan areas rece1ved the bulk of SCB cred1t ( 62.7%) 
Table 2.3: Region-wise Deposit and Credit of SCBs 
Year/ Rural Sem1-Urban Urban Metropolitan 
Re on 
Depos1ts Credit Depos1t Cred1t Deposit Cred1t Deposit Cred1t 
1969 3 I I 5 22 0 11.3 25.9 200 49 0 67 21 
1975 8 I 59 22.2 15 I 24 6 24 0 45 0 55.0 
1980 11.9 97 23 0 16 2 21.5 22 6 21 2 51 6 
1985 134 138 21 5 17.5 26.3 224 24 7 464 
1990 15 3 15 4 21 2 17.1 24 7 22 6 38 9 44.8 
1995 137 119 20 7 13.5 22 2 18 6 45.3 17.2 
2000 14 7 10 6 19.7 12 2 23 0 17.2 42.6 60 0 
2005 12 2 95 16 9 !I 3 21.5 16 4 494 62 7 
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Thus, the aforementioned restrictiOns were lffiposed and fourteen commercial banks 
with deposits of Rs 500 million or more and SIX pnvate banks with deposits exceedmg Rs 
20 billion were nationalized between 1969 and 1980 respectively. Bhattacharya et a!, 
(1998), summanze the goals of the then nationalisatiOn program as that of facilitatmg the 
spread of banking services to sub-urban areas thereby mobilizing savmgs and channelling 
funds towards mvestinent in the public sector and loans m the pnvate sector ultlffiately 
fostenng the development of weaker but vital sectors of the economy such as the 
agncllitliral sector Tins would also remedy the Situation of vast funds flowmg mostly to 
large, family owned industnal enterpnses. 
The regulations lffiposed achieved therr obJeCtives of mob1lizmg the savmgs of the 
country and increasing the credit received by the rural and agricultliral sectors Therr share 
of credit received stood at 15 4% at the time the economic reforms were mtroduced. Gross 
domestic savings as a percentage of GDP also grew from 10% m 1950-51 to 23.6% m 
1990-91. 
An ancillary outcome of the aforementiOned policies, however, was the gradual 
dominatiOn of the bankmg system by PSBs. As can be seen from Table 2 1, pnor to 
economic liberalisatiOn m 1991, the PSBs accounted for 80% of the aggregate deposits of 
SCBs. In contrast, pnvate and foreign banks accounted for JUSt 4% and 5%, respectively, of 
the same. While the share of the latter has nsen gradually over the post-reform penod, the 
PSBs contmue to dommate the Indian Banking System The reasons for this are not far to 
seek The PSBs' mherent advantages courtesy therr pre-reform deposit base, clientele, 
branch network and legacy of government support act as a force multiplier when combined 
with competitiOn mduced efficiency and operational activity diversificatiOn post-
liberalizatiOn. 
The pre-reform regulations had a further, more far-reaching Impact on the banking 
system m terms of the developmental trajectory it followed Restricting the entry and 
operatiOnal ambit of foreign and private banks and offenng unmitigated support to PSBs 
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effectively transformed the banking system mto an mert delivery mechamsm for regulatory 
obJeCtives The mcentive to be operatiOnally efficient, maintam high productivity levels and 
engage in and embrace product mnovation was sidelmed m favour of threshold target 
attainment The author attributes the failure of the system to excess1ve focus on the ab1hty 
of banks to meet socml and developmental goals while not paYJng sufficient attentiOn to the 
mtrins1c financ1al performance of the bank, i e , 1ts profitability and financial soundness 
Ev1dence ofth1s can be found m the nsmg level of Non Performmg Assets (NPAs) 
of banks NPAs m 1992-93, durmg the rmtial phases of reform 1mplementat10n, stood at 
24% oftotallendmg among PSBs The pnonty lending, wlnle implemented with the aim of 
helpmg weaker sectiOns of the economy, forced banks to make non-profitable, high risk 
loans with the potential of accumulating large amounts ofNPAs Additionally, the absence 
of mtemat10nal accountmg standards and weak risk management led to nsing levels of 
NPAs m the banking system, particularly among PSBs. However, depositor confidence m 
PSBs remamed mtact due to the government support these banks rece1ved (Mohan, 2004) 
Further, the banks, m order to recuperate on the losses made on the aforementiOned loans, 
would charge higher rates of mterest on loans proVIded to non-concessional borrowers 
leadmg to cross-subsJd1zation and eventual dJsintermedJatJOn (Agarwal, Chapter 2, 1996) 
Further Josln and Little (c1ted m Sayun, 2001) reported an average level ofROA ofO.lS% 
in the latter half of the e1ghties for banks m IndJ.a and for a large part of the nmeties m the 
Indian Bankmg System Moreover, the lngh CRR and SLR dJ.verted bank funds mto low 
YJeld mvestments (Agarwal, Chapter 2, 1996) 
An exammation of the wages to operating expense and total mcome ratios (Table 
2 4) at the tune of hberahzat10n reveals an additional source of operatiOnal meffic~ency 
Stnct regulatiOns governing the streamlrmng of the labour force eventually led to an 
overuse of manpower at most banks, particularly PSBs. 
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Table 2.4: Key Ratios of the Indian Banking System, 1992-2005 
Rat1o I T1me Penod 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Investment-
Depos1t ratio 37 19 38 86 4411 42 55 40 55 41 64 41 43 43 21 45 97 46 61 48 01 51 13 50 04 47 26 
Depos1t to total 
hab1htJes rat1o 77 74 78 38 80 33 78 90 76 40 79 95 82 57 82 67 81 10 81 50 79 78 79 91 81 17 77 97 
Interest mcome to 
TA rat10 10 27 9 72 8 70 8 65 9 37 9 88 9 27 919 8 96 8 88 8 27 8 28 7 29 6 61 
Non Interest 
1ncome to TA rat1o 1 37 1 16 1 34 1 35 1 49 1 45 1 52 1 34 1 43 1 32 1 57 1 86 2 01 1 45 
Wages to operatmg 
expenses rat1o 6717 66 63 64 92 66 14 69 69 67 68 67 38 6613 66 97 68 04 64 74 6215 60 18 58 31 9 
Wages to total {J 
mcome ratio 15 01 16 27 17 07 18 27 18 84 17 00 16 43 16 64 16 01 17 61 1444 13 72 14 26 15 22 ~ 
"' ROA 0 37 -1 08 -0 84 0 43 015 0 66 0 81 0 49 0 66 0 50 0 75 1 00 1 12 0 89 ~ 
Cl 
-ROE 1414 -36 18 -16 58 7 01 2 50 10 23 12 07 8 50 11 82 9 60 13 77 17 53 18 95 14 12 " 
"' Cl 
"' ROI 9 09 10 09 919 10 89 11 23 10 68 11 01 10 72 10 64 10 25 9 75 9 00 8 20 7 58 <Q, 
s. 
"' Non Interest 
"' 
expense to TA rat1o 2 60 2 66 2 64 2 76 2 94 2 85 2 63 2 65 2 48 2 64 219 2 24 2 20 210 ::.. § 
Non Interest ~ 
expense to total 
"' §
mcome rat1o 22 34 24 42 26 30 27 63 27 04 25 11 24 38 25 16 23 90 2588 22 31 22 08 23 69 26 10 ~ 
" -~ 
"' 
.,. ~ 
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In essence thus, the system of high CRR and SLR, directed lending pohc1es and 
restrictive interest rates, by severely curtailing the operatiOnal ambit of the banks, led to an 
all-round deterioration of bank performances and generated a bankmg system whose 
defmmg charactenstic became 1ts role of a regulatory cred1t disbursement condu1t 
Contrast this w1th a market onented framework, where banks are motivated to 
pmpomt profitable lending targets and mvestlnent avenues, assess the credit wortluness of 
the same and subsequently, to lower the risk of adverse selection and moral hazard, monitor 
the loan portfolio to ensure compliance with the loan terms The need to accomplish this m 
a competitive environment would prov1de added incentives to banks to diversify therr 
service range in order to generate greater market share and to supplement and stabilise their 
primary income streams. Manag~ng the resultmg nsk exposure of the bank would also form 
a crucial part of the intermediatiOn activities of the banks Banks that are so placed would 
be more disposed to embrace technolog~cal spm offs that hold the potential to a1d them m 
their quest to discharge their mtermediatwn activities in as cost effective and profitable a 
manner as possible. Banks, in other words, cease to be mert mstruments of reglilatory goal 
attainment Rather, they functiOn as dynannc econonuc entitles that are dnven to mnovate 
and discharge their activities in as streamlined a manner as possible 
To thus improve the effic1ency and strength of the fmanc1al system, the Government 
mstltuted an economic reform package in 1991-92 Reforms had been mst1tuted since 1985 
although at a much slower pace For example, the RBI had begun de-regulating interest 
rates smce 1985 These reforms, wlule representing a beginning, were not strong enough to 
strengthen an already ailmg fmanc1al system and hence followmg the current account cnsis 
in 1991-92, a more ngorous approach was adopted 
The reforms were based on the recommendatiOns of the Coffiffilttee on Fmanc1al 
Reform, better known as Naras1mham Coffiffilttee I Among the recommendatiOns of the 
Coffiffilttee was a phased reduction of the SLR to 25% over a five year penod along w1th a 
reductiOn m the CRR The Coffiffilttee also advocated the adoption of the BASLE 
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cmrumttee recommendatiOns for mamtaining capital adequacy norms In additiOn, the 
Committee advocated the removal of concess10nal Iendmg rates and a re-assessment of the 
level of credit to be demarcated for the prionty sector along with a re-defimt10n of the 
sector 1teself. 
Reforms were then undertaken m keepmg with the recommendatiOns of the 
Naras1mharn Committee The SLR was lowered from 38.5% to 25%. At present the SLR 
and the CRR stand at 25% and 5% respectively The lowenng of the reserve ratiOs of the 
banks together with the relaxation of rules regardmg pnonty sector lending allowed banks 
to increase therr amount of lending and undertake more commercially viable loans and 
advances This, coupled with the relaxatiOn of regulations that allowed banks to diversify 
therr operations, would, It was felt, aid in raising the profitability of banks 
In other words, as noted by Ahluwalia, (Chapter 2, Cassen and Joshi, 1995), the 
relaxation of the reserve requrrements freed up funds wluch could be used by banks to 
make more productive loans. It also removed a source of low-cost borrowmg for the 
Government Along with tlus, the admnnstered mterest rate reg~me was dismantled and 
banks were allowed to determine their deposit and lending rates (Das et a!, 2004) 
Branching restrictiOns were also hfted thereby giving freedom to banks to set up or close 
operatiOns m vanous areas exceptmg those branches located m rural areas. 
Prudential norms for income recogmtion and classificatiOn of assets and bad assets 
was mtroduced with the alffi of mcreasmg transparency in operations of banks and 
consequently, allowmg for the true health of the bankmg system to be gauged (Arun and 
Turner, 2002) It was believed that one of the reasons for the seventy of NPAs m the 
banking system was the lack of mternational accounting standards and prudential norms 
(Ahluwaha, Chapter 2, Cassen & Joslu, I 995) Thus, as part of the reforms, the RBI Issued 
new proVISions for classification of assets and mcome recogmtion 
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According to Ahluwalia, (Chapter 2, Cassen & Josh1 I 995), under the new 
accountmg standards, nationalized banks which dolllinated the Indian Banking System at 
the tune the reforms were mtroduced, possessed a much higher value of NP As than earlier 
believed Thus, full prov1sioning for these along with complete withdrawal of government 
support for these mstitutions could have a substantial negative impact on the Banking 
System The Government therefore announced a phased reduction m government support 
for PSBs. The Government would contmue to provide support to the PSBs on condition of 
future unproved performance and efficiency This support, however, was to be phased out 
over a period of three years from the Initiation of the reforms 
Further, PSBs were allowed to raise up to 49% of their equity through the capital 
market in the belief that the market imposed dJsciplme would raise therr profitability and 
efficiency The dilution of Government holdmg in the PSBs has the added advantage of 
lowenng excess pohtical interference m credit allocation decisiOns which handicap the 
Banks' ability to make independent credit judgments or manage their portfolio risks 
(Mistry, Chapter 7, Cassen and Joslu, I 995) 
To ensure that the aforementiOned measures were adhered to, the Narasmiham 
Committee II recommended the enforcement of pumt1ve penalties for maccurate reportmg 
to Regulatory Authonties or to the Public. In additiOn, a Board for Fmancial Supervision 
was set up to deal with on and off Site superviSIOn (Anm and Turner, 2002) 
A minimum capital adequacy ratio of 8% was initially specified This was 
subsequently revised to 9% m 2000 Furthermore, startmg 2008, banks were reqmred to 
unplement BASLE II norms Banks that met the capital adequacy reqmrements were given 
the freedom to open new branches and close non-profitable ones with the exceptiOn of 
those branches wluch operated m rural areas In order to further help PSBs with heavy 
NP As, a Special Recovery Tribunal was set up to aid in the collection of debt arrears A 
NatiOnal Renewal Fund was also set up to finance compensatiOn payments to labour made 
redundant due to public sector restructunng It was felt that these measures would serve to 
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mot1vate PSBs to ra1se their efficiency and improve therr operatiOnal profiles wh1ch would 
allow them to better compete with therr private and foreign counterparts. Also, pnor to the 
introductiOn of econom1c reforms, employee salary and promotiOns were not lmked to their 
job performance which led to declme m productivity and efficiency of the bank. 
It was further felt that the contmuous ownership ofPSBs by the Government would 
not benefit their operative performance and may in fact limit therr ability to recru1t, 
promote and adequately reward skilled labour On the other hand, if PSBs were allowed to 
ra1se funds from the capital market, market discipline would force them to streamline the1r 
operations and improve on their profitability and productivity. The dilution of Government 
holdmg in the PSBs possessed the added advantage of lowenng political interference m 
credit allocation decisions which handicapped the banks' ability to make mdependent and 
rmpart1al credit assessments (Mistry, m Cassen and Joshi,l995) 
Further, banks were encouraged to divers1fy into previously restricted areas of 
operatiOn such as underwnting semces and brokerage and dealing services Domg so 
would allow banks to lower their dependence on mterest mcome and increase their avenues 
of profit. Successfully increasmg the range of fee-based mcome earned by the bank would 
also help nutigate the effects of prionty sector lendmg to a certain extent Such 
diversification into fee-based activities would also contnbute to lowering the risk of the 
banks by stabilising its income stream (Sayuri, 200 I). 
Licensmg requirements for new banks were eased and foreign mvestment up to 74% 
of the pa1d-up capital was penmtted in pnvate sector banks 
Reforms were also nutiated to strengthen the cap1tal market which suffered from a 
lack of transparency m procedures and vulnerability to pnce ngging and ins1der trading 
(Agarwal, Chapter I, 1996) In order to strengthen the cap1tal market, the Government 
established the Secunties and Exchange Board of Ind1a as the regulatory authonty for 
capital markets m Ind1a The Secunties and Exchange Board of lnd1a then mtroduced 
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prudential norms m order to IIDprove d1sclosure standards It also mtroduced regulatiOns 
making it mandatory for comparues to d1sclose all material facts associated with the1r 
projects when making a pubhc 1ssue (Agarwal, Chapter 1, 1996). 
In the mdustnal sector, the system of mdustrial licensing wluch requrred that 
government permisswn be obtained for new mvestments and expansionary investlnents m 
industnes was scrapped save for industnes classified as belongmg to the Small Scale Sector 
and those where there were environmental cons1derat10ns (Ahluwaha, Chapter 2, Cassen 
and Joshi, 1995) A large number of mdustnes prevwusly reserved for the pubhc sector 
were also opened up to private sector part1c1pation Examples of such mdustnes mclude the 
electnc power generation, telecommumcatwns and arr transport mdustnes (Ahluwalia, 
Chapter 2, Cassen and Joslu, 1995) 
Moreover, regulations regarding foreign equ1ty investment in the aforementioned 
sectors was also relaxed Whereas pnor to the mtroductwn of the reforms, fore1gn 
investlnent was lrrmted to 40%, post reforms, fore1gn equ1ty mvestlnent upto 51% was 
allowed (Agarwal, Chapter 1, 1996) 
As noted by Cable (1995), the opemng up of the aforementiOned mdustnes to 
foreign investlnent was undertaken w1th the behef that 1t would lead to the Ind1an pnvate 
sector partiCipants improvmg on therr profitab1hty m the face of new competitiOn It was 
also felt that mcreased fore1gn mvestJnents would ra1se international investor confidence in 
Ind1a and thus mdrrectly ra1se the prospects for an IIDproved crecht ratmg 
The reforms have had the1r effect m that Indian banks today have d1versdied theu 
operative range, capital adequacy of Ind1an banks IS now comparable to that of mternat10nal 
banks and the level of NP As has exlubited a downward trend (Arun and Turner, 2002). 
Tlus IS ev1dent from F1gure 2 4. Net NP As as a percentage of total advances fell from 8 I% 
in 1997 to 3.0% in 2004 m the SCB sector In particular, NPAs ofPSBs has dechned from 
9 2% to 4.5% durmg the same penod 
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Figure 2.4 ·Bank Group-wzse Net NPAs to Total Advances Ratzo 
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The dommance of PSBs m the Indian Bankmg System is also on a declme as 
evidenced by Table 2 1 The nse m their level of profitability would seem to mdicate that 
mcreased competitiOn and decentralization has had a positive effect on their performance 
As stated previOusly, tins can be accounted for by the fact that public banks are able to take 
advantage of therr expansive network of branches and their legacy of receivmg government 
support to enhance their operations 
The post-reform bankmg system is a far throw from its pre-reform avatar and tins 
can be seen m Table 2 4 which highlights key performance ratios of SCBs m the Indian 
Bankmg System. The operatiOnal efficiency, as captured by the wages to operating 
expenses and total mcome ratios show a declmmg trend Wlule the mterest mcome to total 
mcome ratio has declined over the post-reform penod, it is complemented to a degree by 
the nse in the share of non-interest mcome to the cumulative mcome of the banks. The 
ROA which dunng the earlier penod of the nineties was negative (thus reflectmg the legacy 
of generally lax operational activities) made a recovery and rose to higher levels 
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2.4 Conclusion 
The current Ind1an fmanc~al system is rad1cally different from the centralized and 
tightly regulated system it was between the periods 1960 and 1990 Today, 1t 1s a highly 
diversified and complex system With 1ts participants able to compete more effectively m a 
globalised environment 
The stringent regulatwns in the form of designated lending targets, pre-emptwn of 
funds through high reserve rat1os and the stlflmg of competitiOn are all factors that were 
drrectly 1mphcated m slnftmg the focus of the bankmg system towards passively meetmg 
quantitative goals that, m turn, would allow them to meet the regulatory restnctwns These 
same factors bred a banking enVIronment that was npe for moral hazard and adverse 
selectiOn problems and that presented 1ts partiCipants With httle mcentlves to adopt sound 
nsk management policies, mnovate and function at operationally efficient levels 
The institutiOn of economic reforms to remedy the Situation were comprehensive in 
nature- they mcluded fiscal reforms, financial sector reforms, cap1tal market reforms and 
mdustnal sector reforms along and were coupled With pohcy and regulatiOn amendment to 
strengthen the overall mstltutwnal framework governmg each sector 
The reforms have had therr effect in terms of improVing the competitiveness of the 
Indian Fmanc1al System. Deregulation has allowed banks to diversify their operative range 
Capital adequacy of Indian banks IS now comparable to that of internatiOnal banks NPAs 
winch were the scourge of the bakmg system in the pre-reform period are on a declme 
Competition via foreign and new private sector bank entnes IS encouraged The declme m 
the mterest and wage expense to total mcome and operating expenses ratios hmt at greater 
operational effic1ency and productivity. The degree to which this is so is exammed m a 
more robust manner in the coming chapters By way of a preview, vanous studies have 
been undertaken to assess the efficiency of the Indian financial system usmg parametnc and 
non-parametric methodologies such as the Stochastic Frontier Analysis and Data 
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Envelopment Analys1s. These stud1es analyse the effic1ency and productivity of PSBs, 
pnvate banks and foreign banks dunng the post reforms penod The1r findmgs and the 
degree to wluch the same correspond With sunilar studies of bankmg systems in developed 
countnes is discussed m more detail in the next chapter 
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CHAPTER 3: EFFICIENCY- THE ASIAN SIDE OF THE COIN 
3.1 Introduction 
Most of the literature on the efficiency and productiVIty of banks focuses on the 
experience of the US and European economies where research has revealed that X-
inefficiencies account for 20% or more of the costs mcurred by firms (Berger et a! I 993, 
Berger & Humphrey I 997) Extrapolation of results from such srud1es onto developmg 
econonnes may, however, result m potentially nnsleadmg results Differences m the 
mstitlltional and regulatory frameworks m such countnes do not pernnt a direct mference of 
efficiency conditions based on the expenences of albeit similar firms m developed 
econonnes 
For example, prior to reforms, the bankmg industry m Ind1a was heaVIly regulated 
with banks mandated to provide prionty sector loans and operate under heavy restnctwns 
on branchmg capabilities. As such, banks operated m an environment with greater costs and 
hnnted flexibility m terms of input and output choice. These regulatiOns are not uniform 
across countnes Therefore, cost structllres and strategies for cost reductions, in developmg 
countries, need to be tailored to match their regulatory and operatmg envrronments 
However, while the results of such analyses on developed econonnes may not 
directly be brought to bear on the Issues of developmg econonnes, they nonetheless provide 
a valuable startmg pomt for research mto the preva!lmg efficiency and productivity 
conditions of developing econonnes By prov1dmg a lustoncal perspective on the 
development traJectory of S!Illi!ar economies, such stlld1es offer an msight mto the causal 
forces that helped shape the nature of the observatiOns under rrnmed1ate stlldy In doing so, 
they additionally bring to light the differential features of the current stlldy from Its 
precedents thus pavmg the road for greater insight into the underlymg econonncs of 
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the research in focus And finally, they provide a context and background to the research m 
questwn 
Tins chapter therefore provides a survey of efficiency and productivity studies It 
begins by revtewmg the findmgs of studies pertammg to developed economies and then 
shifts focus onto the experiences of Astan economies to provtde as analogous as possible a 
contextual background to the study of efficiency and productivity m the lndtan Banking 
System The chapter then goes on to survey studies specifically relating to the latter and 
summanses the maJor fmdmgs and Issues of the same. 
3.2 Empirical Findings 
An investigation mto the efficiency and productivity of bankmg systems, as mdeed 
for most mdustnes, ts motivated by the destre to answer two fundamental questwns - what 
IS the efficiency status of the banks m the mdustry? And what are the causal factors that 
have brought the mdustry to satd efficiency levels? The studtes reviewed m this sectwn 
share a commonahty m thetr desrre to answer, pnmanly these two questiOns The manner in 
which they do so reveals an array of methodolog:tcal Issues, potential solutions, and a 
smorgasbord of causal factors that together shape and influence the efficiency traJectones 
of banks 
For example, post deregulation intprovements m efficiency are documented m the 
Portug:tiese bankmg mdustry, m particular for newer banks m a study by Canhoto and 
Dermme (2003) usmg Data Envelopment Analysts These results, however, contrast that of 
Mendes and Rebelo (1999) who, over the same penod, fmd evtdence of techiiolog:tcal 
regress m the banking mdustry, this time usmg Stochastic Frontier Analysts. Can the 
differences m the results be attnbuted to methodolog:tcal considerations? Are the 
differences in the results driven by other potential factors that mfluence the realised 
effictencies? 
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The stud1es rev1ewed above, thus lughhght several 1ssues related to efficiency and 
produc!iv1ty analys1s. The first concerns the chmce of methodology, wluch broadly, may be 
categonsed mto parametnc and non parametnc approaches The pnmary advantage of the 
former approach IS 1ts ability to reveal the efficiency of a firm wlule Simultaneously 
accountmg for random errors m the estima!ion procedure This is achieved, however, at the 
cost of Slgmflcant assumptiOns regarding the d1stnbutwn of the ineffic1ency term It further 
requires the spec1flca!ion of the fron!ier's functional form The latter, while not requmng 
these assumptions, does not mcorporate the random error component in the estnnation of a 
firm's efficiency. It thus attnbutes the en!ire dev1a!ion from the fron!ier to mefflciency An 
add1t10nal issue IS that of the mput-output spec1flcatwn adopted The aforementiOned 
studies, that of Canhoto and Dennme (2003) and Mendes and Rebelo ( 1999), adopt the 
mtermedJat!On approach to model their mputs and outputs An altema!ive to this approach 
to input-output spec1flcatwn IS the production approach. Wlule these two approaches are 
standard in banking efficiency stud1es literature, they each capture a limited facet of the 
bankmgfirm 
The difference m the two approaches lies m theu defrmt10n of what a bank does 
V1ewed as a producer of serv1ces, the productiOn approach would be more appropriate On 
the other hand, 1f v1ewed as a financial mtermed~ary, the mtermed1atwn approach IS the 
most appropnate one. The debate thus settles on the trea!inent of depositS- are they to be 
treated as mputs or as outputs? (Berger & Humphrey, 1997, Sealey and Lmdley, 1977) 
Under the productiOn approach, the bank is v1ewed as a producer of serviCes These 
services apply to both deposit and loan accounts Thus, the number of accounts serv1ces I 
the number of transac!ions associated with each of these accounts are taken as outputs and 
labour and capital are considered the mputs Total costs encompass operatmg costs 
Under the mtermed1atwn approach, the bank is v1ewed as a fmanc1al mtermediary 
transferrmg funds between surplus savmg units and deflc1t spendmg uruts (Heffeman, 
2000) Intermediation is thus the core activity of the bank Banks accept depos1ts and then 
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use them to make loans and mvestments (Miima and HJalmarsson, 2002) Under tlus 
method therefore, the outputs are taken to be the value of loans and investments of the bank 
and inputs mclude the deposits. Costs are identified as operating costs and interest 
expenses 
Accordmg to Sealey and Lmdley (1977), the technical aspects of productiOn must 
be d1stinguished from the econmmc aspects of production From a purely technical 
v1ewpoint, the output of a bankmg firm would include all the serv1ces rendered by the bank 
to its clients, both depositors and borrowers. Thus, output would mclude all services 
provided by the bank However, from an econormc standpomt, the output of the fmn should 
be those products which the fmn considers to be more mghly valued by the clients and 
whose value 1s measured m terms of market prices Thus, not all technical outputs may be 
considered outputs m the economic sense, 1.e., outputs from the v1ew of the fmn The 
authors therefore argue that depoSits are m fact inputs for the bank as the bank mcurs a cost 
to obtain these depos1ts but does not rece1ve any revenue from the same. Moreover, the 
costs incurred by the fmn include the cap1tal and labour costs associated w1th providing 
these serv1ces along w1th the mterest payments made on the depositS. Consequently, the 
outputs that the firm produces mclude the services rendered to its debtors In other words, 
the outputs include the loans and mvestments made by the fmn 
Ultimately, however, the estimated efficiency scores are sens1t1ve to the model 
adopted. This 1s h1ghlighted m stud1es such as Sturm and W1lliams (2004), Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) and Tortosa-Ausina (2002) 
A second 1ssue mghlighted m the Canhoto and Derrmne (2003) and Mendes and 
Rebelo (1999) stud1es concerns the factors that affect mefficiency Many countnes, 
includmg Indm, have mstltuted various liberalization packages armed at enhancmg the 
competitive strength, profitab1hty, efficiency and productivity of their bankmg systems 
Have these regulatory changes acmeved therr stated arms? Are there addJtwnal factors that 
mfluence the efficiency trajectones of banks? For example, IS the reahsed efficiency of a 
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bank related to Its organisation structure and I or ownerslup? Is the operational direction of 
the bank related to Its termmal efficiency? Does expanding the geographical base of the 
bank enhance its efficiency? Do the regulatory and operatmg cond1t10ns of the home and 
host country have a beanng on the realised efficiencies? 
Related to the above pomt 1s the geographic scope of the study The aforementiOned 
stud1es (i e , Canhoto and Derrnine, 2003; Mendes and Rebelo, 1999) are restncted to a 
smgle country However, a large number of empirical analyses have sought to Identify 
potential efficiency enhancmg regulatory and environmental factors by conductmg cross-
country studies. Wlnle such stud1es may serve to potentially isolate and Identify pointers to 
a1d in the efficiency enhancement of an industry, the questiOn remams as to the appropnate 
way to handle these country umque variations, be they regulatory frameworks, culhlfal 
norms or operatmg environments. Tlus 1ssue IS discussed m more detail below. 
Overall, a number of studies have exanuned these and other Issues. Berger and 
Humphrey (1993) prov1de an extensive survey of 130 such stud1es The overall emergent 
p1cture, however, IS far from clear m terms of the nature of the hnks, both spatially and 
temporally. The pre-eXIstmg operatmg environment of the banks and the mcreasmgly inter-
related lmks between the banks, their chents and other banks serve to make unique the 
expenences ofbankmg mdustnes across countnes. On a temporal basis, changes in bankmg 
regulations and technological progress serve to change the nahlfe ofbankmg operatwns and 
consequently, the level of efficiency attainable and attamed 
Thus while the exact dynarrucs of the relatlonslup between efficiency and 1ts 
potential causal factors remams an Issue of debate, that there is a relatwnsh1p between these 
factors and realised efficiency and productiVIty IS nonetheless clear cut The remamder of 
this literahlfe review IS orgarused mto sectwns covering each of these themes Wlnle an 
attempt IS made to delmeate the various sectwns and their themes, the intrinsically inter-
related nahlfe of the factors affecting the terminal efficiency of an orgarusation leads to a 
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degree of overlap between the vanous sections A synopsis of the stud1es reviewed m tins 
sectwn is provided at the end of the chapter 
3.2.1 De-regulation and Efficiency and Productivity 
Industry regulation IS often JUStified on grounds of promoting eqUitable sociO-
economic development As seen m Chapter 2, m the case of India, for example, th1s formed 
one of the pnmary motlvatwns for the natwnahsatwn of large swaths of the banking 
industry, centralising the operatiOnal focus of the banks and restncting the level of 
competitiOn in the industry As noted by Clarke et a! (2005), there are at least three factors 
that hinder the ab1hty of the state to aclneve success viz , the existence and extent of 
political mterference, corporate governance 1ssues and problems associated With restricted 
competition The interactiOn of these factors drove the Indian bankmg system towards the 
lngh levels of operatiOnal meffic1ency Witnessed at the tune the refonns were mst1tuted. A 
correctiOn of tins Situation often requires a process of deregulation and broad rangmg 
econoffilc reforms. 
Deregulatory measures typically encompass steps that encourage the mflux of 
competition, reductiOns in the level of state part!C!patwn, unproved institutional and 
corporate governance frameworks, relaxatiOn of mterest rate controls and the mtroduction 
of stronger reportmg standards The measures are mstltuted w1th the ann of enhancmg the 
effic1ency and competitive strength of the industry concerned This is theoretically 
plausible as w1th greater operatwnal autonomy, banks may be able to expand the range of 
their serviCe portfolios Stronger mstitutwnal and corporate governance mecharusms not 
only aid m ra1smg the mternal strength of the firms but on a macro level, attract greater 
fore1gn part!C!patwn In turn, this mflux of competitiOn motivates mcumbent banks to 
strearnlme therr operatwns and improve serv1ce provlSlon standards m order to retam and 
eventually further bmld the1r chent base 
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Ernpmcal research into tins issue has thus focussed on the effic1ency status of 
industnes prior to and followmg the implementation of econmmc reforms and deregulatory 
measures Along these lmes, Alien and L1u (2007) fmd that the regulatory changes appear 
to have successfully a1ded Canadian banks in lowermg the1r costs With a greater share of 
the gams accrumg to the larger banks. The authors, further, document technological 
progress. In the Croatian Banking System, Kraft et a! (2006) document a supenor cost 
efficiency performance among the fore1gn banks compared to therr pnvate sector 
counterparts. The unrnedmte post-pnvatisation decline in cost efficiency among these 
banks may reflect the1r mvestments m revenue generatmg technology could adversely 
liDpact therr cost profiles The supenor performance of the new pnvate banks may 
additionally be attnbuted to the lack of overstaffing legacy from the pre-pnvatisatwn era 
However, that deregulation and economic reforms lead to enhanced effic1ency and 
productiVlty is far from conclusively established For example, a study by Gnffell-Ta~e and 
Lovell (1996) fmds a declme m the effic1ency and productivity of the Sparush Savings 
Bank Industry post deregulation. Dogan and Fausten (2003) also find a declme m the post 
deregulation effic1ency m therr study of Malays1an bank effic1encies On the other hand, 
Worthmgton (2004) and Sturm and W1lhams (2004) document an improvement m the post 
deregulation efficiency levels m therr study of the Australian banking sector Havrylchyk 
(2006) examines the cost efficiency of the Pohsh Banking industry usmg the DEA 
methodology between the penods 1997 and 200 I. Overall, the efficiency of the banking 
system appears to have not improved across the study honzon. The author documents a 
higher level of technical and allocative effic1ency for foreign banks However, on closer 
examination tins superior performance among the fore1gn banks 1s that of Greenfield banks 
suggestmg that these banks potentially through better chent screenmg are able to boost theu 
efficiency profiles. Thm counterparts who acquired domestic banks are not found to 
exhibit this efficiency improvement. 
On the Italian bankmg system, Casu and Grrardone (2004) document a nse m the 
profit efficiency of the banks, however, accompamed by a declme in cost effic1ency. These 
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results are replicated m Grrardone et a! (2004) who examme the determinants of cost 
inefficiency among Italian banks To account for the possibility of greater costs mcurred 
due to more stnngent credit evaluation mechamsms, the authors mcorporate the quality and 
nskmess of the outputs of the banks stud1ed. A likelihood ratio test of cost functiOn models 
that d1d and d1d not incorporate quality and nsk variables rejected the hypothesis that the 
two models were not significantly different The authors conclude that the deregulatory 
process had a positive impact in that 1t 1mproved the overall cost efficiency of the Italian 
bankmg system. 
Why m1ght there be a differential lffipact of deregulatiOn on the efficiency of the 
bankmg mdustry? One poss1ble explanation lies m the pace and spec1fics of the reforms 
(Oetzel and BaneJjee, 2008) Industnes w1th lugh levels of problematic asset portfolios 
thrust mto a process of rap1d deregulation may suffer from effic1ency and productivity loss 
due to an mitial mability to cope and compete w1th the influx of greater competitiOn and 
altered operational environments In addition, economic reforms are often perpetuated 
across mdustnes. The natllfe of the reforms m the non-banlang mdustnes may thus have a 
secondary impact on the effic1ency and productiVIty realised m the wake of banlang sector 
spec1fic reforms. Along these lines, Koutsomanoli-Flhppaki et a! (2008) assess the profit 
efficiency of four Central and East European Countries usmg the European Bank for 
ReconstructiOn and Development Index of banking and non-bankmg sector reforms 
Interestmgly, effic1ency 1s found to be positively related to banlang sector reforms, but 
negatively with non-bankmg sector reforms. The potential for matunng capital markets and 
non-bankmg fmancial sectors that offer greater competitiOn for the bankmg mdustry forms 
a potential reason for tlus fmding. Tlus IS reflected in the negative relation between the non-
banking sector reforms and the profit efficiency of the banking industry 
The state of an mdustry pnor to deregulat10ns strongly influences the orgamsat10nal 
and ownership structures of the incumbent banks (Berger and Humphrey, 1997) For 
example, in the Indian banking system, the pre-reform legacy of nationalisation led to the 
dommance of State owned frrms w1th extensive branch networks and a legacy of lugh non-
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performing loans The banks of the pre-reform penod also operated under extremely 
sheltered competitive conditions. Post-reforms, these banks expenenced a reduction m the 
level of State equity holding, introduced capital market diSCipline via public listmg and now 
compete With greater numbers of pnvate and foreign banks In other words, the 
ramifications of deregulatiOn may be different for banks of different ownership and 
organisational structlires These are Issues that are exan~med m the followmg sectiOn in 
greater detail. 
3.2.2 Ownership, Organisational Structure and Efficiency and Productivity 
The influence of ownership and organisatiOnal structlire on efficiency IS propagated 
via pnnc1pal-agent problems, degree of operational specialisatiOn versus diversificatiOn, 
extent of capital market mduced disc1plme and ownership For example, banks that onent 
their operatiOnal focus towards niche product lmes possess a comparative advantage in their 
chose operational areas Tlus may be translated mto supenor operational efficiency VIs-a-
vis their more diversified counterparts These diversified firms, however, through greater 
opportunity for cross-sales, consolidation of back-office operatiOns and access to a broader 
sectiOn of the market, are able to supplement therr mcome streams thereby, potentially, 
garnenng greater cost and profit efficiency. 
The potential for vanations m observed efficiencies bemg lmked with ownership 
thus motivates a study by Altimbas et a! (200 I) who base their study in the German 
banking market The authors employ both the profit and cost efficiency onentatwns The 
German market was chosen due to the existence of three ownership forms: private, public 
and mutual The link between ownership and mefficiency IS denved from the theory that a 
lack of capital market diSCiplme weakens the owners' control over management thereby 
allowmg the latter to pursue Its own operatiOnal agenda In such a situation, according to 
the theory, the management would also face fewer incentives to mamtam efficiency within 
the orgamsatwn. The three ownership forms chosen for tlus study are Ideal m the sense 
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that mutual and public ownerslup is devoid of control from the capital market and therefore 
accordmg to the theory should possess lower efficiency than therr pnvate counterparts 
Altunbas et a! (200 I) Identify the difficulties of estrrnatmg cost and profit functiOns 
across ownership forms Specifically, the degree to wluch combmmg the ownership forms 
m one sample and estimatmg an mdustry frontier is more appropriate than estimating 
md1vidual frontiers according to ownership forms. The former case is appealmg from a 
regulatory perspective smce the relative efficiency to the mdustry best practice can be 
estimated. Moreover, If all frrms, a pnon, faced the same opportunities to combme mputs 
and outputs, then the choice of technology adoption resulting in higher or lower relative 
costs would indicate the strength of management monitoring 
A second difficulty identified concerns the objectives and incentives of managers 
who run the banks of different ownerslup types In other words, the differing ownership 
status may be due to a different operatiOnal focus and thus a different managerial objective 
which a blanket behaviOural assumption may mis1dentify as inefficiency The authors thus 
adopt an approach whereby, separate frontiers are estrrnated according to ownerslup type 
with the results then compared with those denved from a pooled frontier Results suggest 
that there IS little to differentiate the private banks from the mutual and public sector 
counterparts. Overall, the results also do not suggest agency problems between the 
ownerslup types. 
Related to the ownerslup status of a firm IS its organisational structlrre and a later 
study by V ander Vennet (2002) undertakes an investigatiOn mto tlus Issue by examrmng the 
cost and profit efficiency differences ansmg from the dual orgamsatlon structllfe options of 
conglomerate bankmg and uruversal bankmg m the European Umon OrganisatiOnal forms 
are Identified based on the degree of functiOnal diversificatiOn and uruversality of banking 
operations. The three main functions identified by the author are traditiOnal bankmg, 
msurance and secunties related activities Specialised banks are hence defmed as those 
mamly engaged in the traditional bankmg activities Financial conglomerates are defined as 
58 
Chapter 3 Ejficzency- The Aszan Szde of the Cozn 
fmanc1al services firms conducting at least two of the identified maJor banking actiVIties 
Umversal banking IS defmed as comprismg diversified banking institutions holding equity 
stakes m non-financial companies. The methodology thus incorporates. (I) the cost and 
profit charactenstics of the vanous bank types based on a stochastic cost and profit frontiers 
(2) the relationship between profitability and a senes of market and bank charactenstics for 
specialised versus non-specialised banks and (3) usmg stock market data, the lmk between 
profitability and the ability of the bank to deal with moral hazard IS investigated To 
determme If fmanc1al conglomerates are fmanc1ally superior to universal banks, the profit 
efficiency of both IS investigated usmg the alternative profit efficiency functiOn 
The main fmdmgs are that financial conglomerates are more revenue efficient than 
the more specialised conglomerates. The degree of cost and profit efficiency is lngher m 
universal banks than in the non-umversal banks suggesting that a decentralised banking 
system is one that would aid in enhancmg banking efficiency Theoretically, the formatiOn 
of fmancial conglomerates could be beneficial If there were positive cost and I or profit 
benefits that were passed on to consumers and shareholders These could occur through 
cross sales, greater market reach and consolidatiOn of back-office operatiOns Economies of 
scale and scope could further lead to operatiOnal synergies resulting in cost nnprovement 
The pnnc1pal-agent problem may be further exacerbated If the ownership IS lnghly 
concentrated within the organisation Ianotta et a! (2007) focus on the nnpact of ownership 
models and ownerslnp concentratiOn on profitability, cost efficiency and the nsk profile on 
large banks from 15 European nations over the period 1999-2004 usmg univariate and 
mult1vanate analysis. The impact of ownerslnp structure IS sourced to the degree of 
ownerslnp control held by any one party and additionally, the nature of the party Itself. To 
detennine if the profitability of the sa~nple banks vaned across ownerslnp patterns, the 
authors regress the pre-tax profits of the firm under mvestigation on ownerslnp dwmmes, 
tune, country dumnues, per annum GDP growth rates and control vanables to determme 
the nnpact of bemg listed on the stock market, Size, mcome, liqmd1ty, loan losses, deposits 
and capital. Further regressions usmg the loan losses with the entire sa~nple and the asset 
59 
Chapter 3 Efficzency- The Aszan Szde of the Cozn 
volatility and msolvency risk with a restncted sample of listed banks are used to determine 
the impact of ownerslup structure on the asset quality and nsk profile of the sample banks 
The costs of the banks are estimated as the ratio of operating costs to total earning assets 
The overall fmdmgs indicate that the privately owned banks perform better than theu 
government owned counterparts and the mutual banks However their superior profitability 
is sourced to lugher returns on their eammg assets rather than greater cost efficiency The 
public sector banks are mdeed found to be nskier and less profitable than other banks The 
authors further find that the profitability of banks with more dispersed owners is not 
sigruficantly different from their more concentrated counterparts However, the latter 
appear to be possess a higher loan quality and lower asset and insolvency nsk They are 
also found to possess lugher cost efficiency However, the authors adopt a ratio based 
measure of tlus efficiency It would be mteresting to examine the robusmess of this result 
usmg efficiency measures obtained from frontier analysis methods 
In additiOn to orgarusational structiue rmpactmg the realised efficiency and 
productivity of a bankmg umt, the operatmg envuonment, the degree of competitiOn and 
the legal framework of the operating envuonment also play an rmportant role m 
determmmg the termmal efficiency of banks Along these lmes, Cavallo and Rossi (2002) 
examme the performance of European banks operatmg under different bankmg systems and 
lmk theu performance variatiOns with vanous envuonmental variables The envuonmental 
variables utilised encompass factors such as the furn size, organisational structlue and bank 
performance Over the period 1992-1997, the authors find that banks operating under the 
umversal bankmg system (as found m Germany and the Netherlands) exhibited lugher cost 
efficiencies than theu Anglo-Saxon (UK) and Latm model (France, Italy and Spam) 
counterparts The results are thus smular to those ofVander Vennet (2002) To compare the 
firm's efficiency across countnes, the authors utilised a common frontier approach to 
obtam inefficiency values for each firm m the sample and then averaged these efficiencies 
according to size classes for each country and bank organisatiOnal type Tlus approach 
however lacks the ability to account for differences m technology and environments across 
the various countnes exaniined. To overcome tlus, the authors further analyse the banks 
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country-wtse usmg the Battese and Coelli (1995) approach whereby the mean of the 
ineffictency dtstnbutlOn ts hnked drrectly wtth the determmants Fmdmgs from the full 
common frontler sample suggest that the universal bankmg system provides the best 
envrronment for reahsing lower costs. Banks that undertake operations in non-tradit10nal 
actlVllles are also found to exhibtt higher effictenctes than those that restricted theu 
operat10ns to tradttlOnal banking functions The authors hnk the findmgs wtth the potentlal 
for natlonal bamers in existence at the begmning of the sample penod providing a 
hmdrance to aclueving optrrnal performance The findmgs of these studtes are of particular 
relevance for the Indian Bankmg System, containmg as 1t does, three ownerslup forms 
among banks Moreover, the current regulatory chmate ts one wherem bank mergers are 
encouraged m order to estabhsh umversal style banks that operate across a dtverse range of 
tradttlOnal and non-tradttional bankmg actlVllles The results from the studtes revtewed 
herem suggest that such pohctes portend potentially favourable effects for banking 
efficiency. 
3.2.3 Cross-country Efficiency and Productivity Analysis 
As stated previously, cross-country studtes, by vrrtue of greater geograpluc scope, 
possess the potenttal to tsolate those factors that have a dtrect bearing on the reahsed 
effictency of an mdustry and addit10nally, detennme the nalllTe of that influence The 
commonahty of those factors across countrtes, theoretically, pomts to the robustness of 
their causal influence Establislung the methodologteal framework for the same, however, 
ts fraught with problems Poolmg the vanous countnes under study together and 
postulatmg a single common frontler pre-supposes tdentlcal bankmg systems and struclllTes 
and regulatory and operat10nal envtronments across the sample The study by Cavallo and 
Rossi (2002) htghhghts tlus oft encountered problem of cross country studies In fact, 
Lozano-vtvas et a! (2001) report that estrrnated effictency results are sensttive to the 
mclus10n I exclus10n of envrronmental factors across countnes These arguments preclude 
country specific frontier comparisons as the estimated frontler ts uniquely representattve of 
the operat10nal and regulatory characterisllcs of the country m quest10n. 
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The mclusion of macroecononuc and envuonmental control vanables m the 
estimatiOn of the frontier thus offers an avenue to control for this problem Cross country 
research into banking efficiency, consequently, utilises vanables such as the per captta 
GDP, capital and profitability rattos, ownershtp forms and the degree of competttlon in the 
mdustry to account for these factors. A further approach to mcorporating cross-country 
dtfferences IS htghlighted by Bos and Schmiedel (2007) m a study exammmg the effictency 
of European banks Dtfferences m operational regions and variations in the degree of 
technology adoption is accounted for using a meta-frontier approach 
Wtth cross country dtfferences appropnately controlled for, these studtes into 
banking efficiency and productivity offer a range of insights into the evolutwn of the 
effictenctes m countnes that start off from stnular operational base levels. They also 
captllfe the degree to which region specific efficiencies in an industry tend to converge 
Insights mto these tssues hold important policy Imphcatwns for the countnes concerned 
The identification of regulatory and environmental factors that successfully aid in raising 
the efficiency and productivity levels of an mdustry in one country, once suitably tempered 
for adoption m another, could potentially be uttlised to produce stm!lar results 
Thus, results are sinular to those of Koutsomanoh et a! (2008) wherem efficiency 
was found to be posittvely related to bankmg sector reforms, but negatively wtth non-
banking sector reforms are obtamed m a study by Mamatzalas et a! (2007) using an 
expanded sample of I 0 new EU member states An mterestmg aspect to tlus study ts the 
addttwnal analysis of the degree of Beta and Stgma convergence6 on effictency scores 
among the member states The degree of effictency convergence is of relevance gtven that 
these countries seek to JOm the larger EU While some degree of convergence ts seen m the 
6 As outlmed m Barro and Sala-1-Martm (1995), beta convergence refers to the catch up of poor econom1es 
wtth thetr more developed counterparts m terms of per captta m come or product Uncondtttonal beta 
convergence further assumes that factor endowments are Jdenttcal across countnes while uncondtttonal beta 
convergence allows for dtfferences m the same Stgma convergence exammes the dtsperswn of per captta 
mcome or product between the two groups In the context ofbaokmg effic1ency therefore, beta convergence 
would 1mply that countnes w1th lower levels ofbankmg effic1ency would have faster growth rates thao those 
wtth a lower level of effictency In the case of stgma convergence, a country's banking effictency level would 
converge to the average level of the group 1f countnes (We1l, 2008) 
62 
Chapter 3 Efficzency- The Aszan Szde of the Cam 
case of cost effic1ency, very little is reported for the profit efficiency levels It can thus be 
mferred that while the regulatory measures have succeeded in streamlining the cost profiles 
of the banks m the sample countries, their ability to translate and supplement these savrng 
Via mcreased profits possesses greater scope for improvement. The results therefore hint at 
a greater degree of catch up for these banks relative to their EU counterparts. 
These results bear snrulanties to those in studies by Maudos et a! (2002) and 
Yildinm et a! (2007). The latter offers a further potential reason for the low levels of profit 
efficJenctes with respect to the degree of competltlon and the high level of cost efficiency 
The authors hypothesise that the mflux of competitiOn forces the mcumbent banks to 
restructure thetr operatiOnS to reflect greater cost efficiency However, potentially, the 
legacy of opera !ions pnor to the deregulatiOn rmtta!ives may 1mpede therr abthty to rapidly 
translate these cost savings into revenue gams or to adapt to their more autonomous 
operatmg envrronment There may thus be a penod of "learmng" subsequent to which the 
incumbent banks reveal temporally lagged efficiency rmprovements. 
And finally, restncting their analysis to countries in South East Europe, Staikouras 
et a! (2007) find that while overall levels of cost efficiency are low, foreign banks exhibit 
the least inefficiency levels vis-a-vis state owned banks which were found to be the least 
efficient The superior technology, nsk management and technical know-how of the former 
forms a poten!ial explana!Jon for the results evidenced. 
The purswt of these higher efficiency gams forms one of the drivmg forces for the 
geographic expansiOn of banks While, geographic expansiOn 1s touted for its ability to 
enable banks to cut costs, streamline operations and complement ex1sting income streams 
via access to new markets, consolidatiOn of back-office operatiOnS and nsk diversificatiOn, 
1t IS not Without its downs1de This takes the form of the need to adjust to and operate in an 
environment With regulations and operational fea!Jrres that may differ considerably from 
the home country. In addition, the foreign bank would need to operate m competition with 
mcumbent banks m the host country, 1 e, banks that possess a workmg knowledge of and 
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client base m satd country The ultrmate Impact of geographic expansiOn and the 
performance of foreign banks ts thus ambtguous and therefore an area npe wtth research 
The tssues and mstghts of literature centred on thts tssue forms the focus of the next 
sectiOn 
3.2.4 Geographic Expansion and Efficiency and Productivity 
The tssue of geographtcal expanswn and tts effictency rmplicatwns for the 
concerned bankmg urut ts closely lmked wtth the theory on the performance of foretgn 
banks m their chosen host countnes And while cross-country studtes examme banking 
systems across different countries, an addttional mstght mto the realised effictency and 
productiVIty of an orgarusat10n can be gamed by exammmg the effictency dtfferenttals 
across banks of dtfferent ownership and organisational structures withm a gtven regwn In 
fact, cross country studies often document further effictency dtfferences m the performance 
of local and foreign banks (Havrylchyk, 2006; Kraft et al, 2006, Ianotta et al, 2007, 
Statkouras et al, 2007). 
An investigatiOn mto the degree to which foretgn banks make mroads across 
trans1t10n econonnes whtch the author terms "New Europe"7 versus the "Old Europe"8 
compnsmg the contmental developed nations of Europe forms the focus of a study by 
Berger (2007) The htgh foretgn shares in the former versus the low shares m the latter 
represents an interestmg conundnrm that IS analysed m the framework of the econonnc 
comparative advantage and disadvantage of operatmg as a foreign bank m the given nat10n 
and the presence and tmpact of any explicit and implicit barners to entry established by the 
nation's government In thts context, the apparent puzzle is explained through the 
combmatory effects of net comparative disadvantages of foreign banks m the Old European 
countnes and the relatively high Implicit barners Imposed by therr respective governments 
7 
"Old Europe" consists of Germany, France, Italy, Spam, Netherlands, BelgiUm, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Austna, Denmark, Sweden, Portugal, Greece and Fmland 
8 
"New Europe" consists of Poland, Czech Repubhc, Hungary, Slovakta, Slovema, Latv1a, Estoma and 
Ltthuama 
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The relatively h1gh foreign bank penetratiOn m the transition economies IS explamed 
through a combmat10n of relative net comparative advantage and low government entry 
barners Fmdings also pomt to relative lugher efficiency for these banks in the New Europe 
countries 
The degree of bamers to entry can be viewed as one part of a larger picture 
involvmg the degree of differences between the regulatory conditions of the home and host 
country. Tlus differential could strongly Influence the efficiency and productivity of foreign 
banks which must compete with incumbent banks m the host country under the host 
country's regulatory framework The performance of foreign banks thus forms the focal 
pomt m a study by Miller and Parkhe (2002) In essence the authors assess the existence 
and extent of a home field advantage, 1f any, of domestic banks VIS-a-VIs therr foreign 
counterparts. The habihty of foreignness IS traced to the mcreased costs that foreign firms 
must mcur as they learn to operate m a new and unfamiliar envuonment. This period of 
adJustment, m turn, translates mto a home field advantage for the mcumbent domestic 
frrms. From this theory flows two subtle points The frrst, that wtthout a specific frrm 
specific advantage (for example, in terms of services offered) the foreign frrm IS likely to 
suffer from a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis Its domestic counterparts Secondly, the 
degree of differences between the host and home country is likely to ITnpact the 
performance of the foreign frrm m the host country In cases where the cultural and 
operatiOnal charactenstics of the two countnes are s!Tllllar, the foreign frrm has less to lose 
in terms of learning about its new operatmg envuonment The authors thus also examme 
the effect of the envuonment m the two countnes on the efficiency profile of the foreign 
firms In domg so they centre on the financial and regulatory differences between the host 
and the home country In measunng the X-efficiency of their sample, the alternative profit 
efficiency approach IS adopted. The authors find that the competitiveness of the host and 
home countries had an ITnpact on the efficiency of the foreign bank More, specifically, US 
owned banks appeared to perform better m those countnes that possessed bank oriented 
financial systems 
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Rather than seekmg out the factors affectmg foreign bank performance in the host 
country, Lensik et al (2007) question, what, If any, impact does the institutiOnal quality of 
the host country and differences m the same between the host and home country have on 
the efficiency configuratiOn of the foreign banks operatmg in the host country? Examinmg 
over 2000 banks m over I 00 countries via the SFA methodology, the authors fmd that the 
negative rmpact of foreign ownership on efficiency IS less pronounced for countries With 
good corporate governance practices. Also, foreign banks ongmating in countries with lngh 
institutiOnal qualities and operatmg m countries where the degree of divergence was lower 
exhibited greater efficiencies. 
The realised efficiency of foreign banks may be additiOnally affected by the overall 
efficiency of the parent organisation The degree of control exercised by the former over 
the latter plays an rmportant role in Its ability to "export" this supenor efficiency to the 
branch orgamsation The exploratiOn of the ramificatiOns of geograplnc distance on cost 
and profit efficiency thus forms the fulcrum of Berger and De Young, (200 I) Their study 
IS based in the US banking system and covers over 7000 banks and affiliate organ1sat10ns 
The results suggest that the degree of orgamsational control over the profit efficiency of the 
affiliate IS greater than that of cost efficiency The potential for gains from diversificatiOn m 
th1s case thus appear to outweigh the costs Interestmgly, a strongly pos1tive relatiOn 
between the efficienCies of the lead and affiliate bank is also reported from winch 1t can be 
mferred that the efficiency level of the lead bank 1s transmitted to the affiliate The authors 
extrapolate their findings to cross-border cases wherein the results would suggest that the 
vanations m effic1encies may not be related to geograplnc distance. Rather, the need to 
adJust to new operatmg environments and the process of "learmng" to adapt to the same 
may detract from the efficiency gains reaped (Miller and Parkhe, 2002) 
Insofar as the performance of foreign banks m India IS concerned, these have lagged 
behind their pnvate and public sector counterparts The literature reviewed m this sectiOn 
lngh!Ights several potential causal factors for tins 
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3.2.5 Technological Progress and Efficiency and Productivity 
The past decades have Witnessed a transformatiOn in the technological landscape of 
the banking industry Developments m information technology have provided multiple 
benefits by extendmg the semce range of the banks and streamlining costs by 
consohdatmg back office operatiOns Coupled with the mcreasing deregulation of the 
industry across many countnes, many banks have extended operatiOns beyond their 
natiOnal boundaries in search of both heretofore untapped markets and consequently, 
income streams, and closer relatiOns w1th therr chent bases Tlus geograpluc expansion 
possesses the additional advantage of potentially stabihsmg the mcome stream of the bank 
thereby enhancmg Its mcome profile, assuming that the nsks are not correlated However, 
m a bankmg system that IS doiDJnated by cross border banks, systeJruc crises such as that of 
2008 amphfy the nsks of geograplucally dispersed banks. 
More rmportantly, the far reaclung impact of technologtcal change on bankmg 
efficiency 1s evidenced not JUSt by its drrect rmpact on the cost, revenue, profit and 
productivity scope but also via Its mfluence on the struchrre of the mdustry, the scope for 
geographical expansion, the ab1hty to alter risk-retirrn profiles, the competitive landscape of 
the industry and orgarnsation-chent relationships In other words, technologtcal progress 
has a potentially lasting effect on nearly all the factors identified in the pnor sectiOns. 
Research into the Impact of technological changes on the efficiency profile of US 
banks (Berger, 2003) provides evidence of technology driven improvements m costs. 
Significant increases in productlVlty and service quahty are also documented Berger and 
Mester (2003) also examme the Impact of technological change, deregulatiOn and changes 
m the competitive landscape of the US banking system over the penod 1991-1997. 
Interestingly, the authors document the simultaneous declme in cost efficiency and increase 
m profit efficiency of therr sample banks over tlus penod. The result was more pronounced 
for banks that engaged in mergers A triad of potential causes for tlus is put forward m the 
form of management imtmtlves, performance altenng technological progress and the extent 
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to which the latter IS adopted by the banks. Technological progress IS highlighted as 
potentially the leading cause of the authors' fmdmgs As the banks adopted new technology 
that enabled them to expand their service range and deliver the same at greater quality 
levels, the revenue profiles of the banks would expenence a surge but at the expense of an 
mitial spike m costs as the technology IS mtroduced into the fabnc of the banks' operations 
Followmg the Greiffell-Tatje and Lovell (1999) approach and combmmg It with a 
Du Pont style analysis, Asaftei (2008) provides a break down of the sources of US bank 
performance changes. These changes are sourced to price and quantity changes, 
productivity improvements, operational efficiency, scale changes and product and resource 
nnx changes The latter IS m fact found to be a substantial source of changes in the 
technical change and operational efficiency of the examined banks thus mdicatmg that 
realigrunents in the range and direction of the service portfolio of the banks led to 
sigruficant Improvements m their efficiency profiles. 
The studies revtewed thus far provide a glimpse mto the forces that shape the 
reahsed efficiency of bankmg orgarnsat10ns across vanous cntena Beanng m mind the 
issues and insights gleaned through these studies, the next sections review the efficiency 
profiles of banking systems in Asia and more specifically, hidia- the focus of this thesis 
3.3 Banking Efficiency and Productivity: The Asian Experience 
Among Asian studies that assess banking efficiency, Park and Weber (2006) 
examine the productivity and efficiency growth of the Korean bankmg industry over the 
period 1992-2002 adoptmg the directional distance functiOn approach thereby enabling the 
simultaneous expansiOn of desirable output and contractiOn of undesirable outputs such as 
non-performmg loans Productivity growth is assessed via the Luenberger productivity 
mdicator The authors find a declme m the efficiency of the banks m the years pnor to the 
onset of the Asian financial cnsis. The industry as a whole, however, benefited from 
technologtcal progress over the penod exarnmed The authors thus conclude that the 
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banking reforms instituted in the 1990s had an overall, pos1tive impact on efficiency These 
results are not unhke those of Alien and Lm (2007), Casu and Girardone (2004) and 
Worthington (2004) 
Stud1es centred on the Chmese banking industry are very insightful as many of the 
features of the mdustry pnor to reforms resemble that of the Indian banking system For 
example, interest rates were largely detennined by the Central Bank and banks were 
required to make loans to State Owned Enterpnses m Chma much as banks in Indm were 
subject to stnngent mterest rate regulations and were requrred to meet pnonty sector 
lendmg targets Beanng m mmd the previOusly mentiOned caveat on generalising from 
country specific efficiency stud1es, these studies on the Chmese banking system may 
nonetheless prov1de indicators for the general efficiency trends within the Indian banking 
system For example, Fu and Heffernan (2008) document rrnproved post-deregulation 
rrnprovements m banking cost efficiency as do Chen et a! (2005) The latter study further 
reports that overall, Chmese banks exhibited greater techrucal efficiency than allocatlve 
efficiency. Companng the mean efficiency among the types of banks in the sample, the 
authors md1cate that the State Owned Banks were found to be the most techrucally 
efficient The dominance of the State Owned Banks IS interestmg and follows a pattern that 
is reproduced m the Ind1an Bankmg System. Apart from the legacy of State support for 
these banks, the potential for the mfluence of mmonty fore1gn ownerslup forms a potential 
reason for th1s dommance of State owned banks. Berger et a! (2008) find that mmority 
fore1gn ownerslu.p among state owned and private banks IS closely linked w1th 
rrnprovements m efficiency. The degree to winch tins is the rrnpact of foreign ownership 
and practices and government cherry picking these organisatiOns for foreign ownerslu.p 
however is unclear Allocative efficiency rose followmg the mtroduction of reforms 
mi!!ally, but expenenced a downturn due to the rrnpact of the East Asian Cnsis. 
Contrasting the post-deregulation efficiency improvements of Chmese banks, is the 
study ofDogan and Fausten (2003) exanurung post deregulatiOn productivity change m the 
Malaysian banking system over the period 1989-1998 using the Malmquist Index of 
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Productivity (MIP). The banks expenenced a downturn m productivity dunng the penod 
under study The results are relllJillscent of those ofGnffeii-TatJe and Lovell (1996) 
Identrficatwn of the efficrency status of firms forms but a startmg pomt for deeper 
mvestigatrons mto the causal factors that shaped the efficiencies of the firms. As seen m the 
prior section, the grven literature rdentifies several causal factors 
Huang (2000) exammes the profit efficrency of the Taiwanese Bankmg Industry and 
fmds that over half of all potential profits are lost due to inefficiencies. The source of the 
Identified inefficiencies was traced to an mabrlity among the banks to capture optimal 
revenue from their output bundles The author further identifies the dommance of public 
sector banks The performance differences between the ownershrp types may be lmked to 
the corporate governance structure withm the orgarusation. Tlus forms the pomt of 
departure for a study by Wrlhams and Nguyen (2005) Their study covers a time honzon 
wherem banking systems m South East Asia, which forms the study sample, mstituted 
restructunsation programs armed at rarsmg the presence of foreign banks and pnvatrsmg 
exrsting national banks m a brd to enhance the efficiency profiles of their respectrve 
bankmg systems Usmg the SFA methodology, the authors adopted vanous governance 
mdrcators encompassmg ownerslnp dummies, selection dummies to indtcate if the observed 
bank was pnvatised or engaged m domestic or forergn mergers and acquisitions and 
dynarruc dunurues to mdicate the time penod when the governance changes occurred 
Productivity decompositions further helped identify the sources of efficiency and 
productivity changes The authors rdentify the state owned banks as underperforming their 
pnvate sector counterparts. Banks that underwent a process of pnvatisation were also found 
to rmprove theu efficrency, mterestmgly, to levels beyond their pre-pnvatlsatwn levels 
Pnvatrsation was also found to be closely lmked wrth productiVIty unprovements and 
greater profit efficrency. Gams from forergn acqmsrtions were lower than their pnvate 
sector counterparts 
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Among Australian stud1es, Worthmgton (2000) examines the efficiency and 
productlVlty among building SOCieties during the period 1994 to 1997 The determinants of 
efficiency are also assessed The author finds that dunng the penod under consideratiOn, 
Australian buildmg societies experienced a growth m therr average annual total factor 
productivity On further decompositiOn, this change was found to be comprised of an 
average decline m effic1ency accompamed by technological progress In addition, the levels 
of profitability, efficiency and levels of expend1t1rre on marketmg and promotion were 
found to be important detenrunants of productlVlty. 
The effects of geographic expansion are not restncted to the banks involved in 
crossmg borders. Fore1gn bank entry also impacts the effic1ency and productiVIty of the 
mcumbents by expandmg the competitive pool In the case of Australian banks, tlus 
phenomenon IS stud1ed by Stunn and Williams (2004) Effic1ency scores were found to 
vary with the diffenng mput-output specifications. Tlus fmdmg is in !me w1th that of 
prevwus works, such as those of Tortosa-Ausma (2002) and Berger & Humphrey (1997) 
The mam source of the inefficiency was found to be scale inefficiency Fore1gn banks were 
found to be more technically effic1ent than domestic banks. They explam tins result usmg 
the luruted form of the global advantage hypothes1s of Berger et a! (2000), according to 
wluch, mtematwnal banks from select countnes are able to operate m a host natwn w1th 
greater efficiency. The authors further mvestlgate tlus 1ssue m Sturm and W1lliams (2008) 
by examming the efficiency evolution of fore1gn banks in the Australian bankmg system In 
particular they assess the potential for home and host nation and parent entity effects 
V anables used to assess the causal factors for the realised efficienc1es of the banks were 
1dent1fied usmg cluster analysis The results do ind1cate the presence of some natwnality 
effects among the banks Interestmgly, more profitable parent entities were unable to export 
their better management practices to therr affiliates. Tlus may be explamed by the greater 
degree of competition wluch is also found to be lmked to lower foreign banks efficiency 
Moreover, under the earlier study (Stunn and Williams, 2004), foreign banks were 
found to be less efficient than the domestic banks. Tlus md1cates that foreign banks were 
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more efficient m terms of usmg and producmg the optunal quantities of mputs and outputs 
but were less efficient m terms of revenue generation The authors attnbute tins to foreign 
banks being willing to accept lower profits m return for mcreased market share. However, 
th1s argument would be applicable for a limited time period, i e , when the banks first make 
their nntial entry mto a market. Havmg established themselves, fore1gn banks would need 
to generate profits m order to ensure theu long run survival m the market Furthermore, tins 
result would seem to contradict with the Global Advantage Hypothesis accordmg to whtch 
banks from a select set of nat1ons would be able to operate more efficiently. The questiOn 
then also anses regardmg the persistence of efficiency among these banks Productivity 
improvements were also documented following deregulatiOn However, tins progress 
suffered a setback in terms of the As1an Financial Cns1s. 
Another study exammmg the efficiency of the Austrahan bankmg system 1s that of 
Sathye (2001) The main source of the inefficiency was found to be technical in natltre The 
banks studied thus needed to tmprove on thetr mput usage and there was also scope to gam 
from changmg the product nux. In add1tion, the authors find that efficiency was negatively 
related to market power. Comparmg domestic and fore1gn firms, the author finds that the 
former were more effic1ent than the latter. Thts 1s similar to the Sturm and W1lhams (2004) 
results 
An important aspect of the efficiency of a bank IS the degree to wh1ch tins score is 
consistent tltrough tune. The concept of effic1ency mcludes the 1dea that a bank, havmg 
attamed an effic1ent status, is able to mamtam that efficiency consistently tltrough time In 
fact, th1s 1dea of the consistency of efficiency is capt!tred in the consistency conditions 
1denttfied by Bauer et a! (1998) 
In a study of 59 commercial banks in Hong Kong spannmg the period 1992- 1999, 
K wan (2006), tests for this aspect of effic1ency The author terms it the persistency of 
efficiency scores i.e , the ab1hty of a bank Identified as bemg efficient to remam so over the 
penod under mvestigation To test for the persistence of efficiency, the author uses the 
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Spearman's rank correlations of the efficiency estimates of the sample banks Results 
mdiCate that X-effic1ency is highly persistent m the full sample Thus, banks Identified, as 
bemg efficient tended to remam so over the sample period And banks that were identified 
as bemg inefficient failed to Improve on therr efficiency and remamed meffic1ent over the 
time-period analysed Interestmgly, when sub-samples of large and small banks were 
considered, the efficienc1es of the latter were not found to be persistent 
These findmgs indicate that while small banks were more efficient than large ones, 
they were unable to maintain their efficiency over the penod considered Tlus result was 
more promment m the earlier part of the study penod Thus s1ze appears to have had an 
mfluence on the efficiency levels of the bank. In addition to Size, efficiency was also found 
to be positively related to off balance sheet activities. The results also indicate that banks 
pursuing lugh growth strategies as captlrred by the loan growth rates were less likely to be 
cost efficient. It can be argued that banks that are efficient are more likely and capable of 
undertakmg aggressive growth campaigns by virtue of therr efficiency On the other hand, 
adoptmg such a strategy may lead to an increase in costs and therefore a decline in 
effiCiency However, 1f so, th1s should be a temporary phenomenon. Thus mcludmg a larger 
time penod for the analysis of persistency among the banks may shed more hght on this 
ISSUe. 
The above studies, while examming the efficiency of the banks, do not take mto 
account the quahty of the asset portfoho and the nsk associated with the bank As noted by 
M ester (1996), a large proportion of non-performing loans (NPLs) m a bank may indicate 
that the bank mcurred relatively lower costs m the lllltlal credit evaluation and momtonng 
stages Tlus may be mterpreted as a lugh efficiency unless the quality of the asset portfoho 
is controlled for At the same tune, it IS important to differentiate between endogenous and 
exogenous mfluences on the loan portfoho quahty (Berger & Humphrey, 1997) If the 
NPLs are a result of exogenous factors, they should be controlled for However, 1f they are 
the result of poor management decis10ns and practices, they should not be controlled for. 
Furthermore, as noted by Drake and Hall (2003 ), the use of NPLs as a quality control 
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measure requires accurate IDformation regardiDg the actual level of unparred loans, fading 
which, the resultiDg efficiency es!lmates would be inaccurate. Tins 1ssue 1s partiCularly 
relevant ID the Indian context, as pnor to the mtroductwn of economic reforms, the PSBs 
suffered from a large amount ofNPLs 
Therefore, employmg quality and nsk control m therr study of Japanese banks 
Al!lmbas et a! (2000) find that the optimal bank size IS smaller when these factors are taken 
into cons1dera!lon Thus 1gnonng the nsk and quality of the outputs leads to overstatement 
of scale econonnes ID the banks studies InterestiDgly, X-effic1ency measures were not 
found to be sensitive to the IDcluswn or exclusion of these factors and ranged between 5% 
and 9% for the sample of 136 banks observed dunng the penod 1993-1996. However, 
Drake and Hall (2003), poiDt out that the true scale of the bad debt problem was largely 
hidden for most of the 1990s. If these costs were underestunated, 1t would thus b1as any 
efficiency es!lmated These results are corroborated by Drake and Hall (2003), wherein 
estimates of pure techmcal efficiency and scale efficiency are sensi!lve to inclusiOn or 
exclusiOn of the quality control factors m the form of loan loss provisiOns The authors 
further find that overall efficiency and pure teclnucal efficiency mcreased when such 
provlSlons were controlled for and scale efficiency decliDes nnldly. In add1!lon, pure 
teclnucal efficiency scores were more sensitive to tins effect than scale efficiency, a result 
winch differs from those of AI!lmbas et a! (2000) 
3.4 Efficiency: The Indian Banking System 
In 1990-91, a senes of econonnc reforms targeting the Ind1an financial sector was 
IDtroduced With the ann of raJsiDg the efficiency of the bankmg system. Subsequently, 
vanous studies have been undertaken to gauge the extent to which the reforms have 
succeeded in acinevmg tins aim Table 3 3 proVIdes a summary of the findmgs of stud1es 
that exanune the efficiency of the commercial banks in IndJ.a Overall, these studies fmd 
that prior to reforms, the PSBs were rela!lvely the most effic1ent compared to their pnvate 
and fore1gn counterparts 
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For example, covenng an extended tune penod that encompassed the pre-
deregulatwn penod, Bhattacharyya et a! (1997) exammed the total factor productlVlty 
growth of public sector banks from a cost perspective This allowed the total factor 
productivity growth to be decomposed into two components, VIZ., techrucal change and a 
scale effect By adjusting this to take into account the presence of quas1-fixed mputs, the 
authors mclude a tlurd element in the TFP decomposition thereby captunng the unpact of 
adjustments of these mputs on TFP growth The results pomt to an untial, cautious TFP 
growth dunng the pre-reform penod which then accelerated With the mtroductwn of 
econo!IDc reforms. Furthermore, the Imtial gams sourced to changes m scale did not persist 
and evenrually showed a declming trend in the post deregulation period thereby indicatmg 
reduced scope for cost gains from output expansiOn Technological regress was also found 
m the untial periods of the srudy 
Thus the imtial wave of natiOnalisation appears to have had a negative Impact m 
overall TFP change winch was then gradually reversed and showed further signs of 
unprovement over the post deregulation penod m the nmeties Accounting for the relative 
performance of PSBs vis-a-vis the private and the Impact of deregulatiOn on the 
performance across both sectors of banks, Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) fmd that post-
deregulatiOn, pnvate sector banks slightly outperform the PSBs m terms of TFP growth 
The pattern of TFP growth IS found to mmor that of Bhattacharyya et a! (1997) The bulk 
of the growth appears to stem from the scale component wlnle the technologiCal progress is 
!united and even negative in some years. 
In a srudy by Ram Mohan and Ray (2004), convergence m revenue efficiency 
between PSBs and foreign banks was found over the post reform penod. Teclnncal 
efficiency was also found to be highest for foreign and PSBs. However, pnvate sector 
banks were significantly better than PSBs m terms of allocative efficiency. In other words, 
the authors fmd that foreign and PSBs were better at usmg resources, in the sense that they 
produced the maximum outputs using the given mputs. However, they did so usmg a sub-
optimal combmat10n of those mputs These results are echoed m Shanmugam and Das 
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(2004) and in Das et al (2004) The latter study further documents a lugh degree of 
vanat10n between the banks in terms of their profit efficiency In fact, a large proportiOn of 
banks were found to operate at the lower end of the profit efficiency spectrum New pnvate 
sector banks were found to exhibit the greatest improvements in profit efficiency 
In a study similar to that of Bhattacharya et al (1997) but using an extended post-
reform penod, Sensarma (2005) exammes the cost and profit efficiency of banks m the 
Indian Commercial Banking System and finds PSBs to be more cost efficient than their 
private sector counterparts followed by new private sector banks and foreign banks The 
study further failed to find an appreciable improvement m mean cost efficiency over the 
study honzon suggesting that perceived cost benefits ansing out of the deregulatory process 
took tmie to surface and were absent !mrnedmtely post deregulation. The author provides 
potential reasons for !Ius m terms of greater technology mvesllnent by the foreign and 
pnvate sector banks which would potentially be reflected positively in their revenues and 
profits but may lead to an mcrease on the cost front 
Indeed m a latter paper, Sensarma (2006), wherem the author exantmed the 
divergence, If any, of cost efficiency and total factor productivity among public, pnvate and 
foreign banks, the results pomt to an overall Improvement in performance on both cost and 
productiVIty fronts by the banks Echomg the results from the prior study, both public and 
private banks perform well, while foreign banks Jag farthest The poor performance of the 
foreign banks IS explamed by the entrenchment and greater local market knowledge of the 
incumbent banks Furthermore, foreign banks, not bemg hsted on the stock exchange, are 
not subJect to capital market disciplmary forces. Supplementmg tlus is the potential 
prevalence of the mcreasmg quality hypothesis wherem foreign and pnvate banks make 
greater mvesiinents in new technology thereby leadmg to a short-run decline in cost 
efficiency Moreover, the legacy of Government rud, extensive branch networks and client 
bases and long-term client relationships forged via the directed lendmg and target credit 
allocation policies of the pre-reform regime led to the subsequent dommance of PSBs 
These underlying branch networks and client bases provided them with the Ideal launch pad 
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from wh1ch to recast their operatiOnS m the more competitive framework of the post-reform 
banking system 
A further potential cause for the fmdmgs described above lies in the nature of the 
operatmg environment pre and post reforms Bhattacharya et a! (1997) fmd that priority 
sector lendmg had a statistically Significant and negative effect on the efficiency of the 
foreign and pnvate banks However, 1! had a pos1t1ve effect for the PSBs The relatively 
high level of State support for these banks coupled with potential non-recogmt10n of the 
losses mcurred on these loans may explam tlus fmdmg Sarkar et a! (1998), usmg a 
combinatiOn of rat10 analys1s and an analys1s of covanance regressiOn, m fact, fmd that 
pnvate sector banks were better than therr public sector counterparts at accounting for the1r 
portfolio nskmess Banks w1th higher capital adequacy ratios were found to be more 
effic1ent as were banks w1th low levels of NPLs It IS mterestmg to note that the latter effect 
occurs regardless of the input-output spec1ficat10n model chosen 
However, the choice between the mtermed1a!lon and production approaches to 
input-output selection itself contains an explanation for the aforementiOned efficlenC!es. 
Saha and Rav1shankar (2000), by exammmg the relative unportance of vanous mputs and 
outputs over the post reform penod, find that durmg the irutlal penod of the study, the 
operational focus of banks was on expandmg the1r depos1t base. Tlus was m !me With the 
perce1ved goals of the bankmg system durmg the pre-reform penod. However, w1th the 
introduction of the reforms, the focus shifted away from meeting quantitative deposit and 
loan targets to <hvers1fymg income sources and securmg quality asset portfolios Followmg 
the mtroduct10n of econolllic reforms, this would be a plausible assumptiOn, as banks 
became more profit onented. The relaxatiOn of regulations would afford them more 
autonomy to undertake lendmg and mvesl!nents as opposed to the era before when they 
operated under a reg1me of drrected lending The operatiOnal sluft towards non-traditional 
activities in an effort to complement ex1sting income streams IS also documented m 
Bhattacharya et a! (1997) The authors however, emphas1ze the cautious nature of this shift 
md1catmg that the banks were slow to espouse this source of mcome 
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While the efficiency of a bankmg umt may be swayed by the nature of ownerslnp, 
the manner m which the ownerslnp IS structured IS also crucial to determirung the realised 
efficiency of the bank. Usmg an expanded sample covenng banking systems across Europe, 
Cavallo and Ross1 (2002) lmk the performance variations of banks with Size, orgamsatwnal 
structure and envuonmental vanables Over the period 1992-1997, the authors fmd that 
banks operatmg under the umversal banking system (as found in Germany and the 
Netherlands) exhibited higher cost efficienc1es than their Anglo-Saxon (UK) and Latin 
model (France, Italy and Spam) counterparts. Small banks were also found to be more 
efficient than their larger counterparts Banks that undertook operations m non-traditional 
activities were also found to exlubit higher efficiencies than those that confmed their 
operatiOns to traditional banking functiOns. The authors link these findings with the 
potential for natiOnal barners m existence at the beginning of the sample penod actmg as 
!Illpediments to achievmg optimal performance. These fmdings muror those of V ander 
Vennet (2002), who examines the cost and profit efficiency differences ansmg from the 
dual orgamsation structure options of conglomerate bankmg and universal bankmg in the 
European Union The mam fmdmgs are that fmancial conglomerates are more revenue 
efficient than the more specialised conglomerates. The degree of cost and profit efficiency 
IS higher m umversal banks than m the non-universal banks potentially suggestmg that a 
decentralised bankmg system would a1d in enhancmg bankmg efficiency. 
In the context of the Indian Bankmg System the potential for such agency problems 
IS considerably exacerbated, particularly for Public Sector Banks Tlus IS due to the directed 
lendmg nature of the pre-reform bankmg system which stnps the system's banking umts of 
mcentlves to adopt a more active posture m theu intermediatiOn activities. For example, the 
results of financial engmeenng open new avenues to supplement traditional mcome streams 
and diversify service portfolios However, an operating environment wluch emphasises 
regulatiOn dictated credit disbursements is likely to breed banks that perceive little or no 
benefits to adopting such practices Analysis of productivity trends would serve to venfy 
this hypothesis 
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Excess manpower accounts for a significant portion of operatmg and total costs m 
the Indian banking industry and may hold an additional explanatiOn for the levels of 
mefficiency documented in these stud1es In their assessment of the labour use efficiency m 
a large public sector bank, Das, Nag and Ray (2008) find substantial labour use 
ineffic1enc1es that could form a contnbuting factor to overall bank inefficiency In addition, 
the h1gh level of dispersion m effic1enc1es among the regwnal branches pomts to an 
mability of the parent bank to exert due control over the labour use polic1es of branches. 
This assessment was restricted to the maJor metropolitan c1t1es of the country and to the 
branch level labour productivity Interestmgly, the authors developed a natwnal and a 
regional frontier for the branches assessed. An overall assessment of labour use effic1ency 
was obtained via the geometnc mean of the two Regwnal efficiency was designed to 
broadly capture the influences of regwnal soc1o-economic and cultural demograplncs The 
national score was estlffiated w1th reference to branches from all four metropolitan regions 
stud1ed. 
Studies such as those of Das et a! (2004) and Saha and Rav1shankar (2004) further 
document the pOSitiVe mfluence of capital market listmg on the effic!enc1es of the banks 
Das and Misra (2005), exarnme the 1ssue of scale efficiency among PSBs m Ind1a. And find 
that the 4largest PSBs m Indm have further scope to gam from potential economies of scale 
1f their s1ze were to increase Furthermore, the cost of cap1tal declined w1th s1ze md1cat1ng a 
drop in the cost of funds w1th an mcrease m s1ze. Results indicate that siZe has a pos1t1ve 
lffipact on operating profits and negat1ve impact on total costs and cost of capital Ray scale 
econoliDes were also less than unity md1catmg that banks can gam a further reduction m 
costs by further expanding therr output 
3.5 Conclusion 
The stud1es rev1ewed m tins chapter reveal the many factors that together shape and 
mould banking efficiency and productivity Causal factors range from the ownerslnp status 
of the organisation, 1ts organisational structure, the level of competition in the mdustry and 
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the mfluence or lack thereof of the market for corporate control and the capital market 
While these factors each mfluence realised efficiency mdividually, the mterplay between 
them also affects the same There are also temporal and spatial dimensions to these factors. 
The responses of a banking industry located m one region to these factors may not be 
Identical to that located m a different region or indeed at a later time period due to the 
mfluence of the regulatory environment and technological changes 
Turning specifically to studies centered on the Indian banking industry, a common 
findmg is that of the relatively greater efficiency ofPSBs. Nonetheless, there remams scope 
for efficiency Improvements across all three ownership categories In an attempt to realise 
greater efficiency, consolidatiOn among the banks has been encouraged through relaxed 
anti-trust regulatiOns. Have the banks responded positively and engaged m greater mergers? 
If so, what has been the efficiency fallout of these mergers? A review of the literature 
pertaining to mergers and their impact on bankmg efficiency would serve as a useful 
startmg pomt from which to evaluate the efficiency profiles of commercial bank mergers m 
India This thus forms the subject matter for the next chapter. 
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Table 3.1: Banking Efficiency Studies 
Study Country I Countries Methodology Results 
Alien and Lm, 2007 Canada SFA Positive impact of 
technological and 
regulatory changes 
Altunbas et al, 200 I Austna, Belgmm, Founer Evidence of scale 
Denmark, Finland, flexible SF A economies among 
France, Germany, smaller banks 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spam, Sweden, UK 
Berger and De Young, us Multiple Parent entity 
2001 regressiOn control over 
encompassmg affihate efficiency 
standard cost inversely related to 
and profit and geograplnc 
alternative distance. Effect 
profit function found to be nuld. 
Berger and Mester, us SFA Agamst backdrop 
2003 mcorporatmg of technological 
Fourier change, fallmg cost 
Flexible productivity and 
functiOnal Improved profit 
form. productivity 
Bos and Schmeidel, Austna, Belg:tum, Meta frontier Evidence of smgle 
2007 Denmark, France, analysis European bankmg 
Germany, Italy, market Pooled 
Luxembourg, frontiers found to 
Netherlands, Norway, underestimate 
Portugal, Spam, efficiency scores 
Sweden, Switzerland, 
UK. 
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Table 3.1: Banking Efficiency Studies (Continued) 
Study Country Methodology Results 
Canhoto and Dermine, Portugal DEA Overall efficiency 
2003 improvement With 
new banks 
dommatmg older 
banks 
Casu and G1rardone, Italy SFA,DEA Improved profit 
2004 efficiency Less 
clear cut 
improvements in 
cost efficiency 
Cavallo and Rossi, Germany, Netherlands, SFA Universal style 
2002 UK, France, Italy, bankmg offers 
Spam. greater scope for 
efficiency gams 
Grrardone et al, 2004 Italy Founer Dechmng cost 
FleXIble SFA efficienc1es Scale 
efficiency results 
sensitive to 
mcluswn ofnsk 
and output quality 
vanables. 
Gnfeii-Ta(Je and Spain Malmqmst Post-deregulation 
Lovell, 1996 Index of productlVIty 
Producllvity declme. 
Ianotta et a!, 2007 Austria, Belgium, Mulllple Mumal and 
Switzerland, Germany, regressiOn govenunent owned 
Spam, Fmland, France, Framework banks possess 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, lower efficiency 
Luxembourg, The than pnvate sector 
Netherlands, Portugal, banks Ownerslnp 
Sweden, UK concentratiOn not 
found to affect 
rofitabihty 
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Table 3.1: Banking Efficiency Studies (Continued) 
Study Country Methodology Results 
Havrylchyk, 2006 Poland DEA Foreign banks more 
efficient than 
domestic banks. 
Koutsomanoli et a!, Hungary, Poland, the SFA Reforms m bankmg 
2008 Czech Republic, sector are positively 
Slovakia associated w1th 
efficiency. Those of 
non-banking sector 
are negatively 
related w1th 
banking effic1ency. 
Kraft et a!, 2006 Croatla Fourier Foreign banks most 
flexible SF A effic1ent relative to 
pnvate sector 
banks Lack of 
immediate post-
pri vatlsatmn 
improvement m 
effic1ency. 
Lensik et a!, 2007 Cross-country SFA Foreign ownerslup 
encompassing I 05 negatively related 
countnes. to efficiency. 
Greater snmlanty 
in home and host 
country mstltutmnal 
quahty mversely 
related to foreign 
bank meffic1ency 
Lozano-V1vas et a!, Belgium, Denmark, DEA Adverse 
2001 France, Germany, Italy, envrronmental 
Luxembourg, conditmns 
Netherlands, Portugal, positively mfluence 
Spam, UK banking effic1ency 
in the home 
country 
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Table 3.1: Banking Efficiency Studies (Continued) 
Study Country Methodology Results 
Mamatzalas et al, Cyprus, Czech SFA Low cost and profit 
2007 Republic, Estoma, efficiency Foreign 
Hungary, Latvia, more profit efficient 
Lithuania, Malta, than state and 
Poland, Slovak pnvate banks. 
Republic, Slovema. Some eVIdence of 
cost efficiency 
convergence 
Maudos et a!, 2002 Austna, Belgmm, SFA, DFA, Profit efficiency 
Finland, France, FEM,REM found to be lower 
Germany, Italy, than cost efficiency 
Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Spain, UK 
Mendes and Rebelo, Portugal SFA Temporal 
1999 efficiency decline 
Evidence of 
technolog:tcal 
regress. 
Staikouras et a!, 2007 Bosnia-Herzegovina, SFA Low cost efficiency 
Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR levels Foreign 
ofMacedoma, Romama, banks and banks 
Serbia-Montenegro with greater 
foreign ownerships 
show greater 
efficiencies. 
Sathye Australia DEA Low technical 
efficiency 
Technical 
efficiency 
dommates 
allocative 
efficiency. 
Domestic banks 
more efficient than 
forei!,l!! banks 
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Table 3.1: Banking Efficiency Studies (Continued) 
Study 
Sturm and WJiliams, 
2004 
Sturm and W!lliams, 
2008 
YJidmm et a!, 2007 
Vander Vennet, 2002 
Country 
Australia 
Australia 
Czech Republic, 
Estoma, Croatia, 
Hungary, Latv1a, 
L1thuama, FYR of 
Macedonia, Poland, 
Romama, Slovenia, the 
Slovak Republic, the 
Russ1an FederatiOn, 
Albania, Bulgaria, 
Yugoslavia 
Austria, Belgmm, 
Denmark, Fmland, 
France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, 
UK. 
Methodology Results 
DEA, SFA Increase m bank 
effic1ency post 
deregulatiOn 
Foreign banks more 
efficient than 
domestic banks 
SFA, Pnnc1pal Parent profitability 
Component not found to lead to 
Analys1s mcreased efficiency 
in host country. 
Lmuted ev1dence 
for nat10nahty 
spec1fic effects 
SFA,DFA Alternative profit 
efficiency lower 
than cost efficiency 
Cost efficiency 
poSitively 
associated with 
degree of 
competition 
Foreign banks more 
cost efficient but 
less profit effic1ent 
than domestic 
banks 
SFA Financial 
conglomerates 
more revenue 
efficient than non-
d1vemfied banks 
Umversal banks 
more profit efficient 
than non-uruversal 
banks 
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Table 3.2: Studies on banking efficiency set in Asia 
Study Country Methodology Results 
Altunbas et Japan Founer Flexible Scale efficiency estrmates 
a!, 2000 Stochast!C Frontier sensitive to mclusion/ 
Analysis (SFA) exclusiOn of nsk and 
quality control factors 
unh.ke X-effic1ency 
estimates 
Berger et a!, China B1g Four banks least 
2007 efficient, foreign banks 
found to be most efficient. 
Mmonty foreign 
ownership positively 
hnked w1th efficiency 
Chen et a!, Chma DEA Efficiency improvement in 
2005 JrutJa! penod of post-
deregulation penod, 
however, decline m the 
latter penod. Sate banks 
found to be relatively most 
efficient 
Chen et a!, Chma DEA Large state owned banks 
2005 more efficient than 
medium sized counterparts. 
Post deregulatiOn 
improvement in cost 
efficiency 
Doganand Malaysia DEA,MIP Post deregulatiOn 
Fausten, productivity decline 
2003 
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Table 3.2: Studies on banking efficiency set in Asia (Continued) 
Study Country Methodology Results 
Drake and Japan DEA lgnonng asset quahty 
Hall factors overestimates the 
scale efficiency. Pure 
technical efficiency scores 
more sensitive to exclusiOn 
of quahty control factors 
than scale efficiency scores 
Fuand China SFA Decline in x-efficiency 
Heffernan, over rmt!al post-
2007 deregulatiOn penod. 
Huang, 2000 Taiwan Shadow profit More than half of potential 
functiOn profits lost due to 
mefficiency Greater 
degree of technical 
mefficiency than allocative 
mefficiency Large banks 
more efficient than smaller 
counterparts 
Hunter and Korea SFA High growth banks with 
Yang low expense ratiOs found 
to be most efficient. 
Efficiency also positively 
related with number of 
employees and amount of 
core deposits 
Kwan,2002 Hong Kong SFA Cost efficiency found to be 
declining over time X-
Efficiency negatively 
related with size and loan 
loss provisiOns Positively 
related with off-balance 
sheet activities 
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Table 3-2: Studies on banking efficiency set in Asia (Continued) 
Study Country 
Park and Korea 
Weber, 2007 
Wilhamsand Indonesia, Korea, 
Nguyen, Malaysia, 
2005 Phihppmes, Thruland 
Wortlungton, Australia- buildmg 
2000 Societies 
Methodology 
DEA 
SPA 
MIP 
Results 
Post deregulation 
productivity growth m the 
bankmg mdustry 
Pnvatlsation followed by 
IIUprovement m profit 
efficiency. 
ProductlVlty gam resultmg 
from technical innovation. 
Efficiency gams stemmed 
from improved scale 
efficiency Efficiency gam 
related to low expense 
ratios, lugh income-asset 
ratios and lugh marketmg 
expenditures 
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Table 3.3: Studies on banking efficiency in India 
Study 
Bhattacharya et SF A 
a!, 1997 
Das et al, 2004 DEA 
Methodology 
Das et al, 2008 DEA: Output and input onented 
technical efficiency (TE), cost 
efficiency, (CE), revenue 
efficiency (RE), profit 
efficiency (PE), Quasi fixed 
TE, CE, RE and PE 
Galagedera and DEA, MIP 
Edmsunya, 
2004 
Ram Mohan DEA 
and Ray, 2004 
Saha and 
Ravisankar, 
2000 
DEA 
Findings 
Post deregulation improvement m TFP 
growth 
Banks are not very differentiated in 
input or output technical and cost 
efficiency terms Greater differences 
observed in revenue and profit 
efficiency terms Size, ownerslup and 
stock market hstmg impact reahsed 
efficiencieS 
Efficiency iS found to be related to and 
influenced by bank size, ownerslup and 
stock exchange hsting 
Largest banks found to be most 
efficient. Overall, small productivity 
growth mostly stemmmg from 
improved scale efficiency. 
Efficiency ofPSBs and foreign banks 
found to be sunilar PSBs found to be 
more technically efficient thank pnvate 
sector banks but the latter were more 
allocatJ.vely efficient 
Temporal1mprovement m efficiency 
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Table 3.3: Studies on banking efficiency in India (Continued) 
Study 
Sarkar et a!, 
1998 
Methodology 
Profitability measures· ROA, 
Operatmg Profit ratiO ( operatmg 
profit or net operating mcome/ 
Average total assets) 
Efficiency Measures: Net mterest 
margin, operating profit to 
staffexpenses ratio, operatmg cost 
ratio (total operating cost/ average 
total assets), staff expenses rat10 
(total staff expenses/ average total 
assets) 
Analysis of covar~ance model 
Sensarma, SF A 
2005 
Sensarma, SF A 
2006 
Shanmugam SFA 
and Das, 
2004 
Findings 
Foreign banks lead the pack in terms 
of profitability and efficiency 
followed by pnvate and public sector 
banks m both years analysed. 
Temporal improvement in cost 
efficiency and declme in profit 
efficiency PSBs most cost efficient 
Larger banks more cost meffic1ent 
than smaller ones Pnvate sector 
banks found to be most profit 
efficient and foreign banks least 
Post reform Improvement m 
efficiency and productivity. Foreign 
banks expenenced greatest 
mefficiency relative to private and 
state owned banks 
SBI Group and foreign banks found 
to be most efficient Indicatmg 
inability to diversify away from 
traditional banking operatiOns mto 
fee-based sources. 
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CHAPTER 4: MERGERS· A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
4.1 Introduction 
Accordmg to the Bank for International Settlements report on the Consolidation in 
the Financial Sector (2001) 9, a merger is defmed as the combmmg of two firms with at 
least one of the firms losing its identity in the process. It IS thus the amalgamation of two or 
more firms. Mergers represent one of several ways m winch a firm can consolidate. 
Alternatives to mergers include acquisitions, JOmt ventures, and strategic alliances. 
Acquisitions, although often researched synonymously with mergers are d1fferent 
from mergers Acqmsitions are characterized by one firm gammg a controlling share I stake 
in another firm, i e., the target firm (Beena, 2000, BIS, 2001) Accordmg to BIS (2001), 
strateg:tc alliances are alliances or partnerships between the concerned firms that allow them 
to create tangible or mtangible assets and joint ventures are the commg together of two 
firms to control a new entity established to accomplish a specific goal or purpose 
This chapter provides a rev1ew of emp1rical fmdmgs on the efficiency and 
productivity 1mpact of mergers centred m the bankmg mdustry. Section 2 details the 
different types of mergers and the theoretical background belnnd the factors that motivate 
firms to engage m mergers After reviewing stud1es centred on the US and European 
experiences, 1t focuses on studies dealing With mergers in India Tables 4.1 and 4 2 at the 
end of the chapter detail the mam findmgs of the empirical studies rev1ewed m th1s chapter. 
9 Henceforth BIS, 2001 
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4.2 Theoretical Background 
Mergers can be broadly classified mto vertical, honzontal and conglomerate 
mergers 
Vertical mergers refer to "mergers of fmns that produce goods or services that 
represent the output of successive stages of the same vertical cham" (Sudarsanam, 2004) 
Motivations for vertical mergers include greater control over quality and delivery of IDputs 
and lower contract enforcement costs. 
Honzontal mergers mvolve mergers between firms operating m the same IDdustry 
(Beena, 2000) These mergers offer the greatest scope for efficiency gaiDS due to the 
potential for consolidatiOn of back office operatiOns and removal of duplicative systems 
SIDce the merger IDVolves two fmns, winch operate in the same market, horizontal mergers 
also have the potentml to IDCrease a fmn's market power These mergers are thus heavily 
regulated ID order to ensure they do not become velncles for firms to engage anti-
competitive behaviOur 
Mergers between firms in non-related 1Ddustnes fall under the category of 
conglomerate mergers A pnmary factor motivatmg conglomerate mergers IS nsk reduction 
through diversification and extensiOn of product ranges. The merger can thus be a way for 
achievmg growth for the firm This IS particularly relevant ID cases where entry into a new 
industry would reqmre heavy set up (sunk) costs thereby making 1t cheaper for a new 
entrant to merge with an existing fmn. It would allow the firm to gam access to a market 
base and gain goodwill Like their honzontal counterparts, conglomerate mergers may also 
give nse to the 1ssue of anti-competitive behaviour by the merged entity wh1ch gaiDs 
IDCreased market power thereby allowing It to undertake practices such as cross-
subsidization, mutual forbearance and reciprocal buymg (Sudarsanam, 2004). 
Conglomerate mergers may also mcrease the degree of a firm's multi-market contact with 
1ts competitors (Gugler et al, 2003) 
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4.3 Motivations for Mergers 
Mergers may be motivated by a desire to reap gams from econormes of scope and 
scale or X-efficiency They may also be the result of management empire buildmg, the 
pursuit of market share and the creation of barners to entry Mergers may also be 
undertaken m response to mdustry shocks such as changes m technology and deregulation 
(Calomins, 1999) Each of these motivat!Ons IS now discussed in detail below. 
Under the economies of scope and scale argument, a bank may undertake a merger 
as a means of reapmg benefits from a larger size and/or from joint production of products 
and servtces However, most studies on the scale and scope economies among banks fmd 
that such econormes are exhausted at low sizes (Pill off and Santomero, 1999, Amel et a!, 
2004) One can argue, however, that with the changes in technology and regulations 
expenenced in the last decade, this may have changed and the potential for economies of 
scale and scope may have thus expanded m recent times. The BIS (200 I) report cites cost 
savmgs from econormes of scale and scope was one of the pnmary motivatmg factors for 
mergers 
X-efficiency refers to the ability of management to keep costs down and increase 
revenues and profits. Revenues may mcrease from market-expandmg mergers such as 
cross-border mergers. Costs reductions may occur through consolidatiOn of back office 
operations Gams m profits may anse from mcreased monopoly power following the 
merger. However, anti-trust regulations are designed to prevent such mergers from 
occumng The identification of mergers that explicitly lead to market power increases may 
be further complicated due to the need to consider not Just the market under Immediate 
scrutiny but the degree to wluch the merger mcreases multi-market contact between 
organisatiOns (Kim and Singal, 1999) This IS due to the potential for the rise of mutual 
forbearance circumstances between the market partiCipants thereby allowmg the fum to 
enJOY monopoly power in certam markets. An important Issue IS thus to separate out the 
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gams, If any, that anse from mcreased efficiency and those that anse from increased market 
share The potential for market power mcreasmg merger IS highest m the case of honzontal 
mergers Due to the negative impact such mergers have on consumers, these mergers are 
subJect to heavy anti-trust legislatiOn 
In their study, Kim and Singal, (1999) focus on the arrlme mdustry and use the 
direction of change in domestic economy class arrfare pnces to determme which of the two 
effects dominate Their sample included 14 mergers and they examined the Impact of the 
merger on the airfares of over 20,000 affected routes. The effects on these routes was 
contrasted agamst a control group of routes where neither of the merger participants 
operated. Thus, a companson of the change m the post-merger airfare was undertaken 
agamst the average fare of the control group on the same route. A dechne in pnces offered 
by the post merger entity and those of Its nvals IS taken to indicate the presence of 
efficiency gains. Conversely, an mcrease in the prices offered by the merged entity and Its 
rivals points to market power dommatmg over efficiency effects However, the reaction of 
the nvals with regard to a declme m prices may be temporary If the rivals are unable to 
boost therr own efficiency, It unlikely that they will be able to sustain lower pnces Thus 
there should be a reversal m the pnces offered by them following the merger. This can be 
used as a further check on the existence of efficiency gains for the merged entity To 
separate out the market power and efficiency effects, the authors consider two tm1e periods, 
the armouncement and completiOn penod. This IS based on the hypothesis that efficiency 
related merger gams do not surface until the merger has actually gone through, however, 
the market power related gains would surface unmedJately on fmalization of the merger 
deal 
Mergers may also result m lower nsk as a result of diversificatiOn (Beena, 2000 and 
2004) By expandmg Its geographical reach, for example, a frrm can diversify Its market 
base and stab1hze Its earnmgs stream 
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Trautwem (1990), in his survey of merger theones lughhghts the ValuatiOn theory 
as a potential dnvmg force for mergers Accordmg to this theory, mergers are undertaken 
by managers who posses better mformation about the target's value than the stock market 
However, this theory ignores the efficient market hypothesis and regulatiOns restrictmg 
market participants form actmg on insider mformat10n. 
The pursuit of mergers by some management teams may also be a symptom of 
agency problems w1thm the firm, whereby there is a divergence between the interests of 
shareholders and those of management. In such Situations, the merger may be fuelled more 
by managements' desire to fulfil personal ambitions such as lowering therr employment 
nsk and their desire to entrench themselves into the organisation Management thus tnes to 
expand the firm and by moving it into areas of operation more m line with therr talent and 
skill. The management then becomes crucial to ensuring the long run profitability and 
survival of the firm by beconung more difficult to replace (V ander V ennet, 1996) 
Another motive for undertaking the merger may be that of prestige and emprre 
building by management The management team of a company may be more mterested in 
gammg the prestige and Image that accompames the runnmg of a large enterpnse than m 
ensunng that the merger provides tangible benefits to the shareholders In the case of banks, 
managers may pursue tactics that are more hkely to get them into the "Too Big To Fail" 
club Therefore, such mergers would not be expected to bnng about any gains through 
efficiency (Gugler et a!, 2003) 
Managenal hubns IS another reason put forward to explam the motivat10ns behind a 
merger Under tlus theory, management has an unrealistic view of therr skill and talent 
wluch makes them believe that a given merger possesses substantial benefits However, as 
noted by Pilloff and Santomero (1999), the drawback oftlus argument hes m the question 
of why shareholders would permit such mergers more than once Moreover, as the authors 
assert, It also Ignores the ability of management to learn from past experiences An 
explanation may he what Malmend1er and Tate (2008) term "overconfident CEOs" who are 
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propelled by a genume desire to raise shareholder value. Nonetheless the results suggest 
that overconfident CEOs are more hkely to undertake acqmsitions of lower quality when 
their firm has greater mternal resources to fund the acqulSltJOn. 
It IS important to note that the agency theory explanation and managenal hubns 
arguments for why mergers occur possess an implicit assumption that there are no gams 
from the merger (Pill off and Santomero, 1999, Calomms, 1999) 
Mergers may also be undertaken m response to mdustry shocks brought about for 
example, by a change m technology wluch affects the way business is conducted or 
changes in the regulatory frameworks of the concerned mdustry. In such Situations, firms m 
the affected industry would need to restructure and re-orgamze themselves m order to 
ensure long run vmbihty Mergers may thus provide one such means of re-organisation 
(Andrade et a!, 2001 ). Tlus Idea IS developed from two consistent features of merger 
activity, the occurrence of mergers m waves and the clustenng of mergers by mdustry 
Withm each wave (Andrade et a!, 2001) These two facts suggest that mergers are 
undertaken by the participants of an mdustry m response to industry wide shocks 
Bikchandam et a! (cited m Andrade et a!, 2001) explam the effect of merger waves 
and industry clustenng via the information cascade theory according to the which, a merger 
by two fmns sends information signals to the remaining industry participants about the 
profitability and potential gams to be reaped from engagmg in similar mergers themselves 
m the existmg circumstances However, this theory offers no explanation for the factors 
that lead to the imtiation of the first merger Itself. 
Recent work by Toxvaerd (2008) sheds some hght on this issue The author 
proposes a theoretical model of mergers predicated on the relative scarcity of desirable 
targets, the irreversible nature of mergers, therr executiOn m conditions of uncertamty and 
finally, Imperfect competitiOn for the targets In these crrcumstances, the proposed model 
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successfully pred1cts the nse of merger waves because of the potential loss m value from 
foregone merger opportunities due to pre-empt10n of attractive targets by rivals 
In an extens1ve survey of the literature on the market for corporate control, 
Martynova and Renneboorg (2008) classify the dnvers of merger waves mto the followmg 
categones (I) technology, industry, econormc or political shocks, (2) Agency problems 
and corporate governance, (3) managenal hubns and herdmg and (4) market tuning. While 
the first three have been discussed m vanous aspects, the last category, market timing IS 
explained further Market tlrmng models pos1t that mergers are the result of management 
taking advantage of temporary equ1ty over-valuat10ns during penods of fmancial booms 
Differences in the over-valuatlons between firms, enable the firm with the greater over-
valuation to acqurre real assets relatively cheaply, 1 e, usmg over-valued eqmty. 
Schenk, (2000), puts forward a game theoretic mmimax regret model to explarn 
merger activity. Under tins activity, Bank A undertakes a merger for any motive, be 11, 
hubris, synergy etc Its competitor, Bank B, observes the merger and tailors 1ts response 
under two scenanos Under scenano I, Bank B may believe that Bank A's merger will help 
enhance 1ts profitability and therefore, 1f Bank B does not follow smt with a merger Itself, 11 
may regret not doing so Under scenario 2, Bank A's merger is not profitable to it. In tins 
sJtuatJOn, 1f Bank B undertakes a sllllilar unprofitable merger, it may regret its Situation 
The question then becomes, under winch SituatiOn does B expenence more regret? The 
answer would be under the former scenano Tins is because, m such a Situation, Bank B 
would experience an erosiOn m 1ts profitability and competitiveness m the market 
However, if Bank B follows A into an unprofitable merger, 1ts competitive positiOn vis-a-
VIS Bank A remams mtact. Thus, the mmnnax regret model can explain the existence of 
waves in mergers and clustenng in mdustries However, the model, like the mformat10n 
cascade theory, does not explam the motJvatlons belnnd the illlhal merger Itself 
Under the market for corporate control argument, mergers may be a form of market 
d!SC!plrne whereby less efficient frrms are taken over I merged w1th more effic1ent firms 
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thereby allowmg for more efficient allocatiOn and consumption of scarce resources In 
addition, the timing of the merger may also influence Its ab1hty generate efficiency gams 
In trmes of stnct regulatiOns, It may not be possible for the firm to reap all the potential 
gams from the merger (BIS, 2001) Furthermore, the structure of the Board of a firm may 
have an mfluence on the likelihood of a takeover and the likely returns fall out from the 
same For example, as noted in Bates et a! (2008), the presence of a classified board 
wherein the annual election of directors is staggered is likely to have a deterrmg effect on 
likely takeovers. 
Closely related to tlus IS a study by Hagendorff et al (2008) that documents the links 
between the degree of mvestor protection frameworks and the level of abnormal returns 
generated by bidders m mergers and acquisitiOns deals The authors find an inverse 
relatiOnslup between the degree of mvestor protectiOn and the level of abnormal returns 
garnered by bidders The degree of investor protection IS closely allied with the corporate 
governance status of fmns A high level of investor protection reduces the seventy of the 
agency problem by generatmg an active market for corporate control 
Explaining the choice between cross-border and local consolidation, Novo Peterro 
(2008) utilises the geograplucal scope of depositors to show that regional mergers are the 
result from conditions wherem (I) the cost of accessmg a given service IS small or (2) m 
any case where the demand for bankmg services m other regions m small enough. 
VIOlations of these conditions result m cross-region mergers 
In the case of India, it is important to know wluch of these motivations explains the 
current spate of mergers in the country From a pohcy perspective, the stated arm of 
encouragmg mergers m the bankmg sector has been to improve the efficiency of Indian 
banks. It remams to be seen if these regulatiOns have indeed led to the creatiOn of merged 
entities that have the potential to Improve the efficiency of the system 
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4.4 Empirical Studies of Merger Motivations and Post Merger Performance 
There have been numerous stud1es examming the motivations belund and benefits 
of mergers. Some of the 1ssues associated with mergers, apart from their ability to generate 
efficiency gams for therr participants, are the1r 11Dpact on the market power of the firm and 
if these gams, 1f any, are passed on to the consumers m the form of lower pnces One of the 
1mportant 1ssues in merger stud1es 1s the mcluswn of an adequate control sample to provide 
a companson for the non-merger benefits, 1f any that may have accrued to the merger 
partiCipants This may be difficult to mamtam if the mergers are part of a wave This also 
poses measurement problems w1th certam methodologies such as DEA where the loss of an 
efficient firm changes the compositiOn of the sample and consequently, the benchmark 
efficiency frontier 
An example of a method to deal with tins problem 1s that adopted by Garden and 
Ralston (1999), who look at the effic1ency effects of 16 Australian credi! uruon mergers 
dunng the period June 1992 to June 1997. A control sample of non-mergmg other credit 
unions is used and three years pre and post merger are considered Ex post change m X-
efficiency of the merged credit uruon IS measured as the difference between the X-
efficJency of the merged ent1ty and the we1ghted sum of the X-effic1ency of the parent 
firms The we1ghts are based on total assets The 11Dpact of allocatlve efficiency 1s 
determmed m a sunilar manner Overall, the results indicate that there are no post merger 
gains m X-efficiency or relative to the control group of non-mergmg firms. Allocative 
effic1ency was negatively related with the merger vanable and insignificant for all three 
years of the regressiOn 
MethodologiCally, tins study falls under what Rhoades (1999) class1fies as an 
operating effic1ency study. Operatwnal effic1ency stud1es focus on the potential for 
synerg:tstlc gains from lower costs, mcreased revenues, and better management The 
findmgs of studies are sensitive to the methodology employed The other broad category for 
merger classJficatwn based on methodology adopted IS that of event studies which assess 
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the stock price reactiOn to the announcement of a merger. In other words, they assess the 
market reaction to the announcement of a merger by exammmg the abnormal returns of the 
target and the acquirer at the time of the merger announcement (Pilloff and Santomero, 
1997, Rhoades, 1999) 
Rhoades (1990) exammes 39 studies pubhshed between 1980 and 1993 on the 
effects of bank mergers on efficiency, profitability and shareholder wealth His sample is 
spht between those usmg the event study methodology (19 cases) and those usmg 
operational efficiency methodology (20 cases) Reviewmg the studtes usmg event study 
methodology, Rhoades concludes that therr fmdings are not consistent The results of event 
study methodology studies are sensitive to the trme penod used Most operatiOnal studies 
consistently fail to fmd evidence of efficiency gains post merger The author advances 
potentral reasons as being due to the loss of customers causmg fallmg revenues and the 
possibility of firms operatmg close to their optrmal scale level thereby lowenng the impact 
of any post merger cost savmgs The studies find that acqumng firms tend to be more 
effictent than therr target. Thts would support the clarm that mergers help purge the 
mdustry of m efficient frrms. 
Amel et a! (2004), provide a review of studies lookmg at efficiency gams resulting 
from mergers across the mam fmancral mdustry sectors. Accordtng to the author, studies 
centred m the US fmd httle eVIdence of post merger cost efficiency rmprovements Wlule 
European banks show smular patterns, there are a few cases where domestic mergers 
between equals have led to Improved costs post mergers. Similar results are obtamed on 
studies on mergers and therr effects on cost efficiency among Australian banks. The authors 
also state that studies focusmg on the economies of scale and scope resulting from a merger 
find mostly that these tend to disappear once a certam size IS reached These results may be 
different for studies usmg more recent data due to changes m regulatory frameworks and 
technologrcal advances 
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Consistent w1th the conclusions of Amel et a! (2004), Peristiani (1997), fmds that 
mergers across three categones of consolidation, viz., intrastate, Bank Holdmg Company 
(BHC) and Federal Deposit Insurance CorporatiOn (FDIC) assisted mergers failed to 
dehver any X-effic1ency benefits. On the contrary, they led to a declme m the post merger 
efficiency of the bank However, there were gams in scale efficiency. Profitability and post 
merger operating costs were found to have an mfluence on the efficiency of the firm 
The potential reason for the failure of most studies to find evidence of efficiency 
gams and benefits followmg a merger is the focus of a study by Sherman and Rupert, 
(2004) Usmg mtemal operatmg data on one multi-bank merger in order to assess the 
existence of efficiency gams, the authors assess the time taken to realize these gains and 
reasons for delay m the attainment of the same To detennme the reasons for the delay, the 
authors speak to market participants and further examine the impact of mergers on the 
branch network and any efficiency gams m the same 
More specifically, Sherman and Rupert (2004), study a smg!e bank that had 
previously engaged m four mergers usmg DEA to examine the efficiency of the branches 
among the four component banks and compare those with the efficiency of the combmed 
branch network The fmdings indicate that the combmed bank would stand to gam cost 
savings of 22% by combming the branches of the component banks and adoptmg the best 
practices of the most efficient branch. On the other hand, by allowmg the component 
branches to functiOn mdependently, the potential cost savmgs drop to 6 9%. 
Potential reasons for the delay m mtegratlng these branches and taking advantage of 
these potential cost savmgs as 1dent1fied by the mdustry and merger participants included 
tlllle involved m mtegratmg the technology of the firms and compatibility of information 
systems, corporate culture differences and laymg off employees at the frontline with the 
most customer relatwnslups and contacts thereby potentially Jeopard1smg ex1stmg customer 
accounts retention capability LaYJng off the wrong employees may also have led to loss of 
personnel with key legacy information w1th regard to the firm. 
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Calomms (1999), puts forward an additional theory as to why most studies on 
mergers fail to find post merger gains Calomms suggests that tradttiOnal event study and 
operatiOnal effictency methodologtes suffer from certain dtsadvantages that make tt 
dtfficult for them to capture any gams from mergers For example, in the case of event 
study methodology, the negattve market reactiOn found m most studtes may be a result of 
the market's disappomtrnent that a better merger tt was expectmg mvolving one or both of 
the firms wtll now not be realized In the case of the operational performance methodology, 
the maJor problem remams that of finding an adequate control group to measure the post 
merger performance agamst De Bondt and Thompson (1992), add that operational 
efficiency studtes suffer from the additional dtsadvantage of fatling to explain the periodtc 
occurrence of merger waves 
In addition, tt is lffiportant to note the impact of mergers on consumers An 
example ctted in Calomms (1999) ts as follows if a merger enhances competitiOn that 
erodes a bank's mterest margm, the benefits are accrued to the consumers even though the 
bank expenences a fall m tts profitability The merger m thts case should be judged a 
success It is important to recogruse that deregulation may encourage more mergers and 
create an envrronment wherem mergers may be more conductve to effictency gains In 
concluston, m exammmg a merger wtth a view to classifymg tt as a success or a failure, tt IS 
thus lffiportant to take mto account the mottves behmd the merger and tts effects on 
consumers. 
On this note, Gugler et a! (2003), examine the motivatiOn for mergers by lookmg at 
changes m the pattern of sales post merger In mergers that mcrease market power, the 
authors seek to fmd a nse m profits but a fall m frrm sales levels An increase in both sales 
and profits would mdtcate that the merger was successful m capturmg efficiency related 
benefits On the other hand, a fall m both sales and profits would mdicate that effictency 
has been lowered due to management undertakmg the merger for personal reasons The 
authors fmd that a large proportiOn of their sample mergers possess charactensttcs of 
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dechmng sales and profitability millcatmg that they were undertaken for management's 
personal reasons and not shareholders' benefits 
In addition, mergers portend changes not just for the mergmg parties m terms of 
therr efficiency and productiVIty profiles but also for the remamder of the mdustry 
participants v1a altered competitiOn dynarmcs Evanoff and Ors (2002) thus exarmne the 
1mpact that mergers have on the efficiency of incumbent banks They test the hypothesis 
that entry m to a market v1a mergers will lead to an mcrease m the efficiency of the existmg 
banks as they attempt to compete w1th the new arrival. Tius has partiCular relevance in the 
Ind1an context where regulations regardmg mergers have been relaxed in an attempt to 
encourage effic1ency enhancing mergers. Thus, 1f the merger of two banks leads to an 
increase in the efficiency of not JUSt the post merger entity but the mcumbents too, 1t would 
serve to meet the a1ms of the regulations The authors fmd an rrnprovement in efficiency for 
the frrst three years followmg the mergers. 
These fmillngs are echoed in Focarelh and Panetta (2001) also find evidence to the 
effect that adverse pnce changes followmg a merger are temporary and m the long run 
gains from efficiency dommate the market power effect The authors study the rrnpact of 
mergers and acqmsJtlons on prices in the Italian depos1t market over the penod 1990-1998 
Thus pncmg effects are studied over a nme-year penod The authors examine the rrnpact of 
the merger across different categones of depos1ts. The authors note that the use of a longer 
post merger trrne honzon may be more beneficial to the as efficiency gams may take trrne 
to surface Potential causes for tins include trrne needed for restructunsatwn and 
harmomzatwn ofworkmg culture 
As part of the1r study, the authors hrmt their analys1s to m-market mergers as these 
have the most potential to expenence post merger efficiency and market power 
improvements The study des1gn mvolves the use of two sub-penods, transition, and 
completiOn The hypothesis is that, initial market power effects would be felt in the 
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transition penod Subsequent efficiency rmprovements, 1f any, would lead to a rise m the 
deposit rates which would be found in the completiOn period. 
For the whole sample, 1t IS found that depos1t rates m the transition penod of the 
merger went down by 13.5% basis pomts wrule m the completiOn penod, 1t went up by 12 6 
basis pomts. Both results are strongly sigmficant thereby supportmg the authors' hypothesiS 
that market power effects are temporary and likely to be more promment dunng the 
transition periods Moreover, the results are not dependent on the defm1tton of transition 
and completiOn penod. In the case of out-of-market mergers, the authors do not find any 
ev1dence of market power as expected 
Takmg into account the natllre of the mergers, Koetter (2005) exammes mergers 
between German co-operative and savings banks over the penod 1994-2002. To measure 
the success of the merger, the author calculates the cost efficiency of the pre and post 
merger ent1ties and compares these w1th per annum changes vis-a-v1s the control sample of 
non-mergmg banks. In add1t10n, compansons are also made from a base year The author 
further rughhghts the fact that merger success can hinge on the specifics of the merger deal 
1tself. To mvesttgate the vahd1ty of tills the authors investigate mergers under d1fferent 
cucumstances, 1 e , the transfer of sk!lls between the merging banks, the presence of 
learning effects, the potential for reg10nal mfluences and the use of mergers as a distress 
resolutiOn tool. 
A pnon there IS no way to tell 1f a large efficiency difference between the two 
mergmg entitles has the potential to lead to efficiency gams in the merged entity. The large 
d1fference can be mterpreted as a s1gn of potentially large gams. On the other hand, 1t may 
also indicate that the bank with the lower efficiency has senous problems, wh!ch need 
rect1ficat10n and therefore may lead to a post merger declme m effic1ency 
In the mstance of mergers mvolvmg d1stressed banks, the authors evaluate if these 
mergers were successful m terms of leading on to financial stab1hty h! addltlon, banks that 
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have engaged m more than one merger may have benefited from a Jearrung expenence and 
therefore may perform better m subsequent mergers. On the other hand, th1s can work m 
the oppos1te directiOn in the sense that multiple mergers may lead to a large, complex 
organisation that is burdened w1th inefficiency The author thus charactenses the banks 
accordmg to therr experience m mergers and the number of targets mvolved in the merger. 
Contrastmg the above findmgs, Resti (1998) using DEA, fmds that post merger 
efficiency rrnproved m her sample of 67 Italian bank mergers Tlus result was more 
pronounced m mstances where the two parent frrms operated m the same local market and 
when the SIZe of the merged entity was not very b1g. Effic~ency levels were measured 
agamst a control sample of 956 other banks 
Krishnasamy et a! (2003) also document ev1dence of post-merger productivity 
improvements m therr sample of I 0 mergers among Malays1an commercJal banks Therr 
study covered the years 2000 and 2001. Overall, there was an mcrease m total factor 
productivity. The decomposition of tlus productlVlty millcated that it was the result of 
technological progress of 9.7%. Scale efficiency expenenced a detenorat10n of 4 2% and 
technical effic1ency remained unchanged 
The mam drawback of tills study IS that it only considers a smgle time period in 1ts 
assessment of productiVIty changes Thus, one cannot get a sense of the trend of 
productivity change among the merged banks Also, 1t would be mterestmg to discern 
charactenst1cs of the mergers that expenenced an rrnprovement m theu TFP For example, 
had the banks engaged m mergers before?, the ownersJup status of the banks, 1.e., fore1gn 
vs domestic and the efficiency levels of the merger participants 
Addressmg the first 1ssue, Cuesta and Orea (2002) adapt the trrne-varymg efficiency 
stochastic frontier approach of Battese and Coelb (1992) to explicitly allow the temporal 
evolutiOn of efficiency between the banks that do and do not engage in mergers to d1ffer. 
Applymg therr approach to the Spanish savings bank mdustry, the authors report that the 
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nnmed1ate impact of a merger was to cause a decline m effic1ency m the merged entity 
However, allowmg for a lag penod wherem, the banks complete therr restructurisatwn 
processes, the effic1ency begms to nnprove 
A snmlar study by V and er Vennet ( 1996) looks at the performance effects of 492 
mergers and acqms1t1ons between EC credit inshtutwns over the penod 1988-1993 In 
particular, the author analyses honzontal mergers w1th respect to profitability and 
operatiOnal effic1ency. Results md1cate that for domestic mergers among equal s1zed 
partners, the parent mst1tut10ns showed declmmg effic1encies pnor to the merger However, 
followmg the merger, effic1ency improved In cases where targets were less effic1ent than 
their acqurrers, the latter were not able to increase the post merger efficiency Cases of full 
acquisitions led to a detenoratwn m efficiency following the merger. Cross border, 
acquisitions also showed an improvement m post merger efficiency. 
Finally, V an RomJ (1997), prov1des another methodology classification winch 
includes studies that assess gams from mergers by simulatmg mergers between frrms 
Under this methodology, a cost functiOn is estnnated and the predicted costs for the 
hypothetical merger are compared w1th the sum of the predicted costs of the merger 
participants Al!imbas et a! (1997) employ tins methodology in their study of cross-border 
mergers m the EU The sample cons1sted of371 large banks 28% of the simulated pairings 
expenenced a reductiOn m costs However, the maJonty of the cases experienced a cost 
mcrease Overall, the merger led to an mcrease of 7.1% of costs compared to the snnple 
sum of total costs between the parent firms. Thus, their study found httle potential for cost 
savmgs among the mergers studied 
Shaffer (1993) also employs the simulation methodology However, the snnulations 
are performed m two stages In the frrst set of Simulatwns, no mformatlon about the 
efficiency of the banks IS cons1dered However, m the second set of Simulations, details on 
the relat1ve x-effic1ency of the banks are mcluded The author also differentiates between 
mterstate and intrastate mergers With the hypothesis that the potential for efficiency gams is 
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larger in the case of mtrastate mergers due to the greater potential for consolidating 
overlapping branches 
Efficiency was calculated usmg the Tluck Frontier Approach The average merger 
was found to yield a 0 98% decrease in predicted total costs compared to the sum of costs 
for the unmerged banks. However, the maJonty of pamngs (51%) experienced an mcrease 
m costs followmg the merger. Interstate mergers were found to yield a greater cost savings 
of 1.05% compared to mtrastate mergers wluch ytelded a cost savmg of 0.82%. 
When X- effic1ency was taken mto cons1derat10n, mergers where one of the 
mergmg entitles was from the most effic1ent quartile, were found to be most successful. 
Accordmg to the simulations, more than 90% of the mergers led to a cost fall of 21%. 
However, when one of the banks mvolved was from the least effic1ent quartile and this 
bank succeeded m 1mposmg 1ts orgarusatlon structure on the post merger entity, costs were 
found to nse by more than 21% m the average case. Usmg country level corporate 
governance mdJCes, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) fmd that b1dders originating m 
countnes with strong shareholder onentations relative to the target, there IS a positive spill 
over of corporate governance pract1ce form the stronger party. The degree of cross border 
mergers and acqmsinons IS also found to be negatively related to the degree of mmonty 
shareholder protectiOn nghts in the country of the b1ddmg firm. 
The disadvantage of tlus methodology is the arbitrary pairings of mergers In reality, 
mergers are undertaken after detailed assessments of potential profitability and synergies to 
be gained from the painng. Furthermore, 1t IS difficult to account for those efficiency-
enhancing measures that occur post merger in the form of product mix alterations and 
reductiOn m the number of employees. The method thus underestimates the potential cost 
benefits to be gamed from a merger 
The stud1es covered thus far fail to find ev1dence of efficiency gains from mergers 
However, they are based on the US and European experiences Studies that focus 
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specifically on the post merger performance of Indian banks are covered m the following 
section. 
4.5 Mergers : The Indian Experience 
In India, the mtroductwn of econormc reforms m 1990-91 led to a merger wave 
(Bhoi, 2000, Lakshrmnarayan, 2005) across the country as banks sought to become more 
efficient and competitive. 
Histoncally, there have been many mergers in Indra Between the penods 1961-
2004, there have been 71 mergers among vanous banks in India (Appendix A Table AI -
A2) Of these, 55 occurred during the penod 1960-1990 
It is important to note that many mergers during the pre-reform period were 
instituted by the Government m an effort to restructure ailing banking units Market dnven 
mergers are a phenomenon of the post-reform penod where the change m the competitive 
landscape of the Indian banlang system forced many of the incumbent banks to restructure 
themselves and boost their efficiency in order to ensure long-term profitability and survival 
This makes the current merger wave in India the first of its kind (Bhoi, 2000, 
Lakshminarayan, 2005,) 
Currently, the regulatory conditions m India are favourable towards mergers The 
Narasimham Comrmttee report of 1991, on the recommendatiOns of which, reform 
measures were mtroduced, m fact recommended the establishment of 3-4 large banks that 
would operate mtematwnally and domestically and 8-10 national banks that would operate 
as uruversal banks (Deshpande, 2005) 
The favourable environment for mergers IS further lughhghted by the nsmg trend m 
the number of mergers that have taken place in the Indian corporate sector smce the 
mtroduction of econormc reforms. Bhm (2000), fmds evidence of substantial growth m 
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M&A deals followmg the introduction of economic reforms The number of mergers in 
1999-2000 rose by 141.3% over the prevwus year and stood at 193 Interestmgly, the 
author fmds that the number of approvals has also increased indicating a relaxation of 
policies regardmg M&As. The Chelllical, textiles, electric and electronic goods and 
pharmaceutical mdustries expenenced the greatest number of M&As. These results 
correspond with those of another study on merger trends in the pnvate corporate sector by 
Beena (2000 and 2004) winch found that mergers m the manufacturing and non-
manufactunng sector over the period 1990-1994 rose to 236 from a level of 113 dunng the 
pre-reform period 1985-1989 Further, dunng the penod 1995-2000 the total number of 
mergers in the Indian corporate sector stood at 743 The author presents evidence that 
mergers m the Indian pnvate corporate sector were undertaken as a means to attaming 
growth 
A further reason put forward to exp1am the mcrease in the number of mergers in 
India dunng the 1990s was the relaxation of controls on the operatwns of foreign firms who 
were encouraged to set up operations m IndJ.a and did so through mergers with local firms 
(Khanna, 1993, c1ted m Beena 2000; Kumar, 2000) 
Another feature of mergers m India IS the predominance of honzontal mergers. For 
example, Beena (2000) and Bhoi (2005) fmd that the maJonty of the mergers they analysed 
were honzontal in nature and involved firms from the same busmess group. Kumar (2000), 
studied mergers mvolvmg multmatwnal enterprises and Indian firms and finds that the 
maJonty have been horizontal in nature Of the 256 deals the author studied across various 
mdustnes, includmg the banking and financial services sector, only 3 were vertical The 
author fmds that the motives of MNE related mergers IS to establish a presence m the 
country by mergmg with an ex1stmg, well-known local firm thereby allowmg the acqmrer 
unmed1ate access to a large customer base, brand recognition and goodwill 
Wlnle the honzontal natilre of these mergers increases the potential for efficiency 
gams, It also has anti-trust implications Increased honzontal mergers lead to mcreased 
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market concentration and subsequent mcrease m monopoly power which is detrimental to 
competition and consumer welfare 
The regulatory framework for mergers and acquisitiOns m India IS m the form of the 
provisiOns of the Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, clause 40 of the 
L1sting Agreement, Amendments to Clause 40 m 1990, gu1delmes issued by the Secunties 
and exchange Board of India, recommendations of the Bhagwati Committee on Takeovers 
and adoption of the new code in 1997 and amendments to the code in 1998 (Bhoi, 2000, 
Deshpande, 2005) 
Subsequent to the introduction of economic reforms, the then existing merger 
regulatiOns were updated thereby allowmg Indtan firms to undertake those mergers that 
would enhance their competitiveness and long-term profitability Thus the then restrictive 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices act, wluch was Im!ially set up to avmd the 
growth of monopolies and discourage the adoptiOn of anti-competitive behaviour among 
the various industry participants was reformed and revamped In addition, vanous other 
legislation relating to degree of foreign mvestlnent m Indian firms was relaxed m order to 
encourage the entry of fore1gn firms mto the market. 
In other words, the policies adopted by the Indian Government thus far have been of 
a natlire that encourages mergers among Indian banks As noted by Beena, 2004, ". . the 
policy framework m India dunng the nineties has not been in regulatmg M&A deals from 
an anti-trust or competitiOn policy perspective as m the EU and in the US". The motivatiOn 
belund such polic1es has been that mergers would allow Indian banks to divers1fy, expand, 
and improve therr effic1ency which, m tlrrn, would allow them to compete mternatwnally 
In keeping with tlus, the Reserve Bank of India unveiled a "Roadmap to Foreign 
Investlnent m the Bankmg Sector" to encourage foreign bank participation m the Indian 
bankmg system The policy which is to be implemented m two phases, the frrst of whiCh IS 
currently underway allows foreign mvestment up to 74% m select lnd1an pnvate banks 
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followmg RBI approval. Restnct10ns on the branch expansion of foreign banks have also 
been relaxed Foreign banks are also allowed to set up m India as a wholly owned 
subsidianes or branch networks or partictpatwn through a stake m Indtan pnvate banks. 
Thus, policy changes have been mstttuted with the obJ ecttve of enhancing the 
efficiency and competitive strength of the Indtan Bankmg System. Wlule the expenences of 
developed econonnes provtde a guide to the potential effects of mergers on firm 
performance and efficiency, the expenence of emergmg econonnes such as India may 
dtverge from those of therr developed counterparts due to wtdely differing economic 
conditwns. In Indta, examples of such dtfferences can be found m the level of state 
participation m the mdustrial and bankmg sector. In addttion, in developed markets, 
mergers are a means of utihzmg excess capactty whereas m emergmg markets, they are 
often used as a vehicle for overconnng fmanctal dtstress (Kohh, 2005) This ts particularly 
true m the case of India where, prior to reform, mergers were often initiated by the 
Government m an attempt to repatnate financially distressed firms Thus, the mergers 
mvolved a healthy bank and a fmancially unsound one 
Furthermore, as noted by Berger and Humphrey (1997), and Arun and Turner, 
(2002), the ultimate Impact of economic hberahzation is dependent mdustry specific 
factors And the differences m the econonnc structJrre of emergmg and developed 
economies lends credence to the posstbthty of dtfferences m the impact of M&As on 
efficiency and profitabihty 
The Implication of these mitiatives is that the competitive scenano m the Indtan 
banking system ts set to mtensify dramatically leading to the estabhshment of "Darwmtan 
Banking" where a bank's survtval is heavtly dependent on its abihty to dehver quahty 
products at competitive pnces (Lakshminarayan, 2005) For tins to occur, banks must 
become more streamlined and effictent Further, to be able to compete wtth foretgn banks, 
Indian banks would need to enhance therr stzes and one way of acluevmg tins would be 
through consohdattons. 
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Beena (2004) analyzes the merger wave in the corporate sector oflnd1a accordmg to 
type of firm· domestic or foreign In addition, a review of the policy changes on mergers 
and acqwsttiOns pre and post reforms IS also conducted. The author states that the merger 
wave in the corporate sector m the country IS dominated by mergers of firms m the same 
business groups operating m smiilar product lmes In other words, horizontal mergers seem 
to dommate the corporate merger wave m the coW!try In additiOn, the participation of 
foreign firms m the M&A process has increased in the latter part of the mneties. 
There have been very few empirical studies on the rmpact of mergers on the 
profitability and effic1ency of Indian firms Beena (2004) IS one such study However, this 
paper focuses on the pnvate corporate sector and uses accoW!tmg rat1os to assess pre- and 
post merger performance The author analysed 115 domestic and foreign mergers over the 
penod 1995-2000 The foreign mergers did not rncluded mergers representrng new entry 
for the fore1gn firm Performance was gauged using the price cost margrn (profit after 
tax/net sales), rate of return (profit before tax/total capital employed), shareholders' profit 
(profit after tax! net worth), dtvidend per equity, debt-eqmty ratio, export mtenstty, R&D 
intens1ty, and capactty ut!ltsatwn. 
Followmg the merger, both domestic and fore1gn owned acqumng firms 
expenenced a decline m their rates of return and shareholders' profits. However, the ROE 
expenenced an tmprovement And the pnce cost margm went down rnd1catmg an 
improvement m efficiency. Interestrngly, the market share of acqwring firms, particularly 
domestic firms increased following the merger 
This profitability mdexes exhibited a statisttcally sign1ficant downward trend, 
however, the dividend per eqwty increased following the merger The authors explam this 
as an attempt by the firm to retain shareholder confidence Capacity utilisation also showed 
a post-merger declinmg trend The earlier penod of the study honzon mdicated that an 
rncrease m external frnancrng which could explam the nsmg debt-eqmty ratio However, by 
2002, the firms had resorted to mternal sources of frnancmg 
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The author studtes the trends of mergers in India in an earlier paper over the penod 
1973-1995. Exammmg the number of mergers and the mdustry of the merger indtcates that 
pnor to reforms, most mergers were among manufacturing industry firms However, m the 
penod 1990-94, the number of mergers in non-manufacturing mdustnes began to nse. 
However, tt ts mterestmg to note that the number of mergers among companies that fell 
under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act exlubtted an mcreasing trend 
even after the enactment of the Act The data also indicates that the share of fmanctal 
companies VIs-a-vis servtce companies rose from 26% m 1985-1989 to 30% m the penod 
1990-1994. The mergers post 1990 were dommated by firms of large stze wluch were 
preVIously classtfied as belongmg to the domain of the Monopolies and Restncttve Trade 
Practices Act. The mergers were also between firms under related management Also the 
involvement of foretgn firms m mergers began ml992 and out of the 45 cases studied, 
foreign owned firms were mvolved m 22.22% of the mergers The authors explam tlus m 
terms of relaxation of the Foretgn Exchange RegulatiOns Act regulatiOn which constderable 
lowered the number of restnctions on the operatwns of foretgn firms. However, lndtan 
owned firms continued to dommate the merger cases dunng the study honzon. 
Fmally, Kumar (2000) finds that the share of servtces sector has mcreased m the 
M&As m lndta. Over the period 1994-2000, the share of servtces sector m M&As m lndta 
rose by 21% to number 54 out of a total of 256 The bulk of the M&As were in the 
industnal domam, wluch had 190 M&As tt is important to note that the share of the 
banking and financtal services sector among services regtstered tts first merger post 1993 in 
the year 1995 and smce then has exhtbtted an mcreasing trend However, the mergers 
analyzed deal wtth MNE acqmsitwns of lndtan firms and thus exclude any domesttc 
mergers. Most of the deals were horizontal mergers Of the 256 mergers studied, only three 
were verttcal. Interestmgly, m the servtces sector, 48% of mergers have been to truttate 
entry mto the market 
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4.6 Conclusion 
The key features that stand out from the stud1es on mergers m Ind1a are therr fmdmg 
of the dommance of honzontal mergers This has anti-trust unplications since it could lead 
to an mcrease m market concentratiOn and a nse m monopoly power. Furthermore, the 
number of stud1es on mergers m Ind1a, particularly on the bankmg sector IS very few In 
light of the current policy of encouragmg mergers among banks m an attempt to ra1se their 
efficiency, empmcal stud1es on merger 1mplicat10ns would serve as a guide to ensuring that 
policies adopted aclueve such effic1ency enhancement. The next chapter thus analyses the 
potential for such efficiency gains pnor to the mergers and the degree to wluch such gains, 
if any, are realised post-merger. 
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Table 4.1: Literature pertaining to Merger Studies 
Study Country I Countries 
Cuesta and Orea, 2002 Spam 
Evanoff and Ors, 2002 US 
Focarelh and Panetta, Italy 
2001 
Garden and Ralston, Australia 
1999 
Gugler et al, 2003 Austna, Austraha, 
Belgium, Canada, 
Germany, Denmark, 
Spam, Fmland, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, New 
Zeland, Norway, 
Sweden, Portugal, 
Switzerland, UK, US 
and Rest of World 
Methodology 
SFA 
Multmomtal 
Logit 
regressiOn 
DEA 
Companson of 
predicted pre-
merger and 
actual post-
merger sales 
and profits. 
Results 
Differential patterns 
of efficiency 
between merged 
and non-merged 
savmgs banks. 
Former found to be 
more efficient than 
latter 
Mergers related to 
decreased revenue 
efficiency 
Lack of post-
merger 
improvement m 
profits 
Lack of post merger 
effic1ency 
Improvements. 
Bulk of mergers 
exlnbited post 
merger profit 
rmprovements 
accomparued by 
sales declmes 
md1catmg increased 
market power 
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Table 4.1: Literature pertaining to Merger Studies (continued) 
Study Country I Countries Methodology Results 
Hagendorff et a!, 2008 Belgtum, Denmark, Event study Inverse rela!lon 
France, Germany, using market between level of 
Greece, Italy, model of mvestor protectiOn 
Netherlands, Portugal, abnormal m target country 
Spain, Sweden, returns and abnormal 
Switzerland, UK, US returns realised by 
bidders in 
armouncement 
period 
Kim and Smgal, 1993 us OLS Stgmficant increase 
RegressiOn m atrfares on routes 
affected by mergers 
rela!lve to those not 
affected by 
mergers For routes 
wtth common hubs, 
effic1ency gams 
outweigh market 
powergams. 
Koetter, 2005 Germany SFA Very small 
dtfferences in mean 
cost efficiency 
levels between 
mergmg and non-
mergmg banks 
Mergers mvolvmg 
dtstressed banks 
that are acquirers 
not successful. 
Those that involve 
dtstressed targets 
more successful. 
Krishnasamy, 2003 Malaysta DEA, Post-merger 
Malmqmst Improvements m 
Index of efficiency and total 
Productivity factor EroductlV!ty. 
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Table 4.1: Literature pertaining to Merger Studies (continued) 
Study Country I Countries Methodology 
Penstlaru, 1997 us Distribution 
free approach 
Resti, 1998 Italy DEA 
Shaffer, 1993 us Merger 
simulatiOn, 
TFA 
Sherman and Rupert, us DEA 
2004 
V ander Vennet, 1996 Belgmm, Denmark, SF A 
France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Spam, 
Portugal, UK, 
Results 
Lack of post-
merger efficiency 
Improvements for 
acqutrers. 
Post-merger 
mcreasem 
efficiency, 
particularly ID cases 
oflocal market 
mergers 
Potential cost 
reductions m half of 
analysed merger 
cases resulting from 
variatwns ID 
product mix 
Merger benefits 
realised on 
temporally lagged 
basis 
Post merger 
Improvements m 
effictency of 
acquired banks 
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Table 4.2: Literature pertaining to Indian Merger Studies 
Study Methodology 
Beena, 2000 Ratio Analysis 
Beena, 2004 RatiO analysis 
Kumar, 2000 Uruvanate analysis 
Results 
Increase m number of mergers 
over post-econonuc reform 
penod Relaxation of 
Monopoly and restnctive 
Trade Practices Act 
contnbuted to mcreased 
mergers Dominance of 
horizontal mergers Between 
manufactllring and non-
manufactllring mdustry, 
greater number of mergers m 
the former with gradual 
mcreases m latter over post-
econonuc reform penod. 
Acqmring firms in 
manufactllring sector 
performed better than overall 
industry 
Post-merger declme m 
profitability performance for 
both foreign and domestic 
acquirers in the pnvate 
corporate sector However, 
those of foreign owned 
acqurrer better than those of 
Indian acquirers. Greater 
prevalence of honzontal 
mergers. 
Most mergers reside in 
manufactllring sector. Service 
sector mergers show 
increasing trend Mergers 
predommantly honzontal in 
nature 
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CHAPTER 5: NON-PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENCY 
GAINS FROM BANK MERGERS IN INDIA 
5.1 Introduction 
Market dnven busmess mergers have long been an integral part of the commerc~allnstory of 
developed econoiilles However, m the emergmg econoiilles tins phenomenon has gamed momentwn 
relatively recently The reasons for this are not far to seek considermg tl!at the reqws1te enablmg 
envrronrnent such as economic policy liberalization, deregulation, pnvatization and other market 
refonns have been put m place only recently as compared to developed econoiilles. Consequently, 
there l!ave been numerous stud!es exanunmg the motivat:tons belund and benefits of mergers m 
developed economies These stud!es on the !IDpact of mergers on the efficiency of mergmg banks find 
little evidence of effic1ency gams (Amel et a!, 2004, Garden & Ralston, 1999; Penst:tam, 1997) as 
shown in Cl!apter 4 
These stud!es however, are based on the US, UK and European financial mstitutions While 
the data and research find!ngs pertaining to bank mergers m developed economies provide valuable 
evidence on the effects of mergers on firm efficiency, these may not necessanly be applicable m 
entirety to an emergmg economy such as India due to the prevalence of Widely d!fferent econOIIllc 
and mst:ttutional cond!tions Detuls of the same are highlighted m Chapter 2 
This chapter offers an ms1ght into the effectiveness of econoiillc policy refonns m the lnd!an 
Banking System by exaiillning the effic1ency benefits of mergers among Scheduled COIIllnerc1al 
Banks (SCBs) in Ind!a over the post-refonn period 1991-9210 to 2004-05 Usmg the Bogetoft and 
Wang (2005), model, the potential for merger gams IS calculated and decomposed mto technical, 
harmony and SIZe efficiency components We extend tins application to evaluate post sample 
reahsat:tons of the potential gains Post-merger technical efficiency IS used to gauge the degree to 
10 The Fmanc1al year m India begms on Apnl 1" and ends on 31" March Consequently, the penod 1991-92, 
for example, IS henceforth referred to as 1992 
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which the potentlal technical effiCiency gains have been reahzed followmg the completlon of the 
merger, for up to a decade We also provide a metric for judging the success or failure of a merger. 
Imha 1s a relatlvely late entrant to the arena of econoiiiic hberahzatton as the era of s1gmficant 
marl<:et reforms commenced only m 1990. Hence the current merger wave in India offers an Important 
research opportunity to assess the effiCiency benefits that flow from such mergers. In additlon, the 
Government mtroduced pohcy initiatives aimed at deregulation and encouragement of mergers with a 
view to increasmg the SIZe, profitability, and financial strength of Indian Banks thereby enhancing 
their capability to compete globally Tins chmate of relaxed merger regulations fostered an increase m 
the number of merger deals among Indian firms (Beena, 2000) In light oftlns, the dearth of empirical 
stud!es examining efficiency benefits flowing from these mergers IS swpnsing Tins study addresses 
thiS current weakness m the literature 
Tins chapter IS orgarused mto 5 sections Section 5 2 descnbes the methodology employed 
while Section 5 3 detaJis the data set used. Results are presented and diScussed m Sectlon 54 Fmally, 
Section 5 5 concludes 
5.2 Data 
Data on all SCBs spannmg the penod 1991-92 to 2004-05 was collected from the Reserve 
Bank of lnd!a' s Database on the lnd!an Economy. A hst of mergers that took place m the post reform 
penod was obtamed from Lakshmmarayanan (2005), and IS reproduced m Appendix A2. Among the 
mergers, those corresponding to senal numbers SIXty-twon, siXty-four12, and siXty-siX13 were not 
included m thiS study due to unavailability of data. The merger between Global Trust Bank and 
11
•
12
•
13 Merger sixty-two corresponds to that between Kashmath Seth Bank and the State Bank oflnd1a, merger 
sixty-four corresponds to that between Ban Daob bank ltd and the On ental Bank of Commerce and merger 
sixty-six corresponds to that between S1klam Bank ltd and the Umon Bank of India 
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Onental Bank of Commerce, corresponding to senal number seventy·<me, was excluded due to an 
insufficient number of post merger years 
The chmce of input-output specification IS an issue of considerable debate in the efficiency 
studies' literature Broadly, the specifications can be classified into the produc1lon and mtennechatton 
approaches The difference m the two approaches hes in therr definitton of what a bank does. V 1ewed 
as a producer of serv1ces, the productton approach would be more appropnate These serv1ces are 
related to both the depos1t and the loan accounts. Thus, the number of accounts or the number of 
transacllons associated with each of these accounts are taken as outputs and labour and capital are 
considered the mputs On the other hand, when VIewed as a financml mtennechary, the intermechatton 
approach IS more appropnate Under this approach, the bank IS VIewed as a financial intermediary 
transfernng funds between surplus saving Ulllts and defic1t spending uruts (Heffernan, 2000) Banks 
accept deposits and then use them to make loans and mvesttnents Under this method therefore, 
depos1ts are cons1dered an input used to produce outputs that encompass the value of loans and 
mvesttnents of the bank. The debate, thus, settles on the treatment of depos1ts- are they mputs or 
outputs? (Berger & Humphrey, 1997; Sealey and Lmdley, 1977) 
In this chapter, we apply both mput-output specificatton models The reforms heralded the 
slnft from a regune where quantttattve goal attainment was the order of the day to one where 
operattonal effic1ency and profitability dictated long-run SUrVIVal. However, gtven the gradual pace of 
the reforms, banks continued to operate with the dual objectives of mamtainmg profitability and 
meeting regulatory reqwrements geared towards socio-economic development. The applicatton of 
both the production and intermechatton approaches would help capture the degree to wluch banks 
efficrently perform on both these fronts Thus, the mput-output vanables used are as follows· 
Table 5.1: Input-Output Specification 
MODEL INPUTS OUTPUTS 
Model! Borrowmgs, Fixed Deposits, 
(Productton Assets, Other Assets, Advances, 
Approach) Wages Investtnents 
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Model2 Bo110wmgs, FIXed 
(Intermediation Assets, Other Assets, 
Approach) Wages, Deposits 
Advances, 
Investments 
The indlVldual components of the mput and output vanables are hsted m AppendiX B 1 
SIIII1II1lll)' sta1Is1Ics for the above vanables are proVIded m Table 52. These are calculated in constant 
pnces for the comm=al banlang system for the year 2005 
Prima facie, the deposits, mvestments and credit disbursed show a gradual increase over the 
tune tpenod examined With respect to the Wages variable, as noted by Das et a! (2007), 
operating costs of Indian Banks exceed those of other As1an banks in general, with labour 
costs accountmg for more than 60% of the total operatmg costs. Wlnle econorruc reforms 
d1d provide banks with relatively greater autonomy m deterrrunmg the1r operational 
drrection, therr ability to streamlme themselves by lowermg therr manpower was heavily 
restricted This IS reflected by the relatively stable level of wages over the penod examined 
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Table 5.2: Summary Statistics (Real values, Rs M1lbon) 
Year Stat1st1c Advances Investments Deposrts F1xed Borrowmgs Wages Total Assets Other 9 Assets Assets 
" Mean 46923 17 2899510 77956 06 58423 6624 70 1751 51 100283 60 9351 61 
" 1992 Med1an 9121 63 5863 95 20324 87 161 72 1273 40 429 067 23361 20 1086 97 ... V, 
SD 14 123178 20 66372 08 175924 80 1207 68 23138 64 4346 96 260651 70 41782 19 ~ Mean 46908 89 31771 81 81751 16 969 70 8010 40 1846 33 104297 90 10058 96 
" 1993 Med1an 10005 99 7818 94 24465 54 294 57 1684 02 44916 28700 50 1317 94 ' 
SD 120267 30 72621 43 176771 30 1825 29 29744 97 4667 13 253498 10 32769 03 " tl 
Mean 43135 35 39502 90 89562 04 1292 66 3792 93 1911 71 11148830 11064 34 ~ 
1994 Med1an 1288413 1101886 28678 73 329 53 1297.46 523 56 33779 05 1271 79 "' 
"' SD 99776 77 89008 01 189090 50 2167 94 1381002 4643 81 262928 80 34861 28 ;:;· 
Mean 40861 14 34242 80 80511 64 1382 21 5124 55 1841 04 100765 10 8958 89 :... 
" 1995 Med1an 12206 13 7166 73 21960 08 338 28 2071 54 313 04 25804 16 1252 19 " -SD 97414 85 82730 62 176574 00 2362 95 16224 17 5151 81 241900 20 25001 58 "' (;; 
Mean 42675 63 31390 43 77409 14 161286 7157 01 2073 48 101315 00 8630 39 c 
1996 Med1an 13711 41 5503 54 17839 36 551 98 3008 96 320 83 23897 87 1038 31 
SD 105930 50 78710 15 179119 10 2661 71 20928 53 5836 59 25441510 26934 44 
Mean 40941 26 33272 8 79914 13 161320 3488 42 1925 34 99956 45 8090 04 
1997 Med1an 1174416 6915 18 18824 05 60017 1289 34 224 88 24690 73 1208 05 
SD 105930 50 78710 15 179119 1 2661 71 20928 53 5836 59 254415 10 26934 44 
Mean 44834 37 37591 48 88988 06 1741 93 3580 10 1947 92 109894 80 7522 87 
1998 Med1an 11896 56 9541 89 24316 15 631 11 1182 25 24113 29819 42 1175 73 
SD 11501080 88375 60 212157 10 3084 814 11868 81 5483 93 278316 70 24202 75 c ~ 
Mean 48193 45 44277 94 100565 60 1890 89 5250 40 2170 05 123948 60 7405 50 b:> 
" 1999 Med1an 13941 97 13212 73 27835 83 654 55 1736 10 28922 41411 45 1399 97 " 
"'" SD 120953 40 105119 80 250294 40 3634 43 13409 24 6059 45 320328 80 19765 27 ~ 
... 
"' ~
14 SD Standard devtatton :; 
'"" - e. N 
" w 
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics (Continued) 
(Real values, Rs Mzllwn) 
Year Stat1st1c Advances Investments Depos1ts F1xed Borrowings Wages Total Other g Assets Assets Assets i5 
Mean 57112 35 53316 11 115977 90 1993 99 5838 22 2379 11 143023 00 9166 82 
"' 
... 
2000 Med1an 20864 1 16002 90 33963 11 632 00 1977 82 39424 45557 00 1599 86 .., 
SD 15 139722 70 129211 40 283090 90 3888 99 13644 23 6424 57 364655 70 29711 64 ~ Med1an 20864 1 16002 90 33963 11 632 00 1977 82 39424 45557 00 1599 86 
"' 2001 SD 139722 70 129211 40 283090 90 3888 99 13644 23 6424 57 364655 70 29711 64 -,!, 
SD 152791 90 157205 30 321782.10 3797 02 16032 89 7990 78 408235 10 21416 15 ~ 
Mean 78054 08 71093 84 145422 90 2428 09 13019 62 2636 75 185591 80 9349 66 :! 
" 2002 Med1an 21908 09 17548 69 41935 75 650 56 1165 28 519 70 52702 50 2172 82 s 
SD 17111580 184558 60 352751 60 5977 69 60057 85 6782 49 455086 00 20505 14 " :... 
Mean 91109 96 85417 63 167075 40 2494 57 10705 94 2911 20 209089 90 10306 06 "' 
"' 2003 Med1an 27910 27 21479 83 45813 84 810 57 1595 88 621 88 65539 05 2440 85 ~
"' SD 192876 20 216217 90 384914 10 5763 04 42262 83 7339 27 488025 60 24486 26 <:;· 
Mean 103337 90 95903 78 188346 20 2559 56 1155086 3132 12 236130 60 10992 48 ~ 
2004 Med1an 25962 35 2504915 62326 67 921 70 1542 97 721 55 75979 82 2415 86 §l 
SD 211204 30 227192 70 404201 10 5671 12 38632 10 7895 73 51512770 24066 05 " ;;; 
Mean 133747 10 100833 213365 70 2676 96 19647 94 3358 33 273668.10 11542 95 "' ~
2005 Med1an 39967 12 22489 36 65625 33 918 966 1806 40 808 49 85197 71 3180 70 ~ SD 263528 8 232001 50 447597 70 5522 14 67650 23 8158 28 566782 50 23652 48 ~· 
t 
:! 
t:x:. 
"' 
"' 
"'" ~ 
~ 
" ~
:: 
" SD Standard devtatton 
~ 
N ~ 
-1>-
"' 
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The Kolmogorov-Strurnov test is used to examme the impact of the mput-output specification 
adopted on the estnnated effictency scores Followmg Banker and NataraJan (2004), the test is canied 
out usmg log of the efficiency scores The null and alternate hypotheses are 
H 0 : log efficiency is inse!lSlttve to mput-output specrlicatton model used 
and thus consistent across mput-output models 
H 1 : log efficiency IS senstttve to the mput-output specrlicatton adopted 
The Wholesale Pnce Index (WPI), which is used by the Central Bank m Its frammg of the 
Monetaiy Policy, the Government m Its frammg of the FISCal Policy and vanous other Government 
agencies, was used to deflate nominal input and output values mto real values The WPI, has the 
added advantage of greater accuracy by vutue of tt being updated and reported on a weekly basis 
Over the period analysed, Indian banks had less freedom to control costs (Ram Mohan and 
Ray, 2004) They were also reqwred to meet targets lmked to credit disbursement, albeit to a lower 
target level than under the pre-refmm period thereby allowmg the banks relatively greater aut011omy 
m therr operattons, parl:icularly on the output side ThiS, m conJunC!1011 wtth the reduced government 
support, parl:icularly for PSBs and the mflux of foreJgn banks thereby nnsmg the competition m the 
market, unplies that banks must rely 011 strengthenmg therr lending and mvestment operattons to 
remain competittve In light of these factors, we choose the output onentatton for our analysiS 
5.3 Methodology 
Usmg the Bogetoft and Wang (2005), Data Envelopment AnalysiS (DEA) model, the 
potenttal for merger gams is calculated and decomposed into teclmical, harm011y and size efficiency 
components. We extend this apphcatton to evaluate post sample realisations of the potenttal gams 
Post merger teclmical efficiency, denved usmg the DEA model developed by Banker, Charnes and 
Cooper (1984) (henceforth, BCC-DEA), is used to gauge the degree to winch the potential teclmical 
effictency gams have been capttrred followmg the completion of the merger for up to a decade We 
thus work wtth the following ttme!ine· 
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Post Merger Years 
where 
T8 WY ~ Year immedzately precedzng actual merger year, when the Bogetoft & 
Wang Modelzs used to calculate potential efficzency gams 
TMY ~ Year the merger actually occurred 
E, ~ Efficzency m post merger year t 
The Bogetoft and Wang (2005) model takes advantage of the concept of ou1put super-
additivity by aggregatmg the ou1puts and mputs of the parent en1l1les to f01m the merged firm. By then 
calculatmg the maximum proporttonal expansion of the aggregated ou1put given the aggregated input, 
a measure of the poten1lal overall efficiency gam IS obtamed. A measure greater than Ulllty md!cates 
gams from the merger as the merged en1lty has the poten1lal to produce greater aggregated ou1puts 
usmg the aggregated mputs 
Assume a total ofNfinns usmg a vectorofx inputs, such that x eR';, to producey ou1puts, 
such that ye R! . The production set T(x, y) can hence be defined as, T{x,y)= { {x,y) x can 
produce y} We assume the followmg proper1les for the production set. 
1. Convexzty: {x,y) and {x',y') eT=> Jl {x,y) + (1-Jl) {x',y') eT, Jl e [0,1] 
2 StrongDISposability {x,y)e T:=> {x',y') e Twhere x'~ x, y'5. y 
3 Returns to Scale 
Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) · (x, y) e T => k(x, y) e T, k ~ 0 
11. lncreasmg Returns to Scale (IRS) (x, y) e T => k(x, y) e T, k ~ 1 
111 DecreaszngReturnstoScale(DRS)· (x,y)e T:=> k(x,y)e T,05.k5.1 
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Usmg the above, a !'Iecewise Lmear Representauon (PLR) of the production set IS defined as. 
where· set S defines the returns to scale properties as follows. 
Now, assume that J out oftheNfinns merged attimeTMr Within this merged group, these 
J finns are re-labelled k = l •• .J The merged firm is now constructed in period T8 wr by aggregating 
the inputs and outputs of the parent finns. The merged firm, at penod T8 WY , thus has the followmg 
mputs and outputs 
i=1 ... m (5.1] 
r= 1 .•. 1 [5.2] 
Given the above, the output onented potenual overall merger efficiency gam (OE) is 
calculated usmg the following output-oriented program 16 • 
(5.3] 
The CRS asswnp1lon is employed for thiS stage of the analysis, as the current merger wave m 
India 1s the first marl<:et dnven merger wave in contrast to pre-reform mergers winch were msugated 
16 Please refer Section 5 for an explanation of the chotce ofDEA model onentatlon 
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by the Central Bank m order to rescue finanCially d!stressed banks These post refonn mergers can 
thus be viewed as adjustments by the market participants towards long-run optimal scale and 
efficiency While we thus concentrate on results obtained under the CRS asswnpnon, we also employ 
VRS to check for program mfeasibihty17• The merger would be advantageous to the bank rl' F' >I as 
1t would then imply that the firm can produce a greater amount of aggregate outputs using the same 
aggregate mput quannty Holding aggregate input constant, F' s I would lead to a post merger 
decbne in the aggregate output thereby signalbng that the merger IS diSadvantageous. 
Having calculated the overall efficiency ganlS potential, Bogetoft and Wang identifY the 
following decomposition. 
OE=TE*HE*SE [5.4] 
To calculate the techmcal efficiency gams (IE), a Wlthm merger group analysis IS performed 
by first calculanng the technical efficiencies of only those banks that were mvolved m the merger. 
This allows for the outputs of the parent entities to be expanded onto the within-merger group fronner. 
Havmg done so the (adjusted) overall effiCiency IS nxomputed and the techmcal efficiency 
component is Isolated For thiS stage of the analysis, the CRS asswnpnon may be less appropnate 
since specrlic individual mergers may have a more restricted range of adjustments possibilines. By 
restnctmg Within-merger group technical efficiency gains to a VRS asswnption and therefore 
concentranng only on pure technical efficiency improvements w1thm the merger group, a larger share 
of the gams decomposition 1s allocated to the other components We thus use the followmg BCC-
DEA model for the withm merger group analysiS 
kooJ } L A., = 1, 
1;=1 
Vr=l ... l 
kooJ 
L A.,y,, '<!:. Fyro, 
k=J 
Vi=l ... m,oeJ, 
[5.5] 
17 Results for estimatiOns usmg the VRS assumptiOn are presented m Appendix C 
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This allows the merger partners' outputs to be adjusted to their optimal levels m accordance 
With their within-merger group efficiency scores The adjustment IS canied out m the following 
manner: 
~J k=J k LY, = L F Y,. , 
k=l 
k=o=J ... J,r=l ... l [5.6) 
Smce, we are exammmg actual merger cases, which mvolved two mergmg banks, the use of 
only the parties to the merger m tins stage of the analysiS would result m therr contmually bemg 
represented as 100% efficient Thus, m order to better capture their 1rue techrucal effiCiency, banks 
sumlar to the target bank were included m thiS stage of the calculation. These banks were Identtfied 
usmg therr Return on Assets ratio, i e., all banks in the same percentile as the target bank were 
mcluded m the Within merger group, as m theory, any of these banks could have been a target for the 
merger. 
Usmg the adjusted output levels, the (adjusted) overall effiCiency is re-computed using the 
following program 
15: ..t,y,, ~ F(EY: ~ 
J=l [5.7] 
'V r=l ... l 
The techrucal efficiency component of the decomposition is then computed as follows: 
TEJ =FJ I F"J [5.8) 
We now 1l1m to capttmng the hannony gams effect (HE) Hannony gams md!cate the gams 
from hannonising the output miX of the merged entity, I e , the degree to wlnch the mtegration of 
various output miXes complements the effiCiency of the merged entity Hannony gams stem fiom the 
potential that the merger may allow the firm to fine ttme Its production process by enabhng it to adjust, 
I e , hannonise, Its output mix For example, rather than carvmg a ruche matket for Itself; the merged 
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entJ.ty may be able to capture more efficiency gams by adjusbng 1ts output range to more closely 
resemble that of 1ts competitors 
The Bogetoft and Wang model captJ.rres tins effect by measuring how much the average 
output could have been expanded by usmg a gtven level of average input Tins IS done using the 
following program 
H' = max{H ~~ 2h ~[(x: ); J 1 
'il=l ... m, 
(5.9) 
A value of H' greater than umty IS evidence of potential hannony gains while a value lower 
than unity implies that the cost of hannoniSmg the output nnxes IS lugh and therefore will erode the 
potential efficiency gains form the merger 
Havmg calculated technical and hannony gains, any rernammg efficiency sterns from 
changes m the scale of the organiSa!J.on and is calculated as scale efficiency (SE) Consequently, SE 
gams are treated as a residual component of the decompos11:J.on and would allow the merged entJ.ty to 
take advantage of any retwns to scale followmg the merger The following program is used to capture 
thiS effect 
'f 21y,~S [H'E)ij J-=1 (5.10) 
'lr=l ... l 
The Bogetoft and Wang model was applied to the year nnmechately precedmg the merger 
year In cases, where unavailability of data precluded such analysis, the nearest year for winch data 
was available was used. The year of the merger, 1tself; penod T MY , was not used due to the unpact of 
adJusbnent costs 
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Having estabhshed the potential for gams from the merger, the extent to winch such gams are 
realised is examined usmg the BCC-DEA model Tins IS done by applymg the model to the post 
merger sample for each of the post merger years. The post merger sample, Q, IS constructed as the 
difference between the total nwnber of banks in the sample and the nwnber of banks lost due to the 
merger( s) m penod T8 y The nwnber of new !Illliket entrants IS added to thiS and the nwnber of 
banks exiting the !Illliket IS deducted over the post merger nrne honzon. Thus 
where· 
Q=N-G-Ex+En 
N =total number of Banks m T8 y 
G = total number of banks lost due to the merger m T8 y 
Ex =number affirms exztmg the market 
En =number of new entrants m the market 
[5.11] 
The post merger efficiency of the Merged Bank (MB) IS then calculated using the following 
BCC-DEA (VRSi8 program 
p:Q 
:E A.Px'P ~ x", 
p=l 
poQ 
B ~ A.,= 1, 
p=l 
'Vi=l ... m, 
'Vp=l...s ... Q 
p=Q ~ A,Y., ~~n, 
p=l 
A., ~ 0, [5.12] 
'Vr = 1 ... 1, 
However, care must be taken m the post merger effiCiency analysiS as the BCC-DEA model 
proVIdes an mill cation only of the technical efficrency of the banks Thus, the post merger efficiencres 
can only be compared to the technical efficiency component of the overall potent:lal merger gams We 
Just:lzy our chmce of the BCC model because while the mergers do represent a move towards the 
18 Assummg convexity of the productiOn possibihty set and free d1sposabihty ofmputs and outputs, the VRS 
model selects the smallest of the vanous production posstbthty sets 
131 
Chapter 5 Non-Parametrzc AnalysiS of Efficiency Gazns from Bank Mergers zn Indza 
long-run optnnal scale for the banks, tlus movement IS a gradual one thereby restricting banks to he 
wttlun the VRS convex hull of observatiOns rather m the larger CRS convex cone Therefore, post 
merger compansons usmg the BCC-DEA model would be more appropnate. 
A Kolmogorov-Smrrnovi 9 test was also conducted using the post merger efficiency 
scores of the entire sample (merged banks and control groups) for each post merger period 
and under both mput-output models to confrrm the presence of scale inefficiency. The null 
and alternate hypotheses were. 
H 0 : No sigmficant differences m log efficiency scores under the VRS 
and CRS models, i e , there is no evidence of scale meffiCiency 
H 1 : Scale mefficiency IS found to be prevalent among the sample banks 
To analyse the Impact of the merger on the efficiency of the merged entities, we compare 
therr post merger efficiency scores in three ways The first, usmg the benclnmuk of the Bogetoft & 
Wang model, I e, the potential techmcal efficiency gains ln tlus case, a bank's post merger technical 
efficiency in each of the post merger years is compared to the potential techmcal efficiency gam. With 
enhanced efficiency bemg one of the stated obJectives and motivatJ.ons of the mergers, this analysis 
offers a direct avenue to assess the degree to which 1his goal has mdeed been attamed This is because 
the Bogetoft and W ang model offers a quantitative assessment of the existence and magrntJ.Ide of any 
potential merger related efficiency gains and companng this wtth the actual post merger efficiency of 
the banks offers an insight mto the degree to winch the former have been realized. Accordmgly, the 
ingher the post merger TE of the merged bank, the greater the degree to winch It was able to capture 
the potential1E gams as predicted by the Bogetoft & W ang model. 
19 The Kolmogorov-Smtmov D-Stahsttc ts calculated as the maxtmum vertical dtstance between the observed 
cumulative dtstnbutwns of the effictency scores under the two mput-output models, 1 e, 
D ~ max IF0 • (!ne,)- F0 ' (!ne,) I 
A htgh D value and, consequently, a low p-value would md1cate the presence of significant dtfferences m 
effictenctes between the two groups The test can be earned out usmg effictency scores duectly and would 
proVIde eqmvalent results (Hollander and Wolfe, 1999) 
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In addition to analysmg the extent to which the potential gams are realized, we are also 
mterested m the degree to winch the merger was advantageous to the bank relative to its non-merging 
cmmteiparts Tins is because, wlnle the bank may have failed to fully capture Its TE potential, It may 
still have realized sufficient effiCiency gams to attam a competitive advantage relative to Its non-
merging competitors Tins bnngs us to our second analysiS, VIZ., a cornpanson of the post merger 
technical efficiency of the merged bank With the average teclnncal efficiency of a control group of 
non-merging banks. We hencefmth refer to thiS as an analysiS of the TE Level of the bank. To 
perform the analysis, the post merger TE of the merged bank in a particular year was compared with 
the average TE of the control group in the same year For example, the TE of a bank two years after 
Its merger m 1998 IS compared With the average TE of the control group in 2000 
We construct our control group for thiS analysiS to compriSe those banks winch did not 
engage m any mergers over the study penod. The composition of this control group vaned over the 
1:!me studied due to the ently and eXIt of banks A dynarrnc control group such as thiS IS preferred 
g~ven the nature of the mergers Six of the mergers analysed were lllltiated by the Central Bank m a 
b1d to rescue an rulmg bank. Part of the distress may be linked to the influx of new pnvate and foreign 
banks With more efficient and streambned operations Excluding these banks from the sample would 
thus lead to an incorrect es1:!mation of both the potential gains and the ac1:!Ial post merger efficiency of 
the merged bank. Moreover, the post reform penod was characteriSed by a relaxation of regulations 
on the ently of foreign banks and the establiShment of new pnvate sector banks. The market driven 
mergers may thus have been undertaken m anticipation of or m reaction to the ently of new banks 
Excluding these banks from the analysiS in order to mamtam an unchanging control group would thus 
lead to mcorrect es1:!mations of efficiency for the merged banks 
A Mann-Whitney test of the effic1encies between the post merger TE of the merged banks 
and the control group IS used to check if the merger had a sigmficant unpact on the efficiency of the 
merged banks and if so, in what direction, I.e., were the effic1encies of the merged banks higher than 
that of the control group? 
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The Mann-Wlntney test exammes If two independently drawn samples ongmated from the 
same populatiOn. fu domg so, it allows for the investigation mto the presence of a treatment effect by 
exammmg the slnft m locatmn of the mean or median (Hollander and Wolfe, 1999) In the context of 
our study, this test allows us to mvest:tgate if the merger led to significantly different and higher 
efficiency scores for the merged banks VJs-a-VJS the control group The null, alternative, and 
directional alternative hypotheses are as follows 
H 0 : No Significant differences in the TE Levels of the merged banks 
and the control group 
H 1 : The TE Levels of the merged banks are s1gmficantly d!fferent from 
those of the control group 
H 2 : The TE Levels of the merged banks are lngher than those of the 
control group 
If the merger 1s found to enhance the efficiency of the merged bank, 1t may encourage other 
competitors to engage m mergers themselves m order to reap surular gams The analysis of the TE 
Level also has important pohcy rmphcatlons for the fudian case where mergers were often mstttuted at 
the behest of the Central Bank m order to rescue a financially distressed bank. If the post merger 
teclmical effiCiency of the acqwnng bank regtsters a decln!ing trend, it would mdicate that tins pohcy, 
wlnle offermg a quick solution that protected the depositors, in the long run, weakened the positions of 
stronger banks m the system 
The cornbmatton of tins TE Level analysiS and that With respect to the Bogetoft and Wang 
benclnnark provides an mteresttng metnc for estabhslnng the success I failure a merger To start With, 
for a bank that (a) reahzes the efficiency potential as mdicated by the Bogetoft and Wang analysiS and 
(b) displays a consistently lngher effiCiency level than Its non-mergtng counterparts, the merger can be 
considered a success On the other hand, a merger that fails to achieve 1ts efficiency potential under the 
Bogetoft and Wang analysis and, is finther found to have lower post merger effiCiency than the non-
mergtng control group, can be tenned as clearly unsuccessful A merger that partially attams 1ts 
efficiency potential and shows lngher post merger efficiency than the non-mergtng banks can be 
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tenned a partial success, as would a merger that successfully realrzes Its potential efficiency but 
exhibits lower post merger efficiency levels than the control group. The figure below presents thiS 
metnc for JUdgmg merger success I frulure 
Figure 5.1: Merger Metrzc Usmg BW & CG Differentwls 
"' ~ ~ 
z 
w X 
• w 
. 
·12 • c 
~ 
MEJR!C F':~ERGER ANALYSIS 
ilo2 
+ 
1 
IV 
Partial Success 
·1 -08 ..()6 -Q4 
Ill 
Unsuccessful 
08 
08 
04 
02 
..02-0.2 
.04 
.06 
.08 
·1 y 
I 
Successful 
02 04 06 08 
n 
Partial Success 
-
CONTROL GROUP DIFFERENTIALS 
X+ 
In the above figure, the BW Differentials refer to the difference between the per annum post 
merger techrucal efficiency of the merged bank and the Bogetoft & W ang potential techrucal 
efficrency for the merger The Control Group Differentials are calculated as the difference between 
the per annum post merger techrucal efficiency of the merged bank and the per annum average 
techrucal efficiency of the control group Mergers whose techrucal efficiency differentials evolve and 
congregate m Quadrant I are considered a success as they meet the dual cntena of possessing 
techrucal efficiencies that equal or exceed the BW potential20 and exceed that of their non-rnergmg 
20 The Bogetoft & Wang modelts one of many potential merger bluepnnts Therefore, an actual merger may 
employ a structure that IS different from that assumed m the Bogetoft & Wang model The model m thiS sense 
proVIdes a base lme mdicatton of the potential gams emanatmg from the merger A deal organtzed along 
different lmes, on the other hand, may be able to capture more /less effictency gams than those mdtcated by 
the Bogetoft & Wang model Consequently, an effictency dtfferent!al equalhng zero mdtcates that the merger 
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counterparts Those mergers that fall in Quadrant II show a higher efficiency score relatJ.ve to the 
control group However, they frul to meet the BW potentJ.al Thus, wlnle the merger allowed the bank 
to become more efficient than its non-mergmg counterparts, there remamed scope for further 
efficiency gams as shown by the shortfall with the BW potential These mergers are thus partJ.ally 
successful. In Quadrant III, the mergers failed to attain their techrucal efficiency potential and showed 
lower post merger techrucal efficiencies than the non-merging banks These banks would have been 
betJ.er off without the merger as It fruled to proVIde any advantage to the parent banks These mergers 
are thus unsuccessful In the final quadrant, Quadrant N, the mergers were partJ.ally successful as 
despite their efficrency shortfall compared to the control group, they stJ.ll showed a positive differentJ.al 
relative to therr BW potential Possible reasons for this could be (a) the overall potentJ.al gams may be 
small to begm with thereby enabling the bank to fully captllre this but not allowmg It to out-perfoiDI 
the control group or (b) the Bogetoft & W ang model may not be captllnng all the gains as It represents 
only one of many potential bluepnnts for the merger. This metnc is applied to those mergers that 
showed sigruficantly different efficiency levels VIs-a-VIS the control group. 
An initial post merger efficiency gain as mdicated by the TE Level can also be sustamed and I 
or augmented m the post merger years thereby allowing the bank to cement Its competitive edge over 
Its peers An examination of the efficrency change relatJ.ve to a base year would ISOlate this trend and 
proVIde an mdication of the persistence of this efficiency advantage. This represents our final analysis 
wherein we examme this efficiency change (henceforth, TE Change) of the merged banks vis-a-VIS 
the control group from a base year. For example, we compare a bank which, in two years following its 
merger, Improved Its TE by 20% to the control group wluch over the same two years registered a I 0% 
rise m Its TE In this case, an analysis of the TE Change would mdicate that the initial efficiency gams 
from the merger were sustamed and unproved upon in the post merger years The Mann-Wlumey test 
IS employed to deteilllme If the TE Change of the merged banks was significantly different from that 
of the control group The null, alternative and directional alternative hypothesis are as follows· 
successfully reahzed the potenllal gam as mdJcated by the Bogetoft and Wang model A poSI!lve differential 
would mdicate that the merger related gam was higher than that mdicated by the Bogetoft & Wang model 
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H 0 : No s1gmficant differences m TE Change between merged banks 
and control group 
H 1 : The TE Change of merged banks significantly differs from that of 
the control group 
H 2 : The TE Change of merged banks exceeds that of the control group 
We use the first post merger year as our base year for this analysis As menttoned earlier, the 
mergers represent a move towards the opttmal mdustty structure at the constant returns to scale level 
of operattons However, smce nnmediately post merger this would be a gradual shift, and as such, a 
slow adjustment process, the VRS IS more appropnate as it mvolves a more restricted set of 
possibihttes However, 1t is noted that thiS will result in higher post merger technical efficiency scores 
for the merged group than would be the case ~mder the CRS assurnptton The TE Change is calculated 
as the technical efficiency of the merged bank less the average techrncal effic1ency of the control 
group. 
5.4 Results and Analysis 
As can be seen from Table 5.3, there are potential effic1ency gan1S m all the analysed merger 
cases. The scores millcate that the potenttal gams range from a factor of I 095 to I 448 llllder the 
productton approach and from 1.003 to 1.286 ~mder the mtennediatton approach. Mergers 6 and 3 
show the highest overall potenttal gains ~mder the productton and intermediation approaches 
respecttvely The results also reveal that, the banks would not be able to take advantage of any 
technical mefficrency According to these results, the dnver of the finanCial weakness of the d1stressed 
merger targets was not the ~mder-productton of the output, 1 e, techrncal mefficiency. The operational 
backgro~md of these mergers, details of winch are proVided m the latter part of this section may 
proVIde a further clue to explam this In adilltlon, there is a lack of evidence for scale related potential 
gams among the mergers stuilled. The results of an mvestlgatton mto the returns to scale profile of the 
mergmg banks earned out one year pnor to the merger usmg BCC-DEA revealed that most of the 
banks operated ~mder decreasmg returns to scale thereby makmg the eXIStence of any scale related 
gams lllllikely 
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The bulk of the potential effic1ency gains fium the bank mergers analysed appear to stem 
pnmanly from the amalgamation and streamlining of product ffilXes rather than the eradication of any 
techmcal mefficiency. Potential gams under both the productton and mtermediation approaches can, 
consequently, be sourced to the hannony effect whereby the re<>rgarusa!ion of the serv:tce portfolio of 
the merged bank provided scope for mcreased post merger efficiency. Tins alteration of the product 
ffilX may also have the added benefit of!owering the merged bank's credit nsk. These hannony gains 
may thus be the dnvmg force behmd the gradual shift towards the establishment of wnversal banks 
For example, tlus formed one of the merger motivations for the banks involved m Merger 5 The 
proVISIOn of multiple but related serv:tces under one roof would aid m enhancing the efficiency of the 
banks, as 1t would allow for the removal of redundant and repetltlous production actiVIties 
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Table 5.3: Efficiency Scores & Decomposition for Mergers and Post Merger TE under Models 1 & 2 under CRS & VRS, 
respectively g 
MODEL 1 PRODUCTION APPROACH >§ 
"' AVERAGE 
... 
V. 
MERGER CRS POST MERGER EFFICIENCY SCORES UNDER BCC-DEA POST ~ MERGER 
EFFICIENCY 
" ~
OE TE HE SE E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10 E11 
., 
~ 
1 1172 1 000 1 172 1 000 0 97 0 97 0 88 1 00 1 00 0 95 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 0 98 0 977 "' s 2 1 288 1 000 1 288 1 000 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 000 
" 3 1 242 1 000 1 242 1 000 1 00 1 00 0 95 1 00 0 90 0 970 :... 
4 1 448 1 000 1 448 1 000 0 94 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 0 988 " 
., 
5 1 095 1 000 1 095 1 000 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 000 q-
"' 6 1 519 1 000 1 519 1 000 1 00 0 90 0 950 t;; 
7 1 230 1 000 1 230 1 000 1 00 1 00 1 000 ~ 
~ 
MODEL 2 INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
" ;;; 
AVERAGE 
" POST ~MERGER CRS POST MERGER EFFICIENCY SCORES UNDER BCC-DEA MERGER Q ., 
EFFICIENCY a 
OE TE HE SE E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10 E11 ~ 
0 
:! 
1 1 068 1 000 1 068 1 000 0 94 0 99 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 0 994 ~ 2 1 003 1 000 1 003 1 000 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 000 
" 3 1 286 1 000 1 286 1 000 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 0 95 0 990 
"" 4 1166 1 000 1 166 1 000 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 000 ~ 
5 1 082 1 000 1 082 1 000 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 000 ~ 
6 1 198 1 000 1 198 1 000 1 00 0 95 0 975 
"' 7 1 093 1 000 1 093 1 000 1 00 1 00 1 000 ~
Note E(t) refers to numberofyearsfo/lowmg the merger E g, El- I year after the merger ;:; 
"' ~ ., 
-w 
"' 
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A caveat, however, is m order at tins stage, to the effect that these findmgs may be specific to 
the vanables chosen. In other words, the banks would not be able to cap1tahse on any techrucal 
mefficJencJes from therr mergers If there are no techrucal mefficienCies attached to the use of the 
chosen variables Tiris potentially provides another explanation for the preponderance of hannony 
gams m the overall efficiency gains The vanables do not reflect the costs and expend!tures and 
profitability of the banks. A further analysiS that accounts for the profitability of the banks and the 
levels of therr NP As would provide more information on the potential for merger gams In add!tion, 
post merger, under both mput-ou1put models, the merged entities show lngh levels of techrucal 
efficienCies md!catmg potentially, that the dommant partner was able to effectively transplant its more 
successful operations profile onto Its weaker partner. 
Overall, average post merger effiCiency appeared to be higher under the mtennediatJ.on 
approach. 1bis was further mvestJ.gated using the Kohnogorov-Smimov (KS) test, as specified m 
Banker and Natarajan, (2004) The results, presented m Table 54 below, reveal that the per annum 
post merger efficiency scores were lngher in the mterrnedlatJ.on approach than the production 
approach. The post merger effiCiency IS thus sensitive to the mput-ou1put specification adopted. The 
result also signifies a shift away from the quantitative goal attainment nature of bankmg winch 
characterised the pre-reform regmie towards one where banks were afforded greater autonomy m 
deterrnming therr operations and gave emphasiS to the mterrned!ation aspect of their operations The 
results are mterestmg given the pre-drrected lendmg nature of the pre-reform regin!e. In light of these 
merger findings, It would thus appear that the post merger bank was able to take advantage of the 
deposit and chent base of the weaker bank and successfully transfigiire Its operations to adapt to the 
more autonomous banking system of the post-reform period ln add!tion, results of the KS test on the 
presence of scale mefficiency among the banks in the post merger period ind!cate that the null 
hypothesis can be n;Jected thus confinning the presence of scale ineffiCiency, and Justifies the use of 
the BCC-DEA model m the post merger period 
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Table 5.4: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests on Impact of (a) RTS Specification & (b) 
Input-Output Model on Technical Efficiency 
(A) KS TEST OF RTS ASSUMPTION ON TE 
YEAR/ MODEL MOPEL 1 (PRODUCTION APPROACH) MQDEL 2 (INTERMEDIATION APPROACH) 
D STATISTIC PVALUE D STATISTIC PVALUE 
1995 0 3600 0 0000* 0 3553 0 0000* 
1996 0 3222 0 0000* 0 3222 o oooo· 
1997 0 1939 0 0360* 0 1939 0 0360* 
1998 0 2451 0 0030* 0 2451 0 0030* 
1999 0 2255 0 0070* 0 2353 0 0040* 
2000 0 2400 0 0040* 0 2100 0 0170* 
2001 0 2424 0 0040* 0 2424 0 0040* 
2002 0 2604 0 0020* 0 2500 0 0030* 
2003 0 2637 0 0020* 0 2527 0 0040* 
2004 0 2955 0 0010* 0 2841 0 0010* 
2005 0 2299 0 0130* 0 2069 0 0340** 
• S1gmficant at 1% level 
•• S1gmficant at 5% level 
(Bl KS TEST OF INPUT-OUTPUT SPECIFICATION ON TE 
DSTATISTIC CORRECTED P VALUE 
1995 0 3103 0 0020* 
1996 0 2949 0 0010* 
1997 0 3793 o oooo· 
1998 0 3407 o oooo· 
1999 0 3152 o oooo· 
2000 0 3297 0 0000* 
2001 0 2637 0 0020* 
2002 0 2921 0 0010* 
2003 0 2706 0 0020* 
2004 0 2561 0 0060* 
2005 0 3333 o oooo· 
* S1gmf1cant at1% level 
•• S1gmficant at 5% level 
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Usmg the Mann-Wlutney test, we compared the techmcal efficiency of the merged banks 
With the control group. Results are presented in Table 5.5 We find that 1mder both mput-output 
models, the mergers led to significantly higher TE Levels for the merged banks This finding is 
mterestmg m hght of the nature of the mergers Mergers I, 2 and 3 involved a financially dtstressed 
bank and a so1md one, and were llli1lated by the Central Bank m a bid to protect the depositors The 
results suggest that rather than contannnatmg the efficiency of the stronger bank, these mergers raised 
Its efficiency above that of the average techmcal efficiency of the non-mergmg banks It would thus 
appear that the heal tin er bank's CO!JlOrate pohCies were successfully transplanted m to the newly 
merged ennty thereby allowmg it to efficiently operate in the marlcet A revrew of the post merger 
effiCiency evolutiOn from a base year would help corroborate this theory 
As can further be seen fium Table 5.5, the mergers d!d not affect the TE Change of the banks 
in the case of distressed Mergers I and 2 1mder the prod!Iction approach Merger 3 on the other hand 
is fo1md to have a Sigruficant dechne m Its techmcal efficiency change post merger rela1lve to Its non-
mergmg COW!telparts, as does Merger 5 Additionally, both mergers fru.J to ou1perfonn therr non-
mergmg co1mtezparts, i e., the non-mergmg banks displayed a greater gam m efficiency over the post 
merger penod than the merged banks Smce the TE change proVIdes a glimpse into the evolunon of 
the banks' effiCiency over 1lme and the TE Level IS akin to the ultnnate result of this effiCiency 
evolu1lon, our results pomt to a very mterestmg conclusion, VIZ , that the banks mvolved m Mergers I 
and 2 were able to capture an initial efficiency gam courtesy therr mergers and tins gam persisted 
across the post merger years exammed as shown by the TE Levels At the same 1lme, the banks were 
unable to further augment tins llli1lal gam over the post merger years In the case of Mergers 3 and 5, 
the results unply that while post merger, the banks were able to mamtain a higher level of techmcal 
effiCiency than the non-mergmg banks, they, m effect, expenenced an erosion of this head start over 
the post merger period as md!cated by their nega1lve TECs Thus these mergers experienced a 
progressive decline in therr TE post merger. And the rate of decline was different and oppoSite to that 
of the Control Group over the same penod. The market dnven merger, Merger 4, showed a greater 
efficiency change from Its base year than its non-merging co1mtezparts. The combmation of the TEL 
and TEC analysis for this merger md!cates that the merger led to a conSistently progressive 
improvement m its TE thereby enabhng it to outperform the control group. 
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Bogetoft and Wang (2005) pomt out that the dommance of harmony gains IS sugges!lve of 
potential benefits to be gamed from jomt ventures and strategic alhances rather than full-scale 
mergers. Herein hes a potential cause for the above findmg The DRS and CRS profile of the merger 
partoers m Merger 3, the DRS profile of the merging partoers m the case of Merger 5 and the CRS 
and DRS profile of the partoers m Merger 4 further substantiate thiS argument In the case of the 
banking industry though, the scope for JOmt ventures may be restncted due to the competitive 
advantage that soft information, obtamed through prolonged close interaction with clients, confers on 
the bank. Moreover, confidentiahty considerations may further limit the degree to winch a JOmt 
venture would be successful in the case of banks In such cases, a full-scale merger may proVide the 
only alternative However, the joint venture may be successful lf the banks come together for the 
development of new teclmology in winch case, post development, the application of the teclmology IS 
not hnked to confidentiahty considerations and competitive advantage erosiOn. It IS noted that the 
vahdity of thiS argument IS restricted to market dnven mergers. 
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Table 5.5: Mann-Whitney TestofTE Change and TE Level between Merged Banks 
and Control Group 
INPUT-OUTPUT MODEL I MODEL2 (PRODUCTION (INTERMEDIATION SPECIFICATION APPROACH) APPROACH) 
z 1P{MGTE> ZSTATISTIC 1P{MGTE> MERGERS §FOCUS STATISTIC CGTE} (Prob- Value) CGTE} (Prob- Value) 
TELEVEL 3.9900** 0.9960 4 1270** 1.0000 
MERGER! (0 0001) (0 0000) 
(prob-value) TE 0 6280 0.5800 3 9720** 1.0000 CHANGE (0 5303) (0.0001) 
TELEVEL 3.5990** I 0000 3 6140** I 0000 
MERGER2 (0 0003) (0 0003) 
(prob-value) TE 0 4810 0 5710 -0.9960 0 6430 CHANGE (0 6308) (0.3193) 
TELEVEL 2.6520** I 0000 2 1720** I 0000 MERGER3 (0 0080) (0.0067) 
(prob-value) TE -2 0840** 0 0630 -1.9990 0.0940** CHANGE (0 0372) (0 0456)** 
TELEVEL 2.7030** 1.0000 2 8050** 1.0000 MERGER4 (0 0069) (0 0050) 
(prob-value) TE 2 4770** I 0000 -1.9840** 0.1250 CHANGE (0 0132) (0 0472) 
TELEVEL 2 4770** I 0000 2 4770** 1.0000 MERGERS (0 0132) (0 0132) 
(prob-value) TE -2 1210** o ooo•• -2.1210** 0 0000** CHANGE (0 0339) (0 0339) 
•• Szgnzficant at the 5% level 
••• Szgnzficant at the I 0% level 
§ TE Levelzs the companson between the TE of the merged bank zn a partzcular year wzth the Average TE of the 
control group m the same year TE change refers to the companson of the change m e.fficzency of the merged 
group from a base year wzth the change zn efficzency of the control group from the same base year over the same 
tzme perzod The first post merger year IS taken to be the base year 
t MGTE refers to the TE of the Merf!.ed Bank and CGTE refers to the TE of the Control Groue. 
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AddJIIOnally, the natw'e of the mergers themselves also sheds some hght on the findmg of1E 
Change of Mergers 4 and 5 Merger 4 involved two new private sector banks They thus operated 
wtth the same technological and cotpOrate cultw'e thereby offenng potentJ.ally more synergy and 
scope for effiCiency gams In the latter case, however, the merger was between one new pnvate sector 
bank and one old pnvate sector bank, 1 e., two banks With very different operatJ.ng profiles The need 
to synchromse these dJvergent operatJ.ng cultures may have eroded the IDI1:J.al potential efficiency gams 
from the merger Moreover, wlnle the merger would give the new private sector bank access to an 
extensive branch netwmk, new rruuket region and chent base, It would, nevertheless, mhent an asset 
portfoho nddled w1th NP As- the treatJ.nent of which would potentJ.ally have Jmparred Its ability to 
attam and mamtam a lngh level of post merger techmcal efficiency. 
The merger metnc developed m SectJ.on 5.2 further substantJ.ates these findmgs. Results are 
presented in Table 5 6 and figures 5 2-5.3 
Under the production approach, for Merger 1, we find that the merger was successful as It 
captw'ed the potentJ.al as mdJcated by the Bogetoft and Wang model In additJ.on, It also showed a 
higher level of efficiency than the control group m the post merger penods Exammmg the 
chronological progression of the dJfferentials, it can be seen that the efficiency gams however took 
tJ.me to mamfest themselves With the bulk of the gams appeanng four years post merger Havmg 
mamfested themselves however, the gams fium the merger persisted across the post merger penod. 
Mergers 2 and 3 on the other hand do not exhibit this Jag in the emergence of efficiency gams They 
also show a persistence m the efficiency over the post merger penod. 
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Table 5.6: BW & CG Differentials under Modell (Production Approach) & Model 2 (Intermediation Approach) 
POST MERGER YEARS (MODEL I. PRODUCTION APPROACH) g 
MERGER DIFFERENTIALS El E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 EIO Ell 
-§ 
~ 
MERGER I BW -0 030 -0.030 -0.120 0 000 0 000 -0050 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 -0 020 ... .., 
CG 0 103 0 121 0 099 0 138 0.144 0 107 0 155 0.155 0 125 0 129 0098 ~ 
" MERGER2 BW 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0000 0.000 ~
CG 0 138 0144 0 157 0 155 0 155 0 125 0 129 0 118 ; 
MERGER3 BW 0.000 0 000 -0 050 0 000 -0.100 "' ~ 
CG 0.155 0 155 0 075 0 129 0 018 () :... 
" 
"' POST MERGER YEARS (MODEL 2. INTERMEDIATION APPROACH) ~
"' MERGER DIFFERENTIALS El E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 EIO Ell ;;;~ 
MERGER I BW -0060 -0 010 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0000 0000 0 000 0000 0 000 ~ 
CG 0 057 0.132 0 207 0 132 0 141 0 151 0 149 0 152 0 125 0.129 0.117 ~ 
" ~
MERGER2 BW 0 000 0.000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0000 0000 0 000 ~ CG 0 132 0 141 0 151 0 149 0 152 0 125 0 129 0 117 :. 
"' 
MERGER3 BW 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 -0 050 t 
CG 0 149 0 152 0 125 0 129 0 067 :. ~ 
" MERGER4 BW 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 ,.... 
CG 0.149 0.152 0 125 0.129 0.117 ~ 
~ 
"' MERGER5 BW 0000 0000 0 000 0 000 ~ 
CG 0 152 0 125 0 129 0.117 s 
-
~ ~ 9-
"' 
"' 
Figure 5.2: Merger Metnc- Model] (Productwn Approach) 
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Under the mtermediation approach, all the mergers analysed had sJgmficantly higher 
efficiency levels than the control group. Ths corroborates the finding of the producnon approach and 
further substannates the view that the stronger merger partner was able to transplant Its better 
management and efficiency practice onto the weaker bank Ttuning to the TEC analysis, Merger I IS 
now found to exhibit a progressive improvement m Its TE greater than the control group. Merger 2 
dJd not experience any sigmficant Improvement m its TE scores from Its base year while the 
remamder of the mergers expenenced a significant decline in their TEC post merger. Merger 4 on the 
other hand, however, dJd outperfonn the control group, unlike Mergers 3 and 5 Thus wlnle the 
mergers led to mcreased efficiency mitially that persisted in the post merger penod, the majonty of the 
merged banks fruled to capitalise on this head start and further augment their efficiency 
Applying our merger metric, Merger I, under the producnon approach, shows a movement 
from Quadrant ll to Quadrant I, With stronger movement in the latter part of the post merger period 
We can t!Jus mfer tiJat for thJs partJcular merger, the gains took tJme to matenahse However, havmg 
done so, they persist across the penod analysed The remainder of the mergers are located m Quadrant 
I thereby mdJcanng tiJat they captured fully their Bogetoft and Wang potential Efficrency gains and 
successfully outperfonned the non-merging banks Snrular results are apparent under the 
mtermedJanon approach With the excepnon of Merger 3 wluch shows a different pattern m tiJat 1t 
congregates m Quadrant I m the begmnmg of the post merger penod but towards the end of the 
penod, it drops to Quadrant ll. It can be mferred from this movement tiJat the momenrum of efficiency 
gams derived from the merger was lost m the last post merger year. 
Overall, the results indicate that the mergers possessed considerable gains, the bulk of which 
stemmed from hannony gams The banks were able to mamtain a lugh level of post merger technical 
effiCiency Tlus indJcates that the healthier bank was able to transplant its management skills onto the 
weaker bank The average efficrencres of the control group, meanwhile, ind.Jcate tiJat there remams an 
appreCiable amount of mefficrency among lud.Jan banks 
Whereas, central bank dnven mergers dominated this study, the recent nse in voluntary 
private bank mergers could signal the begmoings of a npple effect With more banks Jmnping onto the 
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merger bandwagon ID an attempt to emulate the success of the mergers to date and to take advantage 
the relaxed regulatoty clunate regardmg mergers Extrapolating from our current findmgs, these 
mergers could poten1Ially raise the effiCiency of the banks thus enablmg them to bolster their 
profitability and mcrease therr lendmg se!Vlces thus ensunng that vital crecht percolates down to the 
vanous sectors of the economy thereby stimulating economic growth (Sylla, 2006, Levme 1997). 
Tins warrants further investigation through the inclus1on of profitability measures m the analysis and 
proVIdes a direction for fu!w'e research. Also, for tins to occur, the banks must evolve from a passive 
stance of mouldmg therr operations to ensure compliance with regula1Ion imposed targets to one of 
ac1Ive pUI'SUlt of a lugh calibre asset portfolio. The dommance of the mtermediation approach suggests 
that Indian banks have already begun contending With this slnft m the na!w'e of their operations 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has exammed the efficiency benefits flowmg from post reforms mergers among 
Indian Banks over the penod 1991-92 to 2004-05 Usmg the Bogetoft and Wang (2005), model, the 
potential for merger gams IS calculated and decomposed into technical, hannony and size efficiency 
components We extend this applica1Ion to evaluate post sample reaiiSauons of the poten1Ial gains 
Post-merger technical efficiency, denved usmg BCC-DEA, IS used to gauge the degree to wluch the 
technical efficiency gams have been captured following the completion of the merger for up to a 
decade We also proVide a metnc for judgmg the success or frulure of a merger 
Overall, the results IDdicate that post reforms, the mergers led to COilSiderable enhancement of 
efficiencies for the merging banks. The mergers themselves exlub!ted considerable poten1Ial 
efficiency gams The greater part of these gams stemmed from the synchronisauon of vaned but 
related product IDIXes. In other words, hannony gams were found to be the main source of the 
poten1Ial effiCiency gams Mergers between distressed and strong banks were found to exlub!t 
persiStence in efficiency across 1Ime However, they were not found to IDcrease therr effiCiency from 
the base year suggesting that the initial boost ID efficiency was not built upon. The input-output 
speCification adopted was found to have a s1gmficant impact on the effiCiency scores obtamed. This 
rising sigmficance of the IDtermediauon approach symbolises the shift ID the opera1Ional profiles of 
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banks away from solely functJ.orung as regulatmy condwts for credit disbursement to the prionty 
sectors towards a more autonomous, profit-{)nented operatiOnal profile In other words, wlnle banks 
are still requrred to meet priority sector lendmg targets, (a) these are on a much-reduced scale and (b) 
the regulatory emphasis IS on therr roles as profit oriented financJa! intennediaries Further, an 
examination of the nature of the mergers reveals that although the regulations were relaxed and 
amended to encourage mergers, the unpetus for the mergers remamed Central Bank dnven. It would 
thus appear that the economic pohcy reforms have succeeded in cleanmg up the banking system in 
tenns of ridding 1t of weaker and meffic1ent banks. However, these banks have s1mply been merged 
into healthier banks Incumbent strong banks wd not appear to adopt the merger and acquis1tion route 
to raise their effiCJencles 
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CHAPTER 6: MODELING MERGER RELATED EFFICIENCY 
GAINS THROUGH BALANCED AND UNBALANCED SAMPLE 
CONSTRUCTION USING STOCHASTIC FRONTIER ANALYSIS 
6.1 Introduction 
The introduction of econonnc reforms in India in the early mnetles led to a 
comprehensive change m the operational and competitive landscape of the bankmg system 
Banks were afforded greater operational autonomy, the influx of greater competition was 
encouraged vta relaxation of entry regulatiOns, foreign participation in the banking system 
was encouraged and the systematic dismantling of the drrected Jendmg regime was 
undertaken. Thus, the over-archmg regulatory climate was one that sought to purge the 
bankmg system of its pre-reform lethargy and m Its place, establish one wherein banks 
adopted a more active role in the identification and pursuit of credit disbursement 
opportunities Propelled by these changes, the Indian bankmg mdustry bore wimess to a 
series of mergers and acquisitions as banks sought to adapt themselves to their post-reform 
bankmg environment 
Market dnven busmess mergers have long been an integral part of the commercial 
history of developed economies Consequently, there have been numerous studies 
exammmg the motivatwns behmd and benefits of mergers in developed economies These 
studies on the rrnpact of mergers on the efficiency of mergmg banks fmd little evidence of 
efficiency gams (Arnel et a!, 2004, Garden & Ralston, 1999; Penstlam, 1997) While the 
data and research findmgs pertainmg to bank mergers m developed economies provide 
valuable evidence on the effects of mergers on frrm efficiency, the differing econonnc and 
mstltutional conditions m emergmg economies like India make drrect extrapolation of the 
results from these studies difficult. For example, mergers m the Indian bankmg mdustry fall 
under one of two categones, viz market dnven mergers and those arranged by the Central 
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Bank in an attempt to reparr financzally ailing bankmg uruts What zs the efficiency fallout 
of these mergers? Did the rescue mergers successfully treat the azlmg bankmg unit? 
This chapter offers an mszght mto the effectiveness of the economic pohcy reforms 
m encouragmg efficzency and productivity enhancing mergers m the Indian Bankmg 
System by examirung mergers among commercial banks m India over the post-reform 
penod 1992 to 2005 This is accomplished usmg the Stochastic Frontier Approach and a 
tnad of panels viz., (a) a balanced panel constructed usmg a balanced control group ofnon-
mergmg banks and a bank winch merged durmg the sample penod but whose constituents 
are treated as conglomerate data outszde the merger penod Thzs does not mvolve the use of 
hypothetical data, rather it treats the merged banks addztively as a single data pomt m each 
penod for each year precedmg the year of the merger (b) an unbalanced panel compnsmg 
all banks that entered the market over the post-reform penod and (c) an unbalanced panel 
compnsing of the banks involved m the mergers and a balanced control group of non-
mergmg banks Merger mduced efficiency changes are thus identified and a comparative 
performance analysis of merging and non-mergmg banks zs then undertaken The degree to 
wluch rescue mergers successfully identify the inefficzency of the rulmg bankmg urut zs 
also assessed. In addztion, by reconstructmg the merged entity by snnulation so that zt eXIsts 
addztively from the start of the study honzon until the point of actual merger, an mszght mto 
the temporal potential for merger related efficiency gams IS gamed These three approaches 
exhaust all the patterns of data transformation used in the literature on emprrical merger 
analysis 
This chapter is orgarused mto 5 sections Sectzon 6 2 descnbes the methodology 
while SectiOn 6.3 details the data set used Results are presented and discussed m Section 
6.4. Section 6.5 concludes 
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6.2 Methodology 
The production frontier represents the maximum output that can be produced gtven 
an mput bundle Thus firms wluch are fully efficient operate on the frontJer wlule those that 
are mefficient, operate at some point w1tlun the frontier thereby md1catmg the scope for 
further expansion of outputs produced gtven theu current input bundle This shortfall m 
output productiOn m the latter scenano represents technical mefficiency Our preferred 
methodology for measunng tlus mefficiency IS the Stochastic FrontJer Analysis (SFA) 
The stochast1c frontier methodology was developed by Aigner et a! (1977) and 
Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) mdependently. The methodology mcorporates a 
composed error structJJre to captJJre the meffic1ency of the firm The random error 
component represents statistJcal nOise and measurement error while the non-negatJve 
random vanable represents deVJatJOns from the frontJer due to inefficiency. Thus, a general 
stochastic production functiOn for a panel With N fmns and T time penods usmg a vector of x 
mputs, such that X ER::, toproduceoutputy, such that yE Rf can be wntten as. 
[6.1) 
where Ynt is the n 1h firm's output in log values m the lh period and Xnt is the logged 
value of the mputs that vary between fmns and over tJme /31s a vector of unknown 
parameters to be estimated and the error term &nt iS spec1fied as (vnt- Unt }. The 
vnt represents random error that IS 1.1 d normally distnbuted Unt is a non-negative random 
vanable that represents technical meffic1ency. 
A range of frontier specificatiOns were fitted These mcluded the Pit! and Lee 
(1981) model, Sclumdt and Sickles (1984) panel data approaches, Battese and Coelh (1995) 
and the tune varymg approaches of Comwell, S1ckles and Sclumdt (1990), Battese and 
Coelh (1992), and the True SFA models of Greene (2003) wluch account for both tune 
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varymg inefficiency and latent firm heterogeneity Details of the same are presented m the 
following sections and the structure of the modelling strategy IS set out below m Figure 6.1. 
Econormc reforms were instituted in the bankmg system with a view to raising Its 
efficiency, strength and profitability The effect of tlus was a gradual change m the 
environment and operative nature of the banking system. Tlus m turn would Impact the 
efficiency of the mdividual banks which would respond to the changing structure of the 
banking system The temporal change m efficiency IS accommodated using various models 
that mcorporate time vanat10n in efficiencies. Furthermore, an assessment of the mfluence 
of exogenous factors on mefficiency would serve to provide an md1cation of the 
effectiveness of the economics reforms m acluevmg their stated objective of banking 
system efficiency enhancement and the degree to which they did so. Conducting tlus 
analysis via the aforementioned models enables us to assess merger related efflcienc1es 
under a time varymg settmg, incorporate the inipact of environmental vanables and assess 
the robustness of the results 
6.2.1 Schmidt and Sickles (1984) Panel Data Models 
A simple vanat10n enables the standard panel data approach to be adapted to 
frontier analysis The standard panel approach encompasses both an idiosyncratic error 
component and unobserved heterogeneity wluch can be solely tlme-varymg, solely firm-
varymg or both To enable frontier analysis, tlus unobserved heterogeneity IS assumed to be 
greater than zero. Modellmg both components is accomplished through fixed and random 
effects models The key dJstmct10n between these lies in whether the unobserved effects are 
correlated With the explanatory vanables (Wooldridge, 2002). If such a correlatiOn does 
exist, the fixed effect approach is adopted. 
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The Sclnmdt and Sickles (1984) model of efficzency estnna!Ion can be undertaken 
under both fixed21 and random effects assumptiOns In the case of the former, the estnnation 
takes the followmg form 
[6.2] 
where. A.= A, -u. 
The tzme invanant mefficzency component, u., zs assumed to be correlated with the 
regressors and no further distnbutional assumptions are made regardmg the same The 
model thus resembles a panel data model with firm-specific, time-constant heterogeneity 
whzch appear via firm-specific intercepts, Po •. The zdwsyncra!Ic error term, v ., , has the 
usual properties and IS assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory vanables 
Estimation IS carrted out VIa the withm transformatiOn or the Least Squares Dummy 
Variable (LSDV) procedure. Under the former, the vanables are expressed in terms of 
deviations from therr (lime) means and OLS is apphed. TheN mtercepts are then recovered 
from the residuals Under the LSDV approach, the mtercept is suppressed and N dummy 
vanables are mcluded m the equatiOn to be estnnated. Both procedures produce equivalent 
results. 
Having recovered the mtercept, i e., firm-specific heterogeneity values, inefficiency 
IS then estnnated as follows 
u. =max(A)- P. [6.3] 
21 The Schm1dt and Szckles (1981) fixed and random effects models are henceforth referred to as the Schnudt 
and Szckles FE Model and Schmzdt and Szckles RE Model, respectzvely 
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where the /J. represent the estimated firm spectfic mtercepts 
One firm IS thus 1 00% efficient The meffictenctes of the remaining firms are then 
estimated relative to tills efficient firm The procedure bears similartties wtth the Corrected 
Ordmary Least Squares (COLS) procedure wherem the estimated regression IS shifted up 
by the value of the highest restdual and inefficiencies are esttmated relative to the highest 
valued residual (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000) 
The advantage in adopting thts approach hes m tts ability to incorporate correlatiOns 
between the inefficiencies and the regressors and the non-reqmrement of distributional 
assumptions on the inefficiency term However, the within transformatiOn eradtcates any 
ttme invariant regressors The estimated firm effects, 1 e., inefficiencies may thus include 
the effects of factors I vartables that are firm varymg but ttme constant. The model is, thus, 
m a sense, determtrustic, as any and all heterogeneity ts attributed to mefficiency. 
EstimatiOn under the random effects model, however, enables the mcluswn of ttme 
constant-firm varymg regressors The inefficiency effects are, however, m contrast to the 
fixed effects model, assumed to be uncorrelated wtth the regressors As such, in 
conJunction wtth the idiOsyncratic error term, this leads to an estimatiOn model wtth the 
followmg composed error term. 
u, =max(P,)- p, [6.4) 
Where [6.5) 
The presence of the firm-spectfic, time-constant meffictency effect induces senal 
correlation m the errors. This IS handled through a Generalised Least Squares (GLS) 
procedure (Wooldndge, 2002). 
158 
Chapter 6 Modellzng Merger Related E.fficzencyGains though Balanced and Unbalanced 
Sample Constructzon uszng Stochastzc Frontzer Analyszs 
The firm spectfic meffictencies are then recovered from the reszduals in the 
followmg manner 
. 1~ 
u, =-L...Y_.-p~-x,.p 
T t 
.. •* ... 
U 1 =maxu1 -u1 
' 
6.2.2 Cornwell, Sickles and Schmidt (1990) Time Varying Efficiency model 
[6.6) 
[6.7) 
The Comwell, Stckles and Schmtdt (CSS) model bwlds on the Schmtdt and Szckles 
(1982) model and incorporates trme vanation m the estimated ineffictenctes Beginning 
with the fixed effects model, the time variatJ.on ts introduced through the firm-spectfic 
mtercept which IS spectfied as a quadratic function of time, 1 e , 
[6.8) 
where [6.9) 
The producer specific mefficzency thus vanes over !!me and m a marmer that ts 
dzfferent for each producer Note that, if n ,, = n ,3 = 0 '</ n, the model collapses to the 
Schmidt and Sickles (1984) tJ.me-mvariant model of the precedmg section On the other 
hand, If 0,2 = 0 n 'rf n and 0,3 = 0 n 'rf n, the model collapses to that of the fixed effects 
model of Schmidt and Stckles (1984) 
Estimation of the CSS model can be undertaken under both fixed and random 
effects assumptions. Producer spectfic inefficzenctes can be estJ.mated in a marmer akm to 
that under the Schmidt and Stckles (1984) model 
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6.2.3 Battese and Coelli (1992) Time Varying Efficiency model 
To mcorporate temporal vanations in effic1ency, we apply the Battese and Coelh 
(1992) model and specify u as follows: 
[6.10] 
The u n s are assumed to be 1.i d distributed as truncated-normal, N+ (u, u~) and 17 
IS an unknown scalar parameter to be estrmated If TJ IS pos1tive, mefficiency IS decreasmg 
and if TJ 1s found to be negative, meffic1ency 1s increasmg Teclm1cal efficiency 1s thus 
time varying However, the pattern of tlus temporal variation IS the same for all the firms so 
that a more mstructive name llllght be time pers1stent inefficiency. 
Followmg Battese and Coelh (1992), the bank spec1fic effic1ency is calculated as 
the conditional expectation of exp(- u;) giVen & nt 
[6.11] 
6.2.4 True Stochastic Frontier Models (Greene, 2003) 
The panel data models of Schmidt and S1ckles (1984) and CSS (1990) do not 
distinguish between latent firm heterogeneity and meffic1ency Rather, the time-constant, 
fmn-varymg effects are attnbuted m entirety to meffic1ency The d1stinct10n between the 
two effects can be mamtained m addition to trme vanat10n in meffic1ency Via the True 
Stochastlc Frontier Models (TSFA) of Greene (2003). 
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The fixed effects TSFA model places the heterogeneity effects m the firm specific 
mtercept and leaves the time varying ineffic1ency in the composed error term In other 
words, 
[6.11) 
The ineffic1ency component has the usual stochast1c frontier model spec1ficanons. 
The model can be estimated VIa firm spec1fic dummy vanables to account for the firm 
heterogeneity More importantly, unlike the Schnudt and Sickles (1984) and CSS (1990) 
models, the estimatiOns are carried out usmg Maxnnum Likelihood Estlmatwns 
The True Random Effects model assumes that the inefficiency IS uncorrelated w1th 
the explanatory vanables and takes the followmg forms: 
[6.12) 
The tlme-invanant, firm specific heterogeneity IS embod1ed in w. 
6.2.5 Exogenous Variables 
The nnpact of environmental vanables on meffic1ency can be incorporated by 
including the environmental variables directly onto the frontler or by assuming they affect 
the mefficiency duectly. 
In the former case, where the vanables are mcorporated directly onto the frontier, the 
exogenous variables act as control variables to the productwn process thereby allowing for 
a more accurate representatiOn of the production technology. The factors do not affect 
mefficiency directly but do affect the technology structJJ.re by wluch the outputs are 
produced thereby affectmg the efficiency of the firm mdirectly The exogenous factors thus 
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enter into the determirustic kernel of the frontier. Letting Z = (z1, z2 , ... ,zk) represent these 
k exogenous factors, the productiOn functiOn charactensing efficient output production can 
be wntten as follows 
[6.13) 
Coelli et al (1999) note that the resulting effic1ency estnnates are therefore net of the 
impact of these exogenous factors Th1s approach, henceforth called Model I, 1s used m 
when eshmatmg meffic1ency when usmg the Schm1dt and Sickles (1984), CSS (1990), 
Battese and Coelh (1992), True SFA (Greene, 2003) and Pltt and Lee approaches 
Wlule the temporal pattern of these exogenous variables IS not an issue in the case of 
Random Effect models, the inclusiOn of hme-constant, firm varymg exogenous vanables 
(for example, ownerslup dummy vanables) is problemahc m the cases of F1xed effects 
estnnations. Tlus 1s because the Within-transformation in the fixed effects models 
eliminates lime mvanant variables Their inclusiOn IS thus accomplished via interactions 
With time varymg vanables 
In the second case, the exogenous factors dtrectly mfluence the m efficiency of the 
bank This approach thus assumes that the banks face the same technology and the Impact 
of the exogenous factors IS restricted to the distance of a bank from the front1er 
Consequently, the impacts of the exogenous factors are captured by hnkmg them drrectly 
w1th the mefficiency term 
As noted m Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), early approaches at modelling tlus 
mvolved a two stage analysiS w1th the first stage involvmg the estnnatwn of mefficiency 
and the second stage, the regressiOn of the estnnated inefficiencies on the exogenous 
factors. This inhuhve method suffers from contradictory econometric assumptiOns 
however Tlus IS so because, m the first stage, the meffic1encies are assumed to be 
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independently and Identically distributed thereby allowmg for the firm specific 
mefficiencies to be estimated However in the second stage, these same inefficiencies are 
assumed to then have a functional relatiOnship with the exogenous vanables. 
A solution to this problem was proposed through the works of Kumbhakar et al 
(1991), Reifschiieider and Stevenson (1991) and Battese and Coelh (1995) wherem the 
mefficiency and the factors mfluencmg It are estunated in a single step along with ilie 
remammg parameters of ilie model. These approaches accomplish this by modellmg the 
m efficiency as a functiOn of ilie k exogenous vanables and a random error component The 
m efficiency follows the truncated-normal distnbution, N+ (,e-nt, u~) (CoeJli et a!, 1999). 
Alternatively, as proposed by Reifschiieider and Stevenson (1991), the vanance of ilie 
tnmcated-normally distnbuted mefficiency can be modelled as a function of the exogenous 
factors, i.e. 
u; - N+ (o,u~n) 
where u~n =CT~0 +g(zn,r),g(zn,r)~o [6.14] 
We include a time trend vanable to account for ilie tune-vanatton of inefficiency in tlus 
model. 
The Reifschiieider and Stevenson (1991) model has ilie added advantage of 
belongmg to a class of models ilia! possess ilie scaling property Identified by Schmidt and 
Wang (2002) These models specify a distnbutiOn for ilie mefficiency element and allow 
ilie parameters of iliat distributiOn to be dependent on ilie exogenous factors The resultmg 
effect is to homogemse the shape ofthe mefficiency distnbution across all the firms m ilie 
sample while simultaneously allowmg ilie degree of mefficiency dispersiOn to vary across 
ilie firms. Thus, ilie way ilie exogenous vanables affect efficiency, I e, ilie sensitiVIty of a 
firm to factors influencmg Its efficiency, IS umque to ilie firm and IS caprured by ilie 
differences m efficiency dispersions An alternate and eqUivalent representation of ilie 
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Reifschneider and Stevensen ( 1991) model m equatiOn [ 6 5] that Illustrates this IS 
u1 - N+ (0,1)• u. (z., ,0) where the first element establishes the shape of the mefficiency 
distribution. The second element, which IS the scalmg factor, reflects the influence of the 
envrronmental factors on the inefficiency. 
6.2.6 Output Oriented Stochastic Distance Function for Panel Data 
Estimation of the aforementioned models requires a functional specificatiOn for the 
productiOn technology We adopt the distance functiOn approach to fitting a translog 
stochastlc production functiOn The distance functiOn approach to specifymg a production 
function allows for the handlmg of multiple mputs and outputs. Most production function 
models handle multiple mputs and outputs by aggregatmg them or by utihsmg the dual 
representations of the production techiiology Lack of data on output and mput pnces 
precludes the adoption of this approach to handling multiple inputs and outputs m this 
chapter We thus settle on the &stance functiOn approach which does not reqmre 
mformatwn on input and output prices and can easily accommodate the multi-output, multi-
mput narure of the bankmg process 
Assume a total of N firms m T periods usmg a vector ofx inputs, such that x e R';', to produce 
youtputs, such that ye R~ . Theproductwnset T(x,y) can hence be defined as, 
T(x,y)={ (x,y}:xcanproducey} [6.15] 
Thus the feasible set of output vectors y that can be produced from each input vector x, 
represented as P(x) is as follows 
P(x)= {y:(x,y}eT} [6.16] 
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The output distance functiOn D 0 represents the smallest positive scalar diVISOr 8 of 
a bundles of the bank's outputs such y such that (yjo) IS in the output possibility set. 
D0(x,y)=min{o :% eP(x),o >0} [6.17] 
Thus,Do(x,y )!> 1. The distance functiOn takes a value of unity If the output of the 
bank hes on the frontier It thus lends it readily to the estimatiOn of firm inefficiency. 
Specifically, output distance functions completely characterise the technology set and are 
equivalent to the mverse of Farrell 's measure of output technical efficiency. 
The output distance function IS non-decreasmg in y, non-mcreasmg m x, 
homogenous of degree I m outputs, convex iny and quasi-convex m x. Distance functions 
can be estimated using a vmety of methodologies such as Corrected Ordmary Least 
Squares (COLS), Data Envelopment Analysts (DEA) and Stochastlc Frontier Analysts We 
choose to apply the latter since 1t provides the advantages of incorporatmg a stochastlc error 
term m addition to a one stded meffictency term A translog functwnal form IS specified for 
the output onented distance functiOn as follows 
l-1 M Jl-ll-1 _ _ 
ao + L azln Y!nt + L Pm lnxmnt +- L L azp In Yllt In Yp,t 
l=l m=l 2 l=l p=l 
1 M M l-1 M 
+- L LfJmq lnxmzt lnxq,t + L L 8zm ln.Yzzt lnxm,t +v,t +uu 
2 m=lq=l l=l m=l 
t = 1,2, ... ,T 
z = 1,2, ... ,N 
[6.18) 
where "nt = {exp[-TJ(t-r)nu; Model I [6.19) 
[6.20] 
165 
Chapter 6 Modelling MergerRelated EjjiczencyGams though Balanced and Unbalanced 
Sample Constructzon uszng Stochastzc Frontzer Analyszs 
[6.21) 
We further llllpose the following restrictions· 
I I I 
(a) Homogeneity of degree I m outputs: La I= 1, Lalp = 0 and L.91m = 0 
1=1 1=1 1=1 
(b) Symmetry. a1P =a pi and Pmq = Pqm. 
The vanables are expressed as deviations from the sample mean to ensure that the 
pomt of approximatiOn embodied m the translog functiOn IS the sample mean itself This 
transformatiOn ensures that the econolllic properties of the distance functiOn can be checked 
at the sample mean by using the first order regression coefficients 
Under Model I, exogenous variables enter the functiOn directly. The translog 
function 1s one of the most commonly used functional forms m the literature Linear 
homogeneity is imposed by using one of the output vanables to normalise the remamder 
Estimation of the models IS undertaken using MaXImum Likelihood EstimatiOn (MLE) and 
the estimated parameters are required to sat1sfy the necessary monotomc1ty wluch requrres 
that the functiOn be non-mcreasmg mputs and non-decreasmg m outputs Th1s IS checked 
using the elasticitJes of distance w1th respect to mputs and outputs The former must be less 
than or equal to zero for the function to be non-mcreasmg m mputs and the latter must be 
greater than or equal to zero for the function to be non-decreasing m outputs 
6.2.7 Panel Structure and Merger Analysis 
To a1d our merger analySIS, we construct tlrree panels and apply the aforementioned 
models to each one Panel I IS a balanced panel constructed usmg a balanced control group 
of non-merging banks and a bank wluch merged durmg the sample penod but whose 
constituents are treated as conglomerate data outs1de the merger penod. Tlus does not 
involve the use of hypothet1cal data, rather 1t treats the merged banks add1tively as a single 
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data point m each penod for each year preceding the year of the merger. The merged bank 
is thus constructed additJvely by aggregating the mputs and outputs of the parent banks It 
IS mtroduced mto the sample for the duratiOn of the pre-merger study penod. Thus, while 
the mdJ.VJdual mergers occurred at vanous pomts m time, the merged bank is reconstructed 
to ex1st from the beginning of the time penod exarnmed to the point of actual merger from 
whence the actual merged bank 1s studied Tlus allows us to establish a pattern for the 
evolution of efficiency and productivity for the merged bank Companson to banks that 
were in existence for the duratiOn of the study horizon and did not undertake any mergers 
offers a stable control group agamst wluch to assess the existence, 1f any, of merger related 
efficiency gams An assessment of merger related efficiency gams is carried out by 
comparmg the effic1ency and productivity trend and values of the observationally 
reconstructed merged bank in the pre-merger penod w1th that of the merged entity m the 
post merger penod. Figure 6 1 presents the panel construction specificatiOns for Panel 1 for 
the l1h and m1h mergers. The mergers occur m penods MY1 and MY m respectively, 
wlule T represents the study honzon. 
Figure 6.1: Panell, Observatzonally Merged Bank and Balanced Control Group 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ' 
T 
Merge'i . ' ~----- ... ,-----' ....________ ~------__./ 
• 
RMBI+BCG AMBI +BCG 
Mergerm \·--------------., .--------------··\~---.y~-----") 
,. 
RMBm +BCG AMBm +BCG 
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where. 
Merger m = M 1h merger 1, .. /, . m; I * m 
MY m = Year zn whzch merger m occured 
BCG = Balanced control group 
RMB = Observatzonally Reconstructed Merged Bank 
AMB 
' ' "---- .. \,-----' 
=Actual merged bank 
= Pre- merger perzod 
=Post - merger period 
The second panel, Panel 2, assesses the perl'ormance of the mergers agamst those banks 
that were present throughout the study penod. In thts case, the efficiency and productiVIty of the 
merged bank was estimated as the average of the target and the acqurrer in the year prior to 
the merger The incorporation of a balanced control group proVIdes a stable background against 
winch to study the merger related efficiency and produc1:!VIty gains F1gure 6.2 presents the panel 
construction specificatiOns for Panel 2 for the lth and m th mergers. The mergers occur m 
penods MY1 and MY m respectively, while T represents the study honzon. 
Figure 6.2. Panel2, Merged Bank and Balanced Control Group 
I I I I I 11 I I I I I I I I 11 I I I I I I I I I I I • 
T 
Mergelj 
·····-.:····· '-----...... _______ _...-
' MB1 +BCG 
Mergerm '-................ .. ............• -''--...----.. -----~) 
'{ y 
MBm+BCG MBm+BCG 
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where· 
Mergerm = M 1h merger 1, ... 1, .. m; l '*m 
MY m = year zn whzch merger m occured 
BCG = Balanced control group 
MB = Merged Bank 
AMB =Actual merged bank 
'. _____ _____ : = Pre- merger perzods 
\ 
'--..y----1 = Post- merger periods 
Our fmal panel, Panel 3 IS an unbalanced panel compnsmg all banks that entered 
the market over the post-reform penod. The composition of the control group in this analysiS 
vaned over the time studied due to the ently and eXIt of banks A dynarrnc control group provtdes 
certain advantages given the nature of the mergers studied SIX of the mergers analysed were 11lltiated 
by the Central Bank m a bid to rescue an ailing bank. Part of the distress tnay be lmked to the influx of 
new pnvate and fore:tgn banks With more efficient and streamlmed operations fuclusmn of these 
banks m the control group thus serves as a means to assess the performance of the merged banks 
aganiSt therr competitors Moreover, the post reform penod was charactensed by a relaxation of 
regulations on the entry of foretgn banks and the establiShment of new pnvate sector banks The 
1lllllket dnven mergers may thus have been undertaken in antiCipation of or m reaction to the ently of 
new banks thus mcreasmg the attractiveness of mco1pora1lng these banks in the control group Figure 
6 3 presents the panel constructiOn specifications for Panel 3 for the lth and m th mergers. 
The mergers occur in periods MY1 and MY m respectively, while T represents the study 
honzon 
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Figure 6.3 · Panel2, Merged Bank and Unbalanced Control Group 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I • 
MYt T 
Merge~ . . 
'·-···-.,-----' ..._ ______ -------------
' MB+UBCG AMB1 + UBCG 
u \ ,' ergerm ··----·--------... --------------- '-------.. ;---__./ ,. 
MBm+UBCG AMBm + UBCG 
where 
Merger m = M 1h merger 1, .l, .. m, l 'I' m 
MY m = Year m whzch merger m occured 
UBCG = Unbalanced control group 
MB = Merged Bank 
AMB = Actual merged bank 
·, _____ _____ : = Pre- merger perzods 
' ~ = Post- merger perzods 
In the cases of Panels 2 and 3, If there are sigruficant post-merger efficiency gains, 
the same IS assessed by comparing the post-merger efficiency of the merged bank w1th the 
average efficiency of the target bank over the pre-merger penod. This allows us to assess if 
post-merger, the bank was able to mcrease Its cost efficiency to beyond the pre-merger 
level The second analysiS involves the TE Level of the bank. The TE Level analysis 
mvolves the companson of the post merger cost efficiency of the merged bank With the average cost 
efficiency of the control group of non-mergmg banks This indicates the degree to winch the merger 
was advantageous to the bank relatJ.ve to Its non-merging counterparts Tins IS because, wlnle the bank 
may have failed to fully cap1:ilre Its pre-merger 1E, 1t may still have realized sufficient efficiency gams 
to attain a competJ.tJ.ve advantage relatJ.ve to Its non-merging competJ.tors To perform the analysis, the 
post merger 1E of the merged bank in a particular year was compared with the average 1E of the 
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control group m the same year For example, the 1E of a bank two years after Its merger m 1998 IS 
compared With the average 1E of the control group m 2000 Fmally to assess If an iruttal post merger 
efficiency gam, as mdicated by the 1E Level, was sustained and I or augmented in the post merger 
years thereby allowing the bank to cement Its compe!IIlve edge over Its peers, we undertake an 
analysiS of the merged bank's cost efficiency change from a base year relative to that of the control 
group from the same base year For example, we compare a bank wluch, m two years following Its 
merger, improved Its 1E by 20% to the control group wluch over the same two years regiStered a I 0% 
rise m Its 1E. 11us would thus mdicate that the iruttal efficiency gauiS from the merger were sustained 
and unproved upon m the post merger years An examinallon of the efficiency change relallve to a 
base year would thus Isolate the post-merger effiCiency trend expenenced by a bank and proVIde an 
indicatton of the persiStence of any efficiency advantage Results from such an analysiS can be 
corroborated by examirung the productiVIty fallout for the merged entity 
In the cases of the Sclunidt and Sickles (1984), CSS {1990), Battese and Coelli (1992), 
Battese and Coelli (1995) Pltt and Lee and True SFA (Greene, 2003) models, for each of the above 
panels, we esllmate efficiency with (a) all or (b) a subser2 of exogenous factors on the fronller In the 
case of the Relfsclu!etder and Stevenson model, for each of the above panels, the exogenous factors 
affect variance of the mefficiency directly. 
Diagrammallcally, the merger analysis proceeds as follows. 
22 Reasons for usmg a subset of exogenous vanables m place of the full set 1s dlscussed m detad m Sect1on 
6 3 Bnefly, the reason centers on the nature of the fixed effects estunatton procedure whtch sweeps out ttme 
mvanant explanatory vanables 
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Figure 6.4. SFA of Merger Related Ejjic1ency Gams 
Analytical Structure 
---------------
1 ProductiOn Approach II IntermediatiOn Approach 
1. Pitt and Lee I Pm and Lee 
2 Schmidt and Sickles (1984) 2 Sclurudt and Stckles (1984) 
Ftxed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model 
3. Schmidt and Sickles (1984) 3. Schmidt and Stckles (1984) 
Random Effect Model Random Effect Model 
4 Battese and Coelh (1992) 4. Battese and Coelli (1992) 
5 Battese and Coelli (1995) 5. (Battese and Coelli (199 5) 
6 Comwell, Sickles and 6. Comwell, Sickles and Sclurudt 
Schmidt (1990) (1990) 
7 True SF A Fixed Effects 7 True SF A Fixed Effects 
(Greene, 2003) (Greene, 2003) 
8. True RE SFA (Greene, 2003) 8 True RE SFA (Greene, 2003) 
9 Reifschne1der and Stevenson 9 Re1fschneider and Stevenson 
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6.3 Data 
The data set used m th1s chapter is denved from that of Chapter 5 From the 
complete dataset of 105 SCBs, those banks (totalling 27) w1th advances exceeding depos1ts 
were excluded from the sample thus providing a dataset compnsed solely of Retail Banks 
This Retail Bankrng Dataset thus excludes the effects of banks that operated with an 
investment-banking orientatiOn 
The models were, additionally estimated usmg the complete dataset Tins prov1des a 
larger dataset compnsing all the Scheduled Commercial banks in the Indian Bankmg 
System (ffiS). This data set is henceforth referred to as the Bankmg System Dataset The 
aforementioned Retail Banking Dataset 1s, thus, a sub-set of tins larger Bankmg System 
Dataset. 
A Mann-Whitney test of the effic1encies under the production and mtennediabon approach is 
used to check if the input-Qutput specification adopted has a Significant nnpact on the effic1ency of the 
merged banks and lf so, m what chrection, 1 e , were the effic1enc1es under the intermediation approach 
lugher than that under the production approach? 
The Mann-Whitney test exammes lf two mdependently drawn samples onginated from the 
same populatioJL In domg so, it allows for the investigation mto the presence of a treatment effect by 
exammmg the shift in location of the mean or median (Hollander and Wolfe, 1999) In the context of 
our study, this test allows us to investigate if the merger led to significantly different and higher 
efficiency scores for the mtermediauon approach VIS-a-vis the production approach to input output 
specrlicatloiL The results are integral to determming the eXIStence, lf any, of a sluft m the operational 
paradigm of the banking system m lncha The null, alternative, and chrecuonal alternative hypotheses 
are as follows 
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H 0 : No Sigmficant differences m the banking efficiency under both mput-Qutput 
specifications 
H 1 : Banking efficiency under the mtermedtanon approach IS 
Significantly different from that under the production approach 
H 2 : Banking efficiency is lngher under the mtermedtauon approach than 
the producnon approach 
In addition to the mput-output vanables detailed in Chapter 5, we further mclude 
exogenous variables in the form of industry concentratiOn (as measured by the Herfindahl-
Hrrschman Index of Concentration, HHI), nsk of the bank (as proxied by 1ts provisions for 
bad debt), 2 ownership dummy variables (to account for pnvate sector, public sector or 
foreign bank ownership), dummy variable to determme the existence of merger related 
effic1ency gams (through a group dummy dependmg on 1fthe bank belonged to the merger 
group or the control group) and an interactmg dummy between the lime trend and the group 
to determme 1f the merger banks expenenced a chronological change m efficiency that 
differed from the control group 
The Concentration vanable has an amb1guous effect on efficiency as 1t is dependent 
on the source of the same Provisions 1s expected to be negatively (positively) related to 
efficiency (meffic1ency) Provisions provide an mchcat10n of the nsk exposure of the bank 
to bad debt. However this nsk exposure could anse from both mternal sources (such as 
poor risk management policies) and due to the operating environment of the banks. In the 
former case, the efficiency of the bank can be raised by correctmg the risk management 
pohc1es of the bank In the latter, however, the bank may not be able to control for 1ts nsk 
exposure. Thus, mclus10n oftlus variable in our analysis would prov1de an mdication of the 
main source of tlus risk in the IBS If it 1s found to be s1gruficantly related with a bank's 
mefficiency, 1t md!Cates that the mefficiency of the bank stems from factors w1thm its 
control If, on the other hand, the vanable is not found to be Slgruficant, it may mdicate that 
the source of the nsk IS external to the bank and therefore beyond its control 
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The Group dummy variable indicates if the merger bestowed effic1ency benefits to 
the merged entity v1s-a-v1s the non-merging banks in the control group. Such a finding 
would 1mply that there were merger-specific synerg1es. Post merger realisations of this 
would depend on the merger structure, however, the presence of merger spec1fic 
effic1enc1es may encourage other banks to adopt a Slffillar route to effic1ency enhancement. 
InvestigatiOn mto tlus 1s also relevant, g1ven the current regulatory climate in favour of 
mergers Also, if the merger was earned out to rescue an ailing bank, as was the case w1th 
many mergers pre and post reform in the ms when the Central Bank mstlgated the merger 
of ailing bankmg uruts w1th healthy ones, it would be relevant to see 1f the absorptiOn of an 
a1lmg bank adversely impacted the healthier bani(. Tlus would be relevant from a policy 
perspective as 1f post merger the healthy bank was found to expenence a dechne in 
effic1ency, 1t would signal a spread of the meffic1ency rather than the contamment and 
rescue imtlaily sought. Investigation of this issue is aided through Group and tune-trend 
interaction dummy vanable, !Group An assessment of the pre and post merger efficiency 
of the mergers is thus earned out 1f these two variables are found to have a s1gruficant 
unpact on meffic1ency. These two vanables thus capture the TE Levels and TE Changes 
respectively. 
The inclusion of tune mvanant variables, such as that of the merger dummy 
vanable, IS problematic under the fixed effects estimation approach This IS because the 
fixed effects model uses the w1thm-estimation procedure which sweeps out any tune 
invariant factors Incorporation of the same, however, may be accomplished by mteracting 
the reqmred vanables With time varying vanables. In our case, tlus IS aclueved by 
interactmg the Merger Group Dummy vanable w1th a per annum time dummy, dt, yieldmg 
the groupdt vanable Tlus vanable, thus, mdJCates 1f the mergmg banks experienced 
s1gruficantly different effic1encies VIS-a-vis therr non-merging counterparts on a per annum 
basis relative to the base year For example, a pos1t1ve and s1gruficant value would indicate 
that the mergmg banks' inefficiency was greater than that of the control group in year t 
relative to that of the base year. However, tlus procedure was not used for the remaming 
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trme-invanant vanables as domg so would lead to the number of parameters to be estimated 
becoming very large 
6.4 Results 
Results from the models covered in Section 6 2 are presented m Tables 6.1 a-6.Jh23 
for the Retatl Bankmg Dataset and Tables 6 2a-6.2i for the Banking System Dataset These 
tables provide the parameters requrred for a check of the requrred frrst order condttions. A 
complete list of parameter estimates ts provided m Appendtx E. 
As can be seen from Tables 6 la-6 lh24, under the Retatl Bankmg Dataset, the frrst 
order conditions are preserved m the cases of the Pttt and Lee (1981) model, the Schmidt 
and Sickles Ftxed Effects Models and the Battese and Coellt (1995) However, for the 
productiOn approach, under the Battese and Coellt (1995) model, the frrst order condttions 
are not met m the case of Panel 2 Analyses are thus restncted to the remaining panels 
Also, wtth the exception of Panel 3 under the intermediation approach, the first order 
conditiOns are not met under the Schmidt and Stck!es Random Effects (1984) approach For 
the True SF A models (2002), under the FE approach, convergence was not achieved under 
Panel 3 of the mtermediation approach Also, the frrst order condtttons for Panel I under 
the productiOn approach and panel I under the intermedtation approach are not satisfied 
Moreover, as can be observed from Table 6.2i, the Comwell, Stck!es and Schmidt model 
does not fmd evtdence of time variation m effictency The analysts ts thus restncted to the 
remarmng panels. 
'3 
- Lack of convergence of the MLE m the esllmatwn procedure precluded the mcluswn of results from the 
Battese and Coelh (1992), Retfschnetder andStevenson (1991) and True SFA Random Effects (Greene, 2002) 
models 
24 In Tables 6la-6 h, * stgmficant at 10%, "'* Significant at 5%, ***significant at 1% 
ly1= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total deposits, lx1= wages, lx2= total borrowmgs, lx3= 
fixed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits 
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Turning to the parameter estimates under the Bankmg System Dataset, these are 
presented in Tables 6 2a-6.2i25• the requued first order conditions are satisfied under the 
Pit! and Lee (1981) model (with the exception ofPanel3 under the production approach), 
the Schrmdt and Sickles Fixed and Random Effects models (1984), Battese and Coelh 
(1992) (with the exception of panel 3 under the productiOn approach), the Reifschmder and 
Stevenson (1991) and the Battese and Coelh (1995) (exceptmg Panel 2 under the 
intermediatiOn approach) Also, echomg the results under the Retail Banking Dataset, the 
Comwell Sickles and Schmidt model does not indicate the presence of any time variation in 
efficiency The True SFA Fixed Effects (2002) model is not found to satisfy the FOC and 
under the Random effects model, lack of convergence m the MLE estimations for Panels I 
and 2 and a failure to satisfy the required FOC for Panel 3 under the productiOn approach, 
restricts the analyses to the results of the intermedmt10n approach 
Table 6.1a : Parameter Estimates- Pitt and Lee Model (Retail banking Dataset) 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lyl 0 413*** 0 650*** 
(0 0377) (0 0334) 
ly2 0 309*** 0 204*** 
(0 0216) (0 0215) 
lxl 0 000852 0 00503 
(0 00866) (0 00891) 
lx2 0 00310 0.0127*** 
(0 00229) (0 00243) 
lx3 -0 0101 0 00145 
(0 00679) (0 00761) 
lx4 0 0655*** 0 0755*** 
(0 00780) (0 00866) 
,, 
- In Tables 6 2a-6 21, * stgmficant at 10%,. ** stgmficant at 5%, *** stgmficant at 1% 
lyl~ total advances, ly2 ~total mvestments, ly3~ total depostts, !xi~ wages, lx2~ total borrowmgs, lx3~ 
fixed assets, lx4~ other assets, lx5 ~total depostts 
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Table 6.1b : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles, Fixed Effects 
(1984), Retail Banking Dataset 
variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel 3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lyl 0.750*** 0 739*** 0 607*** 0 359*** 0 274*** 0.340*** 
0.18728 0 19761 0 1802 0.0434 0 043 0 041 
ly2 0 051 0.006 0.021 
0 1137 .1261 0 1139 
1x1 -0 082** -0 I 08** -0 078* -0.294*** -0 374*** -0.352*** 
0 0366 0 0476 0 0437 0 0263 0 028 0 0279 
lx2 -0 013 -0 031* -0 026 -0 063*** -0 049*** -0 064*** 
0 0193 0 0196 0.0189 00118 0.011 0.011 
lx3 -0 180*** -0 125*** -0181*** -0 119*** -0.106*** -0 128*** 
0 0265 0 0303 0 0279 0 0180 0.018 0.017 
lx4 -0 381*** -0 352*** -0.386*** -0.227*** -0.183*** -0.205*** 
0.034 0.0375 0.0364 0 024 0.024 0 024 
lx5 -0 076*** -0 077*** -0 076*** 
0 0028 0.003 0 0028 
Table 6.1 c: Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles, Random Effects 
(1984), Retail Banking Dataset 
variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPPROACH 
HMB MGBCG UNB HMB MGBCG UNB 
ly1 0 854*** 0 628*** 0 651*** 0.515*** 0.526*** 0 528*** 0 047 0 048 0 047 0 024 0 024 0 023 
ly2 0 1134*** 0.196*** 0 192*** 0 029 0.032 0 030 
lx1 0.024*** 0 048*** 0 036**** 0 022*** -0 005 0 008 0 007 0 009 0 008 0 015 0 017 0.016 
lx2 0 045*** 0 039*** 0 039*** -0 023*** -0.022*** -0 025*** 0 004 0 005 0 005 0 007 0 006 0 007 
lx3 0 009 0 004 0 009 0 007 -0 012 0.010 -0 00 0 006 0 007 0 010 0 010 6 0010 
1x4 0 019** 0 008 0 020** -0 006 -0 018 -0 001 0 009 0 010 0 010 0 016 0 014 0 0155 
lx5 -0 278*** -0 165*** -0 250*** 0 055 0 045 0 052 
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Table 6.1d : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1992), Retail 
Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES HMB MGBCG UNB HMB MGBCG UNB 
lyl 
Ly2 
Lxl 
Lx2 
lx3 
lx4 
lxS 
Table 6.1e :Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates -Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), 
Retail Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel 1 Panel2 Panel 3 
lyl 
ly2 
lxl 
lx2 
lx3 
lx4 
lxS 
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Table 6.lf: Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1995), Retail 
Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
[Vanable Panel I Panel2 Panel 3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
LYI 0 761*** -0 097* 0 121 0 474*** I 6145*** -0.892 
0.284 0 059 0 922 0.027 0 035 0 781 
LY2 0.144 0.707*** -0 095 
0 159 0077 0 502 
LXI -0 452*** -0.460*** -I. 708 -0 0866*** 0039 0 499 
0 037 0 031 6.527 0 024 0032 I 411 
LX2 -0 002 -0 039*** -0482 -0 040*** -0.12*** 0 059 
0 029 0 013 0434 0 004 0 007611 0 333 
LX3 -0 282*** -0 033 0 634 -0 008 -0.005 I 273 
0 035 0.024 1.29 0 008 0 016 0.835 
LX4 -0.086 -0 409*** I 265 -0 1839*** -0.205*** 0 029 
0 056 0 035 6 220 0 024 0 031 I 20 
lx5 -0 666*** -0.542*** -0 845** 
0 030 0 032 0403 
Table 6.1g : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA FE (2002), Retail Banking 
Dataset 
[Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Pane12 Pane13 Panel I Pane12 Panel 3 
LYI -1.454*** -0 23 -0 23 0 554*** 0 562*** 
0472 -0 234 0 234 0 047 0 0529 
LY2 0 8553*** 0 665*** 0 531*** 
0 274 0 665 0 1584 
LXI -0 657*** -0 666*** -0.5063*** -0.1392*** -0.089*** 
0 104 -0 667 0 063104 0 021 0 020 
LX2 0 051 -0 044* -0 004 -0 043*** -0 039*** 
0032 -0 044 0 0201 0 005 0 005 
LX3 -0.086 -0 125 -0 125** 0 055*** -0 0182 
0083 -0 125 0 0507 0 017 0 015 
LX4 -0.502*** -0 079 -0 316*** -0 046** 0 004 
0097 -0 079 00605 0 018 0 016 
LX5 -0 842*** -0 884*** 
0 075 0 080 
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Table 6.1h : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA RE (2002), Retail Banking 
Dataset 
!Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
LYI 
LY2 
LXI 
LX2 
LX3 
LX4 
LX5 
Table 6.1i : Parameter Estimates -Cornwell, Sickles and Schmidt Model, Retail 
Banking Dataset 
Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
Constant 446 266*** 390 747*** 472 008*** 445 574*** 391 219*** 471 677*** 
22 753 21 442 23 951 22 920 21472 24 020 
T I 043 3 8729 4202 4 973 4 138 4 238 
8 127 7 520 8 368 8 116 7 531 8 392 
TSQ 0 0011 0 127 0 163 0 325 0 146 0 165 
0 602 0 553 0 617 0 603 0 554 0 619 
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Table 6.2a : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates -Pitt and Lee, Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION 
VARIABLES APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 
3 
lyl -0 0773 -0 129 -0.170** 0 586*** 0.578*** 
(0 119) (0 119) (0 0761) (0 0255) (0 0243) 
ly2 0 653*** 0 690*** 0 686*** 
(0 0732) (0.0724) (0.0576) 
!xi -0.495*** -0.540*** -0 341 *** -0.197*** -0 197*** 
(0 0385) (0 0363) (0 0300) (0 0207) (0.0198) 
lx2 -0.124*** -0.0986*** -0.137*** -0.0755*** -0 0762*** 
(0 0208) (00195) (0.0174) (0 00776) (0 00711) 
lx3 -0.210*** -0 244*** -0.234*** -0.126*** -0.123*** 
(0 0385) (0 0387) (0.0311) (00171) (0 0162) 
lx4 -0 146*** -0 171*** -0318*** -0.0733*** -0 0789*** 
(0 0417) (0 0438) (0.0359) (0 0187) (0.0184) 
lx5 -0.533*** -0 539*** 
(00196) (0 0191) 
Table 6.2b : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles Fixed Effects 
(1982), Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
lyl -0 133 -0 116 -0 328*** 0 562*** 0 549*** 0 521*** 
(0 121) (0 122) (0 0866) (0 0287) (0 0273) (0 0280) 
ly2 0.563*** 0 601*** 0 719*** 
(0 0772) (0 0757) (0 0605) 
lxl -0 372*** -0 572*** -0 287*** -0 216*** -0 214*** 
0 0810*** 
(0 0653) (0 0592) (0 0453) (0 0330) (0 0304) (0 0252) 
lx2 -0 Ill*** -0 104*** -0 156*** -0 0678*** -0 0687*** -0 104*** 
(0 0217) (0 0207) (0 0186) (0 00821) (0 00775) (0 00883) 
lx3 -0.198*** -0 209*** -0 234*** -0 !53*** -0 142*** -0 180*** 
(0 0424) (0 0423) (0 0347) (0 0184) (0 0176) (0 0188) 
lx4 -0 164*** -0 181*** -0 315*** -0 0691 ••• -0 0646*** -0 134*** 
(0 0454) (0 0460) (0 0381) (0 0204) (0 0198) (0 0211) 
lx5 -0 521*** -0 533*** -0 502*** 
(0 0210) (0 0206) (0 0205) 
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Table 6.2c : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles Random Effects 
(1982), Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I Panel 2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lyl -0 0740 -0 132 -0 135* 0 572*** 0 579*** 0 512*** 
(0 122) (0 125) (0 0771) (0 0280) (0 0259) (0 0274) 
ly2 0 651*** 0 690*** 0 659*** 
(0 0753) (0 0760) (0 0586) 
lxl -0 497*** -0 537*** -0 351*** -0 206*** -0 211*** -0 110*** 
(0 0389) (0 0356) (0 0287) (0 0212) (0 0190) (0 0172) 
lx2 -0 126*** -0 0953*** -0 137*** -0 0905*** -0 0975*** -0 120*** 
(0 0213) (0 0202) (0 0178) (0 00849) (0 00713) (0 00845) 
lx3 -0 207*** -0 236*** -0 221*** -0 0526*** -0 0692*** -0 147*** 
(0 0393) (0 0391) (0 0308) (0 0165) (0 0154) (0 0166) 
lx4 -0 146*** -0 164*** -0 318*** -0 0698*** -0 0758*** -0 127*** 
(0 0428) (0 0454) (0 0369) (0 0203) (0 0195) (0 0202) 
lx5 -0 572*** -0 548*** -0 478*** 
(0 0211) (0 0199) (0 0199) 
Table 6.2d : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1992), Banking 
System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I Panel2 Panel 3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lyl -0 183 -0 177 -0 213*** 0 624*** 0 599*** 
(0 124) (0 126) (0 0768) (0 0269) (0 0278) 
ly2 0 748*** 0 752*** 0 753*** 
(0 0798) (0 0795) (0 0610) 
lxl -0 423*** -0 461*** -0 279*** -0 199*** -0 0113 
(0 0552) (0 0474) (0 0365) (0 0236) (0 0229) 
lx2 -0 110*** -0 0969*** -0 135*** -0 0651*** 
0 109*** 
(0 0226) (00211) (0 0182) (0 00893) (0 00976) 
lx3 -0 277*** -0 322*** -0 298*** -0 180*** 
0 258*** 
(0 0468) (0 0455) (0 0368) (0 0203) (0 0221) 
lx4 -0 160*** -0 163*** -0 322*** -0 104*** 
0 153*** 
(0 0463) (0 0477) (0 0381) (0 0201) (0 0212) 
lx5 -0 397*** 
0422*** 
(0 0220) (0 0197) 
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Table 6.2e: Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), 
Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! Panel2 Panel Panel 1 Panel2 Panel 3 
3 
lyl -0 0727 0 536*** 
(0 171) (0 0229) 
ly2 0 707*** 
(0 101) 
lxl -0 425*** -0 0647*** 
(0 0380) (0 0175) 
lx2 -0 0845*** -0 107*** 
(0 0215) (0 00586) 
lx3 -0 198*** 0 00778 
(0 0377) (0 0139) 
lx4 -0 244*** -0 0850*** 
(0 0477) (0 0172) 
lx5 -0 745*** 
(0 0225) 
Table 6.2f: Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1995), Banking 
System Dataset 
Vanable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel 
3 
LYI 02744 -0 0978 0 129 0474*** 1 614*** -0 891 
02240 0 2259 12 830 0 0539 0 0261 42646 
LY2 0 500*** 0 707*** -0 095 
00998 0 0937 9 4945 
LXI -0 485*** -0 460*** -1 7089 -0 086** 0 039* 0497 
0 0508 0 0346 2 9282 0 0371 0 0215 2 6569 
LX2 -0 0360 -0 039* -0 482 -0 040*** -0 1217*** 0 059 
0 0290 00206 2 649 0 0109 00042 1 0872 
LX3 0 0093 -0 033 0 6343 -0 008 -0 005 1.271 
0 0315 0 0309 3 2722 0 0398 0 0140 21802 
LX4 -0.386*** -0 409*** I 265 -0 183*** -0 205*** 0 026 
0 0517 00479 4 893 0 0352 0 0143 26849 
LX5 -0 666*** -0 542*** -0 848 
0 0421 00202 3 9272 
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Table 6.2g : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA FE (2002), Banking System 
Dataset 
Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel 1 Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
LYI -0 I37I -0.237 -0 797** 0.513*** 0 528*** -0 255 
0 I77I 0 I67 0 366 0 053 0 05I 0 356 
LY2 0 676*** 0 75I*** 0 905*** 
0 112 0115 0 36I 
LXI -0 585*** -0 608*** -0 984*** -0 I67 -0 I67*** -0 620*** 
0 0430 0042 0 I04 0 0293 0 027 0 I87 
LX2 -0 OI4 0 006 0 707*** -0 047 -0 048*** 0 223* 
0 02I4 0 02I 0 I656 0 OIO 0 OIO 0 I29 
LX3 0 079* 0 I34*** -0 989*** 0 083 0 079*** -0.274 
0 044 0 046 O.I47 0 022 0 02I 0 I75 
LX4 -0 400*** -0 447*** 0248 -0 I8I -0 I86*** 0 068 
0 0485 0 05I7 0 235 0 027 0 0258 0 223 
LX5 -0 662 -0 654*** 0 846*** 
0 057 0 055 022 
Table 6.2h : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA RE (2002), Banking System 
Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
I 
LYI -o zoo••• 0 60I*** 0 572*** 0 4I65*** 
0 027I 0 OI5I 0 02I5 0008 
LY2 0 539*** 
0 OI60 
LXI -0 475*** -0 222*** -0 212*** -0 I9I*** 
0 0080 0009 0 OI35 0 005 
LX2 -0 I674*** -0 07I*** -0 090*** -0 148*** 
0 0060 0 0046 0006 0002 
LX3 -0 157*** -0 042*** -0 0506*** -0 135*** 
00093 0 009262 0 013 0004 
LX4 -0 236*** -0 I02*** -0 0624*** -0 095*** 
0 OI24 0 OIO 0 OI58 0 006 
LX5 -0 560*** -0 583*** -0 428*** 
0 009716 00132 0 0056 
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Table 6.2i : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA RE (2002), Banking System 
Dataset 
Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
Constant 446 266*** 509 1537*** 654 620*** 446 056*** 441 905*** 654 481*** 
22 753 24090 27 773 22 791 12 641 27 802 
T 1.043 9 217 -2 961 I 050 -0 377 -2 950 
8 127 8 494 9 832 8.141 0.1561 9 8422 
TSQ 0 001 0 431 -0 855 0 001 -0 098 -0 855 
0 602 0.627 0 735 0 603 0 143 0 736 
Beginning w1th the Sclunidt and Sickles Fixed Effects Model, we perform a Mann-
WhJtney6 test to check for significant differences m the technical efficiencies obtamed 
under the productiOn and intermediation approaches As can be seen from Table 6 5, the 
results of the test indicate that the mput-output spec1ficat10n adopted has a s1grnficant 
1mpact on the efficiency scores across the panels27 
This IS interestmg m light of the dual nature of the operatwns of lnd1an banks wh1ch 
are requrred to meet soc1o-econonuc obJectives v1a pnority sector lendmg (albeit on a 
26 Details of the Mann-Whttney test are reproduced here for convenience The Mann-Wlutneytest exammes tftwo 
mdependently drawn samples ongmated from the same population In domg so, rt allows for the mvesbgat!on mto the 
presence of a treatment effect by exarmnmg the slut\ m location of the mean or median (Hollander and Wolfe, 1999) In the 
context of our study, tlus test allows us to mvesbgate If the merger led to Slgrnficantly chfferent and lugher effiCiency o;cores 
for the merged banks VIS-a-VIs the control group The null, alternative, and chrecnonal alternative hypotheses are as follows 
H 0 : No stgruficantchfferences m theTEI.evelsofthemerged banks 
and the control group 
H 1 : The TE Levels of the merged banks are stgruficantlychfferent from 
those of the control group 
H 2 : TbeTEI.evels ofthemergedbanksarelugherthanthoseofthe 
control group 
'7 
- The Mann-Whttney test IS earned out for those models wherem the requrred monotomctty condthons were 
met and wherem th results for the same panel was available under both mteremdtatton and production mput-
output specifications 
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reduced bas1s) m add1t10n to d1schargmg the1r roles as fmancJal mtermed1anes. The former 
objective IS picked up under the production approach wlnle the latter IS picked up m the 
mtermed~ahon approach 
As can be seen from the Mann-Wlnmey tests, there are s1gmficant differences 
between the efficJenc1es under the mtermedJation and productiOn approaches across the 
models and datasets used The long legacy of pre-reform State intervention in the financial 
system led to the development of a bankmg system wherein the banks passively attamed 
regulatiOn identified targets The banks, thus, evolved away from a pro-act1ve intermed1ary 
role The impact of this IS reflected m the sigmficant differences m the banks' efficlencJes 
under the mtermediation and productiOn approaches 
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Table 6.3 : Mann Whitney Test 
Table 6.3a: Schmidt and Sickles Fixed and Random Effects Models (1984) 
Retail Banking Dataset Bankmg System Dataset 
Panel1 Panel2 Panel3 Panel 1 Panel2 Panel3 
Schm1dt and Sickles, 1 201 *** -8 790*** 8 618*** 8 462*** -10 398*** 
F1xed Effects 0 565 (0 0000)*** (0 956) (0 962) (0 0000)*** 
Schm1dt and S1ckles, 8 970*** 8 740*** 
Random Effects 0 983 0 959 
Table 6.3b: Battese and Coelli (1992) 
Retail Bankmg Dataset Bankmg System Dataset 
Panel1 Panel2 Panel3 Panel1 Panel2 Panel3 
-8 888*** -8 927*** 
(0 022)** (0 031 )** 
2 -8 906*** -9 056*** 
(0 016)** (0 025)** 
3 -9 o8o··· -9 836*** 
(0 019)** (0 0000)*** 
4 -8 910*** -9 836*** 
(0 0 024)** (0 0000)*** 
5 -8 977*** -10061*** 
(0 038)** (0 0000) 
6 -8 603*** -9 988*** 
(0 045)** (0 0000)*** 
7 -8 591*** -10 137*** 
(0 053)** (0 0000)*** 
8 -8 225*** -9 836*** 
(0 065)* (0 0000)*** 
9 -8 078*** -9 894*** 
(0 076)* (0 0001 )*** 
10 -7 811*** -9 222*** 
(0 090)* (0 031***) 
11 -7 458*** -8 082*** 
(0 1 09) (0 086)* 
12 -7 053*** -7 960*** 
(0 130) (0 089)* 
13 -6 503*** -7 631*** 
(0 156) -0 103 
14 -6 083*** -4 882*** 
-0178 (0 248) 
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Table 6.3 : Mann Whitney Test (Cont'd) 
Table 6.3c: Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) 
Reta11 Bankmg Dataset 
Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Bankmg System Dataset 
Panel 1 Panel2 Panel3 
8 891··· 
(0 967) 
9 045*** 
(0 975) 
9 836*** 
(1 00000) 
9 836 ... 
(1 00000) 
10 137' .. 
1 000 
9 988*** 
1 000 
10 137 ... 
1 000 
9 836 ... 
(1 00000) 
9 894 ... 
0 999 
9 203*** 
0 968 
8 016*** 
0 911 
7 916*** 
0 909 
7 536 ... 
0 892 
4 613*** 
0 738 
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Table 6.3 : Mann Whitney Test (Cont'd) 
Table 6.3d: Battese and Coelli (1995) 
Retail Bankmg Dataset Bankmg System Dataset 
Panel 1 Panel2 Panel3 Panel1 Panel2 Panel3 
1 5 852* ... 6 009*'** 7 708*** 
(0 810) (0 815) (0 870) 
2 5 693*** 5 953*** 7 281*** 
(0 806) (0 815) (0 857) 
3 5 409*** 5 952*** 6 410*** 
(0 794) (0 815) (0 814) 
4 5 645*** 5 884*'** 5 927*""* 
(0 796) (0 811) (0 779) 
5 5 730*** 6 072*** 9 087*** 
(0 789) (0 816) (0 899) 
6 5 893*** 5 915*** 7 822*** 
(0 793) (0 812) (0 841) 
7 5 796*** 6 072*** 8 583*** 
(0 793) (0 816) (0 860) 
8 5 725*** 5 973*** 8 366*** 
(0 782) (0 813) (0 855) 
9 5 623*** 6 072*** 7 938*** 
(0 777) (0 816) (0 834) 
10 5 498*** 6 073*** 8 105*** 
(0 777) (0 816) (0 842) 
11 5 155*** 6 106*** 7 962*** 
(0 766) (0 815) (0 843) 
12 5 191*** 5 973*** 7 212*** 
(0 775) (0 813) (0 828) 
13 5 302*** 5 937*** 6 978*** 
(0 778) (0 812) 0 814 
14 5 oo8··· 5 937*** 6 314*** 
-0 77 (0 812) 0 787 
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Table 6.3 : Mann Whitney Test (Cont'd) 
Table 6.3e: True SF A FE (2002) 
Retail Banking Dataset Banking System Dataset 
Panel1 Panel2 Panel3 Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 
8 418*** 
(0 993) 
2 8 284*** 
(0 996) 
3 8 480*** 
(0 997) 
4 8 503*** 
(0 988) 
5 8 929*** 
(0 928) 
6 8 842*** 
(0 997) 
7 8 578*** 
(0 983) 
8 8 465*** 
(0 982) 
9 8 484*** 
(0 983) 
10 8 543*** 
(0 991) 
11 8 51 0*** 
(0 989) 
12 8 185*** 
(0 985) 
13 8 441*** 
(1 000) 
14 8 397*** 
(0 997) 
Over the pre-reform penod, banks operated under a drrected lendmg and an 
adnumstered mterest rate system, wherem the operational focus was dommated by the 
passive attainment of regulation identified targets However, post-reforms, the operational 
fulcrum of banks has slnfted towards the active pursuit of lngh calibre asset portfolios 
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W1th the mflux of greater competltion and reduced State support, banks are now mo!lvated 
to seek out return generatmg credit d1sbursement opportum!les It IS mterestmg to note that 
the dominance of the intermedtation approach over the productiOn approach is found in the 
case ofPanel2 under the Schmidt and S1ckles F1xed Effects model (1982) for both datasets 
Tins panel consisted of banks that engaged in mergers and a balanced control group ofnon-
mergmg banks that were present throughout the study period The result thus suggests that 
the incumbent banks were beginnmg to grapple w1th the changmg operatwnal profile of 
banking in the post-reform period The dominance of the mtermed1at10n approach IS agam 
seen under the Battese and Coelh (1992) results for the Banking System Dataset. The 
surfacmg of these results under the Banking System Dataset wh1ch, encompassmg as 1t d1d 
the enllre commercial banking system, suggests that the operational profile of the system 
was movmg away from the (State) directed lending style towards one wherem banks 
adopted a more pro-active intermediary stance 
Turning to the merger analysis, under the Retail Bankmg Dataset, a lack of 
sigmficant differences in the efficienc1es of the mergmg banks and the control group IS 
found across the esllmated models The exceptiOns to tins are the results of the Schmidt 
and S1ckles F1xed Effects model (1984), Battese and Coelh (1995) and the True SFA FE 
(2002) models Under the Sclmudt and S1ckles Fixed Effects model (1984), the negatively 
s1gmficant group and time interaction dummy variable under Panel 1 of the mtermed1at10n 
approach ind1cates that the merging banks' effic1ency was lower than that of the control 
group However, when directly lmked w1th the mean inefficiency and when comparmg 
under Panel 2, as under the Battese and Coelli ( 1995) model, over time, as indicated by the 
pos1!1vely Significant tgroup vanable, the mean mefficiency of the control group was 
greater than that of the mergmg banks. 
The pre-reform penod was characterised by a bankmg system whose sole function 
was that of a regulatory cred1t d1sbursement conduit. The then interventwmst regulations 
were complicit in estabhslnng a banking system wherem the quant1tat1ve attainment of 
asset and liab1hty accounts became the ovemdmg obJeCtive of banks What this gradual 
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accretion of asset and liability accounts accomplished, however, was an extensiOn m the 
market reach of the banks thereby offenng the mcwnbent banks a d1stmct advantage vis-a-
vis new market entrants who would need to establish such a base in order to cement their 
market presence. Tempenng these mherent strengths however, was the operational 
meffic1ency that pervaded the bankmg system at the pomt of reforms Jrutiation and the need 
to re-onent the operational focus of the banks away from regulation dnven targets towards 
more active mtermed1ation roles Moreover, the selfsame regulatiOns that enabled banks to 
extend theu market reach, also promoted a bankmg culture characterised by widespread 
operational inefficiency. Retrospectively, therefore, there would be greater potential for 
efficiency gains at the early part of the tune penod exammed wluch IS captured in Panel 1 
under the Sclurudt and S1ckles F1xed Effects model (1984). The lack of sigruficant 
d1fferences in the productiOn approach for tlus Panel and the presence of the same under the 
intermediation approach suggests that, m addition to the consolidation of the stocks of 
assets and liabilities of the targets, there were potentially, s1gruficant and persistent gams to 
be attained from successfully utilising the mcreased stock of deposits and manpower to 
develop a high )'leld asset portfolio In other words, in add1t1on to the consolidatiOn of the 
stock of assets and liability accounts of the mergmg banks, the realisatiOn of the gams is 
predicated on the successful treatment of any problems (such as NPLs) associated w1th the 
mhented asset portfolios 
The insigruficance of the GroupDT variables highlight the potential inability of the 
banks to recover the aforementiOned potential gmns This is further compounded by a 
potential learning effect as banks adapted to their post-reform operatmg environment 
Moreover, the companson of the tlmmg of the actual and hypothetical mergers provides an 
additional ins1ght. Between the introductiOn of the observationally reconstructed merged 
bank and the actual pomt of merger, the mergmg banks possessed sufficient time to 
acclimatise themselves to the post-reform operatmg environments Banks that were unable 
to sufficiently reorient therr operatiOns and adapt to this new enviroruuent would thus signal 
the ex1stence of potentially deep rooted problems that would make them unattractive 
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merger partners thus requmng rescue mergers that are more hkely to produce negative or 
time lagged efficiency gains 
In the case of the Bankmg System Dataset, much hke the results under the Retail 
Banlang System Dataset, there is largely an absence of s1gmficant differences between the 
effic1encies of the merging banks and the control group The exceptions are that of the 
results under the Schrmdt and S1ckles Random Effects (1984), the Re1fschne1der and 
Stevenson (1991) model and the True SFA Random Effects (1984) model Under the 
Sclunidt and Sickles Random Effects (1984) model, the control group exlub1ts greater time 
lagged effic1encies than the mergmg group under the productiOn approach while under the 
intermediation approach, the reverse IS found (Le., the efficiencies of the merging banks are 
greater than that of the control group over time) For the Re1fschne1der and Stevenson 
(1991) model, the variance of meffic1ency of the mergmg banks are lower than that of the 
control group as indicated by the pos1tive and s1gmficant tgroup variable. 
Table 6.4a : Parameter Estimates- Pitt and Lee Model, Retail Banking Dataset28 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
-0 008*** -0 005** 
(0 00288) (0 00282) 
lnTA -1 080*** -1 105*** 
(0 00967) (0 0103) 
lnprovs -0 007*** -0 008*** 
(0 00276) (0 00298) 
group -0025 0 011 
(0 0232) (0 0164) 
!group -0 00260 0 001 
(0 00203) (0 00152) 
own2 -0 019* -0 018 
(0 0101) (00114) 
own3 0005 0 Oil 
(0 0110) (0 0114) 
rhh1 -0 260 0 614*** 
(0 199) (0 214) 
28 In TA= s1ze, lnprovs =proVIsiOns, group = dummy variable for banks that mergmg banks and control 
group !group = mteractwn between lime trend and group dummy variable, own2 = dummy vanable for pub he 
and pnvate sector banks, own3 =dummy variable for pubhc and fore•gn sector banks, HHI = Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of concentratwn,DT= per annum time dummy, groupDT = merger group dummy mteracted 
w1th per annum time dummy 
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Table 6.4b : Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles, Fixed Effects (1984), Retail 
Banking Dataset 
variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPPROACH 
Panel! Panel 2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel 3 
groupDT2 0 027 0 113 0 122 -0 045 0 013 0 008 
0 0791 0 073 0 081 0 052 0 045 0 052 
groupDT3 -0 069 -0 157** -0 119 -0 110 -0 009 -0 018 
0 114 0077 0 085 0 076 0 047 0 054 
groupDT4 -0 142 -0 250*** -0 219*** -0 148** -0 066 -0 077 
0 108 0 078 0 086 0 074 0 048 0 055 
groupDT5 -0 094 -0 054 -0 114 -0 102 0 047 0 033 
0 Ill 0 086 0 090 0 073 0 052 0 057 
groupDT6 -0 1438 -0 136* -0 097 -0 195*** -0 039 -0 031 
0 105 0 075 0 081 0 070 0 046 0 052 
groupDT7 -0 121 -0 107 -0 052 -0 214*** -0 056 -0 050 
0 105 0 076 0 082 0 070 0 046 0 052 
groupDT8 -0 066 -0 052 0 0510 -0 292*** -0 053 -0 061 
0 105 0 078 084 0 071 0 047 0 053 
groupDT9 -0 126 -0 068 -0 038 -0 293*** -0 066 -0 064 
0 107 0 079 0 087 0 071 0 048 0 055 
groupDTlO -0 212** -0 164** -0 146 -0 271*** -0 060 -0 062 
0 109 0 083 0 092 0 0735 0 050 0 058 
groupDTll -0 098 -0 078 -0 045 -0 210*** -0 037 -0 029 
0110 0 088 0 097 0 073 0 053 0 062 
groupDT12 -0 109 -0 067 0 094 -0 035 -0 236*** -0 070 0 057 -0 072 
0 Ill 0 105 0 073 0 067 
groupDT13 -0 124 -0 085 0 095 -0 048 -0 09 
0112 0 1062 0 067 
groupDTI4 -0 !54 -0 106 0 099 -0 066 -0 274*** -0 108* -0 140** 
0114 0 110 0 075 0 060 0 070 
195 
Chapter 6 Modellmg MergerRelated Ejjic1encyGams though Balanced and Unbalanced 
Sample ConstructiOn usmg Stochast!C Front1er AnalysiS 
Table 6.4d : Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles, Random Effects (1984), 
Retail Banking Dataset 
variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPPROACH 
Panel I Pane12 Pane13 Panel I Panel2 Panel 3 
In TA -0 779*** -0 706*** 0 045 0 0528 
lnprovs -0 011*** -0 006 0004 0 004 
0 015 0 006 group 0 017 0 023 
tgroup -0 000 -0 001 0002 0 002 
own2 0 023 0 018 0 011 0 014 
own3 0 001 0000 0 015 0 016 
rhh1 -0 455*** -0 763*** 0 189 0 305 
Table 6.4g : Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1995), Retail Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
IVanable Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
t -0 077*** -I 25 -0 07897*** -0 116*** -I 4857 
0 013 8 600 0 0102 0011 6443 
group 0 0163 5 5410 29729 3 274 I 316 
4456 53 73 3442 2 309 37.584 
!group -0 0308 I 156 0 323 0 214*** I 350 
12 70 62 834 04765 0074 29 010 
In TA -0 335 -3 752 0 2522 -6 548*** -17 27 
0 343 128 991 3 035 2 100 126 051 
Ln Provs -0 0005 -0 014 00003 -0 0007** -0 020 
0 1616 0 029 0 0003 0 000 00221 
HHI -0 001 -0 054 -0 00435 -0 002 -0 009 
30 326 0449 0 007 0 003 0174 
Own2 I 108 -I 449 -0 306 0 123 0998 
3 075 12 199 0 325 0458 22 848 
Own3 I Ill I 068 0 461** 2 989*** 14 396 
2 976 18 084 0209 0 543 19 272 
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Table 6.4h : Parameter Estimates- True SFA FE (2002), Retail Banking Dataset 
!Variable PRODUCTION APPROAHC INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel 3 
GIT2 0 226 0 240** 0 033 
0 226 0 108 0 041 
GIT3 0 0426 0042 -0 02 
0 0426 0 107 0 0260 
GIT4 0 1759 0 190* -0027 
0 1759 0109 0 028 
GIT5 -0 194 0 110 ·0 077** 
-0 194 0 115 0 033 
GIT6 ·0 094 ·0 026 ·0 0697** 
-0 094 0119 0 034 
GIT7 -0 3692** -0 280** 0 010 
-0 369 0 138 0 026 
GIT8 -0 235 -0 245* 0 026 
·0 235 0 140 0 027 
GIT9 ·0 054 0004 0 0587** 
-0 054 0 126 0 028 
GITIO -0 043 0 151 ·0 013 
-0 043 0 131 0 036 
GITII -0 373* ·0 179 -0000 
-0 373 0 175 0 035 
GIT12 ·0 595** ·0 278 -0026 
-0 595 0 213 0 039 
GIT13 -0 649** -0 360* ·0 026 
·0 649 0 214 0 040 
GIT14 ·0 469* ·0 185 0 101** 
-0469 0.207 0 046 
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Table 6.5a : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates -Pitt and Lee, Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! Panel2 Panel 3 Panel! Panel2 Panel 
3 
lnTA -1 242*** -1 293*** -1 422*** -0 276** -0261** 
(0 294) (0 295) (0 318) (0 135) (0 131) 
lnprovs -0 0120 0 00706 -0 00669 -0 00647* -0 00293 
(0 00803) (0 00584) (0 00592) (0 00369) (0 00257) 
group 0 0970 -0 00192 00497 0 Ill 0 00594 
(0 144) (0 1000) (0 110) (0 0692) (0 0409) 
!group -0 0194* 0 00181 0 0115 0 00495 0 00198 
(0 0102) (0 00835) (0 0104) (0 00477) -0 00367 
own2 0 0188 -0 0495 -0 0292 0 0171 -0 0190 
(0 0473) (0 0412) (0 0680) (0 0216) (0 0169) 
own3 0 359*** 0 341*** 0 299*** -0 0271 0 0264 
(0 0854) (0 11 0) (0 0930) (0 0403) (0 0454) 
rhh1 0 00122** 0 00146*** 0 00202*** 0 000513** 0 000628*** 
(0 000542) (0 000546) (0 000578) (0 000245) (0 000238) 
Table 6.5b : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles Fixed Effects 
(1982), Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel 2 Panel3 
groupDT2 0 0439 -0 0347 0 0458 -0 0234 0 00322 
(0 195) (0 142) (0 0909) (0 0634) (0 0922) 
groupDT3 -0 149 -0 191 -0 0740 -0 0419 -0 0497 
(0 196) (0 142) (0 0914) (0 0632) (0 0919) 
groupDT4 -0 195 -0 331** -0 0612 -0 0406 -0 126 
(0 198) (0 139) (0 0924) (0 0630) (0 0904) 
groupDT5 -0 116 -0 154 0 00328 -0 0241 -0 0389 
(0 197) (0 136) (0 0921) (0 0601) (0 0875) 
groupDT6 -0 153 -0 238* -0 0689 -0 0736 -0 0472 
(0 207) (0 138) (0 0982) (0 0616) (0 0885) 
groupDT7 -0 124 -0 Ill -0 00856 -0 0446 -00515 
(0 198) (0 136) (0 0926) (0 0607) (0 0879) 
groupDT8 -0 138 -0 103 -0 0297 -0 0551 -0 0461 
(0 199) (0 138) (0 0929) (00618) (0 0899) 
groupDT9 -0 204 -0 165 -0 0427 -0 0896 -0 0977 
(0 198) (0 140) (0 0928) (0 0624) (0 0909) 
groupDTJO -0 253 -0 195 -0 00172 -0 0634 -0 0372 
(0 199) (0 144) (0 0932) (0 0643) (0 0938) 
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Table 6.5b : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles Fixed Effects 
(1982), Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
groupDTII -0 170 -0 0219 0 0767 0 0435 0 0519 
(0 199) (0 !50) (0 0935) (0 0668) (0 0976) 
groupDT12 -0 230 -0 180 0 0750 0 0128 0 0457 
(0 201) (0 159) (0 0941) (0 0708) (0 103) 
groupDT13 -0 183 -0 0867 0 0490 0 00559 0 0833 
(0 202) (0 160) (0 0946) (0 0712) (0 104) 
groupDT14 -0 299 -0 348** 0 0169 -0 0315 0 0599 
(0 204) (0 158) (0 0958) (0 0705) (0 105) 
Table 6.5c : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles Random Effects 
(1982), Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel 3 
lnTA -I 246*** -1 315*** -0 352** -0 298** -0 232 
(0 303) (0316) (0 158) (0 150) (0 178) 
In pro vs -0 0123 0 00673 -0 00268 -0 00354 -0 00604* 
(0 00824) (000619) (0 00398) (0 00284) (0 00326) 
group 0 0915 00469 0 106** 0 0558 0 0592 
(0 141) (0 0880) (0 0437) (0 0341) (0 0573) 
tgroup -0 0195* 0 00573 0 00670 0 00593 0 0109* 
(0 0105) (0 00878) (0 00565) (0 00404) (0 00568) 
own2 00207 -0 0584 0 0405** -0 0183 0 0154 
(0 0482) (0 0365) (0 0190) (00120) (0 0344) 
own3 0 367*** 0 378*** 0 0219 0 0755*** 0 0601 
(0 0838) (0 0839) (0 0285) (0 0257) (0 0455) 
rhh1 0 00123** 0 00152*** 0 000745** 0 000808*** 0 000616* 
(0 000559) (0 000586) (0 000291) (0 000275) (0 000318) 
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Table 6.5d : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1992), Banking 
System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
-0 127*** -0 146*** -0 129*** -0 123*** 
(0 0261) (0 0207) (0 0103) (0 0123) 
lnTA -1 143*** -I 221*** -0 124 -0 0691 
(0 287) (0 288) (0 117) (0 !53) 
lnprovs -0 00940 0 0103* -0 000722 -0 00669** 
(0 00761) (0 00573) (0 00296) (0 00276) 
group 0 0917 00399 0 105 -0 0142 
(0 228) (0 122) (0 0708) (0 0809) 
tgroup -0 0187 -0 00146 0 00995 0 00163 
(0 0148) (0 00964) (0 00660) (0 00732) 
own2 00642 -0 0982*** 0 0419*** 0 0609** 
(0 0446) (0 0342) (0 0157) (0 0264) 
own3 0 245*** 0 0636 -0 0367 -0 0160 
(0 0826) (0 101) (0 0263) (0 0346) 
rhh1 0 00138*** 0 00160*** 0 000661*** 0 000600** 
(0 000528) (0 000532) (0 000213) (0 000272) 
Table 6.5e : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), 
Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lnTA -6 220*** -4 458 
(I 996) (3 977) 
lnprovs 00115 -0 287*** 
(0 0343) (0 0725) 
group 0 568 I 907*** 
(0 476) (0 737) 
tgroup 0 0991* 0 296*** 
(0 0562) (0 0826) 
own2 -0 276** -1 837*** 
(0 138) (0 294) 
own3 I 739*** I 707*** 
(0 223) (0 375) 
rhh1 0 00336 0 0501*** 
(0 00240) (0 00880) 
-0 171** I 300*** 
(0 0716) (0 285) 
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Table 6.5f: Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1995), Banking 
System Dataset 
Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel 1 Panel2 Panel 3 Panel 1 Panel2 Panel3 
group 10 2996 0 299 5 5411 29729 1 3163 
61 5772 4 4198 15 5794 21.0569 189 9098 
tgroup -0 0398 0 135 I 1566 0 3238 I 3495 
91.2828 2 0304 2.3814 28.1926 16 37785 
lnTA -5 1697 -2 192 -3 7520 0 2522 -17277 
130838 0850 83 3294 100 1244 67962 8207 516 9257 
LnProvs -0 0009 0 0008 -0 0148 0 0003 -0 0214 
1 4563 0 4793 1 7525 0 1909 7 161956 
rhlu 0 0017 0 0028 -0 0506 -0 004 -0 0828 
315 1549 0 2551 0 1296 163 0245 0 9519 
Own2 0 7613 -0 3581 .) 4493 -0 3062 0 9982 
7 1268 1 7189 7.4857 1 6779 205 3959 
Own3 3 2640 2 5413 1.0686 0 461 14.396 
15 9281 9 5752 11 3472 2 0048 266 69 
Table 6.5g : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA FE (2002), Banking 
!Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel 3 Panel! Pane12 Panel3 
GIT2 0 046 
0 0314 
G1T3 -0 045 
0 0391 
G1T4 00014 
00449 
GIT5 0 1053 
00495 
G1T6 -0 1203 
00796 
G1T7 0 0635 
0 0550 
GIT8 0 1037 
0 0554 
GIT9 01445 
0 0530 
GITIO 0 1914 
00492 
GITII 0 2333 
00442 
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Table 6.5g: Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA FE (2002), Banking 
!Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
GIT12 
GIT13 
GIT14 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I 
0 2399 
0 0398 
0 2595 
0 0384 
0 3572 
0 0381 
Panel2 Panel 3 
Table 6.5h : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA RE (2002), Banking System 
Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
group 0 2361*** 0 1271*** 0 1240*** 0 083*** 
0 0324 0 028361 0 0481 0 016 
tgroup 0 0337*** 0 0051 0 0067 0 0134*** 
00043 0 0038 0 0067 0 002 
Own2 0 0036 ·0 007 0 03527** 0 028*** 
0 0144 0 0113 0 0178 0 006 
Own3 0 4367*** -0 0220 00134 0 2293*** 
0 0167 0 0152 0 0227 0 008 
LnTA -I 226*** -0 1812* 0 4560*** -0.1829*** 
01294 0 1033 0 164 0 065 
lnprovs -0 0159*** -0 0048** -0 001 -0 017*** 
0 0023 00024 0 003 0 001 
HHI o oo2o••• o ooo8••• -3580 0 001*** 
00002 0 0001 0 0003 0 0001 
For the remairung exogenous vanables, the szze vanable zs found to be conszstently 
negatively stgmficant mdtcatmg that larger banks are more meffictent than theu smaller 
counterparts. A rise m the Herfindahl Index zs associated wtth greater mefficiency 
mdzcatmg that greater competitiOn leads to hzgher effictenczes An mcrease m provJSlons on 
the other hand, is seen to be negatively related wzth mefficiency suggesting that greater 
provzszons portend greater NPLs and similar problems wzth the asset portfolio of banks (as 
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mdicated by negatively s1grnficant lnprovs vanable) From the Own2 vanable, overall, It 
can be mferred that the for the retrul banking system dataset, there are no Significant 
differences between the efficienc1es of public sector banks and private sector banks Under 
the Bankmg System Dataset, the unpact of the ownership IS vaned. Overall, however, it 
appears that between the private and public sector banks, the former shows greater 
inefficiency ( as mdicated by the pOSitively significant own2 vanable under the Battese and 
Coelli (1992), intermediatiOn approach and under the True SFA Random Effects (2002) 
models) However, under the Re1fschneider and Stevenson (1991) model, the vanance of 
m efficiency of the pnvate sector banks is found to be lower than that of the public sector 
banks. Examming the efficiency differences between the public and foreign sector banks as 
indicated by the own3 variable, across both datasets, the variable is largely positive and 
sigrnficant Tins mdicates that foreign banks suffered greater meffic1encies than their public 
sector counterparts The results under the Re1fschne1der and Stevenson (1991) model, 
further mdicate that the vanance of inefficiency of the foreign was also greater than that of 
the public sector banks. 
6.5 Conclusions 
Tins study has examined the efficiency benefits flowing from post reforms mergers 
among Indian Banks over the period 1991-92 to 2004-05 using the SFA methodology By 
constructing three panels usmg the parent entities of the analysed mergers, a control group 
of non-merging banks and an observatiOnally reconstructed merged bank, an ms1ght mto 
the potential for temporal congregation of merger related efficiency gams IS also examined 
The results from the Schnudt and Sickles Fixed Effects model pomts to the presence 
of potential merger related efficiency gams for Panel 1 under the mtermedJation approach 
m the Retail Bankmg Dataset Similar results are obtamed over a time lagged basis under 
the Battese and Coelli (1992) model for panel 2 These results may be explamed, 
retrospectively, by the prevruling levels of operational meffic1ency m the bankmg system at 
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that tune the econonnc reforms were mtroduced and the pre-reform legacy of greater 
market reach which would have afforded the mergmg entitles greater opportunities to affect 
post-merger efficiency Improvements The changmg natlire of bankmg in the post-reform 
penod, away from the Central Bank dictated model towards one wherem the banks actively 
took control of therr operatiOnal direction would, retrospectively, suggest that the 
successful treatlnent of the asset portfolios of the banks may lead to further efficiency 
gazns. The ability of the merged bank to realise these benefits would, thus, be dependent on 
the level of mhented problematic asset portfolios and the success with wluch these 
portfolios are treated leadmg to time lagged efficiency gains 
Thus, did the mergers successfully contam the mefficiency of the weaker bank or 
did they dilute the efficiency of the stronger banks? While the results vary across the 
models, they nonetheless suggest that the Central Bank policy of mergmg healthy and 
ailmg bankmg units did not have a detrimental rmpact on the efficiency of the merged 
entity 
And fmally, the results pomt to a paradigm sluft m the nature of the bankmg system 
Pnor to 1990, the bankmg system was subject to strict policy mterventions by the 
Govenrment m Its pursuit of soc1o-econonnc obJectives The post-reforms envrronment has 
afforded banks greater autonomy to detennme therr operatiOnal drrectiOn Effectively, the 
banks now possess greater mcentives to seek out credit disbursement and investlnent 
opportunities The dominance of the intermediation approach speaks to tlus sluftmg 
operational profile. 
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CHAPTER 7: BANK MERGERS IN INDIA -PRODUCTIVITY 
ENHANCING? A COST BASED TOTAL FACTOR 
PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS 
7.1 Introduction 
The past decade has Witnessed a comprehensive change m the competitive 
landscape of the Indian Banking System The economic reforms mtroduced m the early 
nmetles were aimed at raising the competitive strength, efficiency and productivity of the 
bankmg system Consequently, policy irutlatives focused on de-coupling restnctive mterest 
rate regtmes, relaxmg the directed lendmg regime and raising the level of operational 
autonomy afforded to mcumbent banks. The newly relaxed regulatory envrronment was 
accomparued by the mflux of new private and foreign owned banks. Augtnentmg the 
environmental changes in the wake of the introduction of econmmc reforms was the 
technological progress relating to information processmg, telecommunicatwn and 
mnovatwns m fmancial engtneermg which has bestowed considerable benefits to the 
banking industry. Improvements m the avrulability of informatiOn processmg technology 
and advances m statistical modellmg methodologies and the components to carry out such 
modelling, enable banks to appropnate, retam and explmt customer mformatwn m order to 
better assess credit policies (Berger and Mester, 2003) These advances therefore have a 
direct bearing on the credit nsk profile of the banks and m fact can enable them to better 
assess and control for this nsk Such mnovatwns bestow the added benefit of appending 
mcumbent product portfolios with additional and heretofore non-existent service chrumels 
thereby complementing and divers1fymg existing mcome streams The availability of such 
technology may possess properties that enable the bank to reap these benefits at a lowered 
cost wlule Simultaneously improvmg on the quality of the services they deliver. 
The transformatwn of the Indian Banking System from one With a primary focus on 
the socio-developmental needs of the weaker sectors of the economy to a competitive and 
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market oriented system, albeit With a much decreased presence of regulation unposed 
socio-econonuc targets, prov1des an interestmg opportunity to assess the cost effic1ency and 
productivity benefits emanatmg from mergers undertaken by mcumbent banks m an 
attempt to restructure and re-orgaruse themselves in this new setting These mergers can be 
expected to unprove average efficiency, or possibly sh1ft the frontier 1tself, unless they are 
regulated distress mergers. 
We thus assess the existence and extent of merger related cost effic1ency and 
productivity benefits of commercial banks m the Indian Banking System over the post 
reform period of 1992-2005. Productivity analyses were earned out using a d1screte 
approximation to Bauer's (1990) cost based total factor productivity approach (Coelh et a!, 
2003; Orea, 2002) thereby enablmg us to further trace post merger productivity changes 
and identify 1ts source components, including changes m the input and output mix 
allocatlve effic1encies This approach enables an assessment of the 1mpact of mergers on 
efficiency and productiVIty by fustly, lughhghting post-merger resource and product nux 
changes and secondly, the degree to wluch these changes enhanced the profile of the 
merged entitles 
lntnns1c to panel efficiency studies 1s the 1ssue of disentangling the meffic1ency and 
time-mvanant cross fum heterogeneity (Greene, 2002) effects, and we address tlus tluough 
the stochastic frontier analysis specificatiOn. The dual-obJective profile of Indian 
commercial banks IS mcorporated usmg both production and mtermedmtion approaches By 
constructmg tluee panels, VIZ., (!) a balanced panel constructed usmg a Reconstructed 
Merged Bank and a balanced control group of non-merging banks (2) an unbalanced panel 
compnsmg all banks that entered the market over the post-reform penod and (3) an 
unbalanced panel compnsmg of the banks involved in the mergers and a balanced control 
group of non-merging banks, we are able to Identify merger induced effic1ency changes and 
perform a comparative performance analys1s of merging and non-mergmg banks. 
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While numerous stud1es have been undertaken VIS-a-viS developed econom1es, there 
have been relatively few on those of developing economies such as India Tlus paper seeks 
to fill that gap Moreover, the nature of the mergers analysed, the operational landscape 
under which they were executed, the multiple ownership profiles of the banks in the system 
and the dual nature of their operatmg goals affords an mteresting perspective on the 
determmants of merger related efficiency and productiVlty gains. For example, m addition 
to market dnven mergers, the Indian banking system IS w1tuess to mergers initiated by the 
Central Bank in order to rescue ailing bankmg uruts. What are the implicatiOns of these 
rescue mergers for the efficiency and productivity of the stronger bank that absorbed the 
weaker unit? Does tins pohcy successfully isolate the meffic1ency of the weaker unit? In 
the case of market dnven mergers, do the mergers bestow the merged entity With an 
appreciable advantage over 1ts non-mergmg counterparts? These are questions that this 
chapter seeks to answer. 
The remamder of the chapter proceeds as follows SectiOn 7.2 detruls the 
methodology adopted while SectiOn 7.3 prov1des detruls of the data used Results are 
presented m Section 7 4 and Sectwn 7 5 concludes 
7.2 Methodology 
The cost efficiency of a bank enables us to ascertain the degree to wluch the bank's 
actual cost corresponds to that of the best practice bank that is able to produce an identical 
output bundle at a lower cost An mquiry mto the cost effic1ency of banks thus beg~ns with 
the spec1ficat10n of the cost functiOn Itself and includes the Identification of the mputs 
utilised, their respective pnces and the outputs of the bank. Methodological cons1deratwns 
form the next stage of analysis. The exrurunatwn of the cost effic1ency of a bank can, 
broadly, proceed along two lmes, VIa non-parametric methods such Data Envelopment 
Analysis and via econometric methods such as the Stochastic Frontier Analysis method 
Our chmce of the latter approach is based on its abihty to tease out the mefficiency of the 
bank wlule snnultaneously accommodatmg random errors. That the method can also handle 
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temporal vanattons in efficiency and identify the pnmary factors assoctated wtth the 
reahsed efficiencies provtde added JUStificatiOn for tts choice 
Tlus chapter thus employs the Stochashc Frontier Analysts (SFA) methodology to 
gain an insight into the prevalence or lack thereof of cost effictency gains from mergers 
among Jndtan commerctal banks over the penod I992-2005. Thus, for the n'h fmn in the 
t,. ttme period, the smgle equation cost function may be expressed as 
In TCnt =In TC(Pn,Yn;P) + Ent where TC nt represents the cost of the n'h bank in the fh 
penod, Pnt represents the vector of mput pnces for the nth bank m the {h penod, Yn 
represent the nth bank's vector of outputs in the lh penod and p represents the vector of 
parameters to be estimated The composed error term & nt encompasses the standard two-
sided random error component, v nt that captllres statistical nmse, and a one-sided 
mefficiency component, "nt that represents the bank's cost ineffictency The ineffictency 
ts assumed to be dtstributed mdependently of the random error and the regressors 
The meffictency as modelled above captures the overalltmpact of operatmg at sub-
optimal cost, 1 e , 1t captures the overall cost meffictency of the bank Cost inefficiency can, 
m turn, be traced to two sources, teclutical ineffictency and allocattve mefficiency The 
former results from the sub-optimal utilisation of mputs or from the under-productiOn of 
outputs The latter, from the utilisation of an inappropnate mix of inputs Econometric 
tssues in the form of the Greene Problem (Greene I980), detailed further m this sectwn, 
however, form obstacles to such a decomposition 
The SFA specifications adopted to modelling meffictency and tdenttfymg tts 
determmants are tdenttcal to those of Chapter 6. These are appropriately modtfied to assess 
cost effictency 
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7.2.1 Functional Form Adopted 
We nnplement the aforementiOned models usmg the followmg Translog cost 
functiOn. 
lnTC., = 
S L 1 s-1 r-1 
a 0 + La,lnp,., + Lf11lny,., +-LLa,.lnp,.,lnp,.., 
s=l 1=1 2 s=l r=l 
1 1-1 m-1 J-1 M 
+-LLPlm lny1n,lnymnt + LL.91m lnp,.,lnyl•t 
2 l""l m ~e) /cl m•l 
S L 
+ Eo,lnp,.,t+ 1:B1lny1.,t+A,t+0.5A.,t2 +v., +u., 
.J=l 1=1 
n = 1,2,3,. .. ,N 
t = 1,2,3,. .. ,T 
[7.1) 
As detailed in Fuss, McFadden and Mundlak (1978) and Kumbhakar and Lovell 
(2000), a cost function is requrred to possess the following propert1es. 
Monotonzczty . non decreasmg m mput prices and outputs i e, 
olnTC/oln p '?. 0, olnTCjolny '?. 0. 
n. Concavzty The functiOn IS concave in input prices. 
1ii. Homogenezty The function IS positively and linearly homogenous m mput 
pnces. 
IV. Contmuity : The functwn IS contmuous in mput pnces and upper semi-
contmuous m outputs 
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v Domazn · The functwn ts real valued and positive for all posttive input 
prices and all posttlve productble outputs. 
Linear Homogeneity in input process was Imposed by normahsmg total cost (TC), 
the pnce of fixed assets, price of borrowings and the pnce of labour by the pnce of 
deposits. 
7.2.2 Total Factor Productivity Analysis 
At Its most simple and mtuitive level, a measure of Total Factor ProductiVIty (TFP), 
by correlatmg the output generated with the mputs used, provtdes an tnstght mto the abthty 
of the production process to amass the greatest benefits per umt of resources utthsed 
(Coelh et a!, 2003) When temporal TFP compmsons are made, they provide an indication 
of the degree of Total Factor ProductiVIty Change (TFPC) The procedure for estimation of 
TFPC proceeds along two tacks, viz., the Total Denvatlve method and the Index Number 
approach Gtven that the TFPC IS estimated between two dtscrete data pomts, Caves, 
Chnstensen and Dtewert (1982) argue in favour of the latter approach. In tlus study, 
productivity analysts is thus earned out usmg a dtscrete approximatiOn to Bauer's (1990) 
total denvatlve based approach to deriving the cost functiOn based TFPC 
Bauer (1990) decomposes the TFPC into frontier slufts, cost efficiency changes and 
restdual pnce effects The pnce effect m Bauer' s decompositiOn mcorporates the effect of 
allocatlve meffictencies m the input and output mixes via the deviatiOn between the actual 
and efficient cost and revenue shares The adoptiOn of tlus approach to productivity 
decompositiOn IS attractive due to its abihty to incorporate this mput-output nux effect In 
particular, m domg so, It offers an avenue to overcome the "Greene Problem" (Greene, 
1980). Tlus ts explamed further below 
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Bauer ( 1990) notes that the cost efficiency change m equation [ 5] embodies both 
technical and allocative efficiency changes A drrect decomposition from the equatiOn IS, 
however, not possible econometrically. The problem, vzz, the Greene Problem, hes m 
disentanglmg the technical and allocative inefficiency effects from the overall cost 
efficiency m an econometncally feasible manner The Greene Problem is encountered in 
attempts to estimate both technical and allocative inefficiency by estimating the cost 
functiOn along with its associated mput cost share equatiOns Econometncally, tlus IS 
achieved usmg ITSUR29 The problem anses when interpreting the inefficiency in the cost 
functiOn and the error term m the cost share equatiOns The former captlrres the dual rmpact 
of both technical and allocative inefficiency and IS thus an indicator of overall cost 
inefficiency However, If mdeed allocative mefficiency is present, then the error term in the 
cost share equations cannot be distributed mdependently of that in the cost function as 
allocative inefficiency contributes to overall cost mefficiency If, on the other hand, the 
error term m the cost share equations represent statistical nOise, then the error term m the 
cost functiOn must captlrre both aspects of cost mefficiency and disentanglmg the two 
components Is no longer possible. Also, there remains the additional drawback of 
estimatmg cost share equatiOns that are either determlillstiC (with any error being attributed 
entrrely to allocative mefficiency) or that are devoid of allocative inefficiency all together 
with the mefficiency being represented solely m the cost function's composed error term 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003) 
An alternative approach to the decomposition of cost efficiency mto Its technical 
and allocative components requues data on cost efficient input quantities and technically 
efficient but allocatively mefficient input quantities While the former can be ascertained 
usmg Shepherd's Lemma, It IS the latter that is problematic Proposed solutions to this 
mclude those of Kopp and Diewert (1982), Zieschang (1983) and Mensah (1994). These 
techniques centre on the deterrnmation of the technically efficient but allocatively 
mefficient input and mput pnce vectors using the cost frontier as a starting pomt. However, 
,, 
- Zellner's Iterative Seemmgly Unrelated Regression estimatiOn (Wooldndge, 2002, Zellner 1963) 
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the estimatiOn of that frontier in the presence of allocative mefficiency in Itself draws us 
back to the Greene Problem 
While Bauer's (1990) decomposition does not captllre the allocative meffic1ency 
levels itself, it does provide an avenue to trace the contnbutwn of changes m the mix 
efficiencies to the TFPC growth Without the need to estimate the cost share equatiOns 
drrectly. Tlns IS aclneved through the residual price effect terms which captllre the 1mpact 
of input and output mix inefficiencies. The former arises due to output production using 
sub-optimal cost combmations of mputs g1ven factor prices Snrularly, the output mix 
mefficiency arises due to the sub-optimal output m1x produced gJVen output prices For 
firms that operate w1th the optimal combination of mput and output bundles, respectively, 
i e., firms wruch are allocat1vely efficient on one or both fronts, the pnce effect term drops 
out 
In other words, the pnce effect terms are essentially by-products of usmg acrual 
pnces wruch may be b1ased due to the usage of techmcally meffic1ent input (output) 
quantities It arises from the difference m prices implied by the cost functiOn and the 
prevailing market pnces Devmtions between these shadow prices and market prices in rum 
pomt to deviations between the effic1ent cost shares and the acrual cost shares of the firm, 
wruch, mdrrectly, thus, point to allocative inefficiency In the Bauer (1990) decomposition, 
this effect is captllred usmg the difference between the optimal and the acrual cost and 
revenue shares. For frrms that are allocatively effic1ent, the acrual and effic1ent shares w1ll 
be identical Wlule dev1at10ns from the opt~mal cost and revenue shares thus signifY 
allocative mefficiency, 1t IS the repercussions of this mefficiency that are captllred v1a the 
contnbutiOn of the price effect terms to the TFPC. 
A further advantage of tills approach is the abll1ty to carry out the analysis w1thm 
the framework of Stochastlc Frontier Analysis thereby s1de-steppmg the need to use 
ITSUR. 
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Bauer's ongmal TFPC decompositiOn denved usmg the Total Denvative Approach 
IS as follows. 
TFPC = (1-±s,.,) ± Le,., Ytnt s +CE-i+ L{s, -s;.,}p,., 
1=1 1=1 ~ 
L..,.&lnt 
•·1 
1•1 
L 
+ L qln, 
1=1 
[7.2] 
An eqmvalent Index Number based representatiOn of the above is ob tamed usmg the 
approaches of Orea (2002) and Coelh, Estache, Perehnan and Trujillo (2003) The mdex 
number based TFPC is therefore as follows. 
L 
Lilny- Lilnx = O.SL (1ny,+1 -lny,)+ (CE,+1 - CE,] 
1=1 
s 
- o.sL[(s,.,+.- s;.,+.)+ (s,.,- s;JXlnp,., •. -In p,.,) 
s=t 
L 
+ O.SL qlnt+1 
1•1 
&lnt+l 
L 
L8 brt+l 
1=1 
(In Ytnt+1 -In y,) [7.3] 
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where m equations [7.2) and [7.3) 
._olny1, 
Y- at 
olnTC., 
&lnt = :.... 
V.YJnt 
8/nTC., 
&snt = 
o/n P,., 
CE = Cost Efficiency Change 
T =Technical Change 
s,., =Observed cost share of s'• input of n•• firm in t'• period 
s;., =Efficient cost share of s'• input of n'• firm in t'• period 
q1., =Observed revenue share of s'• input of n'• firm in t'h period 
Efficient revenue share of r• output of n'• firm in t'• period 
The various terms in the above TFPC decompositions of equatiOns [ 6) and [7) are, 
respectively, ray returns to scale, cost efficiency change, techmcal change, mput price 
effect and output pnce effect Each of these IS now exammed m more detail 
1. Returns to Scale 
The rmpact of changes m scale on productivity growth IS estimated via the 
elastiCity of cost with respect to the t'• output. The term Itself IS the product of a 
scale factor, ( J-~ &1.,), and the elasticity weighted change m outputs, 
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L ~ 6 tnt 
L.., L Ytnt 
{:/ ~ & 
L.., lnt 
/c/ 
A positive (negative) value for the scale factor unphes 
increasing ( decreasmg) returns to scale. Movements by the firm towards optimal 
scale s1ze would thus contribute positively to TFP growth. 
n. Cost Efficiency Change 
The second element of the TFPC decomposition IS the change m the firm's cost 
efficiency Improvements m the efficiency profile of the firm across time would 
thus contribute positively towards TFPC. A positive value for tins element of 
the TFPC decomposition md1cates that the firm IS movmg closer to the 
benclnnark frontier The cost efficiency change reflects the 1mpact of both 
tecluucal and allocatlve efficiency improvements 
m Technical Change 
Frontier shifts are captured v1a the technical change element of the TFPC 
decomposition Outward (mward) shifts of the frontier represent techmcal 
regress that contributes negatively (positively) to TFPC change 
IV Input Pnce Effect 
The mput price effect IS detenmned as the deviation between actual and efficient 
cost shares Tins element captures the impact on cost of utihsmg a sub-optimal 
mix of inputs given input prices It thus measures mput mix allocatlve 
meffic1ency, albeit, mdirectly via factor cost shares Firms that operate utthsing 
the cost mimmizmg miX of inputs would possess the cost minimizmg m1x of 
mput shares reducmg this term to zero 
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v Output M1x Effect 
The final term m the TFPC decompos1t10n encompasses the impact of non 
margmal cost pricing on output It IS detemuned vJa the dev1ation between 
actual and efficient revenue shares. Much like 1ts mput nux counterpart, it 
md1rectly proVides an indication of the allocatlve meffic1ency arising from 
producmg an meffic1ent output nux For firms that produce the efficient revenue 
shares, the output nux produced IS aligned With the allocatively efficient output 
mix and the term reduces to zero. 
7 .2.3 Panel Structure and Merger Analysis 
To aid our merger analys1s, the tnad of panels detailed m Chapter 6 1s utilised In 
the case of Panel 1, an assessment of merger related effic1ency gams 1s carried out by 
comparmg the efficiency and productivity trend and values of the observationally 
reconstructed merged bank in the pre-merger penod with that of the merged entity m the 
post merger penod. For Panels 2 and 3, the efficiency and productivity of the merged bank 
was estimated as the average of the target and the acqurrer m the year pnor to the merger. 
Deta1ls of the panel construction JS prov1ded m Appendix C The dJagramrnatJcal 
representatiOn of the panels follows 
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Figure 7.2 Panell, Observatzonally Reconstructed Merged Bank and Balanced 
Control Group 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I • 
Mlf 
Merge~ :, : 
------ .----- --------- ~---------• 
• 
RMB 1 +BCG AMB, +BCG 
T 
Merger,. '.-----------------, .. ----------------''---~ ~-------' 
RMBm+BCG 
Figure 7.3· Panel2, Merged Bank and Unbalanced Control Group 
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Figure 7.4 Panel3, Merged Bank and Balanced Control Group 
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\ ....... ,-----' ..._ _____ _ 
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where 
Mergerm = M 1h merger 1, ... 1, .. m,l '#m 
MY m = year m whzch merger m occured 
BCG = Balanced control group 
UBCG = Unbalanced control group 
RMB = Observatzonally reconstructed merged bank 
AMB = Actual Merged bank 
MB =Merged bank 
• • 
.. _____ -----" 
\' = Pre- merger perzod 
'---y----J =Post- merger perwd 
T 
The productivity analyses thus centres on the compansons of the productivity evolutton prior 
to and followmg the merger and decomposmg the same mto Its constttuent elements As Identified in 
the prior section, the source of productivity gams can be traced to cost efficiency enhancements, 
technological progress, improved scale effiCiency and changes in the input and output miX 
efficiencies 
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The first comes mto play due to 1he potentJ.al for elnninatJ.on of duplicatJ.ve operatJ.ons, 
amalgamations of chent base and market reach and access to potentially increased soft mfonnatJ.on 
1hat can be used to improve credit disbursement and morutormg actJ.VIties Teclmolog~cal progress 
may expand 1he range of 1he serVIce portfohos, offer avenues to supplement 1he banks' income stream 
through non-traditional actJ.VItJ.es and enhance Jts abilitJ.es to assess and momtor credit risk exposures 
and streamline 1ts operatJ.ons m a manner 1hat enables 1t to lower costs Mergers naturally change 1he 
scale of operatJ.ons of 1he merged entJ.ty The nature of such changes may e~ther amphfy or detract 
from overall efficiency. Fmally, of particular mterest IS 1he change, if any, of 1he mput and output lDlX 
of 1he post merger entJ.ty and 1he nature of 1hese changes Post merger reahgnments of mput and 
output compositions may enable 1he merged entJ.ty to capitaliSe on allocative effiCiency gams Post 
merger mput mix changes may allow 1he merged bank to reap benefits from re-onentJ.ng Its mput lDlX 
wi1hm 1he exiSting bundle of mputs and I or by allowing it to access additJ.onal factor avenues. Mix 
changes from 1he merger may also unpact on 1he mix and range of credit diSbursements and 
investJ.nents i e , 1here would be an alteration m the type and target of funds allocated to different 
borrowers and investJ.nents Bo1h 1he aforementJ.oned changes would be reflected m 1he mput lDlX and 
output mix changes of 1he TFPC decompositimt 
In addttJ.on, repeatJ.ng 1he analysiS vis-a-VIS 1he control group of non-mefglllg banks would 
then highlight 1he degree to winch such merger mduced changes were successfully translated mto 
competJ.tive gains 
For each of 1he above panels, we estJ.mate efficiency using 1he Pltt and Lee (1981 ), 1he 
Sclmudt and Sickles Random Effects (1982) , the Battese and Coelh (1992) time varymg decay and 
1he True SFA (Greene, 2002) models w11h 1he exogenous factors on 1he frontJ.er; 1he Battese and 
Coellli (1995) model WJ1h the mean of meffic1ency lmked directly w1th 1he exogenous vanables, 1he 
Rerl'sclme~der and Stevenson (1991) model WJ1h exogenous factors affectJ.ng 1he vanance of 1he 
inefficiency dtrectly and 1he Sclunidt and S1ckles FIXed Effects (1982) WJ1h mteractions between a 
merger group dummy and time trend variable The analysis IS presented dtagrammatJ.cally below 
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Figure 7.5 SFA of Merger Related Ejjicwncy and Productzvzty Gams 
SFA~• 
Production Auuroach Intermediation Auuroach 
- Battese and Coelli (1992) 
-
Schmidt and Sickles Fixed Effects 
Model (1984) 
- Battese and Coelli (1995) - Schmidt and Sickles Random Effects 
Model (1984) 
- Cornwell, Sickles and Schmidt (1990) - True SFA Fixed Effects Model 
(2002) 
- Pitt and Lee (1981) - True SFA Random Effects Model 
(2002) 
Bauer Cost Based Total Factor Productivity Decomposition 
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..... 
"V 
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• Retail Banks Dataset • Commercial Bankinu; System 
where 
ARTS= Returns to scale changes 
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7.3 Data 
The merger data set used in this Chapter follows from that utilised in Chapter 6 as 
do the mput-output specifications adopted The Total Cost vanable is added to th1s m order 
to evaluate cost efficiency. The output vanables and the mput pnces are spec1fied below In 
addition, as m Chapter 6, all estrmat10ns are carried out for two datasets - the first 
compnsmg of retru.l commercial banks and the second, one that mcludes the complete 
banking system thus encompassmg banks that operate w1th an mvestlnent bankmg 
approach as well. These are, henceforth, referred to as the Reta1l Banks Dataset and 
Bankmg System Dataset, respectively. The former was constructed by elimmatmg, from the 
Banking System Dataset, those banks w1th advances exceeding therr total depos1ts 
The frrst specificatiOn we adopt IS thus the production approach and utilises fixed 
assets, borrowmgs and labour as the inputs wlule total depos1ts, total loans and total 
mvestlnents compnse the outputs. The pnce of borrowings IS obtamed as the ratio of 
mterest on borrowmgs to total borrowmgs ProvisiOns for wages is taken to be the pnce of 
labour Deterrnirung the price of fixed assets is more mvolved due to the natlrre of the asset 
FIXed assets are acqwred at a point m time and consumed over the lifetime of the asset The 
price of a fixed asset must thus mcorporate all costs assocmted w1th the acqms1tion of the 
asset and any costs mcurred to bring 1t to usable conditiOn Stud1es exru.mrung the cost 
efficiency of financial institutiOns tend to calculate the pnce of fixed assets as the rat1o of 
non-mterest expenses or operating expenses to fixed assets (Cavallo and Ross1, 2001; 
Dietsch and Lozano-Vi vas, 2000; ls1k and Hassan, 2002, Kw an, 2006; Maudos et al, 2002) 
These stud1es take mto account the amortiZatiOn expenses associated With the asset, 
however, exclude any mterest cost associated With 1!. A more comprehensive measure of 
the price of a fixed asset can be obtamed using a modified approach to Jorgenson's (1963) 
measure of the user cost of capital Under Jorgenson's approach, the user cost of capital 
incorporates three elements the per annum depreciation on the asset, the mterest cost 
assocmted with the asset and the real capital gain associated w1th the asset Early studies 
adopting tlus approach found the last component to be relatively unimportant and thus 
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estimate the user cost of capttal as compnsing the per annum depreciation and the 
associated interest costs of the asset In an approach sumlar to that of Jorgenson, Altunbas 
et a! (200 1) estunate the pnce of physical capital as the ratio of the sum of depreciation and 
other capital expenses to total fixed assets 
We adopt a snnilar approach and determine the pnce of fixed assets though the 
amortizatiOn accounts and any mterest expense associated wtth the acqmsttion of the asset 
Details of the per annum depreciation of physical assets were obtained from the annual 
accounts data of the banks. Unavailabthty of data related specifically to the degree of 
interest expense attnbutable to phystcal assets led us to estimate the interest expense 
associated wtth the asset as the proportiOn of total mterest expense, determined using the 
fixed assets to total assets ratio, attnbutable to fixed assets. Tlus measure serves as an 
mdtcator of the degree of interest expense attnbutable to fixed assets The advantage of 
estimatmg the pnce of fixed assets in the aforementioned method IS that It provides a 
comprehensive measure of the pnce of an asset as it includes both the depreciation expense 
and any interest expense mcurred m the process of acqmring the asset 
Under the mtermedtation approach the deposits IS considered an input wtth Its price 
obtained as the ratio of mterest on deposits to total deposits. The remamder of the mputs 
and therr respective pnces and the outputs remam unchanged from the productiOn 
approach Under both specificatiOns, Total Cost (TC) of the firm incorporates interest and 
operatmg expenses. 
A Mann-Wlutney test of the efficiencies under the production and mtermed.Iat:10n approach IS 
used to check If the mpuHmtput specification adopted has a Signrlicant rrnpact on the efficiency of the 
merged banks and If so, m what drrect:!on, I.e., were the efficiencies under the productJ.on approach 
lugher than that under the mtermed.Iation approach? 
The Mann-Whitney test examines tf two independently drawn samples onginated fiom the 
same population. In domg so, It allows for the mvestigation into the presence of a treatment effect by 
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exammmg the sluft in locatton of the mean or median (Hollander and Wolfe, 1999) In the context of 
our study, tins test allows us to investigate If the merger led to Slgmficantly different and higher 
efficiency scores for the intermediation approach VJS-a-VJS the production approach to input output 
specJiication The results are mtegral to determming the existence, if any, of a sluft m the operational 
paradigm of the banking system in Inilla The null, alternative, and d1rectlonal alternattve hypotheses 
are as follows· 
H 0 : No significant differences m tile bankmg efficiency under botil mput-output 
specJiicattons 
H 1 : Banking efficrencyunderthe mtermediation approach is 
Slgmficantly different from fuat under the production approach. 
H 2 : Banking efficiency 1s lugher under tile production approach fuan 
the intermediatJ.on approach. 
Variables used as deternunants of inefficiency mclude tile nsk of tile bank (as 
prox1ed by its provisions for bad debt), 2 ownership dummy vanables (to account for 
pnvate sector, pubhc sector or fore1gn bank ownership), a dummy vanable to detennme the 
eXIstence of merger related effic1ency gams (tlrrough a Group dummy vanable dependmg 
on 1f tile bank belonged to the merger group or tile control group) and an mteracting 
dummy between tile tune trend and the group (tGroup dummy vanable) to detennme 1ftile 
merger banks expenenced a chronological change m efficiency that differed from tile 
control group In tile case of the fixed effects models, v1z. Schm1dt and Sickles Fixed 
Effects and tile True SF A F1xed Effects models, tile 1mpact of tile merger 1s assessed by 
interactmg the merger dummy w1til per annum time dummies 
Appendix B, Table B2 prov1des a hst of all variables used and Table 7 I provides 
summary statistics for the vanables used in the frontier estimatwns These are calculated on a 
real value per annum bas1s for the commercial bankmg system. Prima fuc1e, the gradually increasing 
trend of the deposits, mvestments and credit disbursed IS not unexpected given the influx of 
competJ.tion post-reforms and the relattvely strong operational reach of tile banks, m particular the 
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public sector banks, courtesy the pre-refonn regime With respect to the Wage variable, as noted by 
Das et al (2007), operating costs of Indian Banks exceed those of other Asian banks in 
general, with labour costs accounting for more than 60% of the total operatmg costs. While 
economic reforms did proVIde banks with relatively greater autonomy m determmmg therr 
operational drrection, their ability to streamline their operatiOns VIa manpower prurung was 
restncted Tlus IS reflected by the relatively stable level of wages over the period examined 
The total costs also exhibit a rismg trend over the penod examined 
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Mean 133747 10 100833 00 213365 70 2676 96 19647 94 3358 34 27366810 16295 85 ~ 
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"' SD 263528 80 232001 50 447597 70 5522 15 67650 23 8158 29 566782 50 5046 88 " ::: 
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7.4 Results 
To conserve on space, the first order parameter estimates for both production and 
intermediatiOn approaches, for the datasets and models detailed in SectiOn 7.3 are presented 
in Tables 7 2a-7 2g32 and 7.3a-7 3g33 Complete hsts of parameter estimates for the same 
are provided in Appendtx F 
Begmning With the results under the Retail Bankmg Dataset, as can be seen from 
Tables 7.2a-7 2g, with the exception of the True SFA Random Effects (Greene, 2002) 
model (Table 7 2f), the requrred firsts order condttlons are satisfied m the models 
estirnated34• However, m the case of the Battese and Coelh (1992) model (Table 7.2c), 
convergence of estimatwns was not achieved under Panel 3 of the productwn approach and 
Panels 2 and 3 of the intermediatiOn approach Analyses are thus restricted to the two 
remaining panels, VIZ , Panels 1 and 2 under the productwn approach and Panel I under the 
mtermedtation approach. Snrularly, under the Retfschneider and Stevenson (1991) model 
(Table 7 .2d), the analysts IS restricted to Panel 3 under the productiOn and Intermediation 
approaches. 
Turnmg to the parameter estimates under the Bankmg System Dataset, as can be 
seen from Tables 7 3a-7 3g, wtth the exception of the Battese and Coelli (1995) for panel 1 
and 2 of the production approach, the required first order conditions are satisfied for the 
estimated models Tins IS evidenced by the negatively sigrnficant output vanable, ly2 under 
the productiOn approach for Panels I and 2. Analyses are thus restricted to the results under 
the remammg Panels 
32
.32 * stgmficant at 10%,** stgmficant at 5%,*** stgmficant at 1% 
lyl =total advances, ly2 = total m vestments, ly3= total depos1ts, pi =pnce of depos1ts, p2= pnce of fixed 
assets, p3 = pnce ofborrowmgs, p4 = pnce oflabor 
34 The requrred first order condthon IS that of monotntctty, 1 e , the cost functiOn must be non-decreasmg m 
mput pnces and outputs In other words, oln TC/oln p ~ 0, olnTC/oln y ~ 0 
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Table 7.2a: Parameter Estimates, Pitt and Lee (1984), Retail Banks Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
HMB MGBCG UNB HMB MGBCG UNB 
lp2 0 159*** 0 0724*** 
(0 0174) (0 0130) 
lp3 0 0592*** 0 0849*** 0 0482*** 0 0279*** 0 0213*** 
(0 00716) (00107) (0 00599) (0 00658) (0 00425) 
lp4 0 700*** 0 163*** 0 712*** 0479*** 0 0149** 
(0 0167) (0 0137) (0 0135) (0 0536) (0 00585) 
ly1 0 0944* 0 000576 0 175*** 0480*** 0407*** 
(0 0512) (0 0808) (0 0430) (0 0270) (0 0207) 
ly2 0 249*** 0 323*** 0 203*** 0438*** 0489* .. 
(0 0534) (0 0957) (0 0441) (0 0265) (0 0220) 
ly3 0 603*** 0 699*** 0 616*** 
(0 0932) (0 156) (0 0781) 
Table 7.2b: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles Random Effects(l984), Retail 
Banks Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lp2 0 158*** 0 0843*** 0 161*** 
(0 0188) (0 0131) (0 0144) 
lp3 0 0699*** o 0885*** 0 0601*** 0 0399*** 0 0214*** 0 0320*** 
(0 00741) (0 0112) (0 00608) (0 00672) (0 00455) (0 00515) 
lp4 0 682*** 0.174*** 0 677*** 0474*** 0 0136** 0439*** 
(0 0166) (0 0141) (0 0132) (0 0518) (0 00632) (0 0378) 
ly1 0 109** -0 0315 0 136*** 0 458*** 0 433*** o 508*** 
(0 0547) (0 0834) (0 0441) (0 0284) (0 0202) (0 0214) 
ly2 0.280*** 0.284*** 0 196*** 0 452*** 0 527*** 0430*** 
(0 0575) (0 0980) (0 0464) (0 0273) (0 0197) (0 0207) 
ly3 0 535*** 0 761*** 0 629*** 
(0 0985) (0 157) (0 0797) 
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Table 7.2c: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles Fixed Effects (1984), Retail 
Banks Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
lp2 0 131*** 0 0643*** 0 159*** 
(0 0174) (0 0133) (0 0147) 
lp3 0 0536*** 0 0641*** 0 0499*** 0 0323*** 0 0220*** 0 0328*** 
(0 00778) (0 0121) (0 00652) (0 00711) (0 00433) (0 00606) 
lp4 0 727*** 0 163*** 0 710*** 0 371*** 0 00982* 0 288*** 
(0 0181) (0 0152) (0 0145) (0 0588) (0 00586) (0 0489) 
lyl 0 0617 0 0323 0 125*** 0467*** 0 345*** 0 471*** 
(0 0486) (0 0923) (0 0423) (0 0271) (0 0202) (0 0238) 
ly2 0 208*** 0 348*** 0 171*** 0437*** 0 458*** 0389*** 
(0 0540) (0 109) (0 0451) (0 0289) (0 0216) (0 0249) 
ly3 0 690*** 0436** 0 663*** 
(0 0917) (0 187) (0 0778) 
Table 7.2d: Parameter Estimates, Battese and Coelli (1992), Retail Banks Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel 2 Panel Panel I Panel 2 Panel 
3 3 
lp2 0 142*** 
(0 0177) 
Jp3 0 0566*** 0 0852*** 0 0295*** 
(0 00699) (0 0106) (0 00636) 
Jp4 0 711*** 0 162*** 0 456*** 
(0 0167) (0 0135) (0 0518) 
lyl 0 145*** -0 0829 0489*** 
(0 0512) (0 0826) (0 0260) 
ly2 0 249*** 0 337*** 0428*** 
(00511) (0 0946) (0 0262) 
ly3 0 560*** 0 745*** 
(0 0897) (0 155) 
0 123*** -0 0704** 0 119*** 
(0 0152) (0 0278) (0 0130) 
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Table 7.2e: Parameter Estimates, Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), Retail Banks 
Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel Panel2 Panel3 Panel Panel2 Panel3 
I I 
lp2 0 143*** 
(0 0109) 
lp3 0 0366*** 0 0194*** 
(0 00584) (0 00437) 
lp4 0 754*** 0 459*** 
(0 0103) (0 0275) 
lyl 0 411 *** 0 542*** 
(0 0380) (0 0153) 
ly2 0 348*** 0 445*** 
(0 0374) (0 0145) 
ly3 0 250*** 
(0 0659) 
0 0340*** 0 0302*** 
(0 00988) (0 00720) 
Table 7.2f: Parameter Estimates, Battese and Coelli (1995), Retail Banks Dataset 
VARIABLE PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
LP2 0 109*** 0 0374** 0 157*** 
0 022 0 015 0006 
LP3 0 0630*** -0.332 0 030*** 0 300*** 0 012 0 0164*** 
0 007 0 582 0 005 0 01 0 009 0002 
LP4 0 840*** 2 076*** 0 862*** 0 5286*** 0 017 0 676*** 
0 009 0 719 0 0082 0 024 0 023 0 021 
LYI 0 470*** -4 097 0 434*** 0 16*** 0449*** 0 554*** 
0 034 5 520 0 022 0 023 0 035 0 012 
LY2 0 405*** 0 5941 0 285*** 0 778*** 0 552*** 0 4329*** 
0044 5.357 0 034 0032 0 037 0 0129 
LY3 0050 4467 0 266*** 
0 068 10 088 0 052 
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Table 7.2g: Parameter Estimates, TSFA RE (Greene, 2002) Retail Banks Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Pane12 Panel Panel Pane12 Pane13 
3 I 
LP2 0 110*** 0 147*** 
0 014 0 005 
LP3 0 089''' 0024'" 0 0338'" 
0 002 0 005 0 002 
LP4 0 272*** 0 006 0 280*** 
0 004 0 006 0 014 
LY1 -0 118'" 0 466'" 0 5429'" 
0 017 0 021 0 009 
LY2 0 174*** 0 519*** 0 4363'" 
0 020 0 022 0 008 
LY3 0 879"* 
0 032 
Table 7.2h: Parameter Estimates, Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990) Retail Banks 
Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel 3 
Constant 392 4884 366 071 435 376 392 50 I 366 077 435 388 
44 152*** 40 356*** 44 94I ••• 44.149*** 40 357*** 44 939*** 
TT 
-3 984 0 475 -0 487 -3 984 0 478 -0 486 
9 187 8 588 9 516 9 187 8 588 9 516 
TSQ 0324 0 109 0 198 0 324 0 108 0 198 
0 594 0 559 0 619 0 594 0 559 0 619 
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Table 7.3a: Parameter Estimates, Pitt and Lee (1981) Banking System Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
HMB MGBCG UNB HMB MGBCG UNB 
lp2 0 115*** 0229*** 
(0 0125) (0 0147) 
lp3 0 0734*** 0 0824*** 0 0752*** 0 0331*** 0 0540*** 
(0 0114) (0 00994) (0 00661) (0 00455) (0 00637) 
lp4 0 222*** 0 190*** 0 649*** 0 0250*** 0 413*** 
(0 0152) (0 0134) (0 0141) (0 00628) (0 0337) 
lyl 0242*** 0 162*** 0 153*** 0 414*** 0 410*** 
(0 0468) (0 0591) (0 0277) (0 0177) (0 0222) 
ly2 0480*** 0 378*** 0 258*** 0 503*** 0 506*** 
(0 0700) (0 0725) (0 0323) (0 0181) (0 0218) 
ly3 0 229** 0 470*** 0 532*** 
(0 0988) (0 115) (0 0464) 
Table 7.3b: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles Random Effects (1984) 
Banking System Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel 3 
lp2 0 169*** 0 120*** 0 223*** 
(0 0164) (0 0124) (0 0150) 
lp3 0 0748*** 0 0843*** 0 0795*** 0 0336*** 0 0315*** 0 0594*** 
(0 0116) (0 0103) (0 00663) (0 00666) (0 00467) (0 00625) 
lp4 0 223*** 0 196*** 0 638*** 0 0560*** 0 0243*** 0 377*** 
(0 0156) (0 0138) (0 0137) (0 00938) (0 00646) (0 0317) 
lyl 0 228*** 0 132** 0 151*** 0465*** 0428*** 0 406*** 
(0 0471) (0 0607) (0 0286) (0 0200) (0 0176) (0 0227) 
ly2 0 464*** 0 343*** 0 265*** 0497*** 0 513*** 0 517*** 
(0 0708) (0 0746) (0 0333) (0 0206) (0 0176) (0 0220) 
ly3 0 259*** 0.523*** 0 524*** 
(0 0989) (0 116) (0 0475) 
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Table 7.3c: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles Fixed Effects(1984), Banking 
System Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
lp2 0 135*** 0 0985*** 0 219*** 
(0 0188) (0 0131) (0 0156) 
lp3 0 0673*** 0 0676*** 0 0760*** 0 0406*** 0 0368*** 0 0572*** 
(0 0123) (0 0109) (0 00777) (0 00705) (0 00470) (0.00726) 
lp4 0 232*** 0 202*** 0 651*** 0 0505*** 0 0184*** 0 361*** 
(0 0160) (0 0143) (0 0160) (0 0100) (0 00652) (0 0368) 
lyl 0 252*** 0 186*** 0 156*** 0 399*** 0 361*** 0422*** 
(0 0485) (0 0638) (0 0309) (0 0219) (0 0179) (0 0235) 
ly2 0 475*** 0 387*** 0 223*** 0 427*** 0469*** 0464*** 
(0 0777) (0 0801) (0 0366) (0 0275) (0 0201) (0 0241) 
ly3 0 0832 0 360*** 0 566*** 
(0 lll) (0 133) (0 0529) 
Table 7.3d: Parameter Estimates, Battese and Coelli (1992), Banking System Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel Panel 2 Panel3 
I 
lp2 0 229*** 
(0 0147) 
lp3 0 0749*** 0 0826*** 0 0695*** 0 0542*** 
(0 0114) (0 00993) (0 00682) (0 00640) 
lp4 0 224*** 0 193*** 0 667*** 0 412*** 
(0 0151) (0 0133) (0 0147) (0 0338) 
lyl 0 217*** 0 129** 0 161*** 0 410*** 
(0 0469) (00601) (0 0288) (0 0221) 
ly2 0483*** 0 385*** 0 251*** 0 506*** 
(0 0688) (0 0719) (00317) (0 0218) 
ly3 0 232** 0 482*** 0 545*** 
(0 0975) (0 114) (0 0465) 
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Table 7.3e: Parameter Estimates, Reifschneider and Stevenson(1991), Banking 
System Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel Panel2 Panel3 Panel Panel2 Panel 3 
I I 
lp2 0 0923*** 0 197*** 
(0 00956) (00108) 
lp3 0 0519*** 0 0264*** 0 0318*** 
(0 00620) (0 00387) (0 00485) 
lp4 0 684*** -0 00547 0 490*** 
(0 00985) (0 00565) (0 0234) 
lyl 0 387*** 0 485*** 0 499*** 
(0 0260) (0 0137) (0 0156) 
ly2 0 359*** 0 543*** o 508*** 
(0 0299) (0 0128) (0 0152) 
ly3 0 268*** 
(0 0444) 
Table 7.3f: Parameter Estimates, Battese and Coelli (1995), Banking System Dataset 
IVanable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel 2 Panel3 Panel I Pane12 Pane13 
LP2 0 109*** 0 313*** 0 1629*** 
0 022 0 055 0011 
LP3 0 532 I 464*** 0 054*** 0 300*** 0 268*** 0 048*** 
0 439 0 394 0 007 0 017 0 015 0 005 
LP4 1.316* 0 897*** 0 812*** 0 529*** 0 531*** 0 703*** 
0 757 0 336 0 0137 0024 0 016 0 024 
LYI 2.342* -4 802*** 0470*** 0 162*** 0 294*** 0 474*** 
I 375 I 285 0 031 0024 0 091 0023 
LY2 -8 106*** -3 958** 0270*** 0 784*** 0 603*** 0 484*** 
2 017 I 662 0042 0027 0 123 0 022 
LY3 5 613* 8 438*** 0 227*** 
2 991 2 618 0062 
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Table 7.3g: Parameter Estimates, True SFA RE(Greene, 2002) Banking System 
Dataset 
VARIABLE PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
LP2 0 130*** 
0 011 
LP3 0 087*** 0 030*** 
0 011 0 004 
LP4 0 271*** 0 012*' 
0 011 0 006 
LY1 0 077 0 466*** 
0 061 0 015 
LY2 0 150* 0 506'** 
0 081 0 015 
LY3 0 698*** 
0 118 
Table 7.3h: Parameter Estimates, Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990), Banking 
System Dataset 
VARIABLE PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel 1 Pane12 Pane13 Panel 1 Panel2 Pane13 
Constant 476 891*** 476 882*** 582 476*** 476 875**' 476 877*** 582 493*** 
45 488 45 486 52 911 45 488 45 491 52 910 
TT 2126 2 122 2 533 2 122 2124 2 533 
9 675 9 674 11 030 9 675 9 675 11 030 
TSQ -0 031 ·0 03 .Q 052 ·0 031 -0 031 -0 052 
0 629 0 629 0 711 0 629 0 629 0 711 
Analysis of the results begms w1th a snnple question, viz , are the efficiency scores 
obtained under the two approaches (productiOn and mtermedJatwn) sJgruficantly different 
from one another? If so, the results would attest to a paradigm slnft in the nature of bankmg 
operatwns m the post-reform bankmg system An assessment of tins IS undertaken v1a an 
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applicatiOn of the Mann-Wh!tney test35 to both sets of results from both datasets (1.e, the 
Retail Banks dataset and the Banking System Dataset) The results are presented in Tables 
7 .4a-7 4e Overall, the results ind1cate a sluft away from the productiOn approach to 
banking 
Table 7.4: Mann-Whitney Test of Cost Efficiency for Retail and Banking System 
data sets 
Table 7.4(a): Schmidt and Sickles, Random Effects and Fixed Effects 
MODEL Retail Banks Dataset Commercial Banks Dataset 
SSRE 
SSFE 
YEAR 
1992 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
-5 so2••• -8 040 ... -7 159··· 
0 179 0 029•• 0 121 
-0 067 6 539··· 3 567••• 
0496 0 857 0 684 
Table 7.4(b): Battese and Coelli, 1992 
Panel I 
-8 545••• 
0 062•• 
8 483··· 
0 928 
Panel 2 
7 928··· 
0 900 
Panel3 
-5 964••• 
0206 
3 792••• 
0 683 
Battese and Coelli 1992 
Panel I 
z 
P((P}>(I)) 
-I 378 
0 424 
Retail Banks Dataset 
Pane12 Panel 3 
z z 
P((P)>(I}) P((P}>(I)) 
Commercial Banks Dataset 
Panel I Panel 2 Panel 3 
z 
P((P)>(I)) 
z z 
P((P}>(I}) P((P)>(I)} 
9941 ... 
099 
35 Deta1ls of the Mann-Wh1tney test are reproduced here for convemence The Mann-Whrtneytest exammes 1ftwo 
mdependently drawn samples ongmated from the same population In domg so, rt allows for the mvestiga!Jon mto the 
presence of a treatment effect by exarnmmg the sluft m location of the mean or med!an (Hollander and Wolfe, 1999) In the 
context of our study, tlus test allows us to mvestigate 1f the merger led to S!gmficantly rufferent and lugher efliClency scores 
for the merged banks V!S-il-VIs the control group The null, alternative, and d!rect!onal alternative hypotheses are as follows 
H 0 : No S!gruficant rufferenoesm theTELevels of the merged banks 
and the control group 
H 1 : TheTE Levelsofthemergedbanks areS!gmficantlyrufferent from 
those of the control group 
H 2 : TheTELevelsofthemerged banks arelughertlum those of the 
control group 
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Table 7.4: Mann-Whitney Test of Cost Efficiency for Retail and Banking System 
datasets (Cont'd) 
Table 7.4(b): Battese and Coelli, 1992 (Cont'd) 
Battese and Coelh 1992 
YEAR Retail Banks Dataset Commercial Banks Dataset 
Pane! I Panel2 Panel 3 Panel! Panel 2 Pane13 
1993 -0 841 10 032*** 
0453 0 998 
1994 0 092 10 041*** 
0 505 0 999 
1995 0 622 10 485*** 
0 534 0 999 
1996 0292 10 975*** 
0 516 0 996 
1997 0 537 11 336*** 
0 528 0 992 
1998 0 777 !I 735*** 
0 54 0 993 
1999 I 165 11 561*** 
0 561 0 993 
2000 I 288 11 649*** 
0 566 0 994 
2001 I 679* 11 467*** 
0 587 0 995 
2002 I 71* 10 775*** 
0592 0 996 
2003 I 738* 10 692*** 
0 594 0 99 
2004 I 837* 10 499*** 
0 599 099 
2005 I 954** 10 245*** 
0 608 0 991 
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Table 7.4: Mann-Whitney Test of Cost Efficiency for Retail and Banking System 
datasets (Cont'd) 
YEAR 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Table 7.4(c): Reifschneider and Stevenson, 1991 
Panel I 
z 
P((P)>(I)) 
Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) Model 
Retail Banks Dataset 
Panel 2 Panel 3 
z z 
P((P)>(I)) P((P)>(I)) 
-3 645*** 
0 305 
-4 597*** 
0 253 
-4 765*** 
0 245 
-4 222*** 
0277 
-2 696*** 
0 363 
-3 64*** 
0 326 
-2 722*** 
0 366 
-2.398*** 
0 38 
-2.646*** 
0 368 
-2.315** 
0 383 
-1 824* 
0404 
-1 92* 
0 398 
-1 572 
0 417 
-0 885 
0 451 
Commercial Bank Dataset 
Panel I Panel 2 Panel 3 
z z z 
P((P)>(l)) P((P)>(I)) P((P)>(I)) 
-I 01 
045 
-1 977** 
0 401 
-1 829* 
0408 
-1 852* 
0411 
-1 054 
0452 
-1 167 
0 449 
-0.29 
0488 
-0 721 
0 469 
-0 553 
0 476 
-0 416 
0 482 
0 112 
0 505 
-0 552 
0 475 
-0 629 
0 471 
-0 465 
0478 
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Table 7.4: Mann-Whitney Test of Cost Efficiency for Retail and Banking System 
datasets (Cont'd) 
Table 7.4(d): Battese and Coelli, 1995 
Battese and Coelli, 1995 
Period Retail Banks Dataset Commerc1al Banks Dataset 
Panel I Panel2 Panel 3 Panel Panel2 Panel3 
I 
1992 7 862*** -2 052** -2 502** 
0 931 0 392 0 394 
1993 7 862*•• -I 968** -I 962** 
0 931 0 398 0 398 
1994 7 773••• -I 989** -1 982** 
0 934 0 384 0 395 
1995 8 017••• -2 234** -2 234** 
0 932 0 384 0 384 
1996 8 046••• -2 445** -2 445** 
0 926 0 377 0 378 
1997 8 161*** -2 493** -2 493** 
0 925 0 377 0 377 
1998 8 268*** -2 503** -2 503** 
0927 0 378 0 378 
1999 8 192*** -2 527 -2 527** 
0920 0 375 0 375 
2000 8 039*** -2 396** -2 396** 
0909 0 383 0 383 
2001 7 892*** -2 385** -2 385** 
0 908 0 381 0 381 
2002 7 904*** -2 499** -2 499** 
0922 0 370 0 370 
2003 8 001*** -2 59&••• 2 598** 
0 931 0 362 0 362 
2004 7 719*** -2 719*** -2.719** 
0 916 0 356 0 356 
2005 7 623*** -2 672*** -2 672** 
0 918 0 355 0.355 
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Table 7.4: Mann-Whitney Test of Cost Efficiency for Retail and Banking System 
datasets (Cont'd) 
Table 7.4(e): True SFA Random Effects, (Greene, 2002) 
TSFA RE (Greene, 2002) 
Retail Banks Dataset Commercial Banks Dataset 
Panel I Panel 2 Panel3 Panel I Panel 2 Panel 3 
1992 -7 165*** 
0.130 
1993 -8 61 I ••• 
0 052 
1994 -8261*** 
0 079* 
1995 -6 299*** 
0 185 
1996 -5 372*** 
0.235 
1997 -6 773*** 
0 166 
1998 -6 521 ••• 
0174 
1999 -8 219*** 
0 085* 
2000 -8 421*** 
0 072* 
2001 -8 041*** 
0 081* 
2002 -7 806*** 
0 094* 
2003 -8 0911*** 
0 080* 
2004 -6 280*** 
0 170 
2005 -5 636*** 
0194 
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As can be seen from Table 7 4a, under the Schmidt and Sickles, fixed and Random 
effects models (1984), broadly, the efficienCies under the production and mtermedmtwn 
approaches differ sigmficantly and those of the intermediatiOn approach are lugher than 
those of the production approach The result is found under both datasets Moreover, with 
the exception of Panels 2 and 1 under the Retail and Bankmg system datasets respectively, 
the efficiencies are greater under the intermediatiOn approach. 
The same pattern can be seen under the Battese and Coelli (1992) model (Table 
7 4b ), m particular for Panel 3 under the Banking System dataset Similar results are 
obtamed for both datasets under the Battese and Coelh (1995) model and for the banking 
system under the True SF A model 
In the case of the Retail Bankmg data, under Panel I of the Battese and Coelli 
(1992) model (Table 7.4b), differences m the efficiencies are more pronounced m the latter 
part of the study horizon. Durmg the earher penod, the efficiencies do not differ 
Sigmficantly. However, under the Reifsclu!eider and Stevenson (1991) model (Table 7 3c), 
the pattern m reversed For Panel 3, under the Retail Bankmg Dataset, the efficiencies 
under the productiOn and intermediation approach differ significantly with the latter bemg 
lugher. However, when the entire bankmg system is considered, the differences disappear, 
with the exception of three years in the beginnmg of the study penod 
The followmg patterns can thus be observed from the results. The panels for which 
the estrmations converged differed between the models estimated For those wherem the 
estimations did converge, the resultmg efficiency scores differed sigmficantly between the 
intermediation and production approaches For both datasets, the efficiency scores under 
the Intermediation approach are greater than under the production approach 
Thus, the greater operatiOnal autonomy enJoyed by banks m the post reform period 
IS reflected in the dommance of the intermediatiOn approach and lughhghts the sluft away 
from a regulation dnven target attamment banking practice to one of active pursmt of 
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profitable and credit worthy mvestments and loan outlets The dominance of the 
mtermedtatJOn approach is of additional Importance given the close link between fmance 
and econormc growth (Kmg and Levme, 1993, Wachtel, 2003). The nsing Importance of 
the intermediation approach further hmts at a shift from what Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
refer to as relatiOnship based banlang towards an arm's length based approach 
The relatiOnship based banlang regime IS one wherem close ties resultmg from 
repeated contact form the basis of the lendmg deciSion This form of bankmg tbnves m 
crrcumstances of hrmted competition and scarcity of mformat10n pertammg to the credit 
market partiCipants. These feal!rres were, m fact, the by-products of the pre-reform regime 
which were mtended to foster socio-econormc development but in the process had the 
ancillary effect of propagating banks that simply formed conduits for regulation diCtated 
credit disbursement and deposit mtakes. Post-reforms, with the influx of greater 
competitiOn, reduced government holdmgs in PSBs and greater bankmg autonomy, banks 
became more motivated to actively seek out retlrrns generating mvestJnent and lending 
opportunities. In other words, the disbursement of credit would be dictated by the returns 
generatmg capacity and nsk profile of the proJect. While more research is required to 
conclusively establish this, applymg this paradigm to the ms and takmg mto account the 
dommance of the intermediation approach, It can be Inferred that the mcumbent banks have 
begun the process of movmg away from a stance of passive goal attamment to one of the 
active pursmt of mcome enhancmg outputs 
The banlang system at the dawn of reforms grappled w1th excess staff and stnct 
regulatiOns regarding the manner m which this could be shed As stated previOusly, Das et 
a! (2007) report that operatmg costs of Imhan banks exceed those of other Asian banks in 
general with labour costs accounting for more than 60% of the total operatmg costs This 
excessive use of manpower thus forms an Important reason for the fmdmg of greater cost 
meffic1ency in the earlier part of the time span exarmned Towards the latter penods, w1th 
the mcreased competitiOn from the mflux foreign and new private sector banks and greater 
operational autonomy for banks m general, this meffic1ency fell. In fact, this lack of 
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competition dunng the pre-reform penod forms a further contributing factor to the cost 
profile of the mcumbent banks (Focarelh and Pozzolo, 200 I) In additiOn, the forces of a 
rapidly changmg operating envuonrnent further characterised by dimlmshed government 
support would form compellmg reasons for mcumbent banks to shed excess costs and adopt 
a more dynamic approach to their intermediatiOn activities. However, the need to remedy 
therr asset portfolios of non-performing assets generated from pre-reform loans and purge 
themselves of an operatmg cullllfe charactensed by pass1ve compliance w1th regulation 
identified credit disbursement targets would act as dampeners to the pace of any post-
reform restructunsation In the context of cost efficiency, this would s1gnify a time lagged 
effic1ency surfacmg, an exammat10n of winch, IS detailed next 
Tables 7.5a-7.5e36 and 7 637 thus presents the estimation results for the exogenous 
vanables mfluencmg efficiency under the production and intermec:hat10n approach for all 
three considered panels usmg the Retail banks dataset A summary of the results is 
presented m Table 7 6 
Table 7.5a: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles Random Effects, Retail Banks 
Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel 3 
lnprovs -0 00547 -0 0544*** -0 00324 0 00790 -0 000770 0 00838 
(0 0107) (0 0200) (0 00858) (0 00978) (0 00795) (0 00760) 
group 0 363*** 0 266*** -0 0433 0 431*** -0 00389 -0 0227 
(0 0648) (0 0850) (0 0451) (0 0572) (0 0333) (0 0360) 
!group -0 0451*** -0 000763 0 00190 -0 0430*** 0 00371 0 000705 
(0 00626) (0 00944) (0 00472) (0 00575) (0 00373) (0 00427) 
own2 -0 0952** -0 335*** -0 0603* -0 0740** -0 0892*** -0 0550** 
(0 0398) (0 0585) (0 0323) (0 0341) (0 0236) (0 0240) 
own3 -0 0475 -0 473*** 0 00981 0 0122 -0 0921*** 0 0938*** 
(0 0437) (0 0710) (0 0360) (0 0392) (0 0289) (0 0295) 
36
.37 lnprovs = provtstons, group= dummy vanable for banks that merged and control group, tgroup = 
mteractwn between !!me trend and group dummy vanable, own2 = dummy vanable for pub he and pnvate 
sector banks, own3 = dummy vanable for pub he and foretgn sector banks, Dt =per annum ttme dummy, 
grouptDT =merger group and oer annum time dummtes mteracttons 
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Table 7.5b: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles Fixed Effects, Retail Banks 
Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
groupDT2 -0 180** 0110 -0 105* -0 189*** -0 0461 -0 143*** 
(0 0739) (0 131) (0 0572) (0 0650) (0 0463) (00515) 
groupDT3 0 000284 -0 00670 -0 0302 -0 113 0 0305 -0 0460 
(0 101) (0 137) (0.0611) (0 0883) (0 0477) (0 0548) 
groupDT4 -0 126 0 0111 -0 0107 -0 209** -0 0807* -0 0285 
(0 0932) (0 130) (0 0587) (0 0822) (0 0456) (0 0535) 
groupDT5 -0 138 0.112 0 0181 -0.205** 0 0993* 0 0232 
groupDT6 -0 175' 0 336" 0 0525 -0 296*** 0 00193 0 00900 
(0 0931) (0 133) (0 0587) (0 0803) (0 0472) (0 0527) 
groupDT7 -0 147 0 249' 0 0826 -0 270*" 0 0232 0 0258 
(0 0927) (0 132) (0 0586) (0 0802) (0 0466) (0 0526) 
groupDT8 -0 232" 0 0517 0 0231 -0 338"* 0 00171 -0 0111 
(0 0928) (0 136) (0 0607) (0 0803) (0 0476) (0 0544) 
groupDT9 -0 349*** 0 153 0 0140 -0 452*** -0 0304 -0 0346 
(0 0930) (0 137) (0 0623) (0 0807) (0 0481) (0 0557) 
groupDT10 -0 583*** 0 111 0 00194 -0 576"* -0 00919 -0 0217 
(0 0934) (0 144) (0 0652) (0 0812) (0 0502) (0 0584) 
groupDT11 -0 559*" 0 00745 -0 00719 -0 618*** 0 0524 -0 0135 
(0 0978) (0 153) (0 0718) (0 0846) (0 0529) (0 0643) 
groupDT12 -0 570*** -0 0855 -0 0179 -0 652*** -0 0865 -0 0393 
(0 0983) (0 162) (0 0771) (0 0848) (0 0564) (0 0689) 
groupDT13 -0 707*** -0 0652 0 00173 -0 772'*** -0 0424 -0 0247 
(0 0990) (0 163) (0 0779) (0 0855) (0 0565) (0 0695) 
groupDT14 -0 747*** -0 0822 -0 0169 -0 813*'** -0 0736 -0 0559 
(0 100) (0 166) (0 0792) (0 0868) (0 0574) (0 0706) 
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Table 7.5c: Parameter Estimates, Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) (Retail Banks 
Dataset) 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
t -0 286*** 
(0 0931) 
lnprovs -0 183*** -0 224*** 
(0 0443) (0 0526) 
group -0 868** -0.337 
(0 347) (0 288) 
tgroup 0 101** 0 00850 
(0 0476) (0 0286) 
own2 0 317** 0304 
(0 151) (0 228) 
own3 2 252*** 2 786*** 
(0 171) (0 229) 
Table 7.5d: Parameter Estimates, Battese and Coelli (1995), Retail Banks Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel 3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
GROUP 0 459*** 0 352 1.260*** -2 392 -0 624*** 
0 166 2 2734 0 169 146 231 I 981 
GROUPT 
-0 017 -0 001 0 093*** 0 052 0 0323*** 
0 012 0226 0 020 7 467 0140 
LNTA 
-0 045** -0 274* -0 0001*** -0 864 -0 1556*** 
0 014 0 1539 0 021 21 962 0729 
LNPROVS 
-.322 -656 -0 0008*** 0 0008 -0 0004*** 
0 006135 0 108 0009 1.036 0489 
OWN2 
-0 241*** 0 659 -0 373*** 1428 0 727*** 
0 017 I 156 0034 40 827 2 2419 
OWN3 0 250*** 2 491 -I 604*** 4 8333 I 983*** 
0024 1972 0 109 127 457 4 656 
T 
-0 037*** 0 024 
0011 0 231 
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Table 7.5e: Parameter Estimates, TSFA RE(Greene, 2002), Retail Banks Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Pane12 Panel Panel Panel2 Pane13 
3 I 
GROUP -0 020 0 097*** 
0 038 0 015 
GROUP1T 0 007 -0 016*** 
0 004 0 001 
OWN2 -0 078*** -0 087*** 
0 021 0 008 
OWN3 -0 143*** 0 051*** 
0 028 0 011 
LNPROVS -0 006 0 028*** 
0 0087 0 002 
Table 7.5e: Parameter Estimates, Pitt and Lee (1981), Retail Banks Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
HMB MGBCG UNB HMB MGBCG UNB 
lnprovs -0 0158 -0 0605*** -0 00261 0 00186 0 00152 
(0 0102) (0 0189) (0 00857) (0 00911) (0 00741) 
group 0 167** 0 248*** -0 0233 0 117* 0 0127 
(0 0707) (0 0890) (0 0419) (0 0656) (0 0373) 
tgroup -0 0543*** -0 00171 0 00146 -0 0552*** 0 00102 
(0 00586) (0 00887) (0 00449) (0 00523) (0 00348) 
own2 000131 -0 269*** -0 0674** 0 0505 -0 0869*** 
(0 0439) (0 0684) (00311) (0 0401) (0 0306) 
own3 -0 0575 -0 388*** -0 0684* 0 0254 -0 0768** 
(0 0448) (00781) (0 0373) (0 0406) (0 0329) 
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For the Retail bankmg data, as can be observed from Table 7 6, an exammation of 
the eta and t variables ind1cates, in the Battese and Coelh (I 992, 1995) and Reifschne1der 
and Stevenson (1991) models, a temporal fall in the cost inefficiency In the latter model, 1t 
sigrufies a reductiOn in the variance of cost meffic1ency. These results are found under both 
the mtermed1ation and productiOn approaches 
In fact, as can further be observed from Table 7.6, under the production approach, 
the banks that engaged m mergers showed greater efficJenc1es than their non-merging 
counterparts This is ev1denced by the pos1t1ve and s1gruficant Group vanable under the 
Schmidt and Sickles RE (Panels 1 and 2), Battese and Coelh (1992) (Panel 2) and Battese 
and Coelli (1995) (Panel 1) models. Over time, however, as can be seen from the negatively 
s1gruficant tGroup variable, the cost mefficiency of the control group was lower than that of 
the merging group. The results under the mtermediatwn approach largely remforce these 
results Under the Re1fschneider and Stevenson (1991) model, the variance of meffic1ency 
of the merging banks IS found to be lugher than that of the control group of non-mergmg 
banks m Panel 3 Over trme, however, as evidenced by the negauve and Significant tGroup 
vanable, the variance of inefficiency for the control group exceeds that of the mergmg 
group of banks In the case of the Sclumdt and Sickles RE and Battese and Coelh (1992) 
models, the efficiency of banks that engaged in mergers shows a downward trend compared 
to therr non-mergmg counterparts, as can be seen from the negauve and s1gruficant tGroup 
variable Tins suggests that while the banks had an iniual post-merger efficiency advantage 
vis-a-v1s the non-mergmg banks, this gam d1d not persist over time38 
Under the intermedmtion approach, the results for Panel I are Similar to those under 
the productiOn approach for the Sclunidt and S1ckles RE and Battese and Coelli (1992) 
models for both the Group and tGroup variables For Panel2 under the Sclunidt and S1ckles 
38 The Group variable dJstmgutshes between the tmmedtate post-merger effictenctes of banks that 
engaged m mergers and those that md not The TGroup group vanable captures the emergence, tf any, of 
lagged merger effic1ency gams over the post-merger penod and compares the same between the banks that 
merged and those that d1d not engage m any mergers 
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RE model, m contrast to the productiOn approach, there are no s1gmficant differences 
between the efficienc1es of the mergmg banks and those of the control group either 
immediately followmg the merger or on a time lagged basis Smular results are obtamed for 
Panel 3 under the Schnudt and Sickles RE approach Under the Battese and Coelh (I 995) 
model, the results for the Group variable indicating the presence of merger related 
efficiency gams are Identical to those under the production approach for Panell(I.e, the 
effic1encies of the mergmg banks are greater than those of the control group). In addition, 
this advantage persists over tnne as IS evidenced by the positive and significant !Group 
variable In contrast to the productiOn approach where there were no sigruficant merger 
related efficiency changes for Panel 3, under the mtermed~atwn approach, the immediate 
impact of the merger IS to depress the efficiencies of the mergmg banks (negatively 
sigmficant Group variable) and to raise the efficiency of the same over time (positively 
significant !Group variable) 
We now turn to the results under the Banking System dataset The followmg tables 
refer to the same 
Table 7.7a: Parameter Estimates, Pitt and Lee (1981) Banking System Datasee9 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
HMB MGBCG UNB HMB MGBCG UNB 
In pro vs -0 0158 -0 0605*** -0 00261 0 00186 0 00152 
(0 0102) (0 0189) (0 00857) (0 00911) (0 00741) 
group 0 167** 0 248*** -0 0233 0.117* 0 0127 
(0 0707) (0 0890) (0 0419) (0 0656) (0 0373) 
!group -0 0543*** -000171 0 00146 -0 0552*** 0 00102 
(0 00586) (0 00887) (0 00449) (0 00523) (0 00348) 
own2 0 00131 -0 269*** -0 0674** 0 0505 -0 0869*** 
(0 0439) (0 0684) (0 0311) (0 0401) (0 0306) 
own3 -0 0575 -0 388*** -0 0684* 00254 -0 0768** 
(0 0448) (0 0781) (0 0373) (0 0406) (0 0329) 
39 lnprovs =proVIsiOns, group = dummy vanable for banks that merged and control group, tgroup = 
mteractwn between tune trend and group dummy vanable, own2 ~ dummy vanable for pubhc and pnvate 
sector banks, own3 = dummy vanable for pub he and foreign sector banks, Dt = per annum time dummy, 
grouptDT = merger group and oer annum ttme dummies mteractwns 
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Table 7.7b: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles Random Effects (1984) 
Banking System Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel 3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
-0.135*** -0 126*** 0 0173 -0 0686*** -0 0555*** 0 0189* 
(0 0280) (0 0224) (0 0135) (0 0114) (0 00767) (0 00975) 
lnprovs -0 0151 -0 0179 0 0246*** -0 00720 0 00435 0 0343*** 
(0 0176) (0 0171) (0 00819) (0 0102) (0 00771) (0 00838) 
group 0 110 0.161* -0 0179 0 0278 0 00467 -0 00729 
(0 109) (0 0838) (0 0536) (0 0603) (0 0372) (0 0518) 
tgroup 0 0104 0 00886 0 00148 0 00158 0 00284 0 00157 
(0 0122) (0 00945) (0 00554) (0 00680) (0 00421) (0 00570) 
own2 -0 299*** -0 293*** 0 00878 -0 109*** -0 0990*** -0 0130 
(0 0684) (0 0598) (0 0386) (0 0343) (0 0274) (0 0367) 
own3 -0 493*** -0 488*** 0 0302 -0 108*** -0 133*** -0 00237 
(0 0729) (0 0653) (0 0423) (0 0379) (0 0298) (0 0409) 
Table 7.7c: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles Fixed Effects (1984) Banking 
System Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
(0 Ill) (0 133) (0 0529) 
groupDT2 0 0963 0 0421 -0 0873 00226 -0 0321 -0 104 
(0.121) (0 124) (0 0750) (0 0709) (0 0532) (0 0700) 
groupDT3 00432 -0 0705 -0 0839 -0 00468 0 00245 -0 0919 
(0 146) (0 134) (0 0833) (0 0838) (0 0571) (0 0779) 
groupDT4 00984 -0 0886 -0 0939 00503 -0 128** -0 0854 
(0 142) (0 127) (0 0793) (0 0821) (0 0542) (0 0744) 
groupDTS 00449 0 0562 -0 0400 0 123 0 0321 -0 0507 
(0 131) (0 124) (0 0804) (0 0755) (0 0523) (0 0750) 
groupDT6 0 292** 0 330*** -0 0173 -0 0334 -0 0626 -0 0467 
(0 142) (0 127) (0 0794) (0 0835) (0 0546) (0 0743) 
groupDT7 0 562*** 0 315** 0 0334 0 272*** -00118 -0 00518 
(0 145) (0 126) (0 0791) (0 0846) (0 0543) (0 0740) 
groupDT8 0 167 0 121 0 0330 -0 122 -0 0617 -0 0273 
(0 156) (0 131) (0 0821) (0 0892) (0 0559) (0 0767) 
groupDT9 0244 0 187 -0 0158 -0 0807 -0 0914 -0 0579 
(0 161) (0 135) (0 0845) (0 0937) (0 0576) (0 0789) 
groupDTIO 0226 0142 -0 0321 -0 0509 -0 0533 -0 0570 
(0 172) (0 142) (0 0886) (0 0998) (0 0604) (0 0827) 
groupDTII 0 0850 0 00272 -0 0208 -0 00682 00496 0 0994 
(0 186) (0 150) (0 0941) (0 107) (0 0637) (0 0879) 
groupDT12 -0 0683 -0 0652 -0 113 -0 188 -0 120* -0 128 
(0 202) (0 160) (0 100) (0 118) (0 0682) (0 0936) 
groupDT13 -0 00267 0 00221 -0 0739 -0 120 -0 0303 -0 0875 
(0 202) (0 160) (0 101) (0 118) (0 0685) (0 0940) 
groupDT14 0 0366 0 0505 -0 0461 -0 189 -0 0673 -0 103 
(0 204) (0 163) (0 102) (0 119) (0 0694) (0 0949) 
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Table 7.7d: Parameter Estimates, Battese and Coelli (1992), Banking System Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION 
APPROACH 
Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel3 Panel Panel 2 Panel3 
1 
lnprovs -0 0168 -0 0222 0 0267*** 0 0336*** 
(0 0173) (0 0164) (0 00810) (000815) 
group 0 0423 0 125 -0 0204 -0 0239 
(0 115) (0 0922) (0 0495) (0 0556) 
tgroup 0 00980 0 00724 0 00247 0 000799 
(0 0118) (0 00879) (0 00520) (0 00546) 
own2 -0 301 ••• -0 255*** 0 0249 -0 00928 
(0 0723) (0 0651) (0 0388) (0 0401) 
own3 -0 428*** -0 380*** -0 0121 -0 0253 
(0 0766) (0 0718) (0 0443) (0 0432) 
mu I 425 0 571*** -0 219 I 187*** 
(0 977) (0 156) (0 767) (0 379) 
eta 0 0280** 0 0294** 0 0243* 0 00243 
(0 0138) (0 0121) (0 0125) (0 00777) 
Table 7. 7e: Parameter Estimates, Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), Banking 
System Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION 
APPROACH 
Panel Panel2 Panel 3 Panel Panel2 Panel3 
I I 
lnprovs -0 240*** -0 451*** -0 280*** 
(0 0350) (0 0805) (0 0357) 
group -0 762** -1 570*** -0 370* 
(0 346) (0 322) (0 225) 
!group 0 0978* 0 150*** -0 0275 
(0 0501) (0 0324) (0 0189) 
own2 0 387** 0 0812 0 736*** 
(0 153) (0 326) (0 188) 
own3 2 053*** I 973*** 2 652*** 
(0 153) (0 280) (0 188) 
T -0 246** - 071 ** - 020** 
(0 0988) ( 012) (0 0098) 
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Table 7.7f: Parameter Estimates, TSFA RE (Greene, 1992) Banking System Dataset 
VARIABLE PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Pane13 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
GROUP 0 448*** -0 034 
0 076 0 040 
!GROUP -0 021 *** o ooa· 
0 011 0 004 
OWN2 -0 396*** -0 075*** 
0 050 0 022 
OWN3 -0 760*** -0 152*** 
0 054 0 025 
LNPROVS 0 011 0 004 
0 016 0 007 
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Table 7.8: Exogenous Variables- production approach- Banking System Dataset 
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Chapter 7 Bank Mergers zn lnd1a ProductiVIty Enhanczng? A Cost Based TFP Approach 
Tables 7 7a-7 7g and 7 8 thus presents the estimation results for the exogenous 
vanables mfluencmg efficiency under the production and intermediation approach for all 
three cons1dered panels using the Banlang system dataset A summary of the results 1s 
presented m Table 7 8 
Thus, under the results from the Banlong System dataset, under both input-output 
approaches, for a! the models w1th the exception of the Battese and Coelh (1995) model, 
the cost meffic1enc1es of the private and foreign banks are lower than that of the PSBs. For 
the Reifschneider and Stevenson model (1991 ), the vanance of mefficiency of the pnvate 
and foreign banks are greater than that of the PSBs In the case of the Battese and Coelh 
(1995) model, these results hold for Panels 1 and 2. 
With the exceptiOn of Panel 2 under the Schmidt and S1ckles RE (1984) model, 
under the productiOn approach, we find that, overall, there are no s1gruficant differences 
between the mergmg banks and the control group for the Schnudt and Sickles RE (1984) 
and Battese and Coelh (1992) models For Panel 2 under the Schm1dt and Sickles RE 
(1984) model, the efficienc1es of the mergmg banks are lugher than those of the control 
group For the Re1fschne1der and Stevenson (1991) model, the results remforce those of the 
Retail Banking Dataset, 1 e., the variance of mefficiency of the control group was lower 
than that of the mergmg banks However, over time, the latter's inefficiency variance shows 
a greater declme than that of the former. 
Under the intermediatiOn approach, the results for all three panels under the 
Schnudt and Sickles RE (1984) and Battese and Coelh (1992) model resemble those of the 
production approach In other words, there are no Significant differences between the 
efficienc1es of the mergmg banks and the control group. The Battese and Coelh (1995) 
model however indicates that the mean efficiency of the merging banks under Panels 1 and 
3 are h1gher than those of their non-mergmg counterparts Tlus efficiency gam also persists 
across time as shown by the positive and significant tGroup variable These results parallel 
those of the Retail Banking dataset. Thus, in the time penods followmg the merger, the 
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banks that engaged m mergers gained temporally Jagged supenor cost efficiency profiles 
vJs-it-vJs the non-mergmg banks Tlus fmdmg IS m Jme with the giVen literature that finds 
temporal lags m the emergence of merger related gams (Cuesta and Orea, 2002, Haynes 
and Thompson, 1999) It further suggests that over time, as the banks adjusted themselves 
to their greater operatiOnal autonomy in the post-econoffilc reforms penod, they were able 
to recoup the merger related cost efficienc1es. These results are reminiscent of those under 
Chapter 5 wherein the efficiency gams post-merger were present in the actual wake of the 
merger and showed a temporal persistence over the post merger period That these gams 
materialise under the mtermed1at10n approach further points to a sluft m the nature of 
bankmg away from the production approach to that of an mtermed1ary 
Under the Re1fschne1der and Stevenson (1991) model Panel 2, the vanance of 
meffic1ency of the control group banks IS lower than that of the merging group However, 
the reverse is found over trme, 1 e., over trme, the variance of meffic1ency of the mergmg 
banks IS found to be lower than that of the control group While similar results m terms of 
the nnmed1ate 1mpact of the merger on the vanance of inefficiency of the banks 1s found for 
Panel3, over time, there are no s1gmficant differences m the variances of the two groups 
For the cases wherein the Group and tGroup variables are found to have a 
s1gmficant impact on the performance of the acqumng bank in the case of the Panel I, there 
lies an mterestmg conclusiOn with respect to the t1mmg of the mergers. The (sample) 
merged banks were constructed to eXIst over the complete pre-merger time honzon of the 
study The analysts thus begins at the immed1ate post reform period and continues mto the 
latter stage of the reform period, thereby including the point of merger and extendmg into a 
stage when the banks had sufficient time to mstitute mternal and operational 
restructurisatwn programs to adJUSt to their changing operating enVIronments. The banking 
system at the dawn of the reforms process was charactensed by d1rected lending pohc1es 
and adffi!nistered mterest rate regrmes The subsequent sacnfice of the active pursmt of 
high cahbre asset portfolios usmg frontline credit screerung and monitonng procedures, led 
to a progressive atrophy of the intermediation process cuhrunatmg in Widespread 
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opera!ional mefficiency Creakmg under this legacy of excess costs and persistent non-
performing assets and contending with the influx of new pnvate and foreign banks, 
incumbent banks needed to enhance their operatiOnal profiles m order to secure their long-
term survival Retrospectively, therefore, there would be greater scope for efficiency gams 
from mergers that occurred at the mtroductory phase of the reforms process 
Moreover, while such mergers would allow the merged entity to combme the 
deposit bases of the parent entities and sweep out duplicative procedures, the strength of 
these efficiency gains would, however, be tempered by the inhentance of problematic asset 
portfolios, the changing operational and regulatory envrronment and expectations regardmg 
the nature of future waves of reforms. The confluence of these factors would serve to dilute 
the rate at winch post-merger efficiency gams are recouped. Tins slow-down would be 
picked up as a moderated and temporally lagged surfacmg of merger related efficiency 
gams. The presence of rrnmediate post-merger and temporally lagged efficiency gams 
under the production approach and the lack of immediate post-merger efficiency changes 
coupled with the t1me lagged emergence of efficiency gams for merged banks under the 
intermediation model provtdes added evidence in favour of this 
Importantly, the fmdmgs under both mput-output specificatiOns suggest that the 
Central Bank pohcy of merging ailing bankmg units With healthier ones did not dilute the 
efficiency strength of the latter and m fact, successfully contained the inefficiency of the 
weaker bank 
The question remams, however, as to the source of such merger gains Potentially, 
the merger would enable the merged en!ity to obtam a greater and I or enhanced asset base 
To venfy tins, we tlim to the productivity analysis usmg an index number approximatiOn to 
Bauer's (I 990) decomposition of cost based TFPC. Tins enables us to chart the 
productivity trend of the merging banks pre and post merger, compare the same with that of 
the control group and isolate the potential sources of the efficiency gams experienced by 
the former. The analyses, presented m Tables 7 9a-7 9b to 7.12a-7.12b are earned out for 
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Panel I under the productiOn approach and intermediatiOn approaches for the Schzmdt and 
Sickles Random Effects (1984) model, Panel 3 under the productwn approach for the 
Re1fschne1der and Stevenson (1991) model and Panels I and 3 under the interrnedJatwn 
approach for the Battese and Coelh (1995) model 
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Table 7.9a: Total Factor Productivity Decomposition for Panel 1- CG Banks, Production Approach, Schmidt and 
Sickles Random Effect (1984), Retail Banks Dataset g 
{5 
Penod BauerTFPC BauerRTSeffect BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPRICEeffect ... ... 
'-1 
1:>:1 
"' 2 -0 120918 0 036545 -0 093444 0 062812 -0 117654 "' "" 
3 -0 086173 0 096255 -0 094943 0 043821 -0 127239 ~ ~ 
4 0 001699 0 136157 -0 093752 -0 04675 0 006043 "' ~
5 -0 122823 -0 011924 -0 090646 0 089238 -0 10949 s ~ 
6 -0 239368 2 049695 -0 092809 -1 897063 -0 299192 El-
"' 7 0 057909 0 070432 -0 095431 0 046349 0 036559 i 
8 0 018071 0 080894 -0 094588 0 017659 0 027647 ~ 
" 9 0 120436 0 169596 -0 093096 0 01604 0 026253 -:;;· 
-· 
10 0 065951 0 017878 -0 090833 0 079859 0 059046 ~~ 
11 -0 081043 -0 010887 -0 091127 0 058617 -0 039046 
"'"' "' 
"' 12 -0 101947 0 026167 -0 090947 0 057874 -0 095041 " ~-
13 0 023331 0 073683 -0 090463 0 015362 0 024749 " ::... 
14 -0 024619 0 016794 -0 088989 0 026363 0 021214 ~ 
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:;j 
'ti 
N ~ 
V. '15 
<X> ~ 
"' " 
"'"' 
Table 7.9b: TFPC for Panel 1- Merging Banks, under Production Approach using Schmidt and Sickles (1984) Random 
Effects Model- Retail Banks Dataset 
g bid Eenod BauerTFPC BauerRTSeffect BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPRICEeffect 
M! I {5 ~ 2 0 087736 0 009715 -0 081327 0 00311 0 156237 ... 
3 -0 625665 0 006602 -0 081272 0 011073 -0 562069 
"' 4 -0 243726 0 021366 -0 083237 -0 005396 -0 176458 ~ 
5 -0 024436 0 000065 -0 083254 0 003719 0 055035 
"' ,.... 6 -0 168934 0 05025 -0 085875 0 016577 -0 149887 ~ 7 0 079058 0 145574 -0 087389 0 003053 0017819 
M2 8 0 027192 0 040123 -0 084813 0 020005 0 051878 ~ 
"' 9 0 088127 0 109356 -0 083526 0 001192 0 061106 ~
10 -0 062252 0 005882 -0 082362 -0 010796 0 025024 :; 
11 0 166594 0 108808 -0080417 -0 009404 0 147606 ;;.. 
12 0 06441 0 02455 -0 078428 0 029069 0 089219 e. ~ 
13 0 153225 0 008433 -0 077863 0 040339 0 182316 .., 
14 -0 004021 0 081226 -0 077657 -0 042083 0 034494 Cl 
M3 ~ 
" 2 0 624891 -0 122828 -0 077769 0 014454 0 811034 ~ 
3 -0 714921 -0 042342 -0080017 0 032134 -0 624695 ~ 
4 0 052769 0 008622 -0 081979 0 009364 0 116763 ~ 5 -0 203664 0 086116 -0 080324 -0 023329 -0 186127 ~ 
6 -0 227512 0 109124 -0 079177 -0 004613 -0 252845 
"' n 
7 0 047851 0 15526 -0 078677 0 002214 -0 030946 ~ 8 0 210212 0 05556 -0 076845 0 006031 0 225466 
" 9 -0 127794 0 026491 -0 075586 0 006314 -0 085013 :... 
10 0 042507 0 06635 -007417 -0 017206 0 067533 g 
11 0 249906 0 123205 -0071806 0 001261 0 197246 ~ 
12 -0 070287 0 0527 -0 070231 0 000333 -0 053089 ~ 
!3 0 103063 0 035473 -0 069101 0 003033 0 133658 "' "'-
14 -0 019349 0 078322 -0 067707 -0 014844 -0 015119 :;] 
.., 
N :... 
V. :g 
'0 Cl 
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Table 7.9b: TFPC for Panell- Merging Banks, under Production Approach using Schmidt and Sickles (1984) Random 
Effects Model- Retail Banks Dataset (Cont'd) 
penod BauerTFPC BauerRTSeffect BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPRICEeffect 
4 
5 -2 232197 -1 73788 -0 092012 2 40455 -2 806855 M4 ------~----~~~----------~~~------------~~~~------~~~----------~~~ 
6 0 653942 I 587113 -0 088618 -0 786396 -0 058158 
7 0 273602 0 486653 -0 087679 -0 049025 -0 076346 
8 0 055027 0 287083 -0 086752 -0017184 -0 128119 
9 0 989016 0 37132 -0 08383 0 001266 0 70026 
10 -0 262497 0 233868 -0 082288 -0 006741 -0 407337 
11 0 376019 0 387419 -0 081533 0 014445 0 055689 
12 -0 231709 0271717 -0 079047 -0 061684 -0 362695 
13 0 588323 0 285096 -0 075461 -0 001056 0 379744 
14 0 141371 0 165862 -0 071487 -0 04201 0 089006 
M5 4 
5 0531735 0 103412 -0 090137 0 217439 0 30102 
6 -0 24913 0 298926 -0 089102 -0 049418 -0 409536 
7 0 095897 0 447935 -0 091177 -0 055162 -0 205699 
8 0161776 0 467977 -0 09168 -0 008605 -0 205916 
9 0138931 0 373652 -0 090388 -0 002202 -0 142132 
10 0 96554 0 157184 -0 086394 -0 004467 0 899216 
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Table 7.9b: TFPC for Panell- Merging Banks, under Production Approach using Schmidt aud Sickles (1984) Random 
Effects Model- Retail Banks Dataset (Cont'd) 
g bid penod BauerTFPC BauerRTSeffect BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPRICEeffect 
M6 I -§ ;;; 
2 5 349474 5 932781 -0 104378 -0 071926 -0 407002 -.. 
3 -0 452943 0 142805 -0 091712 -0 00442 -0 499615 " 
4 0 237345 0 130945 -0091103 -0 004389 0 201893 ~ 
0137198 0 187323 -0 088579 -0 001928 0 040382 " 5 
"' 6 -0 284364 0 072337 -0 089385 0 008852 -0 276167 ~ 
7 0 235203 0 219564 -0 090205 0 003884 0 101961 ~ 
-0 059644 0 180271 -0 089574 0 008607 -0 158949 "' 8 ;;'! 
9 0 147099 02209 -0 089467 0 028981 -0 013314 ;;; 
10 -0 3784 0 058574 -0 088881 -0 018493 -0 3296 s-
11 0 044641 0 138046 -0 087749 -0 020748 0 015092 e. 
"' 12 -0 0603 0 026906 -0 088281 -0 001669 0 002744 ~ 13 0 075132 0 142265 -0 087422 -0 015244 0 035532 
14 -0 074531 0 222931 -0 083064 -0 028853 -0 185546 ~ 
M7 ("') :::-
2 0 223654 0 041032 -0 087476 -0 015898 0 285997 ::: 
3 -0210344 0 038456 -0 087767 0 045767 -0 206801 ~ 
4 -0 309335 0 02151 -0 08936 -0 01159 -0 229894 ~ ,.. 
5 -0 491195 0 012049 -0 089185 -0 003739 -0 410319 
"'  6 -0 060341 0 077054 -0 093106 000666 -0 05095 ("')
-· 
7 0 027444 0 093946 -0 094625 -0 000454 0 028577 ~ 
"' 8 0 11197 0 102399 -0 08852 -0 00187 0 09996 :... 
9 0 052001 0 129145 -0 084059 0 00016 0 006756 ~ 10 -0 167785 0 112946 -0083171 -0 013284 -0 184276 
11 -0 220562 0 114493 -0 083591 -0 014011 -0 237454 ~ 12 0 039725 0 126238 -0 086581 0 005098 -0 00503 
13 0 320372 0 076221 -0 086262 0 012219 0318194 "'-
14 0 216502 0 125569 -0 080083 -0 007243 0 178258 :;j 
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Table 7.10a: TFPC Decomposition for Panel I- Control Group Banks under Intermediation Approach, Scbmidt and 
Sickles Random Effects model (1984), Retail Banks Dataset 
g 
~ 
-
"' ... 
:--> 
Penod Bauer TFPC BauerRTSeffect BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPRICEeffect ~ ;:, 
"" ~ 
2 0 083789 0 107207 -0 06807 -0 00891 0 053556 ~ 
"' 
3 0 126725 0 151254 -0 06596 -0 04561 0 087046 ~ :. 
4 -0 0304 0 094833 -0 06273 0 01962 -0 08212 ::-~ 
5 -0 14336 0 066857 -0 06035 0 022397 -0 17226 "' ~ 6 0 18722 0172932 -0 06079 -0 03082 0 10589 ~ 
7 0 034638 0 129864 -0 05966 -0 02911 -0 00646 g_ 
:'0 
8 0 029352 0 124316 -0 056 -0 02274 -0 01622 ~ 
9 0 108101 0 168707 -0 05172 0 000607 -0 0095 ~ ;,.. 
"' 10 0 082096 0 116122 -0 04715 0 001193 0 011933 ;:, 
" 
1l -0 00101 0 012306 -0 04266 0 024405 0 004931 ~ 
" :... 
12 0 089854 0 100415 -0 03842 -0 00648 0 034343 g 
13 0 098071 0 092842 -0 03385 0 001562 0 037517 "' -
14 0 067106 -0 00428 -0 029 0 055335 0 045046 ~ 
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Table 7.10b: TFPC Decomposition for Pan ell- Merging Group Banks under Intermediation Approach, Schmidt and 
Sickles Random Effects model (1984), Retail Banks Dataset g 
{5 
bid penod BauerTFPC BauerRTSeffect BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPRICEeffect 
" 
... 
M! I 
" 2 0 008977 0 057011 -0 04638 -0 0178 0 01614 0, 
3 -0 11084 0 036945 -0 0461 -0 0172 -0 08447 § 
4 0 00389 0 023642 -0 04846 0 003195 0 02551 .... 
5 -0 04042 0 018767 -0 0459 -0 00352 -0 00977 ~ 
6 0 023329 0 03479 -0 04465 -0 01121 0 044406 ~ 
7 0 091437 0 146597 -0 0425 -0 00202 -0 01064 
"' t:1
M2 8 -0 36685 0 055136 -0 03819 -0 00899 -0 37481 :; 
9 0 100187 0 118733 -0 03433 -0 00065 0 016436 
"' 
10 -0 01886 0 022177 -0 0299 0002456 -0 01359 ~ 
11 -0 5531 0 135666 -0 02622 0 006093 -0 66864 1:) 
12 0 099027 0 129816 -0 02199 -004176 0 032957 ~ 13 0 106093 0 12073 -0 01694 -0 059 0 061309 ~ 
14 0 034583 -0 04038 -0 01181 0 065057 0021712 g 
M3 ::: 
2 -0 47504 -0 14213 -0 04975 -0 01449 -0 26867 .:;; 
3 -0 1189 -0 00483 -0 04584 -0 05536 -0 01287 ~ ;:,.. 
4 -0 01637 0 038839 -0 04676 -0 01555 0 007101 1:) 
"' 5 -0 05489 0 08709 -0 04415 0 027178 -0 12501 ::l 
6 0 069371 0 095087 -0 0432 0 008762 0 008722 ~ 
" 7 0 074977 0 146661 -0 04087 -0 00288 -0 02794 :... 
8 -0 02531 0 066097 -0 03641 -0 00937 -0 04562 ~ 9 -0 08801 0 025156 -0 03297 -0 00698 -0 07322 
-10 0 047095 0 107323 -0 02983 0 017495 -0 04789 0, 
11 0 274305 0 15273 -0 02299 -0 0009 0 145464 !:; 
"' 12 0 052022 0 070352 -0 0169 0 001005 -0 00244 "-
13 002726 0 035061 -0 01267 -0 00624 0 011112 ~ 
'ti 14 0 043448 0 067403 -0 00788 0.029859 -0 04593 ~ 
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Table 7.10b: TFPC Decomposition for Pane! I- Merging Group Banks under Intermediation Approach, Schmidt and 
Sickles Random Effects model (1984), Retail Banks Dataset (Cont'd) g 
bid penod BauerTFPC BauerRTSeffect BauerTEC BauerTC 
M4 4 
5 -0 03885 I 024538 -0 04329 
6 0 658073 0 800534 -0 06337 
7 0 349926 0401718 -0 05794 
8 0 322105 0 343032 -0 05281 
9 -0 04077 0 485908 -0 0463 
IO 0 160583 0 176974 -0 04I66 
I I 0 469953 0 453341 -0 037 
12 0 208I54 0 I68665 -0 03053 
13 0 331308 0 321977 -0 0235 
14 0 117I54 0 034723 -0 01587 
MS 4 
5 0 259668 0 393625 -0 07593 
6 0 246008 0 I 83845 -0 0737I 
7 0 345I I I 0 359623 -0 06958 
8 0 499483 0 497791 -0 06374 
9 0 433029 0 392223 -0 05545 
10 0 145958 0217195 -0 03968 
BauerNMCP BauerPRICEeffect 
0 132715 -1 15282 
-0 10572 0 026627 
-0 05163 0 057781 
-0 01021 0 042091 
-0 02849 -0 45189 
0 004323 0 020947 
-0 01174 0 065352 
0 053261 0 01676 
000878 0 024054 
0 099395 -0 0011 
0 03032 -0 08835 
-0 0334 0 I69273 
-0 08655 0 I4I615 
-0 04452 0 109949 
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Table 7.10b: TFPC Decomposition for Pan ell- Merging Group Banks under Intermediation Approach, Schmidt and 
Sickles Random Effects model (1984), Retail Banks Dataset (Cont'd) 
Q 
bid penod BauerTFPC BauerRTSeffect BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPRICEeffect -§ 
M6 I 
"' 
... 
2 6 I 85335 6 OI24I3 -0 07639 0 0393I4 0 2IOOOI 
" 3 -0 005I 0 235299 -0 06292 -0 04329 -0 I342 b:> 
"' 4 0 20I947 0 10878 -0 06II9 0 022489 0 13I866 
" 
"" 5 0 078553 0 I64071 -0 05324 0 OI33 -0 04558 ~ 6 -0 4643 0 08345 -0 04983 -003I02 -0 4669 ~ 7 0 I57075 0 242746 -0 04695 -0 00824 -0 03048 
"' 
8 0 I44472 0 I87995 -0 0441 -0 01142 0 OII992 ~ 
9 0 24075 0 293475 -0 04123 -0 02565 0 014159 
:; 
::;--
10 -0 0179 0 024229 -0 03742 0 012794 -001751 ~ 
II 0 216094 0112811 -0 03II9 0 023743 0 II0728 
"' 12 -0 03559 0 047384 -0 02682 0 006404 -0 06256 .., 
13 0 142437 0 10142 -0 02279 0 025482 0 03832 Cl 
14 0 036901 0 07399 -001718 0 044181 -0 06409 ~ g. 
M7 1 :: 
2 -0 0775 0 004698 -0 05766 0 02705 -0 05159 ~ 
3 0 082344 0 106188 -0 05387 -0 06351 0 093534 t>., 
" 4 -011511 0 012369 -0 05333 0 012665 -0 08682 ::-
"' 5 -0 23503 -0 01405 -0 05665 0 00426 -0 16859 " " 6 0 164625 0 092475 -0 05882 -0 00952 0 140487 ~ 
7 0 100295 0 091259 -0 05237 0 000745 0 060657 " ~ 
8 0 090278 0 109147 -0 04201 0 002869 0 020268 g 
9 0 08829 0 140127 -0 03552 -0 00042 -0 0159 
"' 
-10 -001158 0 091733 -0 03342 0 015607 -0 08549 r II 0 085164 0 105548 -0 03267 0 017922 -0 00563 
12 0119213 0 140699 -003197 -0 00786 0 01834 "-
13 -0 48222 0 129812 -0 02729 -001712 -0 56761 ~ 
14 0 166869 0 13758 -0 01779 0 018794 0 028284 "ti ~ 
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Table 7.11a: TFPC Decomposition for Pane13- Merging Group Banks under Production Approach, Reifschneider and 
Stevenson model (1991), Retail Banks Dataset 
COST INEFFICIENCY 
PERIOD MERGER 1 MERGER2 MERGER3 MERGER4 MERGER 5 MERGER 6 MERGER 7 ACG 
0 393061 0 270486 0 376378 0 376378 0111555 0 39344 
2 0 349792 0 347539 0 328268 0 328268 0 121005 0 395134 
3 0 099333 0111075 0 131416 0131416 0 089847 0 270534 
4 0 066992 0 21855 0 099136 0 09628 0 780559 0 099136 0 045719 0 202416 
5 0 061271 0 08608 0 168516 0 533093 0 615893 0 168516 0 073274 0 259724 
6 0 084024 0187122 0 16682 0 172897 0 539475 0 16682 0 081494 0 287266 
7 0 051634 0 099202 0 149835 0 106316 0 189127 0 149835 0 067854 0 267771 
8 0 064011 0 154839 0 16854 0199113 0 305265 0 16854 0 060807 0 251527 
9 0 068501 0 184859 0 14138 0 026761 0 38387 0 14138 0 089795 0 209236 
10 0 061345 0 191532 0 131107 0 115542 0 382159 0131107 0 069839 0 235405 
11 0 062004 0 214474 0 094086 0 104431 0 094086 0 080396 0 219671 
12 0 06494 0 165342 0 0776 0 06423 0 0776 0 049248 0 21054 
13 0 061638 0 08756 0 063143 0 041414 0 063143 0 03422 0 178486 
14 0 082602 0062111 0 066351 0 056306 0 066351 0 045229 0 18836 
Table 7.llb: TFPC Decomposition for Panel3- Control Group Banks under Production Approach, Reifschneider and 
Stevenson model (1991), Retail Banks Dataset 
BAUER TFP DECOMPOSITION (AVERAGES) CONTROL GROUP 
PERIOD BauerTFPC BauerRTS BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPrice 
Effect 
2 -0 08421 0 334333 -0 02396 -0 03225 -0 24337 -0 10649 
3 -0 28997 0 143411 -0 24511 -0 03129 -0 0067 -0 1485 
4 -0 00065 0 100997 -0 08696 -0 02834 -0 00441 0 018073 
5 -0 01047 0 048847 0 045639 -0 028 0 010198 -0 08223 
6 -0 10554 0 17587 0 031922 -0 03091 0 005966 -0 2884 
7 0 06709 0 153253 -0 04832 -0 03014 -0 02389 0 025238 
8 0 101803 0 09679 -0 0092 -0 02614 0 007974 0 044869 
9 0 159244 0 142262 -0 05018 -0 02121 0 021588 0 062952 
10 0 129228 0 11231 0 038839 -0 01762 -0 03788 0013182 
11 -0 02762 0 089674 0 004676 -0 01886 -0 05366 -0 04688 
12 -0 02291 0 075157 0 002411 -0 01168 -0 00462 -0 08419 
13 0 070712 0 097481 -0 03703 -0 00671 -0 0178 0 034773 
14 0 112971 0 065456 0061641 -0 00568 -0 02274 0 012448 
Table 7.1lb: TFPC Decomposition for Pane13- Merger Group Banks under Production Approach, Reifschneider and 
Stevenson model (1991), Retail Banks Dataset 
MERGER PERIOD BauerTFPC BauerRTSeffect BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPRICEeffect Q 
M1 2 0 112203 0 034801 
-0 07274 -0 0213 -0 06867 -0 01758 >§ 
3 -0 55722 -0 81116 
-1 08414 -0 01944 -0 24938 -0 00416 ;;t ., 
4 -0 04512 -0 08554 
-0 14338 -0 01987 -0 03679 -0 00118 
" 
5 0 126874 0 192873 0 257484 -001704 0 080502 0 001147 0, 
6 -0 11929 -0 07886 
-0 0959 -0 01515 -0 00233 0 000431 § 
"'" M2 7 0 162066 0 279058 0 246534 -0 01304 -0 02009 0 000609 ~ 8 0 048843 0 125366 0 141956 -0 01007 0 022003 0 00466 ~ 
9 -0 01254 0 05758 0 019755 -0 00797 -0 03202 0 002162 
"' ~10 -0 17538 -0 19675 
-0 20693 -0 00532 -0 01197 0 007106 ;; 
11 -0 03234 0 043579 0 0186 -0 00096 -004199 0 017973 !>" 
12 0117393 0 159399 0 1915 0 006683 -0 0183 0 043714 9:-
"' 13 0 230664 0 278554 0 308297 0 014941 -0 01582 0 030625 ~ 14 0055177 0 116665 0 10708 0 018904 0 003442 -003193 
M3 1 ~ 
2 -0 25444 -0 43598 
-051106 -001144 " -0 06297 -0 00066 ::l' 
" 3 -0 67047 -101112 
-I 34912 -0 01421 -031623 -0 00757 ~ 
4 0 122438 0 091504 0 039852 -0 01307 -0 03585 -0 00273 ~ 
5 -0 20566 -0 15908 
-0 17833 -0 00996 -0 00624 -0 00305 ;,.. § 
6 -0 29571 -0 17795 
-0 16634 -0 01174 0 02498 -0 00164 n 
7 -0 04738 0 061077 0 009894 -0 01359 -0 03543 -0 00216 ~ 
8 0 270662 0 334762 0 340206 -0 01088 0 013387 0 002935 " ~ 
9 -0 I 1028 -0 08085 
-0 08551 -0 00825 0 004879 -0 00129 ~ 10 0 089383 0 126978 0 139431 -0 00374 -0 00781 0 024002 
11 0 254734 0 385075 0 409202 0 005191 0 000683 0 018253 ~ 12 -0 07303 -0 00619 0 020773 0 010652 0 003154 0 01316 
"' 
13 0 161493 0 209596 0 013208 <>.. 0 21563 -0 00361 -0 00356 :;j 14 -0 00628 0 095939 0 141492 0 015902 0 022843 0 006808 '".; 
~ 
'15 
il 
IV 
"' 0'> " 00 ;,.. 
Table 7.1lb: TFPC Decomposition for Panel3- Control Group Banks under Production Approach, Reifschneider and 
Stevenson model (1991), Retail Banks Dataset (Cont'd) 
Q 
MERGER PERIOD BauerTFPC BauerRTSeffect BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPRICE 
-§ 
-
"' effect " 
" M4 4 ~ 5 -2 11352 -1 42771 
-1 05308 -0 05422 0 605899 -0 17706 
"' 6 0 031855 0 049011 -0 04631 -051715 0 011688 "'" -0 50276 ~ 7 0 214269 0 539933 0 366924 -0 0444 -0 07751 -0 0511 ~ 8 -0 19493 0193616 0 380384 -0 03585 0 109176 0113442 "' 
9 0225112 1 025861 -0 01958 -0 19604 -0 02022 
;:; 
0 790023 
-· 
"' 10 -0 47321 -0 16797 
-013118 -0 0191 0 09721 -0 04133 
'"' 11 0 093318 0 463914 0 470751 -0 01863 -0 01264 0 038105 s. 
"' 12 -0 3955 -0 2405 
-0 29101 -0 01048 -0 04456 0 004518 .., 
13 0 431714 0 689986 0 720359 -0 0012 -0 02457 0 05614 il 
14 0 11221 0 258098 0 252463 0 006102 0 015933 -0 02767 ~ 
" M5 4 ~ 
5 0 472886 0 988672 0 681227 -0 05626 -0 33241 0 081222 ~ 
6 -0 70184 -0 48277 -0 05371 -0 13669 -0 12566 
/:>j 
-0 79884 "' ~ 
7 -0 01909 -0 03117 
-0 60493 -0 06109 -0 50848 -000419 § 
8 0 075712 0 942813 I 064583 -0 05234 0149236 0 024869 ~ ~ 9 -0 09915 0 422991 0484175 -0 04164 0111131 -0 00831 
" 
10 0 335362 0 7778 -0 03208 -0 00261 0 05414 ::... 0 797252 ~ 
-~ 
!:>.. 
~ 
'"ti 
~ ~ 
N "' 
"' 
" 
'D ~
Table 7.11b: TFPC Decomposition for Pane13- Control Group Banks under Production Approach, Reifschneider and 
Stevenson model (1991), Retail Banks Dataset (Cont'd) 
MERGER PERIOD BauerTFPC BauerRTSeffect BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPRICEeffect g 
M6 ~ 
-2 -0 16646 0 007563 0 08235 -0 02511 0 105422 -0 00553 
"' .... 3 0 130252 -0 05052 -0 40258 -001819 -0 29997 -0 03391 
" 4 0 08911 0 331739 0 452061 -0 0107 0 127883 0 003137 ~ 
5 -0 13983 -012193 -0 28623 -0 01005 -0 15601 0 001747 ::s ..,. 
6 -0 87722 -0 68514 -0 57659 -0 01035 0117218 0 001676 ~ 7 0 097848 0 209267 0 100705 -0 00943 -0 10259 0 003466 
8 -0 17161 0 072808 0 130918 -0 00837 0 06391 0 002569 ~ 
"' 9 -0 02689 0 250946 0 301623 -0 00774 0 0357 0 022721 ~
10 -0 30707 -0 26327 -0 27005 -0 00424 0 007964 -0 0105 
;; 
:;--ll 0 038761 0 185371 0 21264 0 001299 0 028012 -0 00204 ~ 
12 0 021127 -0 00585 -004319 0 007542 -0 05975 0 01487 
" 13 0 032032 0 081573 -0 00754 0 011646 -0 08913 -0 01164 .., 
14 -0 30332 -013133 -0 23875 0 005778 -0 02787 -0 08532 <5 
M7 I ~ 
" 2 0 199843 0 22587 0 232027 -0 00765 0010721 0 003083 ::::-., 
3 -0 40568 -0 35871 -0 38883 -0 00581 -0 0352 0 010887 ~ 
4 -0 41247 -0 46033 -052171 -0 00672 -0 04828 -0 00638 t>] ::s 
5 0 006247 0 032536 0 051293 -0 00949 0 029895 -0 00165 
,.. 
" 6 -0 28865 -0 20554 -0 20085 -0 00855 0 009053 0 004184 ::s 
" 
7 -0 06475 0 003301 -0 01783 -0 00577 -0 01502 -0 00034 ~ 
8 0 086946 0 172149 0 16258 -0 00211 -0 00769 0 000234 " :... 
9 0 190915 0 351171 0 389382 0 002182 0 031847 0 004182 ~ 10 0 038245 0 121225 0 09716 0 004462 -0 02204 -0 00648 
"' -ll 0 042976 0 169169 0 188709 0 006611 0011536 0 001393 ~ 12 -0 09182 0 01764 -0 00202 0 009057 -0 03388 0 005165 
"' 13 -0 06372 0 03952 0 0599 0 011652 -0 01598 0 024709 "-
14 0 218646 0 366851 0 421044 0 018221 0 011659 0 024313 t;j 
'"ti 
~ 
'15 
<5 
N 
" 
_, g. 
0 
Table 7.12a: TFPC Decomposition for Panell- Control Group Banks under Intermediation Approach, Battese and 
Coelli model (1995), Retail Banks Dataset 
Q 
PERIOD BauerTFPC BauerRTS BAuerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnceEffect -§ 
-
"' 
.., 
" ~ 2 ;: 
0 225151 0 106083 0 003352 -0 06709 -0 00778 0 095293 
"" 3 ~ 0 010147 0 141781 0 003357 -0 06375 -0 03614 -0 01755 ~ 4 
"' 
-0 36703 -0 0563 0 000865 -0 05783 0023417 -0 13859 ~
5 ;; 
-0 49345 -0 01409 0 00701 -0 05454 0 02549 -0 22866 ~ 
6 S-
0 700002 0 009057 0 014135 -005187 -0 02793 0 378305 "' 
7 
.., 
-0 29885 0 096222 0003822 -0 04891 -0 03237 -0 15881 ~ 
8 ~ 
" 0 014538 0 123475 -0 00248 -0 04664 -002108 -0 01937 ~ 9 
-0 16704 0 170979 0 000673 -0 04282 0 000372 -0 14812 
10 ~ 
-0 59398 0 112859 0 003409 -0 03918 0 004455 -0 33776 "" 
"' 11 ;: 
" 
-0 03831 0 003151 0 003413 -0 03573 0 033559 -0 02135 ~ 12 
" 0 339081 0 095976 0003427 -0 03174 -0 00205 0 136734 :... 
13 ~ -0 08524 0 21668 0 000539 -0 02878 0 002983 -0 13833 
-14 b:l 
-1 96471 0 011273 0 003456 -0 02406 0 039782 -0 99758 ~ 
"'-
:;j 
'ti 
~ 
'1;j 
~ 
N ~ _, 
"" 
Table 7.12b: TFPC Decomposition for Panel I- Merging Group Banks under Intermediation Approach, Battese and 
Coelli model (1995), Retail Banks Dataset g 
BID PERIOD BauerTFPC BAuerRTS BAuerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnce Effect {l 
M1 1 
'" ... 2 0 125895 0 055566 0 003656 -0 05269 -0 01635 0 140149 
" 3 -0 24273 0 033676 0 003661 -0 0492 -0 01393 -0 20774 b:l 
4 -0 09042 0 024275 0 003665 -0 04571 0 002562 -0 03366 § 
5 0 008786 0 016079 0 003666 -0 04257 -0 00264 0 104999 
""' 6 -0 23011 0 031916 0 003671 -0 04026 -0 00634 -0 16416 ~ 
7 0 018408 0 14563 0 003673 -0 03735 -0 00126 0017451 ~ 
M2 6 -0 10145 0 046736 0 003675 -0 03345 -0 00259 0 009681 "' ~
9 -0 09012 0 117974 0 003676 -0 0299 0 000106 0 001033 ;;· 
10 -0 24333 0 02552 0 003676 -0 02667 -0 00069 -0 01369 ,... 
11 -013315 0 136601 0 003676 -0 02276 0 002956 -0 00294 e. 
12 -0 21951 0 113721 0 003679 -0 01693 -0 02566 -0 00041 ~ 
13 -0 26199 0 094305 0 003679 -0 01655 -0 03256 -0 01322 
..., 
;s 
14 -0 29804 -0 01363 0 003676 -001374 0 036507 -0 01396 ~ 
M3 1 
" 
2 -0 35794 -0 13603 0 00315 -0 05131 -0 0206 -0 21995 ~ 
3 -0 26078 -0 01166 0 003171 -0 04945 -0 04651 -0 19599 ~ 
4 -0 06649 0 033065 0 003191 -0 04709 -0 00976 -0 00641 ~ ;,. 
5 0 03317 0 095652 0 003211 -0 04356 0 016616 0 073088 ~ 
" 6 -0 10447 0 095513 0 003231 -0 03662 0 006336 -0 08258 ~
7 0 03259 0 146717 0 00325 -0 03436 -0 00294 0 025762 ~ 
" 6 -0 01871 0 065359 0 003269 -0 03111 -0 00663 0 096036 ~ 
9 -0 17671 0 023606 0 003267 -0 02646 -0 00543 -0 00729 ~ 10 -0 17383 0 109978 0 003305 -0 02529 0 014839 0 003979 ~ 
11 -0 11377 0152623 0 003323 -0 02148 -0 00079 0 013257 ~ 12 -0 2119 0 070513 0 00334 -0 01736 0 000644 0011143 
"' 13 -021706 0 033649 0 003357 -0 01369 -0 00503 0 045787 ::>.. 
14 -0 30234 0 071082 0 003373 -0 01045 0 026181 -0 03878 ~ 
"ti 
N ~ 
..... ~ N 
~ 
" ;,. 
Table 7.12b: TFPC Decomposition for Panell -Merging Group Banks under Intermediation Approach, Battese and 
Coelli model (1995), Retail Banks Dataset g 
-§ 
BID PERIOD BauerTFPC BauerRTS BAuerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnce Effect " 
.., 
" M4 4 0, 
5 
-0 80474 1 06738 0 003643 -0 05527 0 089868 -0 8063 "' :::: 
6 0 810418 0 003639 -0 04419 -01156 "' 0 525496 0 081988 ~ 7 0 505687 0 401635 0 003633 -0 03943 -0 05155 021961 ~ 8 
-0 05847 0 341882 0 003628 -0 03495 -0 00906 -0 18977 "' ~9 0 938081 0 465676 0 003622 -0 03178 -0 00826 0 126536 ;:; 
10 
-0 34687 0 182576 0 003616 -0 0275 -0 00128 -0 34616 ~ 
11 0 186133 0 448721 0 003609 -0 02195 -0 00712 0 035014 ~ 
"' 12 
-0 39608 0 177455 0 003602 -0 01635 0 04447 -0 33331 ~ 
13 0 326433 0 322261 0 003595 -0 01044 0 008495 0 337434 cl 
14 
-0 12752 0 033168 0 003588 -0 00549 0 100951 0 068142 ~ Q 
M5 4 :;;· 
5 1107191 0 369637 0 003538 -0 05196 0 054308 0 31701 ~ 
6 
-0 5099 0 196193 0 003529 -0 04453 -0 04575 -0 7865 ~ ::t< 
7 0 442639 0 378592 0 00352 -0 04014 -0 10552 0 043179 "' :::: 
8 0 49927 0 00351 -0 03614 -0 046 " 0 675613 0 087412 ~· 
9 0 078201 0 391962 0 0035 -0 03246 -0 00076 -0 16902 
" 
10 0 606511 0 216974 0 00349 -0 02465 -0 00189 
:.... 
0 356226 ~ 
~ 
0, 
El 
"' "'-~ 
"ti 
:.... 
N ~ 
...., <:! w 
"' ::t< 
Table 7.12b: TFPC Decomposition for Panel I- Merging Group Banks under Intermediation Approach, Battese and 
Coelli model (1995), Retail Banks Dataset g 
BID PERIOD BauerTFPC BauerRTS BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnce Effect >§ 
M6 
" 
... 
2 0 036002 6 01809 0 003557 -0 08063 0 033639 -0 02379 
" 3 0 119843 0 222304 0 003567 -0 05813 -0 03029 0 039688 t:<:! 
4 0 106187 0 116505 0 003576 -0 05357 0 014765 0 062237 "' " 0 166954 """ 5 -0 0038 0 003585 -0 04933 0 010417 -0 0811 ~ 6 -0 825 0 076005 0 003594 -0 04629 -0 02357 -0 78004 
7 0 232533 0 239745 0 003602 -0 04276 -0 00524 0 162234 ~ 
"' 8 -0 06838 0 18285 0 003609 -0 03844 -0 00627 -0 08055 ~
9 0 102462 0 278432 0 003617 -0 034 -0 01061 0 052565 s 
10 -0 59919 0 033274 0 003624 -0 0305 0 003749 -0 41496 S' ~ 
11 -021721 0 123151 0 00363 -0 02691 0 013403 -0 08509 
"' 12 -0 24747 0 049266 0 003636 -0 02365 0 004522 0 000526 '"tl 
13 -0 18223 0 107697 0 003642 -0 02028 0 019205 -0 0113 ;s 
14 -0 09296 0 081149 0 003647 -001441 0 037023 0 037693 ~ 
" M7 ~ 2 0 167886 0 015621 0 00361 -0 05435 0 016128 0 168589 
3 -0 42934 0072111 0 003617 -0 05159 -0 02943 -0 46828 fil 
4 -0 07749 0 021266 0 003624 -0 0488 0 003768 -0 01205 ,.. § 5 -0 07067 -001126 0 00363 -0 04509 0 001472 0 021233 
" 6 -0 32484 0 088872 0 003637 -0 04236 -0 00592 -0 28557 ~ 
7 -0 15864 0 091523 0 003642 -0 0398 0 00048 -0 1029 " :... 
8 -0 08947 0 110483 0 003647 -0 03537 0 001533 -0 01398 g 9 0 088175 0 139892 0 003652 -0 0308 -0 00019 0 158964 
"' 10 0 032136 0 100761 0 003656 -0 02694 0 00658 0 153787 -~ 11 -0 10377 0 1131 0 00366 -0 02295 0 01037 0 035054 
12 -0 08658 0 139007 0 003664 "' -0 01955 -0 00616 0 048787 "'-
13 -0 19351 0 126493 0 003667 -0 01634 -0 0138 -0 00856 ~ 
14 -0 22595 0 143049 0 00367 -001219 0 013325 -0 02609 "ti 
N ~ 
..._, ~ -!>-
"' 
" 
,.. 
r----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
Table 7.13a: TFPC Decomposition for Panel3- Control Group Banks under Intermediation Approach, Battese and 
Coelli model (1995), Retail Banks Dataset 
Q 
{3 
Penod BauerTFPC BauerRTS BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnceEeffect 
" ... 
" 0 036157 0 092631 0 001358 -0 02052 -0 00925 0 064566 g; 
2 0 032373 0 145076 0 001304 -001727 -0 03374 0 082074 "' 
,.,. 
3 -0 07768 0 07611 0 000295 -0 01357 0 011924 -0 07633 ~ ~ 
"' 4 -0 12874 -0 10311 -0 00052 -0 01166 0 019687 -0 13625 ;;: 
s· 
5 0 026578 0 098798 -0 00121 -0 011 -0 0176 0 056382 
"' ~
6 -0 02032 0 090822 -0 00422 -0 00778 -0 01678 0 008451 .., 
7 -0 04414 0 117352 0 001252 -0 00397 -0 00957 -003185 Cl ~ Q 
8 0 014501 0061759 -0 01541 0 000857 0 002508 0 026551 ::;· 
~-
9 0 026193 0 06873 0001317 0 005209 0 008074 0 011593 ~ 
"'"" 10 0 071163 -0 0212 0 001193 0 010279 0 043536 0 016155 "' 
"' 
" 
11 0 061847 0 073099 0 001102 0 014967 0 005956 0 039822 ~ 
" :... 
12 0 064999 0 214736 0 007682 0 019435 -0 00737 0 045256 ~ 
-13 0 102225 0 047878 0 001038 0 025001 0 010725 0 06546 t:t: 
~ 
"'-
:;] 
-,; 
~ ~ 
N 
"' _, " V. 
"'"" 
Table 7.13b: TFPC Decomposition for Panel3- Merging Group Banks under Intermediation Approach, Battese and 
Coelli model (1995), Retail Banks Dataset 
g 
>§ 
BID PERIOD BauerTFPC BauerRTS BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnceEffect 
-
"' M1 ... 
'-l 
2 -0 07372 0062819 0000819 -0 00628 -0 02561 -0 10548 tx:. 3 -0 00901 0 032264 0 000812 -0 00558 -0 02088 -0 01562 
"' 4 -0 00587 0 021994 0 000804 -0 00546 0 005692 -0 0289 "' 
"" 5 -0 00374 0 015695 0 000797 -0 00152 -0 0048 -0 01391 ~ 6 0011699 0 020221 0 00079 0 00195 -0 01029 -0 00097 ~ 7 0 21228 0 144574 0 000783 0006772 -0 00131 0 061461 
"' M2 8 0 065003 0 046268 0 000776 0 013088 -0 00379 0 008659 ;;:; 
9 0 098088 0 116459 0 000769 0017558 -4 11E-05 -0 03666 ;:; 
10 -0 00967 0 03133 0 000762 0 020158 -0 00108 -0 06084 S' So 
11 0 244936 0 162868 0 000755 0 023213 -0 00101 0059111 
"' 12 0 146354 0 072377 0 000748 0 028462 0 015681 0 029087 ~ 13 0 148343 0 033393 0 000741 0 034548 0 028334 0 051329 
14 0 081479 0 050422 0 000734 0 040052 -0 02575 0 016017 ~ 
" M3 ::::-::: 
2 -0 02946 -0 11436 0 000153 -0 00099 -0 04402 0 129749 ~ 
3 -0 06989 0 008949 0 000152 -0 0009 -0 06914 -0 00894 ~ 
4 0 01458 0 035498 0 00015 4 14E-05 -0 01221 -0 0089 ~ 
"' 5 -0 00323 00939 0 000149 0 002606 0 020368 -0 12025 "' n 
6 0131145 0 097899 0 000148 0003472 0 005951 0 023676 ~ 
7 0 128214 0 145267 0 000146 0 006149 -0 00148 -0 02186 '" ::.. 
8 0 002181 0 060377 0 000145 0 010653 -0 00365 -0 06534 ~ 9 -0 04542 0 019441 0 000143 0 014361 -0 00126 -0 0781 
-10 0 075387 0 123036 0 000142 0 017486 0 001782 -0 06706 tx:. 
11 0 334397 0.152139 0 00014 0 023987 -0 00031 0 158441 !; 
"' 12 0 107149 0 070984 0 000139 0 030184 0 000373 0 005469 
"" 13 0 071387 0 030658 0 000138 0 034627 -0 00184 0 007801 :;j 
14 0078009 0 086673 0 000136 0 039265 0 010589 -0 05865 
"" ~~ 
N 
"' .... " 0'> ~
Table 7.13b: TFPC Decomposition for Panel3- Merging Group Banks under Intermediation Approach, Battese and 
Coelli model (1995), Retail Banks Dataset 
BID PERIOD BauerTFPC BauerRTS BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnceEffect 
M4 4 
5 -I 23515 0 645614 0 000792 0004997 -0 05907 -1 82748 
6 0 552067 0 564003 0 000785 -0 01837 0 021178 -0 01553 
7 0 286308 0 357716 0 000778 -0 01261 0 004493 -0 06407 
8 0 502225 0 459302 0 000771 -0 0066 0 003798 0 044957 
9 I 115278 0 939506 0 000764 0 003644 0 057135 0 11423 
10 0 249867 0 209107 0 000757 0 011686 -0 02781 0 056127 
11 0 520215 0 403412 0 00075 0 01678 0038188 0 061085 
12 0 271416 0 345298 0 000743 0022717 -0 12337 0 02603 
13 0 383312 0 342242 0 000736 0 028634 -0 01149 0 023186 
14 0 16602 0178218 0 000729 0 035008 -0 0441 -0 00384 
MS 4 
5 I 138825 I 16467 0 002347 -0 02724 -0 06671 0 065758 
6 0310042 0 271397 0 002331 -0 02123 -0 05695 0 114495 
7 0 571422 0 494376 0002315 -0 01497 -0 05913 0 148834 
8 0 957238 0 731045 0 002299 -0 00401 0 017176 0210726 
9 0 555679 0 467445 0 002283 0 007494 -0 01583 0 094285 
10 0 770015 0 56771 0 002268 0 017923 -0 0036 0 185716 
Table 7.13b: TFPC Decomposition for Pane13- Merging Group Banks under Intermediation Approach, Battese and 
Coelli model (1995), Retail Banks Dataset 
Q 
BID PERIOD BauerTFPC BauerRTS BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnceEffect -§ 
-M6 
"' " 2 0 076006 0 10613 0 00116 -0 01409 0 011138 -0 02833 
" 
3 0 174545 0 222997 000115 -0 01007 -0 03975 0000219 ~ 
4 0 218851 0 115544 0 00114 -0 00334 0 012427 0 093077 :: ;.;-
5 0 03302 0 167273 0 00113 0 000537 0 006961 -0 14288 ~ 6 0 141142 0 071372 0 00112 0 001961 -0 01398 0 080669 ~ 
7 0 210671 0 235386 0001111 0 004694 -0 00088 -0 02964 
"' 8 0 20963 0 173067 0001101 0 008151 0 003513 0 023798 ~:; 
9 0315634 0 239978 0 001091 0 01204 0 027843 0 034683 :;--
10 0 005326 0 058078 0 001082 0 016354 -0 02106 -0 04913 ~ 
11 0 296612 0 152933 0 001072 0 022324 -0 01638 0 136662 
"' 
12 -0 0189 0 056046 0 001063 0 027122 -0 00226 -0 10088 ~ 13 0 214358 0 133619 0 001054 0 031209 -0 00672 0 055193 §-
14 0 117622 0 125424 0 001044 0 035563 -0 00725 -0 03716 
" :::-M7 
=" 
2 -0 10592 0 012468 0 00015 -0 00781 0 014565 -0 12529 ~ 
3 0 217675 0 074075 0 000149 -0 0035 -0 01913 0 166078 ~ 
4 -0 13263 0 024644 0 000147 -0 00268 -0 00536 -0 14938 ::-
"' 5 -0 105 -001019 0 000146 -0 00314 -0 00439 -0 08744 :: 
" 6 0 161304 0 076378 0 000145 -0 00067 0 006862 0 078594 ~ 7 00407 0 087728 0 000143 0 002084 -0 0003 -0 04895 
" 8 0 179452 0 108585 0 000142 0 007685 -0 00264 0 065683 :... 
9 0 14954 0 138944 0 00014 0 014231 0 000585 -0 00436 bl 
10 0 069066 0 12052 0 000139 0 018274 -0 01496 -0 05491 ~ 
11 0 225592 0 14386 0 000138 0 022402 -0 01465 0 073847 0, 
12 0 152214 0 130525 0 000136 0 025738 0 005691 -0 00988 El 
"' 13 0 149572 0 117154 0 000135 0 028481 0 014227 -0 01042 ">.. 
14 0 222102 0 173383 0 000134 0 034764 -001701 0 030831 :;j 
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Chapter 7 Bank Mergers m lndw ProductzVlty Enhancmg? A Cost Based TFP Approach 
The general trend of TFP nnprovement IS in !me w1th ex1stmg research 
(Sensarma, 2006, Bhattacharya et a!, 1997). Focussmg specifically on the merged 
entitles for Panel I under the Schnndt and Sickles Random Effects (1984) model, we 
find that the bulk of them experienced productivity Improvements over the time 
period exammed, particularly under the mtermediatwn approach. Under the 
production approach, however, an mitial period of declme is seen Immediately 
followmg the merger. However, tins was subsequently followed by Improvements m 
the same mdicatmg that the merger benefits took time to materialise and lends further 
support to our 1mtial findmgs of temporally lagged merger related efficiency gams. 
Under both approaches, the bulk of the gains appear to emanate from cost reducing 
technolog~cal progress. Interestingly, the iruhal penod of declme IS absent under the 
mtermediatwn approach and m fact, the acquinng bank m the case of Merger I (M!) 
IS found to be the most efficient under the model. 
The gains emanate from changes in the RTS, TC and Price Effect components. 
The positive retlnns to scale component as evidenced by the BauerRTS colunm of the 
aforementioned tables, further highhg!It the movement of the banks towards optimal 
scale size and provides yet another reason for the preponderance of merger related 
efficiency gams. 
The pnce effect arises from the bias in the aggregate mput usage of the bank 
and is m t1nn symptomatic of allocative meffiCiency. Althoug!I different from the cost 
allocahve inefficiency, it does capture the impact of utilising input cost shares that 
diverge from the optimal. Mergers offer the parent entitles an opportunity to 
synchronise their vanous input mixes and thus allow them to operate usmg the 
optimal input cost shares and consequently, the optimal cost levels. Overall, the 
Impact of the pnce effect is larger under the productiOn approach than the 
mtermediation. For both mput-output approaches, however, in the bulk of the mergers 
analysed, the pattern of this pnce effect reveals a negative contribution to the TFPC. 
Overall, tins suggests, an Immediate post merger deterioration m the allocative 
efficiency of the merged entity m the cases of the rescue mergers In conjunctiOn With 
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a temporal analysis of the results, however, a lagged pos1tive contributwn by the pnce 
effect component to TFPC is revealed thereby signalling an enhanced mput-usage 
profile for the merged entity The reason for this pattern can be traced to the need to 
align operational profiles in the Immediate wake of the merger leadmg to the 
temporally lagged emergence of mput rmx enhancement related benefits. For 
example, in the cases of rescue mergers instigated by the Central Bank, the newly 
merged entity would need to treat the mling asset portfolio and re-orgaruse the 
absorbed weaker banking urut. These restructurisations would cause an immediate 
misalignment m the input mix used. Over time, this misalignment can be corrected 
and boosted v1a the merger leading to gradual surfacing of merger related input mix 
gains. 
The pattern IS repeated under the mtermediation approach. Interestingly, the 
negative Impact of input mix changes, while, also present for the market driven 
mergers m this case, does so to a lesser extent. These market dnven mergers occurred 
between young banks that would not possess the same operatwnal profile as the:tr 
longer established pre-reform counterparts. On the contrary, being more rece:titly 
established, these banks would possess an operatmg profile that better accommodates 
the post reform bankmg e:tivironment. Wlnle their relative youth motivates their 
mergers as they attempt to gain a larger asset base, their ab1hty to subsequently utilise 
this expanded mput base to generate rehlms would be mitigated by the pre-reform 
legacy of statutory pre-emptlon of funds and regulation directed deposit intakes In 
addition, routine post-merger restructunsatlons would also eat mto any attempt to 
recover immediate efficiency gains. 
The Variatwn m the contribution of tlus mput mix effect to TFPC is greater for 
the merged banks than for the Control Group Tlus difference in the degree of 
variation between the two groups coupled with the presence of greater negative 
contributions in the cases of the merged banks, hmts that input mix inefficiencies 
were greater for the merged banks than their non-mergmg counterparts. Comparing 
Mergers I and 2 and the Control Group under both approaches, it can be seen from 
Tables 7.10 and 7.11, that the impact of the mix effect IS more unfavourable towards 
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the former. In hght of the presence of rescue mergers m the sample this findmg IS not 
surprismg as 1t 1mphes that the mergers represent a route to sheddmg these m1x 
meffiC1enc1es which are potentially the fall out of mjud1cious cred1t disbursements m 
the pre-reform penod. Desp1te the1r rescue nature, the mergers may still possess 
benefits in terms of reducmg the mformatlon opaqueness associated with the banks' 
target market. W1th tlus soft mformation advantage, the merged bank could re-orient 
its output m1x and consequently, bnng mto alignment any deVIations from the optimal 
output nux. Such adjustJ.nents, however, would take t1me to instigate and the1r 
associated efficiency gams would thus surface over an extended post-merger time 
penod. This 1s corroborated VIa the temporally lagged efficiency evolution coupled 
w1th dechning trend in cost inefficiency 
The final component of the TFPC mdex IS that of non-margmal cost pricmg, 
which captures the Impact of divergences between the actual and efficient revenue 
shares that detract from TFPC Improvements. In the context of mergers, this affords 
the merged entity access to output synerg~es m the form of a potentially expanded 
client base and an enhanced product portfoho. In the case of the mergers analysed, the 
abihty of the merged entity to take advantage of tills enhanced output nux would a1d 
its abihty to attain and maintain greater cost efficiency 
It can further be observed tllat under the production approach, the Impact of 
the revenue price effect is on the whole small, and much hke the Pnce Effect, 
contributes negatively to the TFP. Over the time penod analysed, the effect sw1tches 
between bemg favourable and unfavourable ind1catmg that the banks experienced 
changes m their output nuxes that contributed to both increased and lowered costs. 
The post reform sillfting operational profiles of the banks may thus lie behmd the 
changes m the output nuxes The sillft in tlle operatiOnal profiles of banks away from 
regulation Identified target attamment towards more dynamic intermediary roles 
would be reflected in the1r output bundles willch would accordmgly change. In the 
cases of the rescue mergers, tills would be more apparent as the merged entity would 
need to remedy any problematic asset portfohos of the weaker banks. Overall 
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however, the effect IS found to be small and does not suggest substantial post-merger 
changes m the output mix of the merged entity. 
The combination of nux efficienc1es With the increasing returns to scale profile 
is further suggestive of the potential to accrue greater efficiency benefits under a 
Uruversal Bank style of orgarusatwn. The results are thus not unhke those of V ander 
Vennet (2002) and Cavallo and Ross1 (2002). 
Another interesting feature of the results is brought to light when the nature of 
the mergers IS added to the above TFPC analysis. With the exception of Mergers 4 
and 5, the remainder of the mergers were conducted at the behest of the Central Bank 
in a bid to rescue ailing banking units. While these rescue mergers d1d show a 
subsequent improvement m their TFP profiles, the degree of this change IS lower than 
that of the market driven mergers, Mergers 4 and 5. Potential reasons for this are two 
fold. Firstly, while the merging of a healthy bankmg unit with an a!lmg one d1d not 
appear to dilute the efficiency strength of the former and successfully contamed the 
inefficiency of the latter, the smaller degree of subsequent efficiency enhancement m 
companson with the market driven mergers suggests that the potentially negative 
Impact of the mhng umt nevertheless resulted m a diminished post -merger TFP 
growth for the merged entity. It IS mterestrng however, that despite tlus dinunished 
growth in post merger TFP, these merged umts nevertheless outperformed the control 
group of non-mergrng banks. 
The second reason lies m the ownership pattern of the market driven mergers. 
Mergers 4 and 5 involved two private sector banks The s1nularity m operational 
profiles With therr targets m conJunCtiOn with the potential for an expanded output 
portfolio and client base would serve to enhance the post-merger efficiency profiles of 
the merged banks 
In the case of the remamder of the mergers, the mheritance of a problematic asset 
portfolio m combmation with the need to proVIde a curative for the ailing banking unit 
would detract from the potential TFP growth as is evidenced by the declme m TFP. 
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Wheelock and Wilson's (2000) findmg that the likelihood of an acquiSitiOn of a firm 
drops 1f 1t suffers from cost inefficiency would thus offer an explanation of the results 
found m the cases of the voluntary mergers. The amalgamations involvmg ailmg 
bankmg uruts were arranged at the behest of the Central Bank as these banks would 
not inherently form attractive merger partners for stronger banks. Cost efficiency 
detenorations following such mergers then would not be wholly unexpected. 
The tuning of these voluntary mergers lends further credence to this 
hypothesis. These mergers occurred after the 1mtial wave of reforms and towards the 
nuddle of the time period exanuned thus glVlng sufficient time for the banks to 
acclimatize themselves to the new post-reform bankmg landscape Their failure to do 
so would be mterpreted as symptomatic ofunderlymg financial problems thus makmg 
them unattractive merger partners. 
However, the surfacmg of temporally lagged efficiency gams pomts to the 
successful contamment and treatment of the problems of the ailing bankmg un1t. It 
also potentially hmts at the success of the acqmring bank m transplantmg improved 
operational practices to Its target 
These results are repeated for Panel 3 under the remainder of the models and 
under the Banking System Dataset. These are presented below: 
283 
.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------
Table 7.14a: TFPC Decomposition for Panel3 Control Group, Production Approach, Reifschneider and Stevenson Model (1991), 
Commercial Banking System Dataset 
penod BauerTFPC BauerRTSeffect BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnceEffect 
2 -0 08985 0 067755 -0 01933 -0 03052 0 04551 -0 14164 
3 0 02162 0 20971 0 084756 -0 0322 -0 06074 -0 19713 
4 0 162176 00748 0 043864 -0 03156 0 012766 0 068096 
5 -0 09195 0 115289 -0 04031 -0 03053 -000926 -0 12995 
6 -0 22818 0 068719 -0 00123 -0 03474 0 16234 -041117 
7 0 151095 0 146198 0 004864 -0 03794 -0 01179 0 057788 
8 0 070861 0 108764 -0 01172 -0 03425 0 004908 0 013021 
9 0 215038 0 130683 0 032877 -0 02973 0 022943 0 029001 
10 0 030875 0 074251 -0 02422 -0 02494 -0 01697 0 01264 
11 0 00551 -0 01576 0 00164 -0 02362 0 039239 0 047918 
12 -0 15465 0 057918 0 014714 -0 02167 -0 0311 -0 19472 
13 0 166316 0 015997 0 019873 -0 01954 0 060633 0 089348 
14 0 108027 -0 293408 -0 020709 -0 014738 0 375229 0 061773 
Table 7.14b: TFPC Decomposition for Panel3 Merging Banks, Production Approach, Reifschneider and Stevenson Model (1991), 
Commercial Banking System Dataset 
bid penod BauerTFPC BauerRTSeffect BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnceEffect 
MI 
2 0 118403 -0 13797 0018777 -0 02264 0 150534 0 109703 
3 -0 55485 -0 0905 0 093493 -0 02559 0 105381 -0 63763 
4 -0 0473 0 052473 0 01881 -003177 -0 03624 -0 05058 
5 0 070495 -002517 -0 04569 -0 02791 0 027707 0 141562 
6 -0 10871 -0 02726 0 003053 -0 02741 0 085164 -0 14226 
7 0 361401 0 134685 0 018418 -0 02549 0 015441 0 218343 
8 0 105729 -0 00648 -001131 -0 01812 0 071068 0 070565 
9 0 096579 0 111266 0 013884 -0 01452 -0 00116 -0 0129 
10 -0 24661 0 048628 0 004833 -0 01385 -0 0527 -0 23352 
M2 11 0 082434 0 172686 0 021034 -001316 -0 05382 -0 04431 
12 0 205406 0 02916 0 007358 -0 00825 0 024459 0 152676 
13 0 36211 -003417 0 006861 -0 00067 0 082939 0 30715 
14 0 098288 0 121886 0 000502 0 003706 -0 08274 0 054938 
M3 
2 -0 35792 -0 19216 0 016086 -0 00393 0 085025 -0 26294 
3 -0 6908 -0 38775 0 114979 -0 01191 0 377537 -0 78366 
4 0 167307 -0 11408 0 011585 -0 01538 0 132066 0 153119 
5 -0 22102 0 232575 0 003188 -0 01333 -0 16979 -0 27367 
6 -0 28605 0 143181 -0 01408 -0 01793 -0 03867 -0 35855 
7 0 093413 0 141584 0021731 -0 02114 0 01589 -0 06465 
8 0 363435 0 035763 -0 00944 -0 01639 0 025828 0 327679 
9 -0 12551 0002617 -0 0047 -001212 0 030188 -0 1415 
10 0 158527 0 161241 0 00232 -0 00868 -0 1121 0 115746 
11 0452024 0 146498 -0 00289 -0 00056 -0 02203 0 331015 
12 -0 04402 0 070479 -0 00213 0 004141 -001745 -0 09906 
13 0 24687 0 02319 -0 00192 0 006901 0 015316 0 203383 
N 14 0 059196 0 121486 -0 01604 0 010538 -0 05801 0 001216 00 
V. 
Table 7.14b: TFPC Decomposition for Panel3 Merging Banks, Production Approach, Reifschneider and Stevenson Model (1991), 
Commercial Banking System Dataset (Cont'd) 
btd penod BauerTFPC BauerR TSeffect BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnceEffect 
M4 4 
5 -3 76584 0 45478 -0 14721 -0 03073 -0 32065 -3 72203 
6 0 849222 0 563866 0 242289 -0 06181 0 01675 0 088126 
7 0 647138 0 443776 0 019158 -0 05629 0003799 0 236693 
8 0 06666 0 302555 -0 03439 -0 04979 0 012659 -0 16438 
9 I 475523 I 034785 0 079047 -0 03566 -0 01842 0 415774 
10 -0 49762 0 241605 -0 06154 -0 03394 -0 01448 -0 62927 
11 0 52589 0402684 0 002935 -0 03577 -0 00082 0 156862 
12 -0 24642 -0 46632 0 03675 -0 0315 0 676353 -0 46171 
13 0 786847 0 32924 0 016224 -0 02597 -0 0452 0 512558 
14 0 239132 0 610061 -0 00892 -0 01804 -0 48621 0 142246 
MS 4 
5 I 265236 0 967592 0 063845 -0 07194 -0 06314 0 368881 
6 -0 38834 0 440333 0 024609 -0 07686 -0 03086 -0 74557 
7 0 761082 0 57133 0 252683 -0 08021 -0 01384 0031115 
8 0 821717 0 778799 -0 08909 -0 06683 -0 0086 0 207441 
9 0 320535 0 441899 -0 0592 -0 05372 0 010744 -0 01919 
10 0 772514 0 364046 0 006025 -0 04714 0 11308 0 336503 
11 I 705065 0 629612 0 249986 -0 01491 0 453985 0 386392 
12 -1 80717 -0 02858 -0 2082 -001198 0 181427 -1 73983 
13 0 65946 0 008672 0094518 -0 03767 0 155451 0 438485 
14 0 758328 0 224339 0 058509 -003162 0 072624 0 434473 
Table 7.14b: TFPC Decomposition for Panel3 Merging Banks, Production Approach, Reifschneider and Stevenson model (1991), 
Banking System Dataset ( cont' d) 
bid penod BauerTFPC BauerR TSeffect BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnceEffect Q 
M6 -§ 
2 -0 22269 0 094068 -0 06748 -0 02854 -0 00036 -0 22039 
" ... 3 0 442183 0 272874 0 158225 -0 02424 -0 13549 0 170813 
" 4 0 14251 0 076856 -0 06986 -0 01717 0 048589 0 104094 ~ 5 0 096277 0 148958 0 096285 -0 01565 0 034998 -0 16832 ;:, 
6 -0 96135 0 139123 -0 07787 -0 02023 -0 05391 -0 94846 "" 
7 0 339832 0 249116 0 065029 -0 02406 -0 02567 0075415 ~ 
8 -0 08969 0 256399 -0 03496 -0 02491 -0 06752 -0 2187 ~ 
'" 9 0 148985 0 77889 -0 01602 -0 02672 -0 52901 -005816 ;:; 
10 -0 26275 I 270831 -0 00047 -0 02431 -I 23075 -0 27805 ;;; 
11 0 172258 2 646931 -0 00996 -0 01909 -2 52963 0 084003 9' 
12 0 023744 0 20007 0 039463 -0 01661 -0 17483 -0 02435 ~ 
13 0 247205 0 242705 0 046985 -0 01358 -0 11568 0 086779 !:> 
14 -0 17946 0 087825 0 013986 -0 01359 0 106253 -0 37393 '"';) ... 
M7 I 
c 
~ 
2 0 223893 0 254741 0 011555 -0 01833 -023179 0 207714 
" ::::-
3 -0 3176 -0 34088 0 009814 -0 01685 0 428843 -0 39853 "' 
4 -0 49606 0 087775 0 040261 -0 02194 -0 08064 -0 52152 
q
5 -0 02384 0 037384 -0 01504 -0 02467 -003151 0 009993 ~ ;:,-
6 -0 30991 0 030504 -0 01893 -0 02806 0 052106 -0 34553 !:> ;:, 
7 0 00062 0 089055 0 015321 -0 03302 -0 00021 -0 07053 n 
8 0 238237 0 11652 0 014157 -0 02681 -0 02151 0 155886 ~ 
" 9 0 313393 0 13574 -0 01959 -0 01731 -0 00951 0 224066 ~
10 0 113189 0 150494 0017056 -0 0136 -0 04993 0 009168 g 
11 0 143381 0 166341 -0 004 -001175 -0 0583 0 051082 "' -
12 -0 07286 0 126298 0 026206 -0 01522 0 007982 -0 21813 ~ 
13 0 050282 0 11973 0 011837 -0 01784 -0 01216 -0 05129 '" !:>.. 
14 0 453739 0 180449 -0 01028 -0 00785 -0 06212 0 353535 ~ 
N 'ti 
00 ~ __, 
-a 
... 
c 
!:> 
" ;:,-
N 
00 
00 
Table 7.15a: TFPC Decomposition for Panel2 Control Group Banks, Intermediation Approach, Reifschneider and Stevenson Model 
(1991), Commercial Banking System Dataset 
penod BauerR TSeffect BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnceEffect 
2 0 086805 0 014477 0 056355 0 001881 -0 13304 
3 0 199741 0 013841 0 053673 -0 05484 0 066816 
4 0 091639 -0 02013 0 051514 0 018366 0 036639 
5 0 071683 -0 01662 0 04982 0 015498 -0 0263 
6 0 166311 0 015684 0 047432 -0 02885 -0 07734 
7 0 109266 -001116 0 04466 -0 02375 0032097 
8 0 125702 0 012014 0 042347 -0 02018 0 011303 
9 0 132838 -0 01204 0 040094 -7 6E-05 0 047926 
10 0 106101 -0 01555 0 037928 0 00359 0 061539 
11 0 07498 0 000874 0 03598 0 003254 0 067805 
12 0 07775 0001941 0 034989 0 002697 0 055395 
13 0 072057 -0 04339 0 031984 0 007092 0 17468 
14 0051001 -001725 0 030562 0 018134 0 061583 
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Table 7.15b: TFPC Decomposition for Pane12 Merging Banks, Intermediation Approach, Reifschneider and Stevenson model (1991), 
Banking System Dataset 
bid penod BauerRTSeffect BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnceEffect 
MI I 9 
2 0 122615 0 075878 -0 00649 0 052922 -0 02868 0 028983 {5 
-3 0 052584 0 050907 0 010505 0 050344 -0 02873 -0 03045 "' ., 
4 0097706 0 012724 -0 01499 0 048267 0 010114 0 041594 " 
5 0 013371 0 023853 -0 0237 0 046205 -0 00876 -0 02423 ~ 6 0 088254 0 042579 0 015461 0 043798 -0 02357 0 009985 
"" 7 0 235058 0 149374 -0 01199 0 041708 -0 00432 0 060287 ~ 
8 0 105659 0 07223 0 002983 0 039509 -0 021 0 011932 ~ 
9 0 16587 0 118613 0 000144 0 037111 -0 00162 0 011618 "' ;:; 
10 0 090345 0 018103 0 001078 0035131 0 008654 0 027379 s 
M2 11 0 22911 0 156356 0 018637 0 033222 0 003711 0 017184 ~ 
12 0 166836 0 129244 0 010024 0 030864 -0 02982 0 026526 e. ., 
13 0 196616 0 100319 -0 00087 0 028632 -0 03605 0 104583 ~ 14 0 133643 -0 0088 -0 01539 0 027101 0 030918 0 09982 0 
M3 I ~ 
" 2 
-0 08131 -0 09954 -0 00492 0053192 -0 04 0 009949 ::::-
"' 3 0 098135 0 05227 0 013992 0 050686 -0 07605 0 057234 ~ 
4 0 075374 0 051389 -0 03003 0 048353 -0 02033 0 025989 ~ 
5 0061731 -0 00103 0 046282 0 0368 -0 04021 ~ 0 103576 ., ;:, 
6 0 113142 0 086715 0 000743 0043959 0 011412 -0 02969 " 
7 0 219897 0 149045 0 001311 0 041619 -0 00349 0 031407 ~ 
" 8 0 129088 0 074862 -0 00251 0 039489 -0 01198 0 029218 :... 
9 0079517 0 032737 -0 00402 0 037294 -0 00976 0 023263 g 
"' 10 0 259138 0 084113 0 004041 0 035529 0 025786 0 109669 -
11 0 195569 0 153782 0 013784 0 033797 -0 00119 -0 0046 ~ 
12 0 069575 0 005765 0 031523 0 00lll5 -0 00224 "' 0 105741 I:>. 
13 0 111309 0 038676 -0 0083 0 029463 -0 00605 0 057521 :;j 
N 14 0 118443 0 050072 -0 00862 0 027669 0 026359 0 022965 'ti 00 :... 
'D :g 
~ 
., 
g. 
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Table 7.15b: TFPC Decomposition for Panel2 Merging Banks, Intermediation Approach, Reifschneider and Stevenson Model (1991), 
Banking System Dataset (cont'd) 
b!d penod BauerRTSeffect BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnceEffect g 
M4 4 {3 
5 0 702488 0649176 0 05115 -0 08064 -0 69456 
'"' 0 627622 ... 
6 0 603387 -0 02546 0 047021 -0 02187 -0 06076 " 0 542331 b:J 
7 0 682437 0 363484 -0 01987 0 044254 -0 00443 0 299004 !:> :. 
8 0 262049 0 462195 0 039806 0 041487 -0 00058 -0 28086 "" 
9 I 079007 0 97532 -0 0029 0 038917 -0 00119 0 068863 ~ ~ 10 0 204811 0 190488 0 007939 0 036132 0 002473 -0 03222 "' 
11 0 432148 0 012553 0 033212 -0 00598 0011113 ~ 0 483042 s 
12 0 262526 0 248153 0005963 0 031086 0 008621 -0 0313 s 
13 0 383912 0 332037 0003938 0 029391 -3 9E-05 0 018585 ~ 
14 0 098654 0 111066 -0 01327 0 027553 0 014606 -004131 'tl 
MS 4 cs 
5 I 116033 0455006 0 052207 -0 0942 0 00879 ~ I 537833 
" :::-
6 0 289515 -0 06756 0 048801 -0 03242 -0 01471 "' 0 223631 -· ~
7 0 539773 0543179 0042678 0 044782 -0 07493 -0 01594 ~ 
8 0 859392 0 78334 0 026978 0 041425 -0 04592 0 053571 :.-!:> 
9 0 451024 0 038747 
:. 
0 512579 -0 01625 0 007671 0031391 n 
10 0 545242 0 563047 -0 00485 0 035816 0 002601 -0 05137 ~ 
" 11 I 838332 I 606873 0 079559 0 033187 0 0241 0 094613 :... 
12 
-0 14243 0 015533 -0 08111 0 031388 0 010673 -0 11891 ~ 
"' 
-13 0 159575 0 11662 0 011026 0 029053 -0 00573 0 00861 b:J 
14 0 223665 0 00342 0 027302 0 041921 -0 00977 
t; 
0 28654 
"' !:>.. N ~ \0 0 
'-ti 
~ 
'15 
cs 
!:> 
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Table 7.15b: TFPC Decomposition for Pane12 Merging Banks, Intermediation Approach, Reifschneider and Stevenson Model (1991), 
Banking System Dataset (cont'd) 
btd penod BauerRTSeffect BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnceEffect 
M6 g 
2 0 092648 0 100183 -0 00047 0 053572 0 012916 -0 07355 -§ 
3 0 329366 0 262859 0 013866 0 050973 -0 066 0 067667 ~ .... 
4 0 214028 0 096105 -0 02204 0 049012 0 02743 0 063523 " 
5 0 222484 0 158941 0 003249 0 047246 0011225 0 001823 
0;:, 
t:l 
0 082488 I 507418 
;:, 
6 I 604718 -0 01979 0 052773 -001818 ..... 
7 0 134725 0 236671 0 029493 0 05788 -000118 -0 18814 ~ 
8 
-0 98191 0 182414 0 001039 0 047301 -0 00544 -I 20722 ~ 
"' 9 I 433051 0 270473 -0 00477 0044608 -0 00816 I 130896 ;;: 
10 0 171007 0 047964 -0 00537 0 050466 -0 00669 0 084633 s 
11 
-0 94804 0 132779 0 014065 0 041165 0 004999 -1 14104 ~ So 
12 0 153623 0 049895 -0 00209 0 031696 0 00358 0070545 t:l 
13 0 195503 0 112512 -0 00312 0 030017 0 011682 0 044412 ~ 
14 0 044245 0 093916 -001314 0 027823 0 014586 -0 07894 "' ~ M7 I ("') 
-2 0 064487 0 001161 0 010886 0 062495 0 01788 -0 02794 ;;· 
3 
-1 10558 0 124136 -0 01075 0 054781 -0 05835 -1 21541 ~ 
4 0 087964 0006817 -001135 0 047054 0 012567 0 032876 ~ ~ 
5 0 034823 -0 01858 -0 00481 0 04493 0 003666 0 009614 t:l ;:, 
6 I 556347 0 089832 -0 00297 0 048357 -0 00614 I 427273 
("') 
~· 
7 0 136178 0 087292 -0 01399 0 051686 0 000129 0011056 
" 8 
-I 22659 0 10404 0 012563 0 044143 0 001832 -1 38917 :>.. 
9 I 6139 0139997 -0 00328 0 041977 -0 00044 1435647 6' 
"" 10 0 087579 0 101536 0 012916 0 045315 0 002595 -0 07478 
-
11 
-112976 0 118336 0 007696 0 037816 0 007506 -130111 ~ 
12 0 276361 0 142245 -0 00471 0 030489 -0 00466 0 112999 "' t:>.. 
13 0 23401 0 140611 0 003485 0 028681 -0 00738 0 068609 :;j 
N 14 0 275845 0 146353 -0 00409 0 026812 0 007802 0 098967 "ti 
'0 ~ ~ ~ 
"' t:l ("') 
~ 
Table 7.16a: TFPC Decomposition for Panell Control Group Banks, Intermediation Approach, Battese and Coelli Model (1995), 
Banking System Dataset 
g 
PERIOD BAUERTFPC BAUERRTS BAUERTEC BAUERTC BAUERNMC BauerPnceEffect -§ 
-"' ... 
" ~ 
"'" 2 0 22501 0 078663 0 002221 0036316 0 010023 0 097786 ~ 
3 0 164145 0 32665 0 002226 0 03967 -0 18175 -0 02265 ~ 
"' ~ 
4 -0 0014 0 012121 0 002201 0 028143 0 097884 -0 14175 ::; 
5 -0 09702 -0 01321 0 00217 0 039775 0 100394 -0 22614 
"" ~ ~ 
6 0 579984 0 265701 0 002126 0 056284 -0 12824 0 384113 ~ 
<:> 
7 -0 01329 0 203636 0 002113 0 060593 -0 11812 -0 16151 ~ 
<> 
8 0 138856 0 246595 0 002141 0 049031 -0 14108 -001784 
~ 
:: q 
9 0 024517 0 142863 0 002145 0 04258 -0 0101 -0 15297 ~ 
~ 
10 -0 19675 0 150651 0 002136 0 032851 -0 04096 -0 34143 ~ ;,. 
<> 
11 0 081437 0 097565 0 002153 0 024588 -0 01933 -0 02354 ~ 
" 
12 0 235178 0 168766 0 002179 0 019389 -0 08599 0 130832 :... g 
13 -0 05621 0 104274 0 002181 0 014115 -0 02513 -0 15166 "' 
-0::1 
14 -0 92908 -0 2099 0 002145 0 007105 0 279038 -1 00746 a 
"' I:). N ~ '0 N 
'"ti 
~ ~ 
<:> 
~ 
Q. 
Table 7.16b: TFPC Decomposition for Panel! Merging Group Banks, Intermediation Approach, Battese and Coelli (1995), Banking 
System Dataset 
BID PERIOD BauerTFPC BauerRTS BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnceEffect 
M! Q 
2 I 143852 0 988251 0 001778 0 117866 -0 96815 I 00411 {3 
-3 
-2 65094 0 805557 0 001764 0 124315 -0 81627 -2 76631 "' ... 
4 
-0 41556 I 8805 0 001751 0 124017 -I 84272 -0 57911 " 
5 2 393492 -0 16358 0 001737 0 135233 0 166938 2 25316 b:l 1:> 
6 I 400545 0 097083 0 001723 0 151543 -0 10762 I 25782 " ..... 
7 2 855914 -1 51753 0 00171 0 164194 I 6503 2 55724 ~ 
8 2 15057 -083187 0 001696 0 17764 0 83442 I 96868 ~ 
9 I 94639 -3 35568 0 001683 0 187437 3 46866 I 64429 "' ~
10 0 557152 -2 2839 0 00167 0 187793 2 37581 0 275779 ;:; 
M2 11 0 783518 -5 93799 0 001656 0 184113 6 06133 0 474409 :.-
12 
-194 976 210 634 0 001643 0 107485 -206 706 -199 013 ~ 1:> 
13 
-0 16757 0 346325 0 00163 0 023682 -0 28206 -0 25715 ~ 14 0295932 -0 2688 0001617 0 033343 0290917 0 238858 
"' M3 ~ 
" 2 
-80 9259 -486 504 0 00181 -0 09453 490 876 -85 2052 ::::-:: 
3 
-0 10331 0 231285 0 001796 0059709 -0 25506 -0 14103 <;:; 
4 0 528732 0 106718 0 001782 0035903 -0 07566 0459984 ~ 
5 0 134698 -0 05474 0001768 0 051838 0 153273 -0 01744 
;:,.. 
1:> 
" 6 0 191429 0 04655 0 001755 0 060323 0 051577 0 031225 " 
7 
-0 16441 0 16246 0 001741 0 055674 -0 0169 -0 36739 ~ 
." 
8 0 239564 0 12626 0 001727 0 053023 -0 06337 0 121927 :... 
9 
-0 2857 0 078747 0 001714 0 04857 -0 05577 -0 35897 g 
10 -0 05265 0 0017 0 034904 0 162551 -0 44138 "' 
-0 29487 
-
11 0 160467 0 001687 0 047296 -0 00788 0 258054 
b:l 
0 459628 ~ 
12 0 10351 0 063186 0 001674 0 066249 0 007505 -0 0351 "' !:>. 
13 
-0 39715 0 077405 0 00166 0 063575 -0 04478 -0495 :;j 
N 14 0 046455 -0 15196 0 001647 0 06824 0 228389 -0 09986 ">l 
"' ~ w 15 
Cl 
1:> g. 
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Table 7.16b: TFPC Decomposition for Panell Merging Group Banks, Intermediation Approach, Battese and Coelli (1995), Banking 
System Dataset (Cont'd) 
BID PERIOD BauerTFPC BauerRTS BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnceEffect 
9 
M4 -§ 
-4 "' ... 
" 5 24 63657 -6 7104 0 001602 0 030034 8 15943 23 1559 ~ 6 14 92411 19 1708 0 001589 0 110322 -18 5587 14 2001 ;:, 
7 9 269401 3 09063 0 001576 0 131135 -2 81986 8 86592 "'" 
8 7 065994 9 16223 0 001564 0 16431 -8 86443 6 60232 ~ 
9 
-134 964 -260 023 0 001551 0 03557 263 321 -138 299 
~ 
"' 
10 0 108398 0 001538 -0 08271 0 084565 0 416393 
;:;
0 528182 s 
11 0 37346 0 552188 0 001526 -0 06227 -0 12603 0 008039 ~ 
12 
-0 05713 -0 1777 0 001514 -0 04379 0 434472 -0 27164 a. tl 
13 
-0 29241 0 282329 0 001501 -0 04082 0 049669 -0 58509 ~ 14 0 019038 -0 28759 0 001489 -0 0288 0 413259 -0 07933 c 
M5 4 ~ 
" 5 10 24597 8 49828 0 000564 0 055341 -791971 9 61149 ::t :::: 
6 5 103402 4 68024 0 000559 0 085683 -4 55881 4 89573 ~ 
7 5 598281 9 41479 0 000553 0 103028 -9 24585 5 32576 ~ ;:,-
8 11 08039 15 2829 0 000548 0 127837 -14 9647 10 6338 tl ;:, 
9 
-142 087 -317 989 0 000543 0 063943 321 183 -145 345 " ~· 
10 0 422208 0 529006 0 000538 0003192 0 036642 -0 14717 
"' 11 3 244609 I 14643 0 000533 0 087007 0484539 I 5261 ::... 
12 
-3 0017 -0 14007 0 000528 0 102786 0 166272 -3 13122 ~ 
"' 13 0 154902 0 000523 0 049954 -0 04402 -0 11627 -0 045094 O:l 
14 
-0 28572 -0 03906 0 000518 0 042124 0 304648 -0 59395 El 
"' tl. 
~ 
N "ti 
\0 ~ -1> 
'1"j 
Cl 
tl 
" ;:,-
Table 7.16b: TFPC Decomposition for Panell Merging Group Banks, Intermediation Approach, Battese and Coelli (1995), Banking 
System Dataset (Cont'd) 
BID PERIOD BauerTFPC BauerRTS BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnceEffect 
M6 9 
2 3 157565 -30 5915 0 002006 0 084089 30 7254 2 93757 {5 
-
"' 3 I 718998 -74 0195 0 001991 0 095767 74 0855 I 55524 .... 
" 4 3 749943 I 13381 0 001977 0 112603 -0 93333 3 43488 ~ 5 2 939625 -23 5934 0 001962 0 125123 23 7965 2 60944 ;:,. 
6 
-115 019 620 019 0 001947 -0 12261 -616 152 -118 765 
"" 
7 0 525479 0 215732 0 001933 -0 37462 0 019759 0 662671 ~ 
8 5 223715 0 202696 0 001918 -0 16895 -0 02572 5 21377 ~ 
"' 9 
-4 23206 0331519 0 001904 -0 15496 -0 06921 -4 34132 ~ 
10 
-I 39797 0 07692 0 001889 -0 36252 -0 03564 -I 07862 ;:; 
11 7 223265 0 070054 0 001875 -0 13525 0 067724 7 21886 9' e. 
12 0 542012 0 016138 0 001861 0 116033 0 037338 0 370643 
"' 13 
-1 72101 -0 01377 0 001847 0 113168 0 137967 -I 96022 ~ 
14 
-I 39846 -0 11403 0 001832 0 079589 0 222532 -I 58838 
c 
~ 
M7 
'"' ::::-
2 I 365018 2 99024 0 0015 0 117978 -2 92107 I 17637 ::: 
3 0 918986 -2 86819 0 001488 0 127878 2 79337 0 86444 
q 
4 
-2 17491 3 32153 0 001476 0 123931 -3 26522 -2 35663 ~ :.-
5 2 09716 2 6831 0 001464 0 134106 -2 68001 I 9585 § 
'"' 6 2 24857 -4 6911 0 001451 0 149989 4 75554 2 03269 ~-
7 2 17266 -I 24094 0 001439 0 161901 I 33406 I 9162 
" 
8 I 606504 -5 25103 0 001428 0 166766 5 36795 I 32139 :>. 
9 4 379682 -2 72765 0 001416 0 173266 2 86652 4 06613 g 
"' 10 I 086142 -3 84115 0 001404 0 179908 3 98383 0 76215 -b:1 
11 2 44578 -4 762 0 001392 0 182848 4 92292 2 10062 !;; 
"' 12 
-201 29 201 178 0 001381 0 13625 -197 187 -205 419 ">.. 
13 
-0 72402 0 202776 0 001369 0 072534 -0 06954 -0 93116 :;j 
N 14 
-0 30923 0 072591 0 001358 0 054288 0 081563 -0 51903 "ll 
'-0 ~ V> ~ 
"' '"' :.-
Table 7.17a: TFPC Decomposition for Panel 3 Control Group Banks, Intermediation Approach, Battese and Coelli (1995), Banking 
System Dataset 
PERIOD BauerTFPC BauerRTS BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnceEffect 
2 0 147878 01025 0 00138 -0 04831 0 00929 0 08302 
3 0 172865 0177333 0 001333 -0 04729 -0 05207 0 093559 
4 -0 13981 -0 09521 -0 00456 -0 03998 0 035474 -0 03553 
5 -0 35887 -0 25699 -0 00686 -0 02923 0 058682 -0 12448 
6 0 020187 0 08231 -0 00621 -0 02675 -0 06241 0 033244 
7 0 084226 0 109889 -0 00085 -0 02714 -0 0433 0 045629 
8 0 056697 0 133466 0 001791 ·0 02098 ·0 03512 -0 02246 
9 0 078532 0 139439 0 000691 -0 0142 0 000655 -0 04806 
10 0 063453 0 069221 0 001455 -0 00724 0 002366 -0 00235 
11 0 061612 -0 01421 -0 00347 -0 00216 0 035793 0 045655 
12 0 005607 -0 04437 0 001911 0001631 0 010978 0 035452 
13 0 223974 0167786 0 002908 0 003914 0 001912 0 047454 
14 0 127104 0 048237 0 000978 0 011059 0 025466 0 041365 
Table 7.17b: TFPC Decomposition for Panel3 Control Group Banks, Intermediation Approach, Battese and Coelli (1995), Banking 
System Dataset 
9 BID PERIOD BauerTFPC BauerRTS BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnceEffect {3 
M1 1 ~ 
... 
2 -011078 0 062659 0 000656 -0 04177 -0 02545 -0 10688 
"' 3 0 022861 0 037438 0 00065 -0 03666 -0 02606 0 047495 ~ 4 -0 02738 0 016783 0 000644 -0 03451 0 010904 -0 0212 
" 5 -0 03325 0 020206 0 000638 -0 02708 -0 00931 -0 01771 ,.... 
6 -0 02537 0 032786 0 000632 -0 02414 -0 02285 -001179 ~ 
7 0 158415 0 14719 0 000626 -0 02122 -0 00393 0 035749 ~ 
8 0 036691 0 057011 0 00062 -0 01228 -0 01453 0 005868 "' ~ 9 0 090583 0117297 0 000615 -0 00503 -0 00088 -0 02142 
'" 
10 0 000291 0 02478 0 000609 0 001037 0 00547 -0 0316 ~ M2 11 0 20551 0159015 0 000603 0 005676 0 002842 0 037375 ~ 
12 0 1041 0 10432 0 000598 0 010184 -0 01626 0 00526 1:> 
13 0 083531 0 06229 0 000592 0 015032 -0 00056 0 006182 ~ 
14 0 026108 0 027758 0 000586 0 019065 -0 00308 -0 01822 c 
M3 §-n 
2 -0 06084 -0 12613 0 000257 -0 0312 -0 03224 0128471 
::;> 
;:; 
3 -0 02236 -0 00233 0 000255 -0 03124 -0 05787 0 068814 '? 
4 -0 02979 0 035767 0 000252 -0 02831 -0 01248 -0 02502 ~ 
5 0 029024 0 088728 0 00025 -0 02043 0 02554 -0 06506 ~ 1:> 
6 0 133405 0 092923 0 000247 -0 01438 0 010926 0 043689 " n 
7 0 127428 0 147443 0 000245 -0 00987 -0 00366 -0 00673 ~ 
8 -0 00251 0 068293 0 000243 -0 00152 -001157 -0 05796 " :>.. 
9 -0 01351 0 026508 0 00024 0 006737 -0 00833 -0 03867 Q 10 0 092672 0 099732 0 000238 0 014237 0 025086 -0 04662 ., 
-11 0 238603 0 153041 0 000236 0 020193 -0 00121 0 066346 0;, 
12 0 107055 0 07029 0 000233 0 024303 0 001067 0 011161 El 
"' 13 0 059278 0 034686 0 000231 0 029863 -0 00587 0 000363 ~ 
14 0 103959 0 067389 0 000229 0 03605 0 029873 -0 02958 :;j 
N '1:l 
"' ~ -...) ~ 
c 
1:> 
n 
~ 
Table 7.17b: TFPC Decomposition for Panel3 Control Group Banks, Intermediation Approach, Battese and Coelli (1995), Banking 
System Dataset (cont'd) 
BID PERIOD BauerTFPC BauerRTS BauerTEC BAuerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnceEffect 9 {3 
'" M4 4 
..., 
0 000493 -0 05785 -017856 -1 80315 " 5 -I 27396 0 765098 
15' 6 0 567249 0 615653 0 000488 -0 04156 -0 03047 0 023138 ::. 
7 0 28523 0 364087 0 000484 -0 03097 -0 00188 -0 04649 
,.... 
~ 8 0 496946 0 462032 0 000479 -0 02332 0 001068 0 056683 
9 I 136306 0 962976 0 000475 -0 01531 0 033664 0 154497 ~ 
"' 
10 0 198607 0 00047 -0 01093 -0 01731 -0 02877 ~ 0 142062 ;;: 
11 0 500403 0 419466 0 000466 -0 00833 0 022134 0 066669 S' 
12 0 208593 0 285626 0 000461 -0 00322 -0 0637 -0 01057 ~ 1:> 
13 0 373596 0 334813 0 000457 0 003129 -0 00406 0 039253 ~ 14 0 159126 0 126017 0 000453 0 011898 0 008101 0 012658 c 
M5 4 ~ 
" 5 I 037179 1 00556 0 002114 -0 05079 0 092396 -0 0121 :J 
6 0 235678 0 322905 0 002099 -0 04876 -0 10846 0 067893 ~ 
7 0 550834 0 586713 0 002084 -0 04678 -0 15147 0 160285 ~ ;,-
8 0 937306 0 790119 0 002068 -0 03826 -0 0419 0 225271 1:> ::. 
9 0 533768 0 455433 0 002053 -0 03172 -0 00382 0111815 ~ 
10 0 621591 0 565312 0 002038 -0 02961 -0 0012 0 085051 ~ 
" 
11 I 866728 1 66019 0 002023 -0 02172 -0 02338 0 249605 :... 
12 
-1 11771 0 022731 0 002009 0 00436 0 013599 -116041 ~ 
13 0 279083 0118534 0 001994 0 020809 -0 01021 0 147956 
~ 
Oo 
14 0 441628 0 211724 0 001979 0 022832 0 071893 01332 ~ 
"' 1:>.. 
~ 
IV '"ti 
\0 ~ 00 
'15 
Cl 
1:> g. 
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Table 7.17b: TFPC Decomposition for Panel3 Control Group Banks, Intermediation Approach, Battese and Coelli (1995), Banking 
System Dataset (Cont'd) 
BID PERIOD BauerTFPC BauerRTS BauerTEC BauerTC BauerNMCP BauerPnceEffect 
M6 1 g 
2 0 054287 0 106013 0 001201 -0 05169 0 011255 -0 01249 {5 
-3 0 126908 0 22347 0 00119 -0 04473 -0 04022 "' -0 0128 ... 
0 008274 " 4 0 174372 0 119696 0 00118 -0 03895 0 084167 ~ 5 0 022754 0 168094 0 00117 -0 03182 0 00614 -012083 ::; 
6 0 105658 0 076439 0 00116 -0 03003 -0 01905 0 077137 
"" 
7 0 188877 0 238483 0 00115 -0 02927 -0 00398 -0 01751 ~ 
8 0 17725 0179686 0 00114 -0 02429 -0 00311 0 02382 ~ 
"' 9 0 2809 0 261576 0 00113 -0 02101 0 006246 0 032963 ~
10 -0 02879 0 044971 0 00112 -0 01579 -0 00795 -0 05114 s ~ 11 0 210885 0 138944 0 00111 -0 0114 -0 00239 0 084619 ~ 
12 -0 0681 0 052978 0 001101 -0 00959 0 000809 -01134 
"' 
13 0 191068 0 121458 0 001091 -0 004 0 005445 0 067074 ~ 
14 0 172313 0 104042 0 001082 0 006159 0 014129 0 046901 §-
M7 1 <> ::::-
2 -0 15139 0 012423 0 000332 -0 04357 0 01461 -0 13518 :; ~ 
3 0 181813 0 071814 0 000329 -0 04042 -0 01687 0 166959 ~ 4 
-0 12755 0 020872 0 000326 -0 03759 -0 00159 -010957 ;:,-
"' 5 -0 11891 -0 01394 0 000322 -0 02734 -0 00064 -0 07732 ::; <> 
6 0 102902 0 085564 0 000319 -0 02762 -0 00232 0 046968 ~ 
7 -0 00218 0 087282 0 000316 -0 03194 0 000144 -0 05798 " :... 
8 0 153542 0 105149 0 000313 -0 02381 0 000794 0 071093 ~ 9 0 138838 0 139619 0 00031 -0 01191 -9 03E-05 0010911 
"' 
-10 0 081804 0 104085 0 000307 -0 00274 0 001479 -0 02132 b::1 
11 0 186242 0 125335 0 000304 0 003727 0 003869 0 053006 !:; 
"' 12 0 066369 0138751 0 000301 0 00277 -0 00254 -0 07292 !:>.. 
13 0 1666 0 136021 0 000298 0 004091 -0 00464 0 03083 ~ 
N 
.., 
"' 
14 0 23001 0 152657 0 000296 0 015858 0 003717 0 057483 ~ 
"' '15 ;s 
"' <> ;:,-
Chapter 7· Bank Mergers m lnd1a ProductiVIty Enhancmg? A Cost Based TFP Approach 
7.5 Conclusions 
Tins chapter has provided a breakdown of the productiVIty profile of commercial 
bank mergers m the lndtan Bankmg System over the post-economic reforms penod of 1992 
-2005. 
The general cost efficiency profile of the Indian Banking System over this post 
reform penod mdtcates that there remams considerable scope for efficiency Improvements 
However, there IS a temporal improvement m cost efficiency indtcatmg that the reforms dtd 
mdeed attam theu target of inducmg a rise m the efficiency profiles of the banks. Tins 
overarching trend of mcreasing cost efficiency is mtlmately linked to the inJectiOn of 
competitiOn in the bankmg system vta the entry of new pnvate and foretgn banks, greater 
banking autonomy and, Importantly, the elurunatlon of a!lmg bankmg uruts, albeit 
pnmarily through Central Bank dnven rescue mergers Together the Impact of these factors 
has been to replace the torpidity of the pre-reform banking system wtth a drive towards 
greater dynarrusm and enterprise m the Identification and purswt of soillld credit 
disbursement and mvestrnent avenues In tllfn, this transformatiOn of the bankmg mdustry 
contributes to the overall economic growth VIa the disbursement of vital credit towards the 
most productive sectors (Kmg and Levme, 1993), the development of mnovatlve fmancial 
mstrJiments geared to better manage nsk and liqwdity exposures and enhances the 
operatiOnal and competitive profiles of both the banks and their clients 
The dominance of the mtermedtation approach highlights the operatiOnal shift m 
bankmg practice among Indian banks thereby signalling a shift m the nature of the bankmg 
from one of passtve attainment of regulatiOn dictated targets towards one where the 
operational direction of the bank is dictated by the search for cost reducmg and revenue 
enhancmg credtt disbursement and mvestlnent opportunities. 
Overall, the fmdings indicate that the greatest potential for efficiency gains from 
mergers were concentrated at the beginnmg of the reform penod The prevalence of 
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financially rulmg uruts that nonetheless intnns1cally possessed strong advantages courtesy 
of extended chent and branch networks and baselme operational fronts provided attractive 
targets for incumbent banks adapting to the post-reform operatmg environment This IS 
evidenced by the Significance of the merger related efficiency gains for the observatiOnally 
reconstructed mergers 
While all the mergers showed signs of improved TFPC, the degree of the srune was 
greater for market dnven voluntary mergers The slffillarJty m operatiOnal profiles of the 
srune coupled with their relative fmancial strength of the srune ruded in enhancing their 
post-merger TFP For the remammg banks, the need to provide restoratives to the acqurred 
ailing banking unit nutigated the post-merger TFP growth. Based on these fmdmgs then, 
the Central Bank policy of mergmg healthy fmaJicial urnts with a1lmg ones appears to have 
contained the inefficiency of the latter. 
Furthermore, on exmng the productiVIty breakdown of the merged banks, it is 
apparent that technological change and pnce effects contribute to the productivity changes 
of the banks. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
Th1s thesis has exammed the existence and extent of efficiency and productiVIty 
gains among mergers m the lnd1an Bankmg System It has done so taking mto account the 
impact of post-econmmc reforms on the bankmg system The pre-reform bankmg system 
by virtue of pervasive interventiomst polic1es m the form of administered interest rates, 
statutory pre-emption of funds, branclung restrictions and drrected lending policies 
effectively became a regulatory channel for the eqmtable resource re-allocation leadmg to 
eqmtable socio-economic development The clnef fallout of the aforementioned polic1es 
was the establishment of a bankmg system whose salient feature became the m10101alist 
pursmt of regulat1on 1dent1fied targets by its participants. The mcentive to actively expand 
serVIce ranges and seek out high quality asset portfolios was restricted by regulat1on and by 
a lack of appropnate incentives Furthermore, banks faced little competition and operated 
With substantial Government support In short, the mtermediary role became subordmate to 
the banks' role as a promoter of socio-economic development. The removal of these 
support structures m the wake of the reforms and the subsequent mJection of competitiOn 
and dismantlmg of restnctlve regulatwns concermng the operatwns of banks, created an 
envrronment wherein it became imperative that banks diversify the1r serv1ce portfolios, 
engage m active credit screening and momtonng and seek out revenue enhancmg cred1t 
allocation opportunities The mfluence of capital market discipline via public listmg further 
encouraged this operational slnft. Evidence of these slufting operatwnal dynamics and the 
trans1t10n of the bankmg system from its pre-reform avatar to 1ts current dynanuc state IS 
reflected m the donunance of the intermediatiOn approach in Chapters 5 and the s1gmficant 
differences m efficienc1es between the production and mtermedmtion approaches in 
Chapters 6 and 7 
This thes1s has thus focussed on the response of industry participants who sought to 
adapt to therr newly altered operational profiles and the competitive landscape by engagmg 
m restructunng VIa mergers With partner banks In add1t1on to these market driven mergers, 
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banks that buckled under the pre-reform legacy of operational mefficiency and problematic 
asset portfolios were merged with their financially stronger counterparts at the behest of the 
Central Bank Both the productive and cost efficiency and cost based total factor 
productivity effects of these mergers were assessed using the dual approaches of DEA and 
SFA 
One of the maJor findmgs of tins thesis has been the Identification of substantial 
potential efficiency gains prior to the mergers. Under the DEA methodology, these 
potential merger gains were assessed usmg the Bogetoft and Wang (2005) methodology 
and then compared against the realised efficiencies of the merged bank. The gams were 
traced to nnx effects immediately pre-merger mdicatmg that the greatest scope for merger 
gains lay m the alignment of output mixes between the mergmg banks. Under the SF A 
approaches, the results signalled the congregatiOn of potential efficiency gams around the 
time of the InitiatiOn of economic reforms. The source of these gams was traced to the 
expansion of client bases afforded by mergers In other words, the amalgamation of the 
stock of asset and deposit accounts formed the basis for merger gams The utilisatiOn of a 
tnad of panels mcluding one contammg an observatiOnally reconstructed version of the 
merged bank aided m this assessment 
Assessmg the post-merger productivity changes usmg the discrete approxnnat10n to 
Bauer's (1990) cost based total factor productivity mdex, while not prov1dmg a direct 
assessment of the degree of allocative inefficiency, nevertheless md1cated the changes in 
the input and output mixes and therr contribution to the post-merger productivity changes 
of the merged entity Differences m the methodological assumptions precludes a direct 
companson of the results under the DEA and SFA approaches However, as a broad 
md1cation, post-merger, the contribution of the mput and output mix changes to total factor 
productivity changes IS found to be important The productivity Improvements were found 
to be largely dnven by cost cuttmg technological progress 
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The findmg of potential merger gams from the harmonization of output mixes is not 
mdependent of both the fmancial health status of the mix and the state of technological 
progress Each of these factors is now discussed in turn. Wlule there may be potential gams 
to be recovered from the streamlmmg of product =es, the extent to winch these gams are 
recouped is dependent on the level of default nsk earned by the concerned asset. At the 
lime the economic reforms were introduced, the Indian banking system carried with 1t lngh 
levels of NP As. The mtroduct10n of internationally recognised prudential norms was 
performed m a gradual and phased manner thereby allowmg the banks sufficient time adapt 
to and potentially treat the problematic asset portfolios, m some cases, using Central Bank 
support Thus, wh1le the potential for gains from al!grlffients in the product m1xes might 
have been present, the extent to winch these gains could have been realised IS lied to the 
degree of default risk encompassed in the various assets With the gradual classificatiOn of 
vanous asset categones m tandem with internatiOnal prudential norms, the scope of the 
potential gams changes Moreover, the need to effectively treat these problematiC asset 
portfolios post merger would temper any real1sed efficiency gams. 
The nature of the technolog~cal changes over the study honzon, as detailed m 
Chapter 7, afforded substantial opportunities for banks to laterally expand their asset 
portfolios. The level of efficiency gains would thus change ID tandem w1th the changes ID 
the universe of asset rruxes available to the banks 
Interestingly, across the methodologies and the frames of reference for the 
efficiency assessments, the Central Bank dnven policy of merging healthy and ailing 
bankmg uruts appears to have successfully contained the mefficiency of the latter Potential 
causes of th1s may be the successful transplantation of the superior operational practices of 
the stronger bank onto 1ts weaker umt Furthermore, wlnle the ailiDg bank does suffer from 
financial weaknesses, 1t may have nonetheless possessed mtrinsic strengths in the form of 
1ts market reach which could have served to bolster the efficiency and productivity of the 
stronger bank. Wlule the ab1lity of the merged entity to recover these gams IS dependent on 
the degree to wh1ch the asset base of the absorbed unit is default free, it does not preclude 
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the existence of temporally lagged efficiency changes. These changes are reported in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Together with the results from Chapter 7, these suggest that the mergmg 
banks successfully lowered therr cost loads However, their ability to successfully take 
advantage of the potentially greater market reach that the merger bestowed on them was 
impaired Causal factors for this mclude the need to lower the absorbed NP As and the 
existence of an adJustment period as the banks learned to adapt to therr new roles as 
mtermedlanes. 
The results of this thesis also lughhght the productive and cost efficiency Impacts of 
the mergers In hght of the gradually rising cost efficiency among the banks and the nsmg 
productivity levels, an assessment of the degree to which the mergers aided m enhancmg 
the profit profiles of the mergmg banks vis-a-vis their non-mergmg counterparts would 
serve to lughlight the degree to which the mergmg banks are able to successfully utilise 
these factors to bolster their revenue and profit profiles Tlus represents an avenue for 
extendmg the research presented in this thesis. 
The use of the Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) model pomts to another 
potential extension to the analyses presented m this thesis This model lmks the vanance of 
inefficiency of banks to the exogenous variables However, without an mdicatton of the 
initial level of mefficiencies, the favourabihty or otherwise of changes m the vanance 
cannot be ascertained. Such an mdication can be attamed usmg the approaches of Wang 
(2002) and those outlined m Alvarez et a! (2006), in particular, what the latter term, the 
Scaled Stevensen Model based on the model of Stevensen (1980) Wang (2002) proposes a 
model wherem the inefficiencies, "it are distnbuted as N~u ,uJt r, where additiOnally, 
Pit = zut5 and uft = exp(zur ). The model has the additional property of enablmg non-
monotomc relationslups between the exogenous vanables and the mefficiency Alvarez et 
a! (2006) specify vanous tests to Identify what they term the Scaled Stevensen Model 
wherein the t5 and r parameters of the Wang (2002) model are restncted to be eqmvalent 
Utilisation of these models would enable the IdentificatiOn of the inefficiency levels and 
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variances m a methodologically consistent manner These can then be used together to 
determme the nature of the meffic1ency vanances 
In addition, the bulk of the mergers over the post-merger penod reside m the rescue 
mergers category In light of the nature of the pre-reform banking system, this is not 
surpnsmg However, the surpnsmg lack of greater market dnven mergers even under a 
relaxed anti-trust climate warrants investigation Toxvaerd's (2008) model provides an 
mterestmg startmg pomt into tlus !me of research Predicated on the relative scarc1ty of 
demable targets, the rrrevers1bihty of mergers and their execution under conditions of 
uncertamty and fmally, Imperfect competition for targets, the model pred1cts the start of 
merger waves The nature of the response of the banks in the Indian bankmg system may 
differ from that outlmed m Toxvaerd (2008) due to the greater partiCipation of the state in 
the same The pract1ce of arranging mergers srmultaneously expands the pool of targets and 
dilutes 1t m qualitative terms. The implication then becomes one of not JUSt Jdentifymg 
potentially good targets to acqurre, but ( 1) avmdmg the absorptiOn of problematic targets 
and (2) ident1fymg potential future targets that are so situated The combinatiOn of these 
factors may serve to alter the merger dynanucs m the Indian Bankmg System 
Finally, the bankmg system of the pre-reform penod, as stated previOusly, was 
charactensed by stnngent regulatiOns on the operations of banks coupled w1th strong State 
support for the same. Can the observed inefficiencies of the banks have been "rational" 
(Bogetoft and Hougaard, 2003) given the constraints that these banks faced? The approach 
of Bogetoft and Hougaard (2003) who introduce ratwnal inefficiency models wherem the 
observed inefficiency of an organisation is lmked w1th the costs of eliminatrng 1t can be 
thus used to understand the then prevailing inefficiencies. Such an analysis would be 
particularly useful m exanunmg the mefficJencJes of the pre-reform bankmg system giVen 
that 1t operated along bureaucratic lmes devoid of cap1tal market dJSCiplme 
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Table Al List of Indian Bank Mergers (Taken from Lakshmmarayanan, ConsolidatiOn in 
the Bankmg Industry through Mergers and AcqmsiliOns, Inillan Banks Assocmt10n, Special 
Bulletm, January 2005) 
Sr. Name of Bank Merged 
0 I Prabhat Bank Ltd 
Ltd 
02 Indo-Commercial Bank 
Ltd 
03. Bank ofNagpur Ltd. 
04 New Citizen Bank Ltd 
05 Travancore Forward Bank Ltd 
06 Bank ofKerala Ltd 
07 Bank ofPoona Ltd 
08 Bank of New India Ltd 
With whom Merged Date of Merger 
Natwnal Bank of Lahore 09-03-1961 
Punjab Natwnal Bank 25-03-1961 
Bank ofMaharashtra 27-03-1961 
Bank ofBaroda 29-04-1961 
State Bank ofTravancore 15-05-1961 
Canara Bank 20-05-1961 
Sangli Bank Ltd 03-06-1961 
State Bank of Travancore 17-06-1961 
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Sr. Name of Bank Merged With whom Merged Date of Merger 
09 Venadu Bank Ltd South Indian Bank Ltd 17-06-1961 
11 Seasta Mtd1and Bank Ltd Canara Bank 17-06-1961 
12 Kottayam Onent Bank Ltd State Bank of Travancore 17-06-1961 
13 Bank ofKonkan Ltd Bank ofMaharashtra 19-06-1961 
14 Poona Investors Bank Ltd Sangli Bank 28-06-1961 
15. Bharat Industnal Bank Ltd Bank ofMaharashtra 01-07-1961 
16 Rayalaseema Bank Ltd lndtan Bank 01-09-1961 
17. Cuttack Bank Ltd. Umted Bank of Indta 04-09-1961 
18 Pte Money Bank Pvt. Ltd. Syndtcate Bank 04-09-1961 * 
19 Moolky Bank Ltd. Syndtcate Bank 04-09-1961 * 
20 Merchants Bank Ltd TanJore Permanent Bank 04-09-1961 
Ltd 
21. Tezpur lndustnal Bank Ltd United Bank of lndta 04-09-1961 
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Sr. Name of Bank Merged With whom Merged Date of Merger 
22. G. Raghunathmull Bank Ltd CanaraBank 04-09-1961 
23. Satara Swadeshi Commercial Uruted Western Bank Ltd 06-09-1961 
BankLtd 
24. Catholic Bank Ltd Syndicate Bank 11-09-1961 
25 Phaltan Bank Sangh Bank Ltd 07-10-1961 
26. Jodhpur Commercial Central Bank of India 16-10-1961 
Bank Ltd. 
27. Bank of Citizen Ltd Canara Bankmg Corporation 17-10-1961 
Ltd 
28 Karur Mercantile Bank Ltd LaXIDI Vilas Bank Ltd 19-10-1961 
29. Peoples Bank Ltd Syndicate Bank 14-11-1961 
30. Pratap Bank Ltd Lakshmi Commercial Bank 11-12-1961 
Ltd 
31. Uruty Bank Ltd State Bank of India 20-08-1962 
32 Bank of Algapuri Ltd Indian Bank 14-08-1963 
33. Metropolitan Bank Ltd. United Industrial Bank Ltd. 06-02-1964 
34. Coclun Nayar Bank Ltd State Bank of Travancore 08-02-1964 
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Sr. Name of Bank Merged 
35. Salem Shn 
Kannikaparameshwari 
Bank Ltd. 
36 Unnao Commemal Bank Ltd 
37. Latm Christian Bank Ltd. 
38. Southern Bank Ltd 
39. Shn Jadeya Shankarlmg Bank Ltd 
40. Bareilly Bank Ltd 
41 Tluya Bank Ltd 
42. Allahabad Tradmg & Bkg. Corp. 
Ltd. 
43 Vettaikaran Padur MahaJan 
BankLtd 
44 Malnad Bank Ltd 
45 Josna Bank Ltd. 
46 Amnt Bank Ltd. 
AppendzxAJ 
With whom Merged Date of Merger 
Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. 01-06-1964 
Baredly Corporatwn Bank 12-08-1964 
State Bank of Travancore 17-08-1964 
Uruted Industrial Bank Ltd 24-08-1964 
Belgaum Bank Ltd 26-10-1964 
Benarus State Bank Ltd. 16-11-1964 
Lord Knshna Bank Ltd 16-11-1964 
State Bank of India 25-08-1965 
Bank of Madura Ltd. 01-09-1965 
State Bank ofMysore 06-10-1965 
Lord Krishna Bank Ltd. 13-10-1965 
State Bank of Patlala 03-02-1968 
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Sr. Name of Bank Merged With whom Merged Date of Merger 
47 Chawla Bank Ltd. New Bank oflndia 23-04-1969 
48 Bank ofBehar Ltd State Bank oflndia 08-11-1969 
49 N atwnal Bank of Lahore Ltd State Bank of Incha 20-02-1970 
50 M1raJ State Bank Ltd Umon Bank oflndta 20-07-1985 
51. Lakshrru Commercial Bank Ltd Canara Bank 24-08-1985 
52. Bank of Coclnn Ltd State Bank of Incha 26-08-1985 
53. Hmdustan Commercial Bank Ltd PunJab Natwnal Bank 19-12-1986 
54 Traders Bank Ltd. Bank ofBaroda 13-05-1988 
55. Umted Industna1 Bank Ltd Al1ahabad Bank 31-10-1989 
56. Bank of Tamilnad Ltd Indian Overseas Bank 20-02-1990 
57. Bank ofThanJavur Ltd. Indian Bank 20-02-1990 
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Sr. Name of Bank Merged With whom Merged Date of Merger 
58 Parur Central Bank Ltd. Bank of India 20-02-1990 
59 Purbanchal Bank Ltd Central Bank of India 29-08-1990 
60. New Bank of India Punjab National Bank 04-09-1993 
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Table A2: Post-reform Bank Mergers (taken from Lakshmmarayanan, Consohdatwn in the 
Banking Industry through Mergers and AcqulS!t!OnS, IndJ.an Banks Association, Special 
Bulletin, January 2005) 
Name of Bank Merged With whom Merged Date of Merger 
61 Bank ofKarad Ltd Bank oflndta 1993-1994 
62. Kashmath Seth Bank State Bank oflndta 1995-1996 
63 PunJab Co-op Bank Ltd Oriental Bank of Commerce 1996-1997 
64 Ban Doab Bank Ltd Oriental Bank of Commerce 1996-1997 
65 Bareilly Corp Bank Ltd Bank ofBaroda 03-06-1999 
66. Sikkim Bank Ltd Uruon Bank of India 22-12-1999 
67. Times Bank Ltd HDFC Bank Ltd. 26-02-2000 
68 Benaras State Bank Ltd Bank ofBaroda 20-07-2002 
69 Nedungadt Bank Ltd Punjab Natwnal Bank 01-02-2003 
70. Bank of Madura ICICI Bank Mar. 2001 
71. Global Trust Bank Ltd. Oriental Bank of Commerce 24-07-2004 
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Table Bl: Variables used m Chapters 5 and 6 and their Components 
MODEL INPUTS OUTPUTS 
Modell Borrowings, Fixed Deposits, 
(Production Assets, Other Assets, Advances, 
Approach) Wages Investments 
Model2 Borrowings, Fixed Advances, 
(Intermediation Assets, Other Assets, Investments 
Approach) Wages, Deposits 
Input-Output Components Definitions (Source: RBI- Annual Accounts ofSCBsl: 
Bo"owings: Bo"owzngs zn lndza- from RBI, from other banks, from other znstztutzons and 
agenczes, Borrowzngs outszde Indza 
Fixed Assets Premzses, assets under constructzons, Other fzxed assets 
Other Assets: Net Inter Office A<ljustments, znterest accrued, tax pazd zn advance/ tax deducted 
at source, stamps and statzonery, Others (if any) 
Deposits: Demand Deposzts from banks, from others, Savzngs Deposzts, Term Deposzts- from 
banks, from others, Locatzon wzse Deposzts- branches zn Indza, branches outszde Indza 
Advances: Typewzse Advances Total- Bzlls purchased and dzscounted, cash credzt, overdrafts and 
loans repayable on demand, term loans 
Secunty wzse advances total- advances secured by tangzble assets, advances covered by bank and 
government guarantees, unsecured advances 
Sector wzse advances total- Advances zn Indza to the przonty sectors, to publzc sector, to banks, 
to others 
Advances outszde Indza 
Investments: Investments zn Indza- zn government securztzes, zn other approved secuntzes, zn 
shares, zn debentures and bonds, zn subszdzarzes and/or ;oznt ventures, zn others 
Investments outszde Indza- zn government securztzes, zn subszdzarzes and/or ;oznt ventures, zn 
others 
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Table B2: Vanables used in Chapter 7 
Variable 
Dependent 
Varzable 
TC 
Outputs 
Y, 
Input Przces 
P, 
P, 
Definition 
Total Cost 
Pnce of depos1ts 
Pnce of fixed 
assets 
Pnce of 
borrowmgs 
Pnce oflabour 
Description 
Sum of total mterest expenses (mterest on deposzts+ mterest on 
borrowmgsfrom the REI I other banks+ other mterest expenses) 
and operatmg expenses (payments to and provzswns to 
employees + rent, taxes and bghtzng + prmtmg and statzonery + 
advertzsmg and pubbczty + depreczatwn on property + dzrectors' 
fees and allowances + audztors 'fees and allowances + legal 
charges +postage, telegram and telephone charges + repazrs 
and mazntenance + znsurance + other operatmg expenses) 
Total loans and advances 
Total mvestments 
Total Depos1ts used under productiOn approach 
Interest on deposits/Total Deposits 
. (Fixed assets) . DeprecJatJOn expense+ Total mterest expense 
Total assets 
Interest on borrowings 
Total borrowmgs 
Wages 
Labour 
F JXed Assets 
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Table Cl: Efficiency Scores & Decomposition for Mergers and Post Merger TE under Models 1 & 2 under VRS 
MODEL I PRODUCTION APPROACH 
AVERAGE 
Mergers VRS POST MERGER EFFICIENCY SCORES UNDER CRS, MODEL 4 POST 
MERGER 
EFFICIENCY 
OE TE HE SE El E2 E3 E4 ES E6 E7 E8 E9 EIO Ell 
M! 0997 I 000 I 129 0 883 097 097 0 88 I 00 I 00 0 9S I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 0 98 0 977 
M2 0 999 I 000 I 246 0 802 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 000 
M3 0992 I 000 I 241 0 799 I 00 I 00 09S I 00 0 90 0970 
M4 I 064 I 000 I 438 0 740 094 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 0988 
MS 0 970 I 000 I OSS 0920 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 000 
M6 0 994 I 000 I Sl7 0 6SS I 00 090 0 9SO 
M7 0980 I 000 I 230 0797 I 00 I 00 I 000 
MODEL 2 INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
AVERAGE 
DMUs VRS POST MERGER EFFICIENCY SCORES UNDER CRS, MODELS POST MERGER 
EFFICIENCY 
OE TE HE SE El E2 E3 E4 ES E6 E7 E8 E9 EIO Ell 
M! 0 997 I 000 I 06S 0 936 094 0 99 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 0994 
M2 0 999 I 000 I 003 0 996 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 000 
M3 0 993 I 000 I 120 0 887 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 0 9S 0 990 
M4 0 980 I 000 I 161 0 844 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 000 
MS I 033 I 000 I 041 0992 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 00 I 000 
M6 I 000 I 000 I 187 0 843 I 00 0 9S 0 97S 
M7 0 980 I 000 I 064 0 921 I 00 I 00 I 000 
w Note E(t) refers to number ofyearsfol/owzng the merger E g, El - I year after the merger :.. 
-
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APPENDIX D: PANEL CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICA TJONS FOR 
MERGER ANALYSIS USING STOCHASTJC FRONTIER 
ANALYSIS. 
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Appendix D: Panel Construction Specifications 
Assume a total of N firms usmg a vector of x mputs, such that x e R'; , to produce y outputs, 
such that y e R! . Of these, J (J ~ N) firms engage in M mergers The merger year IS 
designated MY . The tune penods before and after the merger are designated BM and 
AM, respectively and study spans T tune penods m total The tlmelme used m the analysts 
is thus· 
'-------------,------------- "------- _______ _..... 
Pre- merger years Post- merger years 
Furthermore, over the study honzon T, E firms exit the sample 
E~NandE'I'J 
The merger analysts is carried out usmg a control group of firms that do not engage 
in mergers over the study honzon and a merger group conststmg of those banks that did 
engage m mergers over the same The construction specificatiOns of both these groups IS 
detruled next. 
1. Construction of Control Group 
Two different control groups are utilised in the merger analysis, VIZ Balanced and 
Unbalanced Control Groups (BCG and UBCG, respectively) The BCG comprises of those 
banks that existed in the sample over the study horizon The UBCG compnsed of all non-
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mergmg banks in the sample and thus permits entry and exit of banks over the study 
honzon These are thus set up in the following manner· 
UBCG1 = (N -J)1 
BCG1 =(N-J-E)1 
1. Construction Specification of Merger Group 
[Dl) 
[D2) 
The merger group comprises those firms that engaged in mergers over the study 
penod Efficiency analysis IS earned out in one of two ways· (a) by comparing the 
efficiency of an observatiOnally reconstructed merged bank that exists over the pre-merger 
period of the actual merger and that of the merged bank and (b) by companng the average 
efficiencies of the parent banks prior to and following the merger. These are examined m 
detail next. 
a) Observationally Reconstructed Merged Bank (RMB) 
In tins case, a the merged bank is observationally reconstructed to exist over Its pre-
merger period by aggregating the mputs and outputs of the parent over each of their 
pre-merger time penods. Thus, in the case of the M 1hmerger mvolvmg the k 1h and 
fh finns, the inputs and outputs of the hypothetical merged bank is constructed as 
follows 
s 
x,m = L(xik +xij} 
i=l 
R 
Yrm = L{yrk + Yrm) 
r=l 
l, ... i, .. ,s: k,j e J, k"" j [D3) 
l, ... ,R; k,j E J, k * J [D4) 
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The observatiOnally reconstructed bank corresponding to the M th merger is thus 
RMBm With inputs and outputs correspondmg to X 1m and Yim respectively. The 
RMB is thus constructed to exist over each of its pre-merger period. 
b) Average Efficiency of Banks that merge 
Here, the average effic1encies of the parent entities in the pre-merger penods are 
compared with those of the merged entity and the average efficiency of the control 
group over the post-merger period 
Having deterrmned the components of the two groups, the panels for the merger 
analysis can then be constructed by combinatiOns of the aforementioned groups The 
following diagrams Illustrate thus m the case of the M 1h and 11h merger 
Panel 1: Observationally Reconstructed Merged Bank + Balanced 
Control Group 
Panel I = RMBm,BM +BCG BM +BCG AM + AMBm,AM 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I • 
T 
Merger1 
... _____ , ,-----,'-------~ 
.. 
' 
AMB1 +BCG 
Merger m -------------------,.-----------------'"".._--~y-----) 
RMBm +BCG AMBm +BCG 
323 
AppendzxD 
- Panel 2: Merger Banks+ Unbalanced Control Group 
Panel2= MBm,BM +AMBBM +UBCGBM +UBCGAM 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ' 
MY T 
Merge~ :, ____________ .. ...._______ ~-----_.... 
" 
' MBI+UBCG AMB1 + UBCG 
' Merger, ---------------.,.-----------------''----~ ~----' 
MBm+UBCG AMBm + UBCG 
- Panel 3: Merger Banks+ Balanced Control Group 
Panel3 = MBm BM + AMB BM +BCG BM +BCG AM , 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ' 
MY T 
Merge~ :, ____________ .. ________________ ___. 
• 
' MBI+UBCG AMB 1 + UBCG 
Merger, ' .. 
--------------- --------------- '-------.. ,....---------' 
.. \," 
MBm+UBCG AMBm + UBCG 
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where· 
Mergerm = Mth merger l, ... l, ... m; l ~m 
MY m = year m whzch merger m occured 
BCG = Balanced control group 
UBCG = Unbalanced control group 
AMB = Actual merged bank 
RMB = ObservatiOnally reconstructed merged bank 
MB = Merged bank 
' ' 
------\,-----' = Pre- merger perzod 
"-y-----J =Post- merger perzod 
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APPENDIX E: PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR CHAPTER 6. 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Pitt and Lee Model, Retail Banking 
Data set 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION 
APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lyl 0 413*** 0 650*** 
(0 0377) (0 0334) 
Jy2 0 309*** 0 204*** 
(0 0216) (0 0215) 
lxl 0 000852 0 00503 
(0 00866) (0 00891) 
lx2 0 00310 0 0127*** 
(0 00229) (0 00243) 
lx3 -0 0101 0 00145 
(0 00679) (0 00761) 
lx4 0 0655*** 0 0755*** 
(0 00780) (0 00866) 
ly11 0 0839** 0 0849*** 
(0 0366) (0 0119) 
Iy22 0 106*** 0 0207* 
(0 0153) (0 0114) 
lx11 0 0267*** 0 0304*** 
(0 00259) (0 00301) 
lx22 0 00335*** 0 00426*** 
(0 000557) (0 000588) 
lx33 0 00542** 0 00877*** 
(0 00253) (0 00235) 
lx44 0 0483*** 0 0542*** 
(0 00330) (0 00377) 
lylly2 -0 249*** -0 0181 
(0 0406) (0 0178) 
• stgmficant at 10% 
•• szgmficant at 5% 
••• stgmficant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total depostts, /xi= wages, /x2= total borrowmgs, 
/x3= fixed assets, lx4= other assets, /x5 =total deposzts, In TA = stze, 
/nprovs = provzszons, group = dummy varzable dzstznguzshzng between banks that merged (value = 
0) and those that dzd not (value= 1), tgroup = mteractzon between tzme trend and group dummy 
varzable, own2 = dummy vanable dzstzngutshmg between publtc and pnvate sector banks, own3 = 
dummy varzab/e dzstmgutshmg between publtc andforetgn sector banks, HHI = Herfindahi-
Htrschman Index of concentratzon 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Pitt and Lee Model, Retail Banking 
Dataset (Cont'd) 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION 
APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 
lx1lx2 0 000349 -0 00312 
(0 00174) (0 00191) 
lx1lx3 0 0131*** 0 0154*** 
(0 00363) (0 00364) 
lx1lx4 
0 0590*** 0 0669*** 
(0 00415) (0 00463) 
lx2lx3 0 00201 0 00212 
(0 00175) (0 00180) 
lx2lx4 
0 0143*** 0 0110*** 
(0 00249) (0 00274) 
lx3lx4 
0 0242*** 0 0344*** 
(0 00424) (0 00450) 
ly1lx1 -0 105*** 
0 0548*** 
(0 0174) (0 0132) 
ly1lx2 
0 0724*** 0 0247*** 
(0 0102) (0 00749) 
ly1lx3 00230 -0 0124 
(0 0158) (0 0109) 
ly1lx4 0 0909*** 0 0827*** 
(0 0211) (0 0107) 
ly2lx1 0 0277*** 0 0191** 
(0 00930) (0 00869) 
ly2lx2 0 0145*** 0.000634 
(0 00457) (0 00432) 
ly21x3 -000172 
0 0259*** 
(0 00908) (0 00804) 
ly2lx4 0 000927 -0 0194 
(0 0133) (0 0125) 
• significant at 10% 
•• significant at 5% 
*** significant at I% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total 
borrowmgs, lx3= fued assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 = total deposlls, In TA = SIZe, 
Panel3 
lnprovs =proviSions, group = dummy vanable d1stmguzshmg between banks that merged (value 
= 0) and those that d1d not (value= 1), /group = mteractwn between tzme trend and group dummy 
vanable, own2 = dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between publzc and pnvate sector banks, own3 = 
dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between publzc and forezgn sector banks, HHI = Herfindahl-
Hzrschman Index of concentratzon 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Pitt and Lee Model, Retail Banking 
Dataset (Cont'd) 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION 
VARIABLES Panel! 
-0 00867*** 
(0 00288) 
tsq 
0 000823*** 
(0 000148) 
lylt -0 0354*** 
(0 00487) 
ly2t 0 0159*** 
(0 00292) 
lxlt -0 00303*** 
(0 000816) 
lx2t -0 00286*** 
(0 000405) 
lx3t -0 000921 
(0 000737) 
lx4t 0 00378*** 
(0 000989) 
In TA -1 oso••• 
(0 00967) 
lnprovs -0 00725*** 
(0 00276) 
group -0 0253 
(0 0232) 
!group -0 00260 
(0 00203) 
own2 -0 0192* 
(0 0101) 
own3 0 00558 
(0 0110) 
rhlu -0 260 
(0 199) 
Constant 11 so••• 
(0 106) 
• szgnzficant at I 0% 
•• szgnzficant at 5% 
*** Slgnzjicant at 1% 
APPROACH 
Panel2 Panel3 Panel Panel2 
I 
-0 00581** 
(0 00282) 
0 000539*** 
(0 000163) 
-0 00763* 
(0 00437) 
0 00514* 
(0 00290) 
-0 00355*** 
(0 000875) 
-0 00186*** 
(0 000433) 
-3 97e-05 
(0 000823) 
0 00426*** 
(0 00109) 
-1 105*** 
(0 0103) 
-0 00887*** 
(0 00298) 
0 0115 
(0 0164) 
0 00107 
(0 00152) 
-0 0186 
(00114) 
00112 
(00114) 
0 614*** 
(0.214) 
!I 94*** 
(0 Ill) 
lyi= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total deposzts, /xi= wages, lx2= total 
borrowmgs, lx3= fixed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 = total deposzts, lnTA = SIZe, 
Panel3 
lnprovs = provzszons, group = dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between banks that merged (value 
= 0) and those that dzd not (value= I), tgroup = mteractwn between tzme trend and group dummy 
vanable, own2 = dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between pubhc and pnvate sector banks, own3 = 
dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between pubhc and forezgn sector banks, HH1 = Heljindahl-
Hzrschman Index of concentratzon 
329 
AvrendzxEJ 
Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles, Fixed Effects 
(1984), Retail Banking Dataset 
variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Pane13 Panel I Pane12 Pane13 
lyl o 75o••• 0 739••• 0 607*** 0 359*** 0 274*** 0 340*** 0 187 0197 0 180 0043 0043 0 041 
ly2 0 051 0 006 0 021 0113 0 126 0 113 
lx1 -0 082** -0 108** -0 078* -0 294*** -0 374*** -0 3524*** 0 036 0047 0 043 0 026 0 028 0027 
lx2 -0 013 -0 031 -0 026 -0 063*** -0 049*** -0 064*** 0 019 • 0 019 0 018 0011 0011 0 011 
-0 180*** -0 125*** -0 181*** -0 119*** -0 106*** -0 128*** lx3 0026 0030 0027 0 0185 0 018 0 017 
lx4 -0381*** -0 352*** -0 386*** -0 227*** -0 1839*** -0.205*** 0 034 0037 0 036 0024 0 024 0024 
lx5 -0 076*** -o on••• -0 076*** 0002 0003 0 002 
ly11 0 090 0 246*** 0 172*** 0 142*** 0 179*** 0 150*** 0 142 0056 0049 0020 0 022 0020 
lx11 0 027*** 0 053*** 0 043*** -0 068*** -0 053*** -0 052*** 0 011 0 016 0 014 0009 0009 0009 
lx22 0002 o oo5•• 0 003* -0 002* -0 001 -0 001 0002 0 002 0002 0 001 0 001 0 001 
• Significant at 10% 
•• Significant at 5% 
*** szgnificant at 1% 
ly 1 ~ total advances, ly2 ~ total mvestments, ly3~ total deposits, lx1 ~ wages, lx2~ total 
borrowmgs, lx3~ fixed assets, lx4~ other assets, lx5 ~ total deposits, In TA ~ s1ze, 
DT ~ llem dummy, groupDT ~group dummy varwble and time dummy mteractwn 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles, Fixed Effects 
(1984), Retail Banking Dataset 
variable PRODUCTION APPROACH 
Panel! 
lx33 0008 0 010 
lx44 0 047*** 0 014 
lx55 
lylly2 -0 608*** 0 158 
lxllx2 0013 
•• 0 006 
lxllx3 -0 032** 0 015 
lxllx4 -0 022 0 017 
lxllx3 -0 032** 0 015 
lxllx4 -0 022 0 017 
lxllx5 
• szgnificant at 10% 
•• szgnificant at 5% 
*** slgmficant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel3 
0 045*** 0 016 
0 011 • 0009 
0 050*** 0 057*** 
0 016 0 015 
-0 120 -0 158** 
0076 0073 
0005 0 011 
0 008 • 0007 
-0 089*** -0 037*** 
0 019 0 015 
-0 032* -0 030* 
0 019 0 018 
-0 089*** -0 037*** 
0 019 0 015 
-0 032* -0 03* 
0 019 0 018 
INTERMEDIATION APPPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
0 010 0 017 0009 
0.008 •• 0 008 0007 
0 074*** 0 036*** 0 045*** 
0 012 0 010 0 010 
-0 017 0 026 0009 
0 023 • 0 015 0 014 
0 013 0 041*** 0 027*** 
•• 0 006 0006 0005 
-0 029*** -0061*** -0 046*** 
0 011 0 010 0009 
-0 065*** -0 047*** -0 058*** 
0 011 0009 0009 
-0 029*** -0 061*** -0 046*** 
0 011 0 010 0 0094 
-0 065*** -0 047*** -0 058*** 
0 011 0 009 0009 
0 203*** 0 139*** 0.142*** 
0 021 0 015 0 015 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total znvestments, ly3= total deposzts, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowzngs, 
lx3= fued assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposzts, lnTA = szze, 
DT = tzem dummy, groupDT =group dummy vanable and tzme dummy znteractwn 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles, Fixed Effects 
(1984), Retail Banking Dataset 
variable PRODUCTION APPROACH 
lx2lx3 
lx2Ix4 
lx21x5 
Ix31x4 
Ix31x5 
Ix4Ix5 
lyllxl 
1y1lx2 
1y11x3 
Panel) 
0 001 
0 007 
-0 034*** 
0 010 
0 019 
0 0183 
-0 158** 
0 066 
-0 171*** 
0 040 
0 023 
0.065 
• significant at I 0% 
* * Significant at 5% 
*** Slgnificant at 1% 
Panel2 
0009 
0008 
-0 036*** 
0 011 
-0 001 
0 022 
0070 
0057 
0000 
0032 
-0 141** 
0 061 
Panel3 
0005 
0 007 
-0 033*** 
0 010 
-0 009 
0 018 
0 022 
0 052 
-0 035 
0029 
0002 
0 050 
INTERMEDIATION APPPROACH 
Panel I 
-0 003 
0 004 
-0 026*** 
0006 
0 017 
*0009 
0 016 
0 013 
0009 
0 020 
-0 087*** 
0 028 
-0 009 
0020 
0 014* 
0008 
0002 
0 015 
Panel2 
-0 010** 
0004 
-0 023*** 
0 006 
-0 0124 
0008 
0025 
0 015 
0 018 
0 022 
-0 038** 
0 017 
0 026** 
0 014 
0 021*** 
0007 
-0 002 
0 018 
Panel3 
-0 007 
• 0004 
-0 016*** 0 006 
-0 008 
0 008 
0026 
•• 0 013 
0 0197 
0 020 
-0 044*** 0 016 
0004 
0 014 
0 016** 
0008 
0005 
0 016 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments, /y3= total deposits, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowmgs, 
lx3= fu:ed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits, In TA = s1ze, 
DT = t1me dummy, groupDT =group dummy vanab/e and flme dummy mteractwn 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles, Fixed Effects 
(1984), Retail Banking Dataset 
variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPPROACH 
lyllx4 
ly11x5 
ly2lxl 
ly2lx2 
ly2lx3 
1y2lx4 
t 
tsq 
Panel I 
0 362° 
0 086 
-0 010 
0034 
0024 
0 018 
-0 007 
0039 
-0 074 
0054 
0 037 
0 034 
-0 003 
0 002 
• s1gmjicant at 10% 
• • s1gmjicant at 5% 
••• Significant at 1% 
Panel2 
0057 
0049 
-0 002 
0036 
-0 024 
0 017 
0 OII3 
0 041 
0007 
0056 
0008 
0026 
-0 002 
0 001 
Panel3 
0 081° 
0045 
-0 044 
0 033 
-0 013 
0 017 
0002 
0034 
-0 013 
0 051 
-0 016 
0 029 
-0 0003 
0002 
Panel! 
o 065••• 
0 025 
-0 054•• 
0027 
0025 
0 023 
-0 002 
0 001 
Panel2 
o 055•• 
0 027 
-0 07!••• 
0.018 
-0 036•• 
0 016 
0 001 
0 001 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total deposlls, lxl= wages, lx2= total 
borrowmgs, lx3= fixed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 = total deposlls, In TA =siZe, 
DT = llme dummy, groupDT =group dummy vanable and t1me dummy mteractwn 
Panel3 
0 054•• 
0025 
-0 053••• 
0 019 
-0 030* 
0 018 
0 001 
0 001 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles, Fixed Effects 
(1984), Retail Banking Dataset 
variable PRODUCTION APPROACH 
lylt 
ly2t 
lxlt 
lx2t 
lx3t 
lx4t 
lx5t 
DT2 
Panel! 
-0 011 
0020 
00090012 
-0 035*** 
0003 
-0 001 
0 001 
-0 002 
0003 
0 030*** 
0004 
-0 OO!l 
0 074 
• szgnzficant at I 0% 
• • szgnzficant at 5% 
*** szgnzficant at 1% 
Panel2 
0 021 
0 019 
0002 
0013 
-0 028*** 
0 004 
0 001 
0 001 
-0 006* 
0003 
0 028*** 
0004 
-0 107 
0072 
Pane13 
0 023 
0 017 
0 004 
0 Oil 
-0 038*** 
0 003 
0 001 
0 001 
-0 001 
0 003 
0 031*** 
0004 
-0 061 
0080 
INTERMEDIATION APPPROACH 
Panel! 
0 010** 
0004 
0 023*** 
0003 
0 003*** 
0 001 
0 012*** 
0002 
0 023*** 
0002 
-0 076*** 
0002 
0 031 
00509 
Panel2 
0 022*** 
0005 
0 030*** 
0003 
0 002** 
0 001 
0 013*** 
0002 
0 019*** 
0002 
-0 077*** 
0003 
0042 
0 043 
Panel3 
0 014*** 
0 004 
0 026*** 
0 003 
0 003*** 
0 001 
0 013*** 
0002 
0 021*** 
0002 
-0 076*** 
0 002 
0 040 
0 051 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total znvestments, ly3= total deposzts, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowzngs, 
lx3= fixed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposzts, lnTA = szze, 
DT = tzme dummy, groupDT =group dummy varzable and tzme dummy znteractzon 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles, Fixed Effects 
(1984), Retail Banking Dataset 
Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 
DT3 -0 002 0 073 0102 0070 
DT4 0 056 0 164** 0 095 0 073 
DT5 0 158* 0 102 0 097 0 082 
DT6 0 097 0 097 0 097 0 072 
DT7 (dropped) (dropped) 
DT8 -0 051 -0 056 0 100 0 078 
DT9 -0 094 -0 074 0 101 0 080 
• szgmficant at 10% 
•• szgnificant at 5% 
••• szgnzjicant at I% 
Panel3 
0098 
00803 
0 236*** 
0082 
0 296*** 
0 088 
0 183** 
0082 
0 087 
0 083 
(dropped) 
-0 004 
0 085 
INTERMEDIATION APPPROACH 
Panel! 
-0 008 
0069 
0024 
0067 
0 016 
0068 
0 001 
0067 
-0 036 
00679 
(dropped) 
-0 041 
0065 
Panel2 
-0 014 
0 043 
0 068 
0045 
0027 
0049 
0024 
0045 
(dropped) 
-0 019 
0048 
-0 053 
0 048 
Panel3 
0000 
0 051 
0 092* 0 053 
0063 
0056 
0 034 
0053 
0 017 
0053 
(dropped) 
-0 041 
0054 
lyJ~ total advances, ly2 ~total znvestments, ly3~ total deposzts, /xi~ wages, /x2~ total borrowzngs, 
lx3~ fixed assets, lx4~ other assets, lx5 ~total deposlls, In TA ~ szze, 
DT ~ tzme dummy, groupD T ~ group dummy varzable and tzme dummy znteractzon 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles, Fixed Effects 
(1984), Retail Banking Dataset 
variable PRODUCTION APPROACH 
DTIO 
DTII 
DTI2 
DTI3 
DTI4 
groupDT2 
groupDT3 
groupDT4 
Panel! 
-0 038 
0 102 
-0 154 
0 100 
-0 123 
01004 
-0 129 
0105 
(dropped) 
0027 
0079 
-0 069 
0 114 
-0 142 
0 1088 
* significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** Slgmficant at 1% 
Panel2 
-0 000 
0 083 
-0 100 
0086 
-0 083 
0094 
-0 069 
0100 
(dropped) 
0113 
0073 
-0 157** 
0077 
-0 250*** 
0 078 
Panel3 
0 077 0 090 
-0 039 0 094 
-0 030 0 102 
-0 040 
0110 
(dropped) 
0 122 
0 081 
-0 119 0 085 
-0 219*** 
0 086 
INTERMEDIATION APPPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 
-0 063 
0 0700 067 0 051 
-0 112* -0 102** 
0066 0.053 
-0 116* -0 100* 
0 065 0057 
-0 089 -0 098 
0 069 0 061 
(dropped) (dropped) 
-0 0457 0 013 
0 052 0045 
-0 110 -0 009 
0 076 0047 
-0 148** -0 066 
0 074 0 0481 
Panel3 
-0 055 0 057 
-0 085 0 060 
-0 0890 066 
-0 085 0 070 
(dropped) 
0 008 0 052 
-0 018 
0054 
-0 077 
0 055 
lyl= total advances,ly2 =total znvestments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowmgs, 
lx3= fu:ed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits, lnTA = s1ze, 
DT = t1me dummy, groupDT =group dummy vanab/e and lime dummy mteractwn 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles, Fixed Effects 
(1984), Retail Banking Dataset 
varioable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPPROACH 
groupDT5 
groupDT6 
groupDT7 
groupDT8 
groupDT9 
groupDTIO 
DTII 
Panel! 
-0 094 
0 111 
-0 1438 
0105 
-0 121 
0 105 
-0 066 
0 105 
-0 126 
0 107 
-0 212** 
0 109 
-0 154 
0 !00 
* szgn!ficant at 10% 
•• szgn!ficant at 5% 
* * * szgmficant at 1% 
Panel2 
-0 054 
0086 
-0 136* 
0075 
-0 107 
0076 
-0 052 
0078 
-0 068 
0 079 
-0 164** 
0 083 
-0 1001 
0086 
Panel3 
-0 114 
0090 
-0 097 
0 081 
-0 052 
0082 
00510 084 
-0 038 
0 087 
-0 146 
00924 
-0 039 
0094 
Panel! 
-0 102 
0073 
-0.195*** 
0 070 
-0 214*** 
0070 
-0 292*** 
0071 
-0 293*** 
0071 
-0 271*** 
0 073 
-0 112* 
0 0667 
Pane12 
0 047 
0052 
-0 039 
0046 
-0 056 
0 046 
-0 053 
0 047 
-0 066 
0 048 
-0 060 
0 050 
-0 102** 
0053 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total znvestments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total 
borrowzngs, lx3= fzxed assets, lx4= other assets, /x5 = total deposzts, lnTA = szze, 
DT = tzme dummy, groupDT =group dummy vanable and tzme dummy znteractwn 
Panel3 
0 033 0 057 
-0 031 
0052 
-0 050 0 052 
-0 061 0 053 
-0 064 0 055 
-0 062 0 058 
-0 085 0 060 
337 
Appendzx El 
Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles, Fixed Effects 
(1984), Retail Banking Dataset 
variable 
DTI2 
DTI3 
PRODUCTION APPROACH 
Panel I 
-0 123 
0 100 
-0 129 
0 105 
Panel2 
-0 083 
0094 
-0 069 
0 100 
Panel3 
-0 030 
0 102 
-0 040 
0 1100 
INTERMEDIATION APPPROACH 
Panel I 
-0 116* 
0 065 
-0 089 
0069 
Panel2 
-0 100* 
0 057 
-0 098 
0 061 
Panel3 
-0 089 0 066 
-0 085 0 070 
DTI4 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 
• Significant at I 0% 
•• szgniflcant at 5% 
•• • significant at I% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total deposlls, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowmgs, 
lx3= fi:xed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 = total depositS, lnTA =SIZe, 
DT = /1me dummy, groupDT =group dummy vanab/e and t1me dummy mteractwn 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles, Random 
Effects (1984), Retail Banking Dataset 
variable PRODUCTION APPROACH 
lyl 
ly2 
lxl 
lx2 
lx3 
lx4 
lx5 
Panel! 
0 854••• 
0 0477 
0 I 13*** 
0029 
0 024••• 
0 007 
o 045••• 
0 004 
0 009 
0006 
0 019** 
0009 
• stgnificant at 10% 
•• szgnificant at 5% 
••• szgnificant at 1% 
Panel2 
0 628••• 
0 048 
0 196••• 
0032 
0 048••• 
0 009 
0 039*** 
0005 
0004 
0007 
0008 
0 010 
Panel3 
0 65J••• 
0047 
0 192••• 
0030 
0 036•••• 
0 008 
0 039••• 
0005 
0009 
0007 
o 02o•• 
0 010 
INTERMEDIATION APPPROACH 
Pane! I 
0 515••• 
0024 
o 022••• 
0 015 
-0 023*** 
0 007 
-0 012 
0 010 
-0 006 
0 016 
-0 278••• 
0055 
Panel2 
0 526*** 
0024 
-0 005 
0 017 
-o 022••• 
0006 
0 010 
0 010 
-0 018 
0 014 
-0 165*** 
0 045 
Panel3 
o 528*** 
0023 
0 008 
0 016 
-0 025*** 
0007 
-0 006 
0 010 
-0 000 
0 015 
-0 250J••• 
0052 
ly1~ total advances, ly2 ~total mvestments, ly3~ total deposits, 1x1~ wages, 1x2~ total 
borrowmgs, lx3~ fixed assets, lx4~ other assets, lx5 ~total deposzts, In TA ~ szze, 
/nprovs ~ provzswns, group ~ dummy varzab/e dzstmguzshmg between banks that merged (value 
~ 0) and those that dtd not (value ~ 1), tgroup ~ mteractwn between ttme trend and group 
dummy vanable, own2 ~ dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between publtc and pnvate sector 
banks, own3 ~dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between publtc and forezgn sector banks, HHI ~ 
Heifindahi-Hzrschman Index of concentratwn 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles, Random 
Effects (1984), Retail Banking Dataset 
variable PRODUCTION APPROACH 
lyll 
ly22 
Ixll 
Ix22 
Ix33 
Ix44 
Ix55 
Panel! 
0 124*** 
0 038 
0 097*** 
0 016 
0 025*** 
0 002 
0 003*** 
0 000 
0 006*** 
0 002 
0 049*** 
0 003 
* szgmjicant at 10% 
•• stgmficant at 5% 
••• szgmficant at I% 
Panel2 
0 037••• 
0 013 
0 0070 013 
0 030*** 
0 003 
0004231*** 
0000 
0 009••• 
0 002 
0 064*** 
0004 
Panel3 
0 098*** 
0 012 
0 013 
0 012 
0 030*** 
0 003 
0 004*** 
0 000 
0 009*** 
0 002 
0 057••• 
0003 
INTERMEDIATION APPPROACH 
Panel! 
0 095*** 
0 012 
0006 
0004 
-0 0007 
0 000 
0 004 
0 004 
0 066*** 
0 007 
0 006 
0 015 
Panel2 
0 1281348*** 
0 013 
0 016*** 
0 005 
0 001 
00009 
0 004 0 004 
o 058*** 
0006 
-0 033*** 
0009 
Panel3 
o too••• 
0 012 
0 022*** 
0005 
0 00009 
0 0009 
0 007 0 004 
0 048••• 
0 007 
-0 034*** 
0 009 
lyi= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total deposzts, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowmgs, 
/x3= fzxed assets, lx4= other assets, /x5 =total deposzts, lnTA = szze, 
lnprovs = provzszons, group =dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between banks that merged (value = 0) 
and those that dzd not (value = 1), tgroup = mteractzon between tzme trend and group dummy 
varzable, own2 = dummy varzable dzstmguzshmg between publzc and przvate sector banks, own3 = 
dummy vanable dzstznguzshzng between publzc and forezgn sector banks, HHI = Herjindahl-
Hzrschman Index of concentratwn 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles, Random 
Effects (1984), Retail Banking Dataset 
variable PRODUCTION APPROACH 
lylly2 
lx1lx2 
lxllx3 
lxllx4 
lxllx5 
lx2lx3 
lx2lx4 
lx2lx5 
Panel! 
-0 251*** 
0 043 
0 0006 
0 001 
0 009••• 
0003 
-0 056*** 
0 004 
0002 
0 001 
-0 015*** 
0 0023 
• szgmficant at 10% 
• • szgmficant at 5% 
* *"' szgnzjicant at 1% 
Panel2 
0 044** 
0020 
-0 009••• 
0002 
0 024*** 
0004 
-o oso••• 
0 005 
o oos••• 
0 002 
-0 007** 
0 003 
Panel3 
-0 013 
0 019 
-0 002 
0 002 
o o1o••• 
0003 
-0 067••• 
0004 
0 002 
0 001 
-0 0132••• 
0 002 
INTERMEDIATION APPPROACH 
Panel! 
00002 
0 003 
0 0155*** 
0005 
-0 060*** 
0007 
0 044••• 
0 010 
-0 003 
0002 
-0 009··· 
0003 
0 017••• 
0005 
Panel2 
0 0198••• 
0 003 
-0 008 
0 005 
-0 094*** 
0 006 
o ass••• 
0 008 
-0 002 
0 002 
-0 009*** 
0 003 
-0 00 
0 005 
Panel3 
0 011··· 
0 003 
0 00020005 
-0 087••• 
0 005 
0 045••• 
0 008 
-0 002 
0 002 
-0 009••• 
0 003 
0 003 
0 005 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total znvestments, ly3= total deposits, /xi= wages, lx2= total 
borrowzngs, lx3= frxed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposzts, lnTA = szze, 
lnprovs = provzszons, group = dummy varzable dzstznguzshzng between banks that merged (value 
= 0) and those that dzd not (value= 1), /group= znteractzon between tzme trend and group 
dummy vanable, own2 = dummy vanable dzstznguzshmg between publzc and przvate sector 
banks, own3 = dummy vanable dzstznguzshzng between publzc and forezgn sector banks, HHI = 
Herfindahl-Hzrschman Index of concentratzon 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles, Random 
Effects (1984), Retail Banking Dataset 
variable PRODUCTION APPROACH 
Ix3Ix4 
lx31x5 
lx4Ix5 
lyllxl 
lyllx2 
lyllx3 
lyllx4 
Panel I 
-0 023*** 
0004 
-0 0895*** 
0 018 
-0 074*** 
0 010 
-0 007 
0 016 
0 098*** 
0 022 
• szgnificant at I 0% 
** szgmficant at 5% 
*** szgnificant at 1% 
Panel2 
-0 043*** 
0005 
-0 0624*** 
0 014 
-0 038*** 
0 008 
0 009 
0 012 
0 067*** 
0 012 
Panel3 
-0 033*** 
0 004 
-0 044*** 
0013 
-0 034*** 
0008 
-0 033*** 
0 011 
0 078*** 
0 011 
INTERMEDIATION APPPROACH 
Panel I 
-0 005 
0 008 
-0 015 
0 012 
-0 060*** 
0 016 
-0 009 
0 011 
0 005 
0 004 
-0 023*** 
0 009 
-0 015 
0 014 
Panel2 
-0 009 
0 008 
0 015 
0 011 
-0 003 
0 010 
-0 00002 
0008 
0002 
0004 
-0 058*** 
0 010 
0 024 
0 014 
Panel3 
-0 010 
0007 
0 003 
0 0111 
0 012 
0 010 
0 0100 008 
0 001 
0 004 
-0 034*** 
0.009 
-0 0005 
0 014 
lyi= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total deposlls, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowmgs, 
lx3= fu:ed assets, lx4= other assets, /x5 =total deposlls, lnTA = szze, 
lnprovs = provzswns, group = dummy varzable dzstmguzshmg between banks that merged (value = 0) 
and those that dzd not (value= I), /group= mteractwn between tzme trend and group dummy 
varzable, own2 = dummy varzable dzstmguzshmg between publzc and pnvate sector banks, own3 = 
dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between publzc and forezgn sector banks, HHI = Herjindahl-
Hzrschman Index of concentratzon 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles, Random 
Effects (1984), Retail Banking Dataset 
variable PRODUCTION APPROACH 
lylt 
ly2t 
lxlt 
lx2t 
Jx3t 
lx4t 
lx5t 
Panel! 
-0 030*** 
0005 
0 013*** 
0 003 
-o oo2••• 
00008 
-0 003*** 
00004 
-0 0009 
0 0007 
0 0032*** 
0 001 
* Significant at 10% 
•• Significant at 5% 
••• significant at 1% 
Panel2 
-0 002 
0004 
0 003 
0 003 
-0 004*** 
00009 
-o oo2••• 
00004 
00002 
00009 
0 006*** 
0 001 
Panel3 
-0 0006 
0 004 
0 0008 
0003 
-0 002*** 
0 0009 
-0 001*** 
00004 
-0 0004 
0 0008 
0 004*** 
0 001 
INTERMEDIATION APPPROACH 
Panel! 
-0 001 
0002 
-0 002 
0 001 
0 001** 
00006 
0 0038*** 
0 001 
0 004*** 
0 001 
-0 007*** 
0002 
Panel2 
00005 
0002 
00007 
0001 
0 001 
00005 
-0 0002 
0 001 
0 007*** 
0 001 
-0 010*** 
0002 
Panel3 
-0 001 
0002 
00005 
0 001 
0 001 
0 0006 
0 002** 
0 001 
0 004*** 
0 001 
-0 0114*** 
0 002 
lyl~ total advances, ly2 ~total mvestments, ly3~ total deposits, !xi~ wages, 1x2~ total 
borrowmgs, lx3~ fixed assets, lx4~ other assets, lx5 ~total deposits, lnTA ~SIZe, 
lnprovs ~proviSions, group ~ dummy vanable d1stmgu1shmg between banks that merged (value 
~ 0) and those that d1d not (value~ 1), tgroup ~ mteractwn between lime trend and group dummy 
vanab/e, own2 ~ dummy vanable d1stmgu1Shmg between public and pnvate sector banks, own3 ~ 
dummy vanab/e d1Stmgu1shmg between public and foreign sector banks, HHI ~ Herfindahl-
H<rschman Index of concentratwn 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles, Random 
Effects (1984), Retail Banking Dataset 
variable PRODUCTION APPROACH 
lnTA 
lnprovs 
group 
tgroup 
own2 
own3 
rhlu 
_cons 
Panel! 
-1.080*** 
0 010 
-0 007*** 
0 002 
-0 011 
0020 
-0 0004 
0 001 
-0 016* 
0009 
0 033*** 
0 010 
-0 016 
01611 
11 830*** 
0 Ill 
• szgnificant at 10% 
•• szgnificant at 5% 
••• szgnificant at I% 
Panel2 
-1 105*** 
0 011 
00007 
0003 
0 013 
0 014 
0 001 
0 001 
-0 019* 
0 010 
0 029** 
0 012 
0 501*** 
0 195 
12 024*** 
0 116 
Panel3 
-1 102*** 
0 010 
-0 006** 
0 003 
0 004 
0 016 
0 001 
0 001 
-0 018* 
0 010 
0 0417*** 
0011 
0 383* 
0207 
11 944*** 
01083 
INTERMEDIATION APPPROACH 
Panel! 
-o 1oo••• 
0055 
-0 005 
0004 
-0 017 
0 031 
-0 0009 
0 003 
0 014 
0 015 
00006 
0 016 
-0 213 
0253 
7 698*** 
0 606 
Panel2 
-0 779*** 
0045 
-O ou••• 
0 004 
0 015 
0 017 
-0 0005 
0002 
0023 
0 011 
0 001 
0 015 
-0 455*** 
0 189 
8 573*** 
0484 
Panel3 
-0 706*** 
0 052 
-0 006 
0004 
0006 
0023 
-0 001 
0002 
0 018 
0 014 
0 00008 
0 016 
-0 763*** 
0 305 
7 677*** 
0 567 
lyi~ total advances, ly2 ~total znvestments, ly3~ total deposzts, !xi~ wages, 1x2~ total borrowzngs, 
lx3~ fixed assets, lx4~ other assets, lx5 ~total deposzts, lnTA ~ szze, 
lnprovs ~ provzszons, group ~ dummy varzable dzstznguzshzng between banks that merged (value ~ 0) 
and those that dzd not (value~ I), tgroup ~ znteractzon between tzme trend and group dummy 
varzable, own2 ~ dummy varzable dzstznguzshzng between publzc and przvate sector banks, own3 ~ 
dummy varzable dzstznguzshzng between publzc andforezgn sector banks, HHI ~ He1jindahi-
Hzrschman Index of concentratzon 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1992), Retail 
Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! 
lyl 
ly2 
lxl 
lx2 
lx3 
lx4 
lyll 
ly22 
lxll 
lx22 
lx33 
lx44 
• Significant at 10% 
++ szgnzficant at 5% 
•• • significant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel3 
INTERMEDIATION 
APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
ly 1 = total advances, ly2 = total mvestments, ly3= total deposlls, lx1 =wages, lx2= total 
borrowmgs, lx3= fued assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposlls, lnTA =SIZe, 
lnprovs = prov1swns, group = dummy vanable d1stmgU1shmg between banks that merged (value 
= 0) and those that d1d not (value= 1), tgroup = mteractwn between lime trend and group dummy 
vanable, own2 = dummy vanable d1stmgu1shmg between pubilc and pnvate sector banks, own3 = 
dummy vanable d1stmgu1shmg between publ!c and fore~gn sector banks, HHI = Herfindahl-
H~rschman Index of concentratwn 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1992), Retail 
Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I 
lylly2 
lxllx2 
lxllx3 
lxllx4 
lx2lx3 
lx2lx4 
lx3lx4 
lyllxl 
lyllx2 
lyllx3 
lyllx4 
ly2lxl 
* szgmficant at 10% 
** szgmficant at 5% 
*** slgmficant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 
lyJ~ total advances, ly2 =total mvestments, ly3~ total deposits, /xi= wages, lx2= total 
borrowmgs, /x3= fv:ed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total depos1ts, lnTA =SIZe, 
Panel3 
lnprovs = provzswns, group = dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between banks that merged (value 
~ 0) and those that d1d not (value= 1), tgroup = mteractlon between t1me trend and group dummy 
vanable, own2 = dummy vanable dzstznguzshmg between pub!Jc and pnvate sector banks, own3 = 
dummy vanable d1stmgu1shmg between public andfomgn sector banks, HHI ~ Herftndahl-
Hzrschman Index of concentratwn 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1992), Retail 
Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I 
ly2lx2 
ly2lx3 
I 2lx4 
tsq 
lylt 
ly2t 
lxlt 
lx2t 
lx3t 
lx4t 
* szgmjicant at 10% 
** szgm.ficant at 5% 
*** szgmjicant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 
lyl~ total advances, ly2 ~total znvestments, ly3~ total deposzts, lxJ~ wages, lx2= total 
borrowzngs, lx3~ fvced assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposzts, In TA ~ szze, 
Panel3 
lnprovs =provisions, group = dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between banks that merged (value 
= 0) and those that dzd not (value= 1). tgroup = mteractzon between tzme trend and group dummy 
vanable, own2 = dummy vanable dlStmguzshzng between publzc and pnvate sector banks, own3 = 
dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between publzc andforezgn sector banks, HHI = Herfindahl-
Hzrschman Index of concentratzon 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1992), Retail 
Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I 
lnTA 
In pro vs 
group 
tgroup 
own2 
own3 
rhh1 
ETA 
• significant at i 0% 
** szgmficant at 5% 
*** srgm.ficant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lyi= total advances. ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total deposits, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowmgs, lx3= 
fixed assets, lx4= other assets, /x5 =total depos1ts, lnTA = szze, 
lnprovs = prowswns, group = dummy vanable dlSttngmshmg between banks that merged (value = 0) and 
those that d1d not (value = i), tgroup = mteractwn between tlme rrend and group dummy vanable, own2 
= dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between publzc and pnvate sector banks, own3 = dummy vanable 
dtstmgwshmg between public and fore~gn sector banks, HHi = Heljindahl-Hmchman index of 
concentratzon 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1992), Retail 
Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lyl 
ly2 
lxl 
lx2 
lx3 
lx4 
lyll 
ly22 
lxll 
lx22 
lx33 
lx44 
* szgmficant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** szgmficant at 1% 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total deposits, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowmgs, lx3= 
fixed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits, lnTA = szze, 
lnprovs = prov1szons, group = dummy vanable d1stmgu1shmg between banks that merged (value = 0) and 
those that d1d not (value= !), tgroup = mteractwn between t1me trend and group dummy vanable, own2 
= dummy vanable dzstmguzshzng between public and pnvate sector banks. own3 = dummy vanable 
d1stmguzshmg between publzc andforezgn sector banks, HHJ = Herfindahl-Hzrschman Index of 
concentratzon 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1992), Retail 
Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! 
lylly2 
lxllx2 
lxllx3 
lxllx4 
lx2lx3 
lx2lx4 
lx3lx4 
lyllxl 
lyllx2 
lyllx3 
lyllx4 
ly2lxl 
* szgnificant at 10% 
** szgnificant at 5% 
*** szgmflcant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel3 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Pane12 Pane13 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total deposlls, bel= wages, lx2= total borrowmgs, /x3= 
fixed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposzts, lnTA = szze, 
lnprovs = provzszons, group = dummy vanable dzstmgwshzng between bank! that merged (value = 0) 
and those that dzd not (value= 1), tgroup = mteractzon between tzme trend and group dummy vanable, 
own2 = dummy vanable dzstzngwshzng between publzc and pnvate sector banks, own3 = dummy vanable 
dzstmguzshzng between public and forezgn sector bank!, HHJ = Herfindahl-Hzrschman Index of 
concentratwn 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1992), Retail 
Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! 
ly2lx2 
ly21x3 
ly2lx4 
tsq 
lylt 
ly2t 
lxlt 
lx2t 
lx3t 
lx4t 
* sigmficant at 10% 
** szgmficant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
Pane12 Panel3 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Pane12 Pane13 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments,/y3= total deposzts, lxl= wages,lx2= total borrowmgs, lx3= 
fzxed assets, ix4~ other assets, /x5 ~total deposzts, lnTA ~ szze, 
lnprovs ~ provzszons, group ~ dummy vanable dzstznguzshzng between banks that merged (value ~ 0) 
and those that dzd not (value~ 1), tgroup ~ znteractzon between tzme trend and group dummy vanable, 
own2 = dummy vanable d1stmgwshmg between publzc and pnvate sector banks, own3 = dummy vanab/e 
dzstmgwshmg between public and foreign sector banks, HHI = Herfindahl-Hzrschman Index of 
concentratzon 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1992), Retail 
Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I 
lnTA 
lnprovs 
group 
!group 
own2 
own3 
rhh1 
Constant 
ETA 
* szgnificant at 10% 
*"' szgmflcant at 5% 
*** szgmflcant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lyJ~ total advances, ly2 ~total mvestments, ly3~ total depos1ts, /xi~ wages, 1x2~ total borrowmgs, b:J~ 
fzxed assets, lx4~ other assets, lx5 ~ total depos1ts, lnTA ~ s1ze, 
lnprovs = prov1s1ons, group ~dummy vanable d1stmguzshmg between banks that merged (value~ 0) 
and those that d1d not (value~ 1), tgroup ~ znteractwn between t1me trend and group dummy vanab/e, 
own2 = dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between pubbc and pnvate sector banks, own3 = dummy vanable 
d1stmgu1shmg between publzc and jore1gn sector banks, HHJ ~ Herfindahl-Hzrschman Index of 
concentratzon 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates -Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), 
Retail Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I Panel2 Panel 3 
lyl 
ly2 
lxl 
lx2 
lx3 
lx4 
lyll 
ly22 
lxll 
lx22 
lx33 
lx44 
* szgmficant at 10% 
** szgmficant at 5% 
*** szgmficant at 1% 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lyl~ total advances, ly2 ~total mvestments, ly3~ total deposits, lxl~ wages, 1x2~ total borrowmgs, lx3~ 
fu:ed assets, lx4~ other assets, lx5 ~total deposzts, lnTA ~ szze, 
lnprovs ~ provzswns, group ~ dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between banks that merged (value ~ 0) 
and those that dzd not (value ~ 1), tgroup ~ znteractzon between tzme trend and group dummy vanable, 
own2 = dummy varzable dzstmguzshmg between publlc and przvate sector banks, own3 = dummy vanable 
dzstmguzshmg between publzc and forezgn sector banks, HHI ~ Herjindahl-Hzrschman Index of 
concentratzon 
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Table El :Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates -Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), 
Retail Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I 
lylly2 
lxllx2 
lxllx3 
lxllx4 
lx2lx3 
lx2lx4 
lx3lx4 
lyllxl 
lyllx2 
lyllx3 
lyllx4 
ly2lxl 
* szgmficant at 10% 
** szgnificant at 5% 
*** szgmjicant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel3 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lyJ~ total advances, ly2 ~total mvestments, /y3~ total deposzts, !xi~ wages, /x2~ total borrowmgs, !x3~ 
fixed assets, lx4~ other assets, lx5 ~total deposzts, In TA ~ szze, 
lnprovs ~ provzswns, group ~ dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between banks that merged (value ~ 0) 
and those that dzd not (value= 1), tgroup = mteractzon between tzme trend and group dummy vanab/e, 
own2 = dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between publzc and pnvate sector banks, own3 = dummy vanable 
dzstmguzshzng between publzc andforezgn sector banks, HHI ~ Herfindahl-Hzrschman Index of 
concentratiOn 
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Table El :Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates -Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), 
Retail Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I 
ly2lx2 
ly2lx3 
ly2lx4 
tsq 
lylt 
ly2t 
lxlt 
lx2t 
lx3t 
lx4t 
* szgmjicant at 10% 
*"' szgm.ficant at 5% 
*** szgmficant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel3 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total deposzts, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowmgs, 
lx3= fzxed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposzts, lnTA = szze, 
lnprovs = provzszons, group = dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between banks that merged (value = 0) 
and those that dzd not (value = 1), tgroup = mteractzon between tzme trend and group dummy vanable, 
own2 = dummy vanable dzstznguzshzng between publzc and pnvate sector banks, own3 = dummy 
vanable dzstznguzshzng between publzc andforezgn sector banks, HHI = Herfindahl-Hzrschman Index of 
concentratzon 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates -Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), 
Retail Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! 
lnTA 
lnprovs 
group 
!group 
own2 
own3 
rhh1 
Constant 
ETA 
* srgmficant at 10% 
** srgm.ficant at 5% 
*** szgnzflcant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel3 
INTERMEDIATION 
APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
lyl~ total advances, ly2 ~ totalmvestments, lyJ~ total deposzts, lxl~ wages, 1x2~ total 
borrowmgs, lxJ~ fu:ed assets, ix4~ other assets, /x5 ~total deposzts, lnTA ~ szze, 
lnprovs = provzszons, group = dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between banks that merged (value 
~ 0) and those that dzd not (value~ 1), tgroup ~ znteractwn between tzme trend and group 
dummy vanable, own2 = dummy vanable dzstmguzshzng between publlc and pnvate sector banks, 
own3 ~dummy vanable dzstmguzshzng between publzc andforezgn sector banks, HHI ~ 
Herfindahl-Hzrschman Index of concentratzon 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1995), Retail 
Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
JVanable Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel 3 
LYI 0 761*** -0 0975* 0 121 0474*** I 614*** -0 892 
0 284 0059 0922 0027 0 035 0 781 
LY2 0144 0 7079*** -0 095 
0 !59 0 077 0 502 
LXI -0 452*** -0 460*** -1 708 -0 086*** 0 039 0499 
0 037 0 031 6 527 0024 0 032 141J 
LX2 -0 002 -0 039*** -0482 -0 040*** -0 121*** 0059 
0 029 0013 0434 0004 0 007 0333 
LX3 -0 282*** -0 033 0 634 -0 008 -0 005 I 273 
0 035 0 024 I 297 0 008 0 016 0 835 
LX4 -0 086 -0 409*** I 265 -0 183··· -0 205*** 0029 
0 056 0 035 6 220 0 024 0 031 I 208 
lx5 -0 666*** -0 542**• -0 845** 
0 030 0032 0403 
LYII 0 255 0.041 0461 0 020*** 0 113*** 0 0009 
0 473 0.027 0 574 0 006 0 008 0 378 
LY22 0 049 0 049** 0 063 
0 211 0 022 0 417 
• s1gnzjicant at 10% 
•• szgmficant at 5% 
*** szgmficant at 1% 
lyi= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total deposits, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowmgs, 
/x3= j'ued assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total depos1ts, lnTA = s1ze, 
/nprovs = provzswns, group = dummy vanable dzstmguzshzng between hanks that merged (value = 
0) and those that d1d not (value = I), tgroup = mteractwn between t1me trend and group dummy 
vanable, own2 = dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between pub!Jc and pnvate sector banks, own3 = 
dummy vanable d1stmguzshmg between public andforezgn sector banks, HHI = Herfindahl-
Hzrschman Index of concentratzon 
357 
AppendzxEJ 
Table El :Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1995), Retail 
Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION 
APPROACH 
IVanable Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel 3 
LXJJ -o o5o••• 0 013*** -0 081 0 003 -0 001 -0 285 
0 014 0004 0 815 0002 0 003 0 684 
LX22 0 006 0 003 -0 317 -0 006*** -0 010*** -0 080 
0004 0 003 0 361 0 001 0 001 0.398 
LX33 0020 -0 0001 -0 178 0 022*** 0 022** -0 189 
0 021 0 0120 0764 0004 0 009 0 941 
LX44 0 070* 0 030** -0 474 0 027** -0 022 -0 525 
0 037 0 014 0429 0011 0 020 0440 
lx55 0007 -0 049*** 0 156 
0007 0 009 0 221 
LYILY2 -0 241 0 184*** -0 377*** 
0 451 0 062 0 014 
LXILX2 0 026** -0 004 0 790 0 017*** 0 025*** -0 010 
0 012 0 006 0 673 0 003 0 004 0220 
LXILX3 0 014 -0 024*** -I 099 0 006 -0 004 -I 367 
0 031 0 009 I 249 0 005 0 008 11302 
LXILX4 -0 008 -0 024** 0 469 -0 024*** -0 004 0 818 
0 037 0 011 I 014 0 007 0 009 I 095 
LXILX5 0 005 -0 009 0 863 
0 006 0 010 0 605 
• s1gmjicant at 10% 
•• szgmficant at 5% 
*** szgmficant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total deposzts, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowzngs, lx3= 
fu:ed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits, In TA =SIZe, 
lnprovs =prOviSions, group =dummy vanable d1stmgU1shmg between banks that merged (value = 0) 
and those that d1d not (value = I), tgroup = mteractwn between time trend and group dummy vanable, 
own2 = dummy vanable dzstznguzshmg between pubilc and przvate sector banks, own3 = dummy vanable 
dzstmgwshmg between publlc andforezgn sector banks, HHI = Herfindahi-Hzrschman Index of 
concentratzon 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1995), Retail 
Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION 
APPROACH 
IVanable Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
LX2LX3 -0 010 0 007 0017 -0 026*** -0 021*** -0 085 
0 016 0 009 0242 0 005 0 007 0 880 
LX2LX4 -0 034 -0 019* 0455 -0 008 -0 008 0479 
0 023 0011 0438 0006 0 008 0 880 
LX2LX5 0 038*** 0 0339*** -0 174*** 
0 005 0 010 0 014 
LX3LX4 -0 0527* 0 010 0 378 -0 008 -0 005 0 036 
0027 0023 0905 0 011 0 019 I 054 
LX3LX5 -0 009 -0 015 0 121 
0 009 0 016 0 108 
LX4LX5 -0 038** 0 075*** 0 069 
0 015 0 028 0 368 
LYILXI -0 385** -0 299*** 0 382 -0 0004 0 027** -0 285 
0 174 0 050 I 562 0 009 0 012 I 626 
LYILX2 -0 032 0 040* -0 167*** 0 022*** 0 105*** -0 212*** 
0 105 0 021 0 014 0 004 0 008 0 021 
LYILX3 -0 235 -0 097* 0026 -0 007 0 003 0 253 
0 148 0 051 0 623 0 006 0 013 0 253 
LYILX4 0 632*** 0 205*** -2 030* -0 022** -0 206*** I 413 
0 153 0 057 I 232 0011 0 024 0 917 
LYILX5 0 029*** 0 156*** -0 452*** 
0 009 0 016 0 012 
LY2LXI 0099 0 0523* -0 247 
0 095 0 027 I 396 
LY2LX2 0 039 0 0005 -0 2939*** 
0043 0 018 0 015 
• s1gnzjicant at 10% 
** szgnzficant at 5% 
*** szgnzflcant at 1% 
lyJ~ total advances, ly2 ~total znvestments, ly3~ total depos1ts, !xi~ wages, 1x2~ total borrowzngs, !x3~ 
fzxed assets, lx4~ other assets, lx5 ~ total depos1ts, lnTA ~ s1ze, 
lnprovs ~ prov1szons, group ~ dummy vanable d1stzngu1shzng between banks that merged (value ~ 0) and 
those that dzd not (value = 1), tgroup = znteractwn between tzme trend and group dummy vanable, own2 = 
dummy vanable dJStzngwshmg between pub he and pnvate sector banks, own3 = dummy vanable 
d1stzngu1shmg between publzc and [ore1gn sector banks, HHI ~ He1jindahl-H1rschman Index of 
concentratlon 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1995), Retail 
Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION 
APPROACH 
IVanable Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
LY2LX3 0066 0 123*** 0244 
0 086 0 033 0 886 
LY2LX4 -0 267** ·0 165*** 1.175 
0133 0 037 0 997 
LY2LX5 
LX2LX3 -0 010 0 007 0 017 ·0 026*** -0 021*** ·0 085 
0 016 0009 0242 0 005 0 007 0 880 
LX2LX4 ·0 034 ·0 019* 0 455 ·0 008 ·0 008 0479 
0 023 0011 0 438 0006 0 008 0 880 
LX2LX5 0 038*** 0 0339*** -0 174*** 
0005 0 010 0 014 
LX3LX4 -0 0527* 0 010 0 378 -0 008 -0 005 0 036 
0 027 0 023 0905 0011 0 019 I 054 
LX3LX5 ·0 009 -0 015 0 121 
0009 0 016 0 108 
LX4LX5 ·0 038** 0 075*** 0 069 
0 015 0 028 0 368 
LYILXI -0 385** -0 299*** 0 382 -0 0004 0 027** .Q 285 
0 174 0 050 I 562 0 009 0 012 I 626 
LYILX2 -0 032 0 040* -0 167*** 0 022*** 0 105*** ·0 212*** 
0 105 0 021 0 014 0004 0 008 0 021 
LYILX3 -0 235 ·0 097* 0 026 -0 007 0 003 0 253 
0 148 0 051 0 623 0 006 0013 0 253 
LYILX4 0 632*** 0 205*** ·2 030* -0 022** ·0 206*** I 413 
0 153 0 057 I 232 0 011 0 024 0 917 
LYILX5 0 029*** 0 156*** -0 452*** 
0009 0 016 0 012 
• s1gmjicant at I 0% 
** szgmjicant at 5% 
*** szgnzficant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments,ly3= total depOSits, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowmgs,/x3= 
fu:ed assets, /x4= other assets, lx5 =total depos1ts, lnTA =siZe, 
lnprovs =proVISIOns, group = dummy vanable dlStmgUlshmg between banks that merged (value = 0) and 
those that d1d not (value = 1), tgroup = mteractzon between hme trend and group dummy vanab/e, own2 = 
dummy vanab/e dzstmguzshmg between publzc and pnvate sector banks, own3 = dummy vanable 
dlSimgUlshmg between public and fore.gn sector banks, HHI = Herfindahl-H.rschman Index of 
concentratzon 
360 
AppendzxEJ 
Table El :Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1995), Retail 
Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
IVanable Panel! Pane12 Pane13 Panel! Panel2 Pane13 
LY2LXI 0 099 0 0523* -0 247 
0 095 0027 1.396 
LY2LX2 0 039 0 0005 -0 2939*** 
0 043 0 018 0 015 
LY2LX3 0 066 0 123*** 0244 
0 086 0 033 0 886 
LY2LX4 -0 267** I 175 
0 165*** 
0 133 0 037 0 997 
LY2LX5 
T -1 258 -0 078*** -I 485 
0 077*** 0 100*** 0 116*** 
0 013 0 016 8 600 0 010 0011 6 443 
TSQ 0 097 -0 002*** 0 017 
0 003*** 0 003*** 0 002*** 
0 001 0 001 0 576 0 0007 0 0008 0423 
LYIT 0 094*** 0 061*** I 463 0 003 0 117*** 0 !50 
0 037 0 014 0 919 0 003 0004 0 896 
LY2T -0 029 -0 001 -0 499 
0020 0 009 0 855 
LX IT -0 344 -0 012*** -0 002 -0 227 
0 015*** 0 029*** 
0 005 0 003 0711 0002 0 003 0 388 
LX2T 0 006 0 010*** -0 018 o oo••• -0 002** 0 0178 
0004 0 002 0 3389 00009 0 001 0 291 
LX3T 0 016*** -0 013 00009 0002 -0 040 
0 012*** 
0004 0 003 0 526 0 001 0002 0 532 
LX4T 0 019*** 0 0004 0 463 -0 013*** 0 316 
0 015*** 
0007 0 004 0 815 0003 0004 0 644 
• szgmjicant at 10% 
•• szgnzficant at 5% 
*** szgmficant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowmgs, /x3= 
fixed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposzts, lnTA = szze, 
lnprovs = provzszons, group = dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between banks that merged (value = 0) and 
those that dzd not (value = 1), tgroup = mteractzon between tzme trend and group dummy vanable, own2 = 
dummy vanable dzstznguzshzng between publzc and pnvate sector banks, own3 =dummy vanable 
dzstmguzshmg between publzc and forezgn sector banks, HHJ = Heifindahl-Hzrschman Index of 
concentratzon 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1995), Retail 
Banking Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
IVanable Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
Lx5t 0 0244*** 0 036*** 0 1039 
0003 0 004 0421 
GROUP! 0 016 0 299 5 541 2 972 3 274 I 3163 
4 456 0 508 53 739 3 442 2 309 37 585 
GROUPT -0 030 0 135* I 156 0 323 0 214*** I 350 
12 700 0 082 62 834 0 476 0074 29 010 
LNTA -0 335 -2 192 -3 752 0 252 -6 548*** -17 277 
0 343 2.925 128 991 3 035 210 126 051 
LNPROVS -0 0005 0.0008 -0 014 0 0003 -0 0007** -0 020 
0 161 0 000 0 029 0 0003 0 0002 0 022 
RHHI -0 001 0 002 -0 054 -0 0043 -0 002 -0 009 
30 326 0.003 0449 0 007 0 003 0 174 
OWN2 11086 -0 358 -I 449 -0 306 0 123 0 998 
3 075 0 299 12 199 0 325 0458 22 848 
OWN3 Ill! 2 5415** I 068 0 461** 2 9899*** 14 396 
2 976 I 064 18 084 0 209 0 543 19 272 
Constant -0 584 -I 065*** -28 913 -0 480*** -0 856*** -23 762 
0045 0 065 64 578 0 041 0 0438 
• s1gmjicant at 10% 
** szgnzjicant at 5% 
*** szgmficant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total znvestments, ly3= total depos1ts, lx1= wages,lx2= total borrowzngs, lx3= 
fixed assets, lx4= other assets, /x5 =total depos1ts, lnTA = s1ze, 
lnprovs = prov1swns, group = dummy vanable d1stmgu1shmg between banks that merged (value = 0) and 
those that d1d not (value= 1), tgroup = mteractwn between t1me trend and group dummy vanable, own2 = 
dummy vanable dtstmgwshmg between pub/le and pnvate sector banks, own3 =dummy vanable 
d1stmgu1shzng between publzc andjore1gn sector banks, HHI = Hetfindahl-Hzrschman Index of 
concentratzon 
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Table El: Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA FE (2002), Retail Banking 
Dataset 
IVanable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
LYI -I 454*** -0 234 -0 237 0 554*** 0 562*** 
0472 -0 234 0 234 0 047 0 052 
LY2 0 855*** 0 6658*** 0.531*** 
0274 0 66 0 158 
LXI -0 657*** -0 666*** -0 506*** -0 139*** -0 089*** 
0 104 -0 667 0 063 0 021 0020 
LX2 0 051 -0 044* -0 004 -0 043*** -0 039*** 
0032 -0 044 0020 0 005 0 005 
LX3 -0 086 -0 125 -0 125** o 055••• -0 018 
0 083 -0 125 0050 0 017 0 015 
LX4 -0 502*** -0 079 -0 316*** -0 046** 0 004 
0 097 -0 079 0060 0 018 0 016 
LX5 -0 842*** -0 884*** 
0 075 0 080 
LY11 I 273*** 0 395*** 0 260*** 0 112*** 0 156*** 
0404 0 395 0 091 0 019 0 020 
LY22 0 028 0 265** 0 179** 
0 196 0 265 0 086 
LX11 0028 0 016 -0 046*** 0 010 -0 049*** 
0028 0 016 0 017 0 006 0 007 
LX22 0 034*** 0 0109* 0 012*** -0 004*** -0 006*** 
0006 0 010 0 0037 0 001 0 001 
LX33 0003 0 11056*** 0 0426*** -0 001 -0 003 
0025 0 1l0 0 013 0 006 0 006 
LX44 0 129*** 0 060 o 1oo••• 0 007 0 009 
0041 0 060 0 025 0 010 0 007 
LX55 -0 038** -0 140*** 
0 019 0 014 
• srgmficant at 10% 
•• srgmficant at 5% 
*** szgmficant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total deposrts, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowmgs, 
b:3~ fued assets, b:4~ other assets, lx5 ~total deposrts, lnTA ~ szze, 
GJTJ =merger group dummy mteracedw1th time trend 
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Table El :Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA FE (2002), Retail Banking 
Dataset 
JVanable PRODUCTION APPROAHC 
Panel! 
LYILY2 -0 777 
0 486 
LXILX2 0 030 
0 019 
LX1LX3 0 061* 
0 037 
LX1LX4 -0 118** 
0 050 
LX1LX5 
LX2LX3 -0 024 
0 0194 
LX2LX4 -0 088*** 
0 029 
LX2LX5 
LX3LX4 -0 018 
0 049 
LX3LX5 
LX4LX5 
LY1LX1 -1112*** 
0206 
LY1LX2 0448*** 
0 115 
LY1LX3 -1 019*** 
0 191 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel3 
-0 630*** -0 383*** 
-0 630 0132 
0 063*** 0036*** 
0 063 0 012 
-0 131*** 0 015 
-0 131 0020 
0 018 -0 015 
0 018 0029 
-0 011 0 007 
-0 011 0 011 
-0 056** 
0 0643*** 
-0 056 0 018 
-0 061 
0 0731*** 
-0 061 0 028 
-0 03 -0 296*** 
-0 030 0092 
0 059 0 065 
0 059 0 051 
-0 462*** -0 254*** 
-0462 0070 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
-0 0184*** 0 017*** 
0 005 0 005 
0 003 -0 018** 
0 007 0 007 
-0 083*** -0 079*** 
0 011 0 008 
0 066*** 0 177*** 
0 015 0 014 
-0 015*** -0 021*** 
0 004 0004 
0 013** 0 013*** 
0 005 0 004 
0 027*** 0 009 
0 008 0 006 
0 006 -0 008 
0 011 0 011 
0 0062 0 073*** 
0 016 0 016 
0 032 0 035*** 
0 024 0 013 
-0 004 -0 009 
0 015 0 012 
0 032*** 0 020*** 
0 007 0006 
-0 036*** -0 051*** 
0 014 0 014 
lyl= total advances, lyl =total investments, ly3= total deposits, /xi= wages, lxl= total borrowmgs, 
lx3= fiXed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 = total deposits, In TA = size, 
GJTJ =merger group dummy mteraced with time trend, 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA FE (2002), Retail Banking 
Dat 
!Variable PRODUCTION APPROAHC INTERMEDIATION APPROACH as et 
Panel I Pane12 Panel3 Pane! I Panel2 Panel 
3 
LY1LX4 0 5585** 0 217** 0 2437*** -0 0272 -0.033* 
0274 0 217 0 077 0 021 0 020 
LY1LX5 0 043* 0 0709*** 
0 022 0 0170 
LY2LX1 0 3663*** -0 032 0 132** 
0115 -0 03 0 06 
LY2LX2 -0 151*** -0 005 -0 023 
0 052 -0 005 0 029 
LY2LX3 0 167* 0 151* 0 041 
0 103 0 1514 0 050 
LY2LX4 0005 -0 159 -0 142* 
0166 -0 15 0 085 
LY2LX4 
T -0 2031*** -0 1131*** -0 141*** -0 024*** -0 019*** 
0 017 -0 113 0 010 0 003 0002 
TSQ -0 008*** -0 0034*** -0 006*** -0 0008*** -0 0003 
0 001 -0 003 0 0009 00003 0 0002 
LYIT 0 010 0 07* 0 007 0 013*** 0 009** 
0062 0 076 0 0293 0 003 0 003 
LY2T 0011* -0 00545 0 0100 
0037 -0 005 0020 
LX IT -0 0494*** -0 029*** -0 016*** -0 0202*** -0 005** 
0009 -0 02 0 006 0002 0 002 
LX2T 0 015*** 0 0155*** 0 010*** 0 001 0 003*** 
0005 0 015 0 003 0 000 00008 
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* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowings, 
lx3= fiXed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits, In TA= size, 
GITJ =merger group dummy interaced with time trend, 
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Table El :Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA FE (2002), Retail Banking 
Dataset 
!Variable PRODUCTION APPROAHC INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
LX3T -0 014 -0 006 -0 0007 0 005** -0 002 
0 009 -0 006 0 005 0 001 0 001 
LX4T 0 015 0 0199* 0 001 -.3021 0003 
0 012 0 019 0 007 0 002 0002 
LX5T 0 01*** -0 0008 
0 003 0 003 
GIT2 0 007 0 226 0 2403** 0 086** 0 033 
0 193 0 226 0108 0 039 0 041 
GIT3 -0 769** 0042 0042 -0040 -0 021 
0 335 0042 0107 0 059 0 026 
GIT4 -0 578** 0 175 0 190* -0 066 -0 027 
0 269 0 175 0109 0 056 0 028 
GIT5 -0 396* -0 19 0110 -0 093* -0 077** 
0 246 -0 194 0115 0 050 0 033 
GIT6 -0 173 -0 094 -0 026 -0 028 -0 069** 
0 244 -0 094 0 119665 0 048 0034 
GIT7 -0 243 -0 369** -0 280** -0 010 0 010 
0 251 -0 369 0 138 0 048 0 026 
GIT8 -0 314 -0 235 -0 245* 0 008 0026 
0257 -0 235 0140 0 048 0 027 
GIT9 -0 217 -0 054 0 004 0 022 0 058** 
0258 -0 054 0 126 0 048 0 028 
GITIO -0 207 -0 043 0 151 -0 0699 -0 013 
0 301 -0 043 0 131 0 061 0 036 
GITII -0 322 -0 373* -0 179 -0 076 -0 0002 
0 293 -0 373 0 175 0 0560 0 035 
GITI2 -0 374 -0 595** -0 278 -0 109* -0026 
0 291 -0 595 0 213 0 056 0 0391 
GITI3 -0 509* -0 6491** -0 360* -0 125** -0 026 
0 297 -0 649 0 214 0 058 0 040 
GITI4 -0 120 -0 469* -0 185 0 027 0 101** 
0 309 -0469 0 207 0 062 0 046 
• significant at 10% 
•• significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx1= total borrowings, 
lx3= fiXed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits, In TA =size, 
GJTI =merger group dummy mteraced with tJme trend, 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA RE (2002), Retail Banking 
Dataset 
JVanable PRODUCTION APPROACH 
Panel! 
LYI 
LY2 
LXI 
LX2 
LX3 
LX4 
LXS 
LYll 
LY22 
LXll 
LX22 
LX33 
LX44 
LX55 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
Panel 2 Panel 3 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel 2 Panel3 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowmgs, 
lx3= fu:ed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits, In TA = s1ze, 
GITI =merger group dummy interaced with lime trend, 
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Table El : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA RE (2002), Retail Banking 
Dataset 
!Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH 
Panel I 
LYILY2 
LXILX2 
LXILX3 
LXILX4 
LXILX5 
LX2LX3 
LX2LX4 
LX2LX5 
LX3LX4 
LX3LX5 
LYILXI 
LYILX2 
* SJgnificant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
Pane12 Panel3 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total 
borrowings, lx3= fixed assets, lx4= other assets, Ix5 =total deposits, In TA= size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value 
= 0) and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between tzme trend and group 
dummy variable, own2 =dummy variable distinguishing between public and private sector 
banks, own3 =dummy variable distinguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHI = 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of concentration. 
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Table El :Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA RE (2002), Retail Banking 
Dataset 
!Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! 
LYILX3 
LYILX4 
LYILX5 
LY2LXI 
LY2LX2 
LY2LX3 
LY2LX4 
LY2LX5 
T 
TSQ 
LYIT 
LY2T 
* s1gnijicant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total 
borrowings, Ix3= fiXed assets, lx4= other assets, Ix5 =total deposits, In TA= size, 
Panel3 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value 
= 0) and those that dzd not (value= 1}, tgroup =interaction between time trend and group 
dummy vanable, own2 =dummy variable distmguishzng between public and private sector 
banks, own3 =dummy variable distinguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHJ = 
Herfindahi-Hirschman Index of concentration. 
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Table El :Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA RE (2002), Retail Banking 
Dataset 
!Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH 
Panel I 
LX IT 
LX2T 
LX3T 
LX4T 
LXST 
Group 
Group! 
Own2 
Own3 
lnTA 
lnprovs 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel3 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, Iy3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowings, 
lx3~ fu:ed assets, lx4~ other assets, lx5 ~ total deposits, In TA ~ size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value = 
0) and those that did not (value~ 1), tgroup ~interaction between time trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 =dummy variable distingu1shmg between public and przvate sector banks, own3 = 
dummy variable distinguishing between public and foreign sector hanks, HHI = Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates -Pitt and Lee, Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION 
APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lyl -0 0773 -0 129 -0 170** 0 586*** 0 578*** 
(0.119) (0 119) (0 0761) (0 0255) (0 0243) 
ly2 0 653*** 0 690*** 0 686*** 
(0 0732) (0 0724) (0 0576) 
!xi -0 495*** -0 540*** -0341*** -0 197*** -0 197*** 
(0 0385) (0 0363) (0 0300) (0 0207) (0 0198) 
lx2 -0 124*** -0 137*** -0 0755*** -0 0762*** 
0 0986*** 
(0 0208) (00195) (0 0174) (0 00776) (0 00711) 
lx3 -0 210*** -0 244*** -0 234*** -0 126*** -0 123*** 
(0 0385) (0 0387) (0 0311) (00171) (0 0162) 
lx4 -0 146*** -0 171*** -0 318*** -0 0733*** -0 0789*** 
(00417) (0 0438) (0 0359) (0 0187) (0 0184) 
lx5 -0 533*** -0 539*** 
(00196) (0 0191) 
lyll 0 0477 0 0606* 0 112*** 0 0230*** 0 0239*** 
(0 0327) (0 0342) (0 0209) (0 00502) (0 00491) 
ly22 0 0927*** 0 0951*** 0 145*** 0 0111*** 
(0 0234) (0 0238) (0 0139) (0 00292) 
lx11 0 0223*** 0 0293*** 0 0138** 0 0127*** -0 01 06*** 
(0 00711) (0 00693) (0 00542) (0 00306) (0 00127) 
lx22 -00101*** 0 00410 
0 0159*** 0 0135*** 0 0192*** 
(0 00408) (0 00350) (0 00320) (0 00151) (0 00644) 
lx33 0 0267** 0 0205 0 000530 0 0271*** 
0 0242*** 
(0 0136) (0 0128) (0 00778) (0 00709) (0 00880) 
lx44 0 0523*** 0 0538*** -0 00434 0 0199** 0 0558*** 
(0 0155) (0 0141) (0 00952) (0 0100) (0 00463) 
lx55 0 0550*** 
(0 00489) 
• szgmficant at 10% 
** szgnzficant at 5% 
*** szgmficant at 1% 
lyl~ total advances, ly2 ~total znvestments, ly3~ total deposzts, /xi~ wages. 1x2~ total borrowzngs, 
lx3~ fzxed assets, lx4~ other assets, lx5 ~total deposzts, lnTA ~ szze, 
lnprovs ~ provzszons, group ~ dummy van able dzstznguzshzng between banks that merged (value ~ 0) 
and those that dzd not (value= 1), tgroup = mteractzon between tzme trend and group dummy vanable, 
own2 = dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between public and pnvate sector banks, own3 = dummy 
vanable dzstznguzshzng between publzc andforezgn sector banks, HHJ ~ Herfindahl-Hzrschman Index of 
concentration 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates -Pitt and Lee, Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Pane12 Panel3 
lylly2 -0 00206 -0 00137 -0 172*** 
(0 0755) (0 0777) (0 0361) 
lxllx2 -0 00108 0 00499 0 0142*** 0 00482 0 00247 
(0 00669) (0 00658) (0 00546) (0 00296) (0 00278) 
lxllx3 -0 0273*** -00311*** -0 0287*** -0 0134*** -0 0126*** 
(0 00915) (0 00915) (0 00821) -0 00463 (0 00447) 
lxllx4 -0 0137 -0 0165 -0 0162* -0 00203 -0 00180 
(0 0105) (0 0105) (0 00891) (0 00587) (0 00567) 
lxllx5 0 00517 0 00753 
(0 00625) (0 00605) 
lx2lx3 0 0459*** 0 0337*** 0 0319*** 0 00101 -0 000263 
(00111) (0 0104) (0 00857) (0 00531) (0 00468) 
lx2lx4 -0 00791 -0 00871 0 00227 -0 0120* -0 0117** 
(0 0127) (0 0116) (0 0101) (0 00629) (0 00549) 
lx2lx5 0 0322*** 0 0335*** 
(0 00600) (0 00557) 
lx3lx4 -0 0738*** -0 0607** 0 0332** 0 0423*** 0 0341*** 
(0 0264) (0 0245) (0 0141) (0 0127) (0 0114) 
lx3lx5 -0 0467*** -0 0453*** 
(0 00888) (0 00837) 
lx4lx5 -0 0778*** -0 0836*** 
(0 0142) (0 0129) 
lyllxl -0 169*** -0 220*** -0 131*** 0 0533*** 0 0535*** 
(0 0472) (0 0485) (0 0296) (0 00790) (0 00756) 
lyllx2 -0 0340 -0 0117 0 0860*** 
(0 0378) (0 0375) (0 0232) 
lyllx3 -0231*** -0 245*** -0 00504 -0 0444*** -0 0498*** 
(0 0696) (0 0690) (0 0358) (0 00905) (0 00884) 
lyllx4 0 289*** 0 295*** -0 0935** -0 0130 -0 00488 
(0 0694) (0 0662) (0 0382) (0 0119) (00111) 
1yllx5 0 0531*** 0 0502*** 
(0 00892) (0 00851) 
• s1gnijicant at 10% 
** s1gnijicant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
ly1~ total advances, ly2 ~total investments, ly3~ total deposits, 1x1~ wages, 1x2~ total borrowings, 
lx3~ fu:ed assets, lx4~ other assets, lx5 ~ total deposits, In TA ~ size, 
lnprovs ~prOVISions, group ~dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value~ 0) 
and those that d1d not (value~ 1), tgroup ~interaction between lime trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 =dummy variable distingutshing between public and private sector banks, own3 = 
dummy var~able distinguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HH1 ~ Herjindahl-
Hirschman Index of concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates -Pitt and Lee, Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
ly2lxl 0 0562** 0 0640** 0 102*** 
(0 0254) (0 0257) (00183) 
ly2lx2 -0 00798 -0 00853 -0 0414*** 
(0 0221) (00211) (0 0139) 
ly2lx3 0 0989*** 0 104*** 0 0350 
(0 0349) (0 0348) (0 0214) 
ly2lx4 -0 131*** ·0 124*** ·0 00573 
(0 0386) (0.0360) (0 0256) 
ly2lx5 
·0 0920*** -0 138*** -0 0689*** ·0 0680*** 
0 0647*** 
(0 0168) (0 0159) (0 0168) (0 00782) (0 00691) 
tsq 
0 00300** 0 00423*** 0 00861*** 0 00308*** 0 00344*** 
(0 00147) (0 00149) (0 00157) (0 000682) (0 000660) 
lylt 0 0568*** 0 0488*** 0 0680*** 0 00620** 0 00618** 
(0 0188) (0 0181) (0 0126) (0 00312) (0 00300) 
ly2t ·0 0112 -0 00515 -0 0317*** 
(0 00980) (0 00969) (0 00819) 
lxlt -0 0440*** -0 0246*** -0 0194*** -0.0197*** 
0 0449*** 
(0 00396) (0 00395) (0 00327) (0 00233) (0 00226) 
lx2t 0 00478* 0 00680*** 0 00820*** -0 000985 ·0 00108 
(0 00276) (0 00260) (0 00248) (0 00106) (0 00100) 
lx3t 0 000132 -0 00153 0 00381 
0 00554*** 0 00595*** 
(0 00425) (0 00435) (0 00359) (0 00192) (0 00186) 
lx4t 0 0294*** 0 0277*** 0 00499 -0 00163 -0 00200 
(0 00500) (0 00522) (0 00452) (0 00233) (0 00226) 
lx5t 0 0274*** 0 0283*** 
(0 00284) (0 00276) 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowings, 
/x3= fiXed assets, /x4= other assets, /x5 = total deposits, In TA = size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 
0) and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy 
vanable, own2 =dummy variable distinguishing between public and private sector hanks, own3 = 
dummy variable thstinguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHI = Herflndahl-
Hirschman Index of concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates -Pitt and Lee, Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel 3 
lnTA -1 242*** -1 293*** -1 422*** -0 276** -0 261** 
(0 294) (0 295) (0 318) (0 135) (0 J31) 
lnprovs -0 0120 0 00706 -0 00669 -0 00647* -0 00293 
(0 00803) (0 00584) (0 00592) (0 00369) (0 00257) 
group 00970 -0 00192 00497 0 Ill 0 00594 
(0 144) (0 1000) (0 11 0) (0 0692) (0 0409) 
!group -0 0194* 0 00181 0 0115 0 00495 0 00198 
(0 0102) (0 00835) (0 0104) (0 00477) -0 00367 
own2 0 0188 -0 0495 -0 0292 0 0171 -0 0190 
(0 0473) (0 0412) (0 0680) (0 0216) (0 0169) 
own3 0 359*** 0.341 *** 0 299*** -0 0271 00264 
(0 0854) (0 110) (0 0930) (0 0403) (0 0454) 
rhh1 0 00122** 0 00146*** 0 00202*** 0 000513** 0 000628*** 
(0 000542) (0 000546) (0 000578) (0 000245) (0 000238) 
Constant 5.772*** 6 157*** 6 410*** 0 816 0 692 
(I 733) (I 695) (I 835) (0 773) (0 754) 
* szgmflcant at I 0% 
** szgmficant at 5% 
*** szgnzjicant at 1% 
lyi= total advances. ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total deposzts, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowmgs, 
lx3= fzxed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposzts, lnTA = szze, 
lnprovs = provzszons, group = dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between banks that merged (value = 0) 
and those that dzd not (value = 1). !group = mteractzon between tzme trend and group dummy vanab/e, 
own2 =dummy varzable dzstmgwshmg between publzc and pnvate sector banks, own3 = dummy 
vanable dzstmguzshmg between public andforezgn sector banks, HHI = Herfindahl-Hzrschman Index 
of concentratiOn 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles Fixed Effects 
(1982), Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lyl -0 133 -0 116 -0 328*** 0 562*** 0.549*** 0 521*** 
(0.121) (0 122) (0 0866) (0 0287) (0 0273) (0 0280) 
ly2 0 563*** 0 601*** 0 719*** 
(0 0772) (0 0757) (0 0605) 
lxl -0 372*** -0 572*** -0 287*** -0 216*** -0.214*** 
0 0810*** 
(0 0653) (0 0592) (0 0453) (0 0330) (0 0304) (0 0252) 
lx2 -0111*** -0 104*** -0 !56*** -0 0678*** -0 0687*** -0 104*** 
(0 0217) (0 0207) (0 0186) (0 00821) (0 00775) (0 00883) 
lx3 -0 198*** -0 209*** -0 234*** -0 !53*** -0 142*** -0 180*** 
(0 0424) (0 0423) (0 0347) (0 0184) (0 0176) (0 0188) 
lx4 -0 164*** -0 181*** -0 315*** -0 0691*** -0 0646*** -0 134*** 
(0 0454) (0 0460) (0 0381) (0 0204) (0 0198) (00211) 
lx5 -0 521*** -0 533*** -0 502*** 
(0 0210) (0 0206) (0 0205) 
lyll 0 0633* 0 0542 0 134*** 0 0306*** 0 0297*** 0 0291*** 
(0 0342) (0 0347) (0 0238) (0 00584) (0 00569) (0 00548) 
ly22 0 0961*** 0 0893*** 0 156*** 
(0 0237) (0 0242) (0 0147) 
lx11 0 0329** 0 0349*** 0 00876 0 0199*** 0 0252*** 0 00363 
(0 0132) (0 0124) (0 00922) (0 00625) (0 00559) (0 00503) 
lx22 -0 00848*** -0 00875*** 
0 0185*** 0 0162*** 0 0238*** 0 0157*** 
(0 00416) (0 00362) (0 00329) (0 00173) (0 00143) (0 00160) 
lx33 0 0205 0 0228* -0 00247 0 00459 0 0350*** 
0 0347*** 
(0 0144) (0 0134) (0 00839) (0 00759) (0 00688) (0 00655) 
lx44 0 0236 0 0410*** -0 0195* 0 0274** 0 0298*** 0 00373 
(0 0173) (0 0154) (0 0102) (0 0120) (00100) (0 00896) 
lx55 0 0566*** 0 0560*** 0 000885 
(0 00506) (0 00483) (0 00442) 
• s1gmjicant at 10% 
** srgmjicant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowings, Ix3-
fu:ed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits, In TA= s1ze,DT= per annum llme dummies, GroupDT 
=merger group dummy interacted with per annum time dummy 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles Fixed Effects 
(1982), Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Pane12 Panel3 
lylly2 -0 0970 -0 0387 -0 243*** 
(0 0789) (0 0803) (0 0429) 
lxllx2 -0 00968 -0 000128 0 0137** 0 00381 0 00244 0 00450 
(0 00729) (0 00714) (0 00567) (0 00332) (0 00311) (0 00306) 
Jxllx3 -0 0151*** -0 0119** -0 00664 
0 0316*** 0 0329*** 0 0306*** 
(0 0104) (0 0101) (0 00922) (0 00513) (0 00485) (0 00530) 
lxllx4 0 000917 -0 00342 -0 0107 -0 00529 -0 00802 -0 000525 
(0 0120) (0 0115) (0 00967) (0 00673) (0 00610) (0 00636) 
lxllx5 0 0106 0 00979 0 00152 
(0 00673) (0 00642) (0 00633) 
lx2lx3 0 0264** 0 0234** 0 0327*** 0 00156 -0 00155 -0 0119** 
(0 0124) (0 0114) (0 00909) (0 00582) (0 00510) (0 00510) 
lx2lx4 0 0150 0 00503 0 0106 -0 0192** 
0 0201*** 0 0280*** 
(0 0135) (0 0124) (0 0105) (0 00778) (0 00663) (0 00647) 
lx2lx5 0 0350*** 0 0382*** 0 0736*** 
(0 00663) (0 00611) (0 00568) 
lx31x4 -0 0412 -0 0544** 0 0517*** 0 0459*** 0 0367*** 0 0225** 
(0 0291) (0 0263) (0 0153) (0 0140) (0 0123) (0 0109) 
lx3lx5 -0 0438*** 
0 0469*** 0 0771*** 
(0 00950) (0 00888) (0 00829) 
lx4lx5 -0 0880*** -0 00228 
0 0830*** 
(0 0156) (0 0138) (00116) 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposrts, lxl= wages, /x2= total borrowmgs, lx3= 
fu:ed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 = total deposits, In TA = s1ze,DT =per annum time dummies, GroupDT 
=merger group dummy mteracted wrth per annum time dummy 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles Fixed Effects 
(1982), Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I Pane12 Pane13 Panel! Pane12 Pane13 
lyllxl 0 0465*** 0 0421*** 0 0559*** 
0 165*** 0 190*** 0 0992*** 
(0 0495) (0 0506) (0 0305) (0 00865) (0 00845) (0 00820) 
lyllx2 -0 0271 -0 00943 0 0911*** -0 0146** 0 0116* 
0 0165*** 
(00391) (0 0386) (0 0245) (0 00636) (0 00613) (0 00605) 
lyllx3 -0 0215 -0 0471*** -0 0127 
0 292*** 0 304*** 0 0481*** 
(0 0718) (0 0711) (0 0380) (0 00983) (0 00942) (0 00911) 
lyllx4 0 319*** 0 324*** -0 0858** 00139 0 0162 
0 0462*** 
(0 0712) (0 0681) (0 0424) (0 0145) (0 0138) (0 0109) 
1yllx5 0 0405*** 0 0427*** 0 0306*** 
(0 00944) (0 00892) (0 00653) 
ly21xl 0 0548** 0 0381 0 0999*** 
(0 0262) (0 0268) (0 0188) 
ly21x2 000174 0 000515 -0 0353** 
(0 0224) (0 0219) (0 0144) 
ly2lx3 0 141*** 0 147*** 0 0392* 
(0 0366) (0 0364) (0 0225) 
ly21x4 -0 0198 
0 175*** 0 165*** 
(0 0392) (0 0377) (0 0268) 
ly2lx5 
-0 0216 0 00381 -0 0653 -0 0651** 
0 0585*** 0 0761*** 
(0 0548) (0 0442) (0 0486) (0 0255) (00197) (0 0263) 
tsq 0 000476 -0 00376 -0 00270 -0 00249* 
0 000229 0 00408** 
(0 00403) (0 00303) (0 00339) (0 00187) (0 00135) (0 00181) 
* srgnificant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 = totalmvestments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowmgs, lx3= 
fiXed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits, In TA= size,DT= per annum tzme dummies, GroupDT 
=merger group dummy interacted with per annum time dummy 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles Fixed Effects 
(1982), Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! Panel2 Panel 3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lylt 0 0369* 0 0326* 0 0345** 0 00483 0 00363 -0 00259 
(0 0195) (0 0185) (0 0147) (0 00347) (0 00328) (0 00365) 
ly2t 
-0 0113 0 00109 -0 0180** 
(0 0104) (0 0100) (0 00890) 
lxlt 
-00217*** -0 0224*** 0 0420*** 0 0463*** 0 0184*** 0 00993*** 
(0 00485) (0 00491) (0 00356) (0 00280) (0 00272) (0 00232) 
lx2t 0 00643** 0 00608** 0 00674** 9 4le-06 -0 000541 -0 000660 
(0 00298) (0 00276) (0 00264) (0 00116) (000109) (0 00123) 
lx3t 0 00231 0 00237 0 00429 -0 00632*** 0 00685*** 0 00695*** 
(0 00454) (0 00465) (0 00390) (0 00207) (0 00203) (0 00213) 
lx4t 0 0220*** 0 0245*** 0 000707 -0 00180 -0 00129 0 00738*** 
(0 00548) (0 00555) (0 00471) (0 00252) (0 00243) (0 00261) 
lx5t 0 0282*** 0 0280*** 0 0238*** 
(0 00305) (0 00291) (0 00315) 
DT2 0 0114 0 0854 0 0609 -0 0335 0 0306 0 00443 
(0 175) (0.125) (0 !50) (0 0814) (0 0557) (0 0802) 
DT3 0 0227 0 0597 0 00608 -0 00329 -0 0406 -0 0248 
(0 173) (0.123) (0 145) (0 0804) (0 0546) (0 0777) 
DT4 0170 0 310** 0 315** 0 0315 0 000438 00720 
(0 176) (0 121) (0 140) (0 0826) (0 0545) (0 0759) 
DT5 0 220 0 289** 0270* 00225 0 0318 0 0243 
(0 182) (0 119) (0 138) (0 0854) (0 0533) (0 0741) 
DT6 0 619** 0 727*** 0 639*** -0 0674 -0 0497 0 0183 
(0 257) (0 180) (0 204) (0 120) (0 0812) (0 Ill) 
DT7 0 000298 0 0188 -0 00557 -0 0148 -7 67e-05 -0 0192 
(0 189) (0 123) (0 143) (0 0880) (0 0549) (0 0766) 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowrngs, 
lx3= faed assets, lx4= other assets, Ix5 =total deposits, In TA= size,DT= per annum time dummies, 
GroupDT =merger group dummy interacted with per annum time dummy 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles Fixed Effects 
(1982), Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION 
APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Pane13 
DT8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
DT9 0 00128 -0 000938 0 0313 0 00646 0 0263 0 0176 
(0 185) (0 127) (0 148) (0 0860) (0 0567) (0 0792) 
DTIO 
-0 0298 -0 0557 -0 0466 -0 0330 -0 00241 -0 0222 
(0 179) (0 129) (0 !50) (0 0834) (0 0576) (0 0802) 
DTII 
-0 110 -0.239* -0 114 -0 0928 -0 0933 -0 0795 
(0 172) (0 133) (0 154) (0 0802) (0 0593) (0 0823) 
DT12 
-0 151 -0 195 -0 135 -0 106 -0 0832 -0 0802 
(0 169) (0 141) (0 162) (0 0786) (0 0628) (0 0870) 
DT13 
-0 0939 -0 198 -0 114 -0 0646 -0 0650 -0 0676 
(0 173) (0 149) (0 170) (0 0806) (0 0663) (0 0911) 
DT14 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
groupDT2 0 0439 -0 0347 0 0593 0 0458 -0 0234 0 00322 
(0 195) (0 142) (0 172) (0 0909) (0 0634) (0 0922) 
groupDT3 
-0 149 -0 191 -0 0439 -0 0740 -0 0419 -0 0497 
(0 196) (0 142) (0 172) (0 0914) (0 0632) (0 0919) 
groupDT4 
-0 195 -0 331** -0 259 -0 0612 -0 0406 -0 126 
(0 198) (0 139) (0 168) (0 0924) (0 0630) (0 0904) 
groupDT5 
-0 116 -0 154 -0 00468 0 00328 -0 0241 -0 0389 
(0 197) (0 136) (0 164) (0 0921) (0 0601) (0 0875) 
groupDT6 
-0 !53 -0 238* -0 0330 -0 0689 -0 0736 -0 0472 
(0 207) (0 138) (0 165) (0 0982) (0 0616) (0 0885) 
groupDT7 
-0 124 -0 Ill 0 0339 -0 00856 -0 0446 -0 0515 
(0 198) (0 136) (0 164) (0 0926) (0 0607) (0 0879) 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total znvestments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total 
borrowings, lx3= fixed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total depos•ts, In TA= size,DT= per 
annum time dummies, GroupDT =merger group dummy interacted with per annum flme 
dummy 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles Fixed Effects 
(1982), Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
groupDT8 -0.138 -0 103 0 0751 -0 0297 -0 0551 -0 0461 
(0 199) (0 138) (0 168) (0 0929) (0 0618) (0 0899) 
groupDT9 -0 204 -0 165 -0 0395 -0 0427 -0 0896 -0 0977 
(0 198) (0 140) (0 170) (0 0928) (0 0624) (0 0909) 
groupDTIO -0 253 -0 195 0 0198 -0 00172 -0 0634 -0 0372 
(0 199) (0 144) (0 175) (0 0932) (0 0643) (0 0938) 
groupDTll -0 170 -0 0219 0 108 0 0767 0 0435 0 0519 
(0 199) (0 150) (0 182) (0 0935) (0 0668) (0 0976) 
groupDT12 -0 230 -0 180 0 0556 0 0750 0 0128 0 0457 
(0.201) (0 159) (0 192) (0 0941) (0 0708) (0 103) 
groupDT13 -0.183 -0 0867 0134 0 0490 0 00559 0 0833 
(0.202) (0 160) (0 193) (0 0946) (0 0712) (0 104) 
groupDT14 -0 299 -0 348** -0 0666 0 0169 -0 0315 0 0599 
(0 204) (0 158) (0 196) (0 0958) (0 0705) (0 105) 
Constant -0.347* -0 216 -0 415** -0 362*** -0 341 *** -0 257** 
(0.202) (0 163) (0 198) (0 0970) (0 0730) (0 109) 
• stgnificant at 10% 
** s1gnijicant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, /xi= wages, lx2= toto/ bo"owings, 
Ix3= fu:ed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits, lnTA = size,DT =per annum time 
dummies, GroupDT =merger group dummy interacted with per annum time dummy 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles Random Effects 
(1982), Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
ly1 -0 0740 -0 132 -0 135* 0 572*** 0 579*** 0 512*** 
(0 122) (0 125) (0 0771) (0 0280) (0 0259) (0 0274) 
ly2 0 651*** 0 690*** 0 659*** 
(0 0753) (0 0760) (0 0586) 
lx1 -0 497*** -0 537*** -0.351*** -0 206*** -0 211*** -0 110*** 
(0 0389) (0 0356) (0 0287) (0 0212) (0 0190) (0 0172) 
lx2 -0 126*** -0 0953*** -0 137*** -0 0905*** -0 0975*** -0 120*** 
(0 0213) (0 0202) (0 0178) (0 00849) (0 00713) (0 00845) 
lx3 -0 207*** -0.236*** -0.221*** -0 0526*** -0 0692*** -0 147*** 
(0 0393) (0 0391) (0 0308) (0 0165) (0 0154) (0 0166) 
lx4 -0 146*** -0 164*** -0.318*** -0 0698*** -0 0758*** -0 127*** 
(0 0428) (0 0454) (0 0369) (0 0203) (0 0195) (0 0202) 
lx5 -0 572*** -0 548*** -0 478*** 
(0 0211) (0 0199) (00199) 
ly11 0 0487 0 0617* 0 109*** 0 0131** 0 0216*** 0 0305*** 
(0 0335) (0 0356) (0 0212) (0 00595) (0 00569) (0 00556) 
ly22 0 0927*** 0 0969*** 0 142*** 
(0 0241) (0 0253) (0 0142) 
lx11 0 0221*** 0 0253*** 0 0161*** 0 0106*** 0 00728*** 0 000911 
(0 00704) (0 00563) (0.00490) (0 00215) (0 00193) (0 00281) 
lx22 -0 0160*** -0 0118*** -0 0187*** -0 00927*** -0 0114*** -0 0146*** 
(0 00419) (0 00366) (0.00329) (0 00183) (0 00141) (0 00157) 
lx33 0 0263* 0 0167 -0 0224*** 0 00228 0 000840 0 0392*** 
(0 0139) (00131) (0.00782) (0 00681) (0 00637) (0 00611) 
lx44 0 0524*** 0 0562*** -0 000499 0 00941 0 0279*** 0 0159* 
(0 0159) (0 0143) (0 00964) (0 0108) (0 00928) (0 00879) 
lx55 0 0520*** 0 0549*** -0 00333 
(0 00538) (0 00500) (0 00442) 
• significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
lyi= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowings, lx3= 
fu:ed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits, lnTA =size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 0) 
and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between hme trend and group dummy variable, 
own2 =dummy variable dlStingurshing between public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy 
vanable dzstinguishing between publzc and foreign sector banks, HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
of concentraflon. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles Random Effects 
(1982), Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lylly2 -0 00130 0 0103 -0 163*** 
(0 0777) (0 0823) (0 0363) 
lxllx2 -0000919 0 00605 0 0141** 0 00601* 0 00522* 0 0101*** 
(0 00687) (0 00671) (0 00559) (0 00309) (0 00282) (0 00294) 
lxllx3 -0 0273*** -0 0291*** -0 0280*** -0 0117** -0 00919** -0 00656 
(0 00936) (0 00917) (0 00818) (0 00464) (0 00442) (0 00484) 
lxllx4 -0 0139 -0 0224** -00171* 0 00144 0 00300 0 00155 
(0 0108) (00106) (0 00903) (0.00614) (0 00582) (0 00600) 
lxllx5 -0 00164 -0 00239 -0 00826 
(0 00671) (0 00619) (0 00613) 
lx2lx3 0 0465*** 0 0369*** 0 0331*** -0.00502 0 00303 -0 0197*** 
(0 0114) (00107) (0 00878) (0 00558) (0 00479) (0 00495) 
lx2lx4 -0 00834 -0 0154 -0 000286 -00181** -0 0155** -0 0372*** 
(0 0130) (0 0120) (0 0104) (0 00715) (0 00623) (0 00625) 
lx2lx5 0 0447*** 0 0370*** 0 0880*** 
(0 00641) (0 00577) (0 00571) 
lx3lx4 -0 0735*** -0 0559** 0 0286** 0 0553*** 0 0354*** 0 0183* 
(0 0270) (0 0247) (0 0141) (0 0126) (0 0113) (0 0102) 
lx3lx5 -0 0593*** -0 0448*** -0 0729*** 
(0 00950) (0 00875) (0 00824) 
lx41x5 -0 0668*** -0 0843*** -0 0118 
(0 0150) (0 0135) (0 0115) 
• sigmficant at I 0% 
** sigmficant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyi= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowings, 
lx3= fu:ed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 = total deposits, In TA = size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group= dummy vanable distinguishing between hanks that merged (value= 
0) and those that did not (value = 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 =dummy varzable distinguishing between public and private sector banks, own3 = 
dummy variable distinguishing between pub/1c andfore~gn sector banks, HHI = Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles Random Effects 
(1982), Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel 3 
lyllx1 -0 169*** -0 223*** -0131*** 0 0479*** 0 0459*** 0 0484*** 
(0 0485) (0 0503) (0 0302) (0 00866) (0 00816) (0 00820) 
lyllx2 -0 0365 -0 0197 0 0816*** -0 00337 -0 00293 0 00403 
(0 0386) (0 0392) (0 0237) (0 00637) (0 00567) (0 00576) 
lyllx3 -0 228*** -0 220*** 0 00323 -0 0295*** -0 0422*** 0 000416 
(0 0713) (0 0718) (0 0361) (0 0102) (0 00969) (0 00892) 
lyllx4 0 289*** 0 294*** -0 0982** -0 0327** -0 0133 -0 0452*** 
(0 0714) (0 0696) (0 0385) (0 0145) (0 0132) (0 0112) 
lyllx5 0 0609*** 0 0555*** 0 0293*** 
(0 0100) (0 00936) (0 00650) 
ly2lxl 0 0560** 0 0655** 0 0961*** 
(0 0261) (0 0268) (0 0188) 
ly2lx2 -0 00767 -0 0146 -0 0436*** 
(0 0227) (0 0220) (0 0142) 
ly2lx3 0 0982*** 0 0932** 0 0354 
(0 0359) (0 0363) (0 0218) 
ly2lx4 -0 130*** -0 112*** -0 00246 
(0 0397) (0 0377) (0 0260) 
ly2lx5 
-0 0958*** -0 138*** -0 0669*** -0 0698*** -0 0694*** 
0 0646*** 
(0 0173) (0 0168) (0 0174) (0 00918) (0 00777) (0 00935) 
tsq 
0 00300** 0 00413*** 0 00840*** 0 00293*** 0 00327*** 0 00335*** 
(0 00151) (0 00160) (0 00164) (0 000811) (0 000765) (0 000870) 
• significant at 10% 
•• significant at 5% 
***significant at I% 
lyl= total advances, Iy2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowings, 
lx3= fvced assets, lx4= other assets, lxS = total deposits, In TA = size, 
lnprovs =proVIsions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 
0) and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between hme trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 = dummy vanable dtstinguishing between public and private sector banks, own3 = 
dummy variable distinguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HH1 = Herfindahl-
Htrschman Index of concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Schmidt and Sickles Random Effects 
(1982), Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
lylt 0 0570*** 0 0575*** 0 0743*** 0 00559 0 00730** -0 00475 
(0 0193) (0 0190) (0 0126) (0 00362) (0 00336) (0 00365) 
ly2t -0 0113 -0 00992 -0 0344*** 
(0 0101) (0 0101) (0 00831) 
lxlt -0 0423*** -0 0263*** -0 0197*** -0 0215*** -0 0126*** 
0 0449*** 
(0 00404) (0 00401) (0 00327) (0 00248) (0 00233) (0 00212) 
lx2t 0 00471* 0 00772*** 0 00856*** -0 000601 -0 00174 -0 00312*** 
(0 00284) (0 00271) (0 00254) (0 00118) (0 00109) (0 00120) 
lx3t 0 000233 -0 00258 0 00402 -0 00225 -0 00410** -0 00624*** 
(0 00437) (0 00451) (0 00366) (0 00208) (0 00198) (0 00198) 
lx4t 0 0294*** 0 0282*** 000577 -0 00307 -0 00202 -0 00570** 
(0 00514) (0 00546) (0 00466) (0 00261) (0 00246) (0 00256) 
lx5t 0 0268*** 0 0306*** 0 0288*** 
(0 00311) (0 00291) (0 00298) 
lnTA -I 246*** -I 315*** -I 456*** -0 352** -0 298** -0 232 
(0 303) (0 316) (0 332) (0 158) (0 !50) (0 178) 
lnprovs -0 0123 0 00673 -0 00692 -0 00268 -0 00354 -0 00604* 
(0 00824) (0 00619) (0 00614) (0 00398) (0 00284) (0 00326) 
group 0 0915 0 0469 0 0647 0 106** 0 0558 0 0592 
(0 141) (0 0880) (0 105) (0 0437) (0 0341) (0 0573) 
tgroup -0 0195* 0 00573 0 0136 0 00670 0 00593 0 0109* 
(00105) (0 00878) (0 0107) (0 00565) (0 00404) (0 00568) 
own2 0 0207 -0 0584 0 00315 0 0405** -0 0183 0 0154 
(0 0482) (0 0365) (0 0623) (00190) (0 0120) (0 0344) 
own3 0 367*** 0 378*** 0354*** 0 0219 0 0755*** 0 0601 
(0 0838) (0 0839) (0 0807) (0 0285) (0 0257) (0 0455) 
rhh1 0 00123** 0 00152*** 0 00209*** 0 000745** 0 000808*** 0 000616* 
(0 000559) (0 000586) (0 000604) (0 000291) (0 000275) (0 000318) 
Constant 6 525*** 6 787*** 7 340*** I 314 0 993 0 786 
(I 731) (I 810) (I 884) (0 908) (0 863) (I 011) 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly1 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx1= total borrowings, lx3= 
ftxed assets, lx4= other assets, lx.S =total deposits, In TA= size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishmg between banks that merged (value= 0) and 
those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy variable, own2 = 
dummy vanable distinguishing between public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy variable 
distinguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of 
concentration. 
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Table E2: Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1992), Banking 
System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lyl -0 183 -0 177 -0 213*** 0 624*** 0 599*** 
(0 124) (0 126) (0 0768) (0 0269) (0 0278) 
ly2 0 748*** 0 752*** 0 753*** 
(0 0798) (0 0795) (00610) 
!xi -0 423*** -0 461*** -0 279*** -0 199*** -0 0113 
(0 0552) (0 0474) (0 0365) (0 0236) (0 0229) 
lx2 -0 110*** -0 135*** -0 0651*** -0 109*** 
0 0969*** 
(0 0226) (00211) (0 0182) (0 00893) (0 00976) 
lx3 -0 277*** -0 322*** -0 298*** -0 180*** -0 258*** 
(0 0468) (0 0455) (0 0368) (0 0203) (0 0221) 
lx4 -0 160*** -0 163*** -0 322*** -0 104*** -0 153*** 
(0 0463) (0 0477) (0 0381) (0 0201) (0 0212) 
lx5 -0 397*** -0 422*** 
(0 0220) (0 0197) 
lyll 0 0337 00429 0 103*** 0 0502*** 0 0483*** 
(0 0348) (0 0365) (0 0212) (0 00540) (0 00514) 
ly22 0 0936*** 0 101*** 0 147*** 
(0 0240) (0 0245) (0 0138) 
lxll 0 0152** 0 0182*** 0 0112** 0 00646*** -0 000975 
(0 00614) (0 00585) (0 00532) (0 00198) (0 00229) 
lx22 -0 00896*** -0 0134*** 
0 0171*** 0 0150*** 0 0204*** 
(0 00417) (0 00353) (0 00324) (0 00136) (0 00136) 
lx33 0 0254* 0 0223* 0 00623 0 0311*** 
0 0260*** 
(0 0132) (0 0125) (0 00790) (0 00563) (0 00539) 
lx44 0 0356** 0 0430*** -0 00854 0 0367*** 0 0156** 
(0 0154) (0 0138) (0 00959) (0 00973) (0 00781) 
lx55 0 0452*** -0 00861** 
(0 00470) (0.00384) 
* s1gnijicant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowings, lx3= 
fLXed assets, lx4= other assets, Ix5 = total deposits, In TA = size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 0) and 
those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy variable, own2 = 
dummy variable distmguJShmg between public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy variable 
distinguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHJ = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of 
concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1992), Banking 
System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
lylly2 0 001 -0 0134 -0 159*** 
(0 0790) (0 0812) (0.0361) 
lxllx2 -0 0036 0004 0 0121** 0 00744*** 0 00574** 
(0 00692) (0 00672) (0 005) (0 002) (0 002) 
lxllx3 -0 0241*** -0 0262*** -0 0248*** -0 000746 -0 000337 
(0 009) (0 009) (0 00828) (0 0039) (0 004) 
lxllx4 -0 0164 -0 0238** -0 0183** 0 0134** 0 00902* 
(0 0105) (0 010) (0 0088) (0 00551) (0 005) 
lxllx5 -0 0300*** -0 0163*** 
(0 006) (0 005) 
lx2lx3 0 0303** 0 0222** 0 0302*** -0 00319 -0 0185*** 
(0 0124) (0 0109) (0 00871) (0 0050) (0 0046) 
lx2lx4 0 009 0 006 0 00643 -0 0167*** -0 0447*** 
(0 0137) (0 0122) (0.0102) (0 006) (0 005) 
lx2lx5 0 0386*** 0 0927*** 
(0 0055) (0 005) 
lx3lx4 -0 0548** -0 0518** 0 0380*** 0 0126 0 0265*** 
(0 0254) (0 0236) (0 0142) (0 0105) (0 009) 
lx3lx5 -0 0251*** -0 0668*** 
(0 00812) (0 007) 
lx4lx5 -0 0786*** -0 0124 
(0 0131) (0 0100) 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl~ total advances, ly2 ~total investments, ly3~ total deposits, lxl~ wages, lx2= total borrowings, lx3~ 
fiXed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposrts, In TA= size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value = 0) and 
those that d1d not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy variable, own2 = 
dummy variable distinguishing between public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy variable 
distinguishing between publ1c and foreign sector banks, HHI = Herjindahl-Hirschman Index of 
concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1992), Banking 
System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I Pane12 Pane13 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
lyllxl -0 114** -0 180*** -0 125*** 0 0378*** 0 0460*** 
(0 0488) (0 0491) (0 0304) (0 00719) (0 00727) 
lyllx2 0 00343 0 00891 0 0928*** -0 0506*** -0 0153* 
(0 0387) (0 0379) (0 0236) (0 00856) (0 00813) 
lyllx3 -0 241*** -0 288*** -0 0354 00117 -0 0201** 
(0 0707) (0 0706) (0 0365) (0 0118) (0 00913) 
lyllx4 0 252*** 0 313*** -0 0684* 0 0316*** 0 0218*** 
(0 0707) (0 0670) (0 0390) (0 00892) (0 00567) 
ly2lx1 0 0399 0 0517** 0 0961*** 
(0 0260) (0 0260) (0 0186) 
ly2lx2 0 00986 0 00550 -0 0329** 
(0 0227) (00216) (0 0143) 
ly2lx3 0 0756** 0 0939*** 0 0306 
(0 0356) (0 0354) (0 0215) 
ly2lx4 -0 121*** -0 128*** -0 0103 
(0 0390) (0 0362) (0 0258) 
lx2lx5 
-0 127*** -0 146*** -0 178*** -0 129*** -0 123*** 
(0 0261) (0 0207) (00211) (0 0103) (0 0123) 
tsq 
o oo5n••• 0 00652*** 0 00986*** 0 00553*** 0 00610*** 
(0 00163) (0 00158) (0 00160) (0 000665) (0 000845) 
lylt 0 0421** 0 0432** 0 0675*** 0 0120*** 0 00510 
(0 0189) (0 0181) (0 0124) (0 00306) (0 00339) 
ly2t 0 00234 0 00263 -0 0255*** 
(0 0104) (0 0101) (0.00836) 
• Significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowings, lx3= 
fu:ed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 = total deposits, In TA = size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable tbstinguishing between banks that merged (value= 0) and 
those that d1d not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy variable, own2 = 
dummy variable thstinguishing between public and pr1vate sector banks, own3 =dummy variable 
distinguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of 
concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1992), Banking 
System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lxlt -0 0342*** -0 0325*** -0 0176*** -0 0189*** -0 00210 
(0 00549) (0 00501) (0 00394) (0 00243) (0 00251) 
lx2t 0 00617** 0 00713*** 0 00895*** 0 000707 -0 00206* 
(0 00282) (0 00267) (0 00248) (0 00112) (0 00120) 
lx3t -0 00851* -0 0111** -0 00360 -0 0148*** -0 0190*** 
(0 00498) (0 00489) (0 00410) (000211) (0 00226) 
lx4t 0 0269*** 0 0263*** 0 00337 -0 00542** -0 0108*** 
(0 00528) (0 00549) (0 00462) (0 00234) (0 00251) 
lx5t 0 0435*** 0 0372*** 
(0 00281) (0 00270) 
lnTA -1 143*** -1 221*** -I 424*** -0 124 -0 0691 
(0 287) (0 288) (0311) (0 117) (0 153) 
lnprovs -0 00940 0 0103* -0 00598 -0 000722 -0 00669** 
(0 00761) (0 00573) (0 00575) (0 00296) (0 00276) 
group 0 0917 0 0399 0.105 0 105 -0 0142 
(0 228) (0 122) (0 139) (0 0708) (0 0809) 
tgroup -0 0187 -0 00146 0 00903 0 00995 0 00163 
(0 0148) (0 00964) (0 0115) (0 00660) (0 00732) 
own2 00642 -0 0982*** 0 0284 0 0419*** 0 0609** 
(0 0446) (0 0342) (0 0655) (0 0157) (0 0264) 
own3 0 245*** 0 0636 0 211** -0 0367 -0 0160 
(0 0826) (0 101) (0 0875) (0 0263) (0 0346) 
rhh1 0 00138*** 0 00160*** 0 00208*** 0 000661*** 0 000600** 
(0 000528) (0.000532) (0 000567) (0 000213) (0 000272) 
eta -0 0786*** -0 0752*** -0 0553*** -0 181*** -0 !55*** 
(0 0156) (0 0126) (0 0120) (0 0123) (00111) 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowings, lx3= 
fzxed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits, In TA= size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 0) and 
those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy vanable, own2 = 
dummy varzable thstmguishmg between publ1c and private sector banks, own3 =dummy variable 
diStinguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHJ = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of 
concentration. 
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Table E2: Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), 
Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! 
lyl 
ly2 
lxl 
lx2 
lx3 
lx4 
lx5 
lyll 
ly22 
lxll 
lx22 
lx33 
lx44 
lx55 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
Panel2 
-0 0727 
(0 171) 
0 707*** 
(0 101) 
-0 425*** 
(0 0380) 
-0 0845*** 
(0 0215) 
-0 198*** 
(0 0377) 
-0 244*** 
(0 0477) 
0 00310 
(0 0402) 
0 0193 
(0 0318) 
0 0201*** 
(0 00423) 
-0 00547 
(0 00385) 
0 00726 
(0 0135) 
0 0646*** 
(0 0148) 
Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
0 536*** 
(0 0229) 
-0 0647*** 
(0 0175) 
-0 107*** 
(0 00586) 
0 00778 
(0 0139) 
-0 0850*** 
(0 0172) 
-0 745*** 
(0 0225) 
0 0412*** 
(0 00519) 
0 00338*** 
(0 00120) 
-0 0134*** 
(0 000875) 
-0 0118*** 
(0 00426) 
0 0131** 
(0 00649) 
-0 0421*** 
(0 00597) 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowings, 
lx3= f~:xed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 = total deposits, In TA = size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value 
= 0) and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 =dummy var~able d1stmguishrng between public and private sector banks, own3 = 
dummy variable distinguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHI = Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), 
Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! 
lylly2 
lxllx2 
lxllx3 
lxllx4 
lxllx5 
lx2lx3 
lx2lx4 
lx2lx5 
lx3lx4 
lx3lx5 
lx4lx5 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel3 
0 358*** 
(0 106) 
0 00708 
(0 00747) 
-0 0375*** 
(0 00961) 
-0 0225* 
(0 0121) 
0 0427*** 
(0 0119) 
-0 0348** 
(0 0136) 
-0 0431* 
(0 0251) 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 
0 0134*** 
(0 00190) 
0 00958*** 
(0 00297) 
-0 00486 
(0 00379) 
-0 0160*** 
(0 00424) 
0 00877*** 
(0 00325) 
-0 0129*** 
(0 00394) 
0 0303*** 
(0 00402) 
-0 0298*** 
(0 00815) 
0 0441*** 
(0 00737) 
0 0135 
(0 0108) 
Panel3 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, bel= wages, lx2= total borrowings, lx3= 
fixed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 = total deposits, In TA = size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distingurshing between banks that merged (value= 0) 
and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy variable, 
own2 =dummy variable distlnguishing between public and przvate sector banks, own3 =dummy 
variable distingurshing between public andfore~gn sector banks, HHI = Herfindahl-Hrrschman Index 
of concentratlon. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), 
Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! Panel2 
lyllxl -0 174*** 
(0 0585) 
lyllx2 -0 0904* 
(0 0488) 
lyllx3 -0 0854 
(00891) 
lyllx4 0 311 *** 
(0 0901) 
lyllx5 
ly2lxl 0 0211 
(0 0329) 
ly2lx2 0 0217 
(0 0261) 
ly2lx3 0 0127 
(0 0465) 
ly2lx4 -0 0778 
(0 0507) 
ly21x5 
-0 0706*** 
(0 0162) 
tsq -0 00225* 
(0 00116) 
lylt 0 0588** 
(0 0236) 
ly2t -0 00592 
(0 0132) 
• sigmficant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
Panel3 Panel I Panel2 
0 0202*** 
(0 00568) 
0 00387 
(0 00856) 
-0 0178* 
(0 0102) 
0 0150 
(0 0104) 
-0 0895*** 
(0 00607) 
-0 00409*** 
(0 000410) 
0 00700** 
(0 00283) 
Panel3 
lyl~ total advances, ly2 ~total investments, ly3~ total deposits, lxl~ wages, 1x2~ total borrowings, 
lx3~ frxed assets, lx4~ other assets, lx5 ~ total deposits, In TA ~ size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishmg between banks that merged (value = 
0) and those that did not (value ~ 1), tgroup ~interaction between time trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 =dummy variable distinguishing between public and private sector banks, own3 = 
dummy variable distinguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHI ~ Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), 
Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I 
lxlt 
lx2t 
lx3t 
lx4t 
lx5t 
lnTA 
lnprovs 
group 
!group 
own2 
own3 
rhh1 
Constant 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** s1gmjicant at 1% 
Panel2 
-0 0253*** 
(0 00448) 
0 00824*** 
(0 00289) 
-0 00445 
(0 00475) 
0 0195*** 
(0 00569) 
-6 220*** 
(I 996) 
0 0115 
(0 0343) 
0 568 
(0 476) 
0 0991* 
(0 0562) 
-0 276** 
(0 138) 
I 739*** 
(0 223) 
0 00336 
(0 00240) 
-0 171** 
(0 0716) 
35 80*** 
(11 80) 
Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
-0 00688*** 
(0 00204) 
-0 00329*** 
(0 000835) 
0 000175 
(0 00171) 
-0 00668*** 
(0 00205) 
0 0189*** 
(0 00271) 
-4 458 
(3 977) 
-0 287*** 
(0 0725) 
I 907*** 
(0 737) 
0 296*** 
(0 0826) 
-I 837*** 
(0 294) 
I 707*** 
(0 375) 
0 0501*** 
(0 00880) 
I 300*** 
(0 285) 
-6 514 
(26 58) 
lyl= total advances, ly2 = totalmvestments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowings, lx3= 
fiXed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits, In TA= size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable disllnguishmg between banks that merged (value= 0) 
and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy variable, 
own2 =dummy varzable distinguishing between public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy 
variable distinguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHJ = Herjindahl-Hirschman Index 
of concentration. 
393 
Appendzx£2 
Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1995), Banking 
System Dataset 
Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
LYI 02744 -0.0978 0 1219 0 4740*** I 6149*** -0 8916 
02240 0 2259 12 8307 0 0539 0 0261 4 2646 
LY2 0 5001*** 0 7071*** -0 0952 
0 099 0 0937 9 4945 
LXI -0 485*** -0 4606*** -1 7089 -0 0868** 0 0398* 0 4975 
0 0508 0 0346 2 9282 0 0371 0 0215 2 6569 
LX2 -0 0360 -0 0397* -0 4825 -0 04064*** -0 1217*** 0 0598 
0 0290 0 0206 2 6491 00109 00042 I 0872 
LX3 0 0093 -0 0332 0 6343 -0 0089 -0 0059 I 2716 
0 0315 0 0309 3 2722 0 0398 00140 2 1802 
LX4 -0 386*** -0 4090*** I 2659 -0 1832*** -0 2052*** 0 0269 
0 0517 0 0479 4 8934 0 0352 0 0143 2 6849 
LX5 -0 6667*** -0 5420* .. -0 8482 
0 0421 00202 3 9272 
LYII -0 0018 0 0418 0 4613 0 0208 0 1134*** 0 0005 
0 0362 0 0628 3 8437 0 0169 0 0061 I 3176 
LY22 0 0398 0 0499 0 0630 
0 0402 0 0508 2 7855 
LXII 0 0191*** 0 0134 -0 0815 0 0035 -0 0017 -0 2845 
0 0077 0 0097 0 6155 0 0113 00028 0.5240 
LX22 0 0028 0 0038 -0 3174 -0 0061** -0 0113*** -0 0748 
0 0063 0 0086 0 5808 00026 00010 0 2792 
LX33 -0 0071 -0 0001 -0 1782 00229 0 0229*** -0 1848 
0 0179 00200 14790 0 0171 00084 0 9059 
LX44 0 0177 0 0308 -0 4747 0 0270 -0 022*** -0 5180 
0 0207 0 0184 I 8144 0 0282 00071 I 6287 
LX55 00072 -0 0502*** 01693 
0 0139 0 0060 1.2850 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly1 =total investments, ly3= total depos1ts, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowmgs, lx3= 
fiXed assets, lx4= other assets, Ix5 =total deposits, In TA= s1ze, 
lnprovs = proviswns, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 0) 
and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy variable, 
own2 =dummy variable d1stingu1shing between public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy 
variable d1s11nguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHI = Herfindahl-H~rschman Index 
of concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1995), Banking 
System Dataset 
Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Pane12 Panel3 
LYILY2 0 1266 0 1847 -0 3776 
0 1238 0 1658 5 8926 
LXILX2 -0 0080 -0 004 0 7910 0 0170*** 0 0257*** -0 0092 
0 0088 0 0094 I 0534 0 0065 0 0034 0 5842 
LXILX3 -0 0479*** -0 0244*** -1.0997 0 0068 -0 0043 -I 3669 
0 0098 0 0085 I 4837 0 0130 0 0075 I 0396 
LXILX4 -0 0094 -0 0240* 0 4691 -0 0248 -0 004 0 8204 
0 0093 0 0149 I 4398 0 0181 00072 1.2723 
LXILX5 0 0059 -0 0093 0 8663 
0 0161 00077 I 4551 
LX2LX3 0 0126 0 0078103 0 0173 -0 0266 -0 021*** -0 079 
0 0104 0 0098 0 0169 0 0065 0 8301 
LX2LX4 -0 0212 -0 019 0 4558 -0 0080 -0 0083 0 487 
0 0169 0 0181 I 9320 0 0177 0 0060 I 049 
LX2LX5 0 0383*** 0 0332*** -0 1657 
0 0149 0 0053 11372 
LX3LX4 0 0323 0 0103 0 3789 -0 0086 -0 005 0 0427 
0 0361 0 0360 2 8353 0 0409 0 0147 2 206 
LX3LX5 
-0 0093 -0 0154* 0 1294 
00230 0 0083 I 859 
LX4LX5 -0 0381 0 0751*** 0 078 
0 0362 0 0107 2220 
* significant at 10% 
'** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl~ total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowings, 
lx3= fiXed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 = total deposits, In TA = s1ze, 
lnprovs =provisions, group= dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 0) 
and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 =dummy variable distinguiShing between public and private sector banks, own3 = 
dummy vanab/e dzstznguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHI = Herjindahl-
Hirschman Index of concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1995), Banking 
System Dataset 
Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Pane13 Panel I Pane12 Pane13 
LYILXI -0 250*** -0 2994*** 0 3825 -0 0004 0 0276*** -0 285 
0 0480 0 0648 5 7467 0 0245 0 0080 I 696 
LYILX2 0 0294 0 0405 -0 1677 0 0222* 0 1052*** -0 2122 
0 0521 0 0708 4 1484 0 0123 00054 12929 
LYILX3 -0 2470** -0 0970 0 0263 -0 0072 00038 0254 
0 1065 0 0613 4 8324 0 0428 00107 I 7589 
LYILX4 0 20902074** 0 2054** -2 0300 -0 0229 -0 2063*** I 4144 
0 0895 0 0814 8 4650 0 0389 0 0192 2 5418 
LYILX5 0 0290 0 1566*** -0 4522 
0 0384 0 0079 I 3665 
LY2LXI 0 0478*** 0 0524** -0 2471 
0 0169 0 0259 3 0121 
LY2LX2 0 0114 0 0005 -0 2939 
0 0500 0 0573 2 6343 
LY2LX3 0 2341*** 0 123** 0 2443 
00542 0 0513 4 8662 
LY2LX4 -0 2241*** -0 165*** I 1754 
0 0550 00474 5 6248 
LY2LX5 
T -0 0803*** -0 1005*** -I 2586 -0 0789*** -0 1169*** -I 494 
0 0173 0 0220 2 6736 00134 0 0093 2 947 
TSQ -0 00326*** -0 0036** 0 0993 -0 0027** -0 0002 0118 
0 0012 0 0015 0 2009 0 0012 0 0007 0 2419 
LYIT 0 0389 0 0613*** 14638 0 0037 0 1172*** 01480 
0 0353 0 0234 I 8372 0 0114 0 0035 0 7690 
LY2T -0 0016 -0 0016 -0 4994 
0 0147 00132 I 3638 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowings, 
lx3= fu:ed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits, lnTA =size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 0) 
and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between hme trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 = dummy variable distinguishing between public and private sector banks, own3 = 
dummy vanable distinguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHI = Herjindahl-
Hirschman Index of concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1995), Banking 
System Dataset 
Vanable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
LXlT -0 0336*** -0 0298*** -0 3448 -0 01253481** -0 0019 -0 2206 
0 0056 00044 0 4147 0 0063 00029 05464 
LX2T 0 0089*** 0 0108*** -0 0187 0 0030 -0 0027*** 0 0171 
00027 00029 0 3689 0 0041 0 0010 0 2147 
LX3T 0 0199*** 0 01614*** -0 0130 0 0009 0 0027* -0 0360 
0 0033 0 0045 04075 0 0041 0 0015 0 44390 
5 
LX4T 00009 00004 04639 -0 0134*** -0 0146*** 0 3236 
00052 00054 0 6823 00048 0 0019 04364 
LX5T 0 0242*** 0 0366*** 0 1127 
0 0069 0 0022 0 7934 
GROUP! 10 2996 0 2991 5 5411 29729 04106 I 3163 
61 5772 4 4198 15 5794 21 0569 11238 189 90 
GROUPT -0 0398 0 1358 11566 0 3238 0 2149 I 3495 
91 2828 2 0304 2 3814 28 1926 0 3635 16 377 
LNTA -5 1697 -2 1924 -3 7520 0 252 -6 548 -17 277 
130838 0850 83 3294 100 124 67962 8207 12 6655 516 92 
4 
LNPROV -0 0009 0 0008 -0 0148 0 0003 -0 0001 -0 0214 
s 
I 4563 0 4793 I 7525 01909 0 0520 7 1619 
RHHI 0 0017 0 0028 -0 0506 -0 0043 0 0575 -0 0828 
315 1549 0 2551 0 1296 163 0245 0 0683 0 9519 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl~ total advances, ly2 ~total investments, ly3~ total deposits, lxl~ wages, 1x2~ total borrowmgs, lx3~ 
fu:ed assets, lx4~ other assets, lx5 ~ total deposits, In TA ~ size, 
lnprovs ~proviSions, group ~dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value~ 0) and 
those that did not (value= 1), tgroup = mterachon between time trend and group dummy variable, own2 = 
dummy variable distinguishing between public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy variable 
distinguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHJ ~ Herjindahi-Hirschman Index of 
concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- Battese and Coelli (1995), Banking 
System Dataset 
Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Pane12 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
OWN3 7 1268 I 7189 7 4857 I 6779 0 5897 205 39 
3 2640 2 54137 I 0686 0 4619 2 98930 14 396 
15 9281 9 5752 11 3472 20048 4 2196 266 69 
Constant 19.1445 10 8060 86 9019 -1 4912 2 07794 134 16 
627983 2860 372 9181 602 7353 326702 076 81 5331 3289 6 
• s1gmjicant at 10% 
•• szgnzjicant at 5% 
*** szgnzjicant at 1% 
/yl~ total advances, ly2 ~total znvestments, ly3~ total depos1ts, lxl~ wages, lx2~ total borrowzngs, lx3~ 
fixed assets, lx4~ other assets, lx5 ~total depos1ts, In TA ~ s1ze, 
lnprovs = provzszons, group = dummy vanable dzstmguzshmg between banks that merged (value = 0) and 
those that dzd not (value= 1), tgroup = mteractzon between tzme trend and group dummy vanable, own2 = 
dummy vanable dzstmguzshzng between publzc and pnvate sector banks, own3 = dummy vanable 
d1stzngwshzng between publzc andjore1gn sector banks, HHI ~ Herfindahi-Hzrschman Index of 
concentratzon 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA FE (2002), Banking System 
Data set 
!Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel 3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
LY1 -0 1371 -0 2373 -0 7977** 0 5139*** 0 52842*** -0 2559 
0 1771 01674 0 3661 0 0536 0 0515 0 3562 
LY2 0 6763*** 0 7518*** 0 9054*** 
0 1126 0 1156 0 3616 
LXI -0 5850*** -0 6083*** -0 9848*** -0 1677 -0 1678*** -0 6202*** 
0 04308 00424 0 1043 0 0293 0 0276 0 18798 
LX2 -0 0145 0 0066 0 7072*** -0 0478 -00481*** 0 2236* 
0 0214 0 0212 0 16560 0 0108 0 0102 0 1295 
LX3 0 0791* 0 13484*** -0 9890*** 0 0838 0 0797*** -0 2741 
00445 0 0466 0 1476 0 0226 0 0214 0 1751 
LX4 -0 4002*** -0 4478*** 02480 -0.1815 -0 1868*** 0 0680 
0 0485 0 0517 0235 0 027 0 0258 0 2233 
LX5 -0 6624 -0 654*** 0 8467*** 
0 0575 0 0556 0 2274 
LYll 0 1165*** 0 15615*** 0 4527*** -0 01409 -0 0128*** 0 0532 
0 0336 0 034789 0 0756 0 0096 00090 0 0731 
LY22 00364 0 0509* 0 5221*** 
0 0257 0 02827 0 0703 
LXll 0 0190*** 0 0208*** 0 1618*** 0 0011 0 0022*** -0 0092 
0 0051 0 00534 0 0157 0 0032 0 0030 0 0192 
LX22 0 0118*** 0 01633*** -0 1581*** -0 0050 -0 0048*** 0 008 
0 003 0 0035 0 0243 0 0020 0 0019 0 0193 
LX33 -0 0022 -0 021 0 1997*** 0 0153 0 0164*** -02251*** 
0 0134 0 01408 00309 0 0086 0 0082 0 0560 
LX44 0 0645*** 0 0523*** 0 3323*** 0 0127 0 0146*** -0 11421 
0 0152 0 0149 0 05393 0 0132 0 0126 0 0967 
LX55 0 0257 0 0279*** 0 1984*** 
0008 0 0075 00302 
• significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances,ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowings, 
lx3= fiXed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits, DT= per annum time dummy, groupDT 
=merger group dummy interacted with per annum time dummy. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA FE (2002), Banking System 
Dataset 
IVanable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel 3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
LYILY2 0 2542*** 0 2021** -0 5568** 
0090 0 0992 0 2285 
LXILX2 -0 003 -0 005 0 0033 0 01597 0 0163*** -0 0061 
0 006 0 0074 0 0337 0 0038 0 00364 0 0308 
LXILX3 -0 021** -0 0049 0 2561*** -0 0026 -0 0032*** -0 1596*** 
0 0090 00096 0 0398 0 00571 0 00543 00567 
LXILX4 -0 0322*** -0 0496*** -0 3238*** -0 0253 -0 0292*** 0 44829*** 
0 01146 0 01168 0 0594 0 0083 0 0079 0 0760 
LXILX5 0 0178 0 0219*** -0 3237*** 
0 0082 0 0079 0064 
LX2LX3 0047*** 0 0381*** 0 0929* -0 0359 -0 0352*** -0 045 
0012 0 0115 0 0564 0 0076 00072 0 051 
LX2LX4 -0 0737*** -0 0728*** 0 1410*** -0 0137 -0 0147*** 0 1219* 
0 0153 0 0144 0 0528 0 0087 0 0082 0 0627 
LX2LX5 0 0542 0 0541*** -0 076 
0 0091 0 0086 0 0655 
LX3LX4 -0 0084 0 0271 -0 6207*** 0 04009 0 0395*** 0 26475** 
0 0247 0 0256 0 05439 0 01783 0 0168 01094 
LX3LX5 -0 03447 -0 0366*** -0 005 
0 01228 0 0115 0 077 
LX4LX5 -0 0586 -0 0609*** -0 1629* 
0 01906 0 0179 0 0938 
LY1LY2 0 2542*** 0 2021** -0.5568** 
0 090 0 0992 0 2285 
LX!LX2 -0 003 -0 005 0 0033 0 0159 0 0163*** -0 0061 
0006 0 007 0 033 0 0038 0 00364 0 0308 
• s•gmficant at 10% 
•• significant at 5% 
*** szgmficant at 1% 
lyl~ total advances, ly2 ~total mvestments, ly3~ total deposits, lxl~ wages, 1x2~ total borrowmgs, lx3~ 
fzxed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits, DT= per annum tzme dummy, groupDT =merger group 
dummy mteracted wzth per annum tzme dummy 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA FE (2002), Banking System 
Dataset 
!Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
LY!LXI -0 4853*** -0 59639*** -0 3819* 0 0162 0 0165*** 0 6574*** 
0 0584 0 0624 0 2163 0 0108 0 0101 01090 
LYILX2 -0 018 0 0377* 0 6716*** 0 0293 0 0301 ••• -0 207*** 
00477 0 0442 0122 00087 0 0082 0 0951 
LYILX3 -0 0002 0020 -0 4350*** 0 01403 0 0118*** 0 1758* 
0 0861 00804 0 1598 0 0134 0 012 0 1036 
LYILX4 0 2140** 0 1746** -0 4180** -0 083 -0 0834*** 01372 
0 0936 00727 0 2041 00204 0 01939 0 129 
LYILX5 0 0608 0 062*** 
0 3686*** 
0 0125 00117 0 0411 
LY2LXI 0 13082*** 0 1785*** -0 0034 
0 0330 0 0353 0 1226 
LY2LX2 -0 0229 -0 048** -0 7039*** 
0 0240 0 0234 0 0732 
LY2LX3 0 0563 0 0607 0 1871** 
0 049 0 0453 0 0907 
LY2LX4 -0 088 -0 0887** 0 5730*** 
0 0561 0 0451 0 15032 
LY2LX5 
T -0 2249*** -0 3627*** -0 5087*** -0 0945 -0 112*** -0 672*** 
0 0254 0 0211 0 1419 0 0165 0 0159 0 1025 
TSQ -0 0094*** -0 0156*** -0 022** -0 002 -0 0032*** -0 027*** 
0 0019 0 0016 00094 0 0013 0 001 0007 
LY1T 0 1013*** 0 1111 *** 0 2723*** 00075 0 0097*** -0 109*** 
0 0239 0 023 0 0678 00045 0 0043 0 0366 
LY2T -0 0229* -0 021 -0 1871 *** 
00135 0 0139 00449 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowings, lx3= 
fu:ed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits, DT= per annum time dummy, groupDT =merger 
group dummy interacted with per annum time dummy. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA FE (2002), Banking System 
Dataset 
!Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
LX IT -0 036*** -0 0388*** -0 1076*** -0 0212 -0 0214*** -0 117*** 
0 0041 0004 0 0157 0 003 0 0031 0025 
LX2T 0 011*** 0 016*** 0 108*** 0 005 o oos••• 0 009 
0 0028 0 002 00206 0 0014 0 0013 0 0167 
LX3T 0 0227*** 0 030*** -0 109*** 0 007 0 00731*** -0 053*** 
0 0050 0 0053 0 0167 0 002 00024 0 0214 
LX4T -0 0008 -0 007 0 096*** -0 015 -0 0!4*** 0 0497* 
0 0056 0 023 0 003 0 0030 0 0299 
LX5T 0 0280 0 0274*** 0.2280*** 
00041 0 0039 0 0331 
GIT2 0 105* 0011 -0 161 0 0468 0.0343*** 0 3857 
0 050 0 054 0202 0 0314 0 0300 0 2450 
GIT3 -006194 -0 1674*** -0 5585** -0 045 -0 067*** 0 1299 
00574 0 0572 0247 0 0391 0 0375 0 2427 
GIT4 0028 -0 077 -0 9621*** 0 0014 -0 0277*** 0 3008 
0 0663 0 0626 0 303 00449 0 0431 0 2038 
GIT5 o zoo••• 0 !54** -1 207*** 0 1053 0 0729*** -3 4190*** 
0 076 0 069 0402 0049 0047 I 0497 
GIT6 0 526*** 0 283*** 0119 -0 1203 -0 1454*** -I 262** 
0142 0 101 0 451 0 079 0 0755 0 5501 
G!T7 0 08 0 086 -4 21 0 0635 0 028*** -I 676*** 
0 081 0 070 3 916 0 0550 0 053 0 4251 
• s1gmjicant at 10% 
•• s1gmjicant at 5% 
*** szgmjicant at 1% 
lyl= total advances. ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total deposits, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowmgs, lx3= 
fu:ed assets. lx4= other assets, lx5 =total depos1ts, DT= per annum t1me dummy, groupDT =merger 
group dummy mteracted wzth per annum tzme dummy 
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Table E2 :Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA FE (2002), Banking System 
Dataset 
!Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel 1 Panel2 Panel3 
GlT8 0 1889** 0 234*** 0 214 0 1037 0 0683*** 02935 
0 0801 0 0703 0 291 0 055 0 053 0 202 
GIT9 0 213*** 0 3213*** -5 552 01445 0 1157*** -0 604** 
0 078 0 0686 3 799 0 0530 0 0511 0 294 
GlTlO 0.2459*** 0 4282*** 0 245 0 1914 0 1724*** -1 966*** 
0 076 00670 0 286 0 0492 00472 0 3949 
G!Tll 0 4238*** 0 698*** -8 oo5** 0 2333 0 22375*** -4 482* 
0 068 0 0616 3 8430 0 044 0 0424 2 644 
GlTl2 0 488*** 0 845*** 0 612 0 2399 0 2416*** -0 288 
0 068 0 065 0 039 0 0380 0 342 
G!Tl3 0 7418*** I 2299*** 0 671 0 2595 0 2750*** -0 264 
0 0657 0 0652 0 592 0 03844 0 0365 0 3436 
GlTl4 0 880*** I 4840*** 0 932 0 3572 0 3833*** -I 516* 
0 076 0 0745 0 0381 0 0364 0 916 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowings, lx3= 
fiXed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits, DT= per annum time dummy, groupDT =merger 
group dummy interacted w1th per annum time dummy. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA FE (2002), Banking System 
Data set 
JVanable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Pane12 Pane13 Panel I Pane12 Pane13 
LYI 
-0 1320 -0 3688*** 0 5018*** -0 07614*** 
0 1219 0 1347 00434 21324 
LY2 061591*** 0.8758*** 
0 07763 0 0835 
LXI 
-0 373*** -0 5472*** -0 1935*** -0 4351*** 
0 06532 0 0333 0 0221 6998 
LX2 -0 10227*** -o 053o••• -o o5o8••• -0 2278*** 
0 0218 0 016 0 0094 7574 
LX3 -0 234*** 0 0321*** o 0605*** -0 103*** 
0 042 0 0384 0 0206 1217 
LX4 
-0 1480*** -0 411*** -0 1752*** 0 2781*** 
00452 0 043 0 024 1591 
LX5 
-0 6276*** -0 1874*** 
0 0479 1575 
LYII 0 0434 0 1497*** -0 0135 -0 042*** 
0 0345 0 028 0 008 2814 
LY22 0 1058*** 0 0607••• 
0 02397 0 0234 
LXII 0 0373*** 0 026*** 0 0031 -0 0445*** 
0 0131 0 00429 0 0030 12736 
LX22 
-0 0147*** 0 00885*** -0 0047••• 0 0016*** 
0 0041 0002 0 0018 7017 
LX33 0 0298** -o 011••• 0 0156** 0 07319··· 
0 0146 0 011 0 0079 224 
LX44 0 0341** 0 047*** 0 0206* 0 0539*** 
0 0175 0 0123 0 0120 3244 
LX55 0 0345*** 0 1159*** 
0 0066 2376 
• significant at 10% 
•• stgnijicant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowings, lx3= 
fu:ed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 = total deposits, In TA = size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable dtstinguishing between banks that merged (value= 0) and 
those that d1d not (value= 1), tgroup = interachon between time trend and group dummy vanable, own2 
=dummy variable distinguishing between public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy variable 
distinguishing between publtc and foreign sector banks, HHI = Herjindahl-Hirschman Index of 
concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA FE (2002), Banking System 
Dataset 
IVanable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel) Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
LY1LY2 
-0 0839 0 1860*** 
0 0791 0 0824 
LX1LX2 
-0 006 -0 00739*** 0 0143*** 0 045*** 
0 0073 0 006 0 003 .1785 
LX1LX3 
-0 0303*** -0 0071*** -0.002 0 154*** 
0 010 0 0081 0 005 .2527 
LX1LX4 
-0 0100 -0 04415*** -0 024*** -0 0077*** 
0 0120 0 0097 0 0074 2868 
LX1LX5 0 0187** -0 1266*** 
00074 2198 
LX2LX3 0 0255** 0 0280*** -0 0303*** -0 0004*** 
0 0125 0 009 0 0068 2681 
LX2LX4 0 0115 -o 05oo••• -0 0098 0 0738*** 
00136 00116 0 0078 2339 
LX2LX5 0 04367*** -0 124*** 
0 0078 2415 
LX3LX4 
-0 0569** 0 0128*** 0 0330** -0 152*** 
00296 0020 0 0160 3910 
LX3LX5 -0 0339*** -0 0557*** 
00110 3750 
LX4LX5 
-0 0691*** 0 0066*** 
0 0165 4250 
• significant at 10% 
•• significant at 5% 
***Significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, /y2 =total investments, /y3= total deposits, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowzngs, lx3= 
fzxed assets, lx4= other assets, Ix5 =total deposits, lnTA =size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 0) and 
those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy vanable, own2 = 
dummy variable distinguishing between public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy variable 
distinguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of 
concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA FE (2002), Banking System 
Dataset 
!Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
LYILXI -0 1634*** -0 48177*** 0 0146 0 0163*** 
0 0502 0 0534 0 0098 3655 
LYILX2 0011 0 0439*** 0 0296*** 0 1267*** 
0 0387 0 036 0 007848 29318 
LYILX3 -0 28406*** 0 0182*** 0007442 -0 4065*** 
0 07260 0 069 0 012026 3707 
LYILX4 0.29448*** 0 1510*** -0 0742*** 0 2015*** 
00723 0069 0 018276 4517 
LYILX5 0 •• 0 1861*** 
0 011235 .2858 
LY2LXI 0 05649** 0 1500*** 
0 0267 0 029 
LY2LX2 
-0 0171 -0 027554*** 
00224 0 019656 
LY2LX3 0 1204*** 0 04472*** 
0 0366 0 038 
LY2LX4 
-0 1530*** -0 0873*** 
0 0397 0042 
LY2LX5 
T -0 04525*** -0 1013*** -0 0457*** -0 349*** 
0 0152 0 0098 0 00697 2448 
TSQ 
-0 00129 -0 00411*** -0 00075* -0 0094*** 
0 00093 0 000 0 00044 1800 
• significant at 10% 
•• s1gnijicant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowings, lx3= 
fiXed assets, lx4= other assets, Ix5 =total deposits, In TA= size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group= dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 0) 
and those that dtd not (value= 1), tgroup = interacflon between time trend and group dummy variable, 
own2 =dummy variable d1stingu1shing between public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy 
variable distinguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
of concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA FE (2002), Banking System 
Dataset 
!Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
LYIT 0 0346* 0 0842*** 0 006 -0 094*** 
0 0192 0020 0 004 190 
LY2T -0 0108 -0 0045*** -0 0244**• -0 045*** 
0 0104 0 011 0 0025 7255 
LX IT -0 0439*** -0 0365*** 0 0047*** -0 0381*** 
0 0048 0003 0 0012 7968 
LX2T 0 0058** 0 0101*** 0 0064*** 0 0203*** 
0 0028 0 0023 0 0022 1205 
LX3T -0 001 0 0203*** -0 0129*** 0 0517*** 
0 0045 0 0042 0 0028 1523 
LX4T 0 0273*** -o ooo5••• 0 0284*•• o o7o••• 
0 00543 0 0047 00033 1538 
GROUPT 
-0 0198•• -0 0094*** -0 0088• -0 0793 ... 
0 01018 0 0046 0 005 905 
• significant at 10% 
•• significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowings, 
lx3= fu:ed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits, lnTA =size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 0) 
and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 =dummy variable dzstmguishing between public and private sector banks, own3 = 
dummy variable d1st1ngu•shmg between public and foreign sector banks, HHI = Herjindahl-
Hirschman Index of concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates - True SF A RE (2002), Banking System 
Data set 
PRODUCTION APPROACH 
Panel! 
LYI 
LY2 
LXI 
LX2 
LX3 
LX4 
LX5 
LYll 
LY22 
LXll 
LX22 
LX33 
LX44 
LX55 
* sigmjicant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel3 
-0 2009*** 
0 0271 
0 5392*** 
0 0160 
-0 4753*** 
0 0080 
-0 1674*** 
0 0060 
-0 1574*** 
0 0093 
-0 2361*** 
0 0124 
0 1361*** 
00072 
0 1368*** 
0 0048 
0 0370*** 
0 0012 
-0 0234*** 
0 0013 
-0 0271*** 
0 0029 
0 01346*** 
0 0035 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! 
0 6012*** 
0 0151 
-0 2222*** 
00097 
-0 0776*** 
00046 
-0 0420*** 
00092 
-0 1021*** 
0 0107 
-0 5603*** 
00097 
0 01312*** 
00028 
0 01086*** 
0 0012 
-0 0084*** 
00009 
-0 003 
0 0037 
0 00234 
0 0053 
0 0601*** 
0 0027 
Panel2 
0 5726*** 
0 0215 
-0 2124*** 
0 0135 
-0 0904*** 
00064 
-0 0508*** 
0 0133 
-0 0624*** 
0 0158 
-0 5834*** 
00132 
0 007* 
0 0039 
Panel3 
0 4164*** 
0 0081 
-0 1918*** 
0 0054 
-0 1485*** 
0 0028 
-0 1354*** 
0 0043 
-0 0952*** 
0 0064 
-0 4280*** 
00056 
0 0231*** 
0 0016 
0 01104827*** 0 0071*** 
0001838 00006 
-0 0108*** 
0 001276 
00022 
0 00566 
0 00493 
0 0078 
0 0597*** 
0 0038 
-00171*** 
0 0005 
0 0378*** 
0 00192 
0 0136*** 
0 0032 
0 0253*** 
0 0015 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, lxl= wages, lx2= total borrowings, 
lx3- fu:ed assets, lx4- other assets, lxS - total deposits, In TA = size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distmguishmg between banks that merged (value= 
0) and those that did not (value = 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 =dummy variable distinguishing between public and private sector banks, own3 = 
dummy variable distinguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHI = Herjindahl-
Hirschman Index of concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA RE (2002), Banking System 
Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
LY1LY2 -0 2034*** 
0 0134 
LXILX2 0 0129*** 0 00235 0 0065*** 0 0179*** 
0 0019 0 00177 0 00254 0 001095 
LXILX3 -0 0203*** -0 0068** -0 OIOO••• -0 0002 
00026 0 002731 0 00381 0 00151 
LXILX4 -0 0393!••• 0 00771** 0 0017 0 00210 
00029 0 003567 0 0055 0 00182 
LXILX5 -0 01000** -0 0038 -o 0202••• 
0 003907 0 0055 0 002139 
LX2LX3 0 0529··· -0 0064** -0 0102** -0 0229··· 
0 0031 0 003234 0 00470 0 001806 
LX2LX4 -0 0140••• -0 01639··· -0 0136** -0 0398*** 
0 0038 0 003723 0 00536 0 0025 
LX2LX5 o 0435o••• 0 0461*** 0 0998*** 
0 003183 0 0042 0 0020 
LX3LX4 0 0261*** 0 0717*** 0 0702*** 0 0539*** 
0 0054 0 007196 0 01071 0 00311 
LX3LX5 -0 0642*** -0 0674*** -0 1062*** 
0 00497 0 0070 0 0027 
LX4LX5 -0 0727*** -0 0760*** -0 0430*** 
0 007223 0 0103 0 0043 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at I% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, Ixl= wages, lx2= total borrowings, 
lx3= fu:ed assets,lx4= other assets,lx5 =total depos1ts,lnTA =size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 
0) and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup = interachon between hme trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 = dummy variable distinguishing between public and private sector banks, own3 = 
dummy variable drshnguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHI = Herjindahi-
Hirschman Index of concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA RE (2002), Banking System 
Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
LYILXI -0.1320*** 0 05261*** 0 04663*** 0.0213*** 
0 0102 0 004722 0 0067 0 0023 
LYILX2 0 08912*** -0 0049* 0 0026 0 0044** 
0 0088 0 002851 0 0037 0 0019 
LYILX3 0 0372*** -0 0301*** -0 0288*** -0 0121*** 
00117 0 005514 0 0074 0 0027 
LYILX4 -0 14906*** -0 0355*** -0 0379*** -0 0489*** 
0 0141 0 006587 0 0087 0 0041 
LYILX5 0 06859*** 0 0672*** 0 0569*** 
0 005484 0 0068 0 0025 
LY2LXI 0 1251*** 
0 0057 
LY2LX2 -0 0539*** 
0 0053 
LY2LX3 0 0474*** 
0 0071 
LY2LX4 0 0110 
0 0086 
LY2LX5 
T -0 1072*** -0 0644*** -00511*** -0 05614*** 
0 0063 0 0059 0 0095 0 0033 
TSQ -0 0042*** -0 0034*** -0 0018** -0 0032*** 
00006 0 0005 0 0007 0 0003 
LYIT 0 08297*** 0 0083*** 0 0045 -0 0076*** 
00043 0 0020 0 0029 0 0010 
LY2T -0 05781*** 
0 0025 
• significant at 10% 
•• significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, /xi= wages, lx2= total borrowings, 
lx3= fu:ed assets, lx4= other assets, lx5 =total deposits, lnTA =size, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 0) 
and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between tlme trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 =dummy variable dtstinguishing between public and pnvate sector banks, own3 = 
dummy variable distinguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHI = Herjindahl-
Hirschman Index of concentration. 
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Table E2 : Chapter 6, Parameter Estimates- True SFA RE (2002), Banking System 
Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
LX IT -0 0321*** -0 02013*** -0 02063*** -0 022*** 
0 0010 0 001259 0 00176 00007 
LX2T 0 0124*** 0 0011* -0 0003 -0 0026*** 
00009 0 000673 0 0009 00004 
LX3T -0 0001 -0 002* -0 0031* -0 0112*** 
0 0013 0 0011 0 0016 00006 
LX4T 0 0122*** -0 0061*** -0 0028 -0 0020** 
0 0017 0 0014 0 0021 0 00083 
LX5T 0 0273*** 0.0275*** 0 03837*** 
0 0017 0 0024 0 00087 
GROUP! 0 2361*** 0 12718*** 0 1240*** 0 0839*** 
0 0324 0 0283 0 0481 0 01625 
GROUP IT 0 0337*** 0 0051 0 0067 0 0134*** 
0 0043 0 0038 0 0067 0 0021 
OWN2 0 0036 -0 0077 0 0352** 0 0284*** 
0 0144 0 0113 0 01786 0 0067 
OWN3 0 43678*** -0 0220 0 01343 0 2293*** 
0 0167 0 01520 00227 0 00868 
LNTA -I 2263*** -0 1812* 0 4560*** -0 1829*** 
0 1294 0 103349 0 1641 0 0651 
LNPROVS -0 0159*** -0 00487** -0 00188 -0 0178*** 
0 0023 0 0024 0 0038 0 0011 
RHH1 o oo2o••• o ooo8••• -.3580 0 00112*** 
00002 0 000191 0 0003 0 0001 
• significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
ly1= total advances, ly2 =total investments,ly3= total deposits,lx1= wages,lx2= total borrowings,lx3= 
fiXed assets, lx4= other assets, Ix5 =total deposits, In TA= size, 
lnprovs =proviSions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 0) 
and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy variable, 
own2 =dummy variable distinguishing between public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy variable 
distinguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHI = Herfindahl-Hmchman Index of 
concentratlon. 
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APPENDIX F: PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR CHAPTER 7. 
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Table Fl: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles Random Effects Retail Banks 
Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel 3 
lp2 0 158*** 0 0843*** 0 161*** 
(00188) (0 0131) (0 0144) 
lp3 0 0699*** 0 0885*** 0 0601*** 0 0399*** 0 0214*** 0 0320*** 
(0 00741) (0 0112) (0 00608) (0 00672) (0 00455) (0 00515) 
lp4 0 682*** 0 174*** 0 677*** 0474*** 0 0136** 0 439*** 
(0 0166) (0 0141) (0 0132) (00518) (0 00632) (0 0378) 
lyl 0 109** -0 0315 0 136*** 0458*** 0 433*** 0 508*** 
(0 0547) (0 0834) (0 0441) (0 0284) (0 0202) (0 0214) 
ly2 0-280*** 0 284*** 0 196*** 0452*** 0 527*** 0 430*** 
(0 0575) (0 0980) (0 0464) (0 0273) (0 0197) (0 0207) 
ly3 0535*** 0 761*** 0 629*** 
(0 0985) (0 157) (0 0797) 
lp22 -0 00667 0 0541*** -0 0112 
(0 0124) (0 0136) (0 00922) 
lp33 0 0117*** 0 00179 0 0110*** 0 00512** 0 00192 0 00569*** 
(0 00205) (0 00416) (0 00170) (0 00199) (0 00164) (000159) 
lp44 0 0853*** -0 0186*** 0 0716*** 0 246*** 0 00196 0 215*** 
(0 00952) (0 00389) (0 00655) (0 0350) (0 00192) (0 0273) 
lyll 0 0491*** 0 0566 0 0451*** 0 0963*** 0 0795*** 0 0920*** 
(0 0107) (0 0947) (0 00904) (0 00907) (0 0209) (0 00737) 
ly22 -0 141** -0 189 -0 0604 0 0995*** 0 0622** 0 0813*** 
(0 0701) (0 224) (0 0575) (0 0151) (0 0250) (0 0122) 
ly33 -0 459*** -0.223 -0 313*** 
(0 131) (0 329) (0 109) 
lp2lp3 0 0129* 0 00852 0 0142** 
(0 00782) (0 00815) (0 00628) 
lp2lp4 -0 0779*** 0 0638*** -0 113*** 
(0 0270) (0 0121) (0 0209) 
lp3lp4 -0 0416*** 0 00580 -0 0367*** -0 00978 0 0128*** 0 00121 
(0 00725) (0 00846) (0 00589) (0 0143) (0 00370) (0 0115) 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, PJ=price of depoSits,p2= pnce offu:ed 
assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 0) and 
those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between tlme trend and group dummy variable, own2 = 
dummy variable distmguishing between public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy variable 
distinguishing between public and foreign sector banks, HHI = Herjindahl-Hrrschman Index of 
concentration. 
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Table Fl: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles Random Effect Retail Banks 
Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
lylly2 -0 247*** -0 149 -0221*** -0 187*** -0 131*** -0 163*** 
(00631) (0 170) (0 0527) (0 0239) (0 0455) (0 0194) 
lylly3 0 142** 0 0385 0.132** 
(0 0649) (0 281) (0 0545) 
ly2ly3 0 650*** 0 459 0 412*** 
(0 184) (0 508) (0 152) 
lp2lyl 0 0353 0 00979 00294 
(0 0232) (0 0215) (00185) 
lp2ly2 -0 0336 -0 000261 -0 0145 
(0 0231) (0 0237) (0 0184) 
lp2ly3 
lp3lyl 00213 -0 0494 0 0332** 00112 0 00365 0 0108 
(0 0169) (0 0378) (0 0139) (0 0116) (0 00892) (0 00904) 
lp3ly2 0 0359* -0 195*** 0 0345** -0 00838 -0 00625 -0 0119 
(0 0208) (0 0649) (00171) (00111) (0 00965) (0 00880) 
lp3ly3 -0 0577* 0 249** -0 0731*** 
(0 0308) (0 0976) (0 0258) 
lp4lyl -0 00432 -0 0698 -0 00639 0 0894*** -0 0378*** 0 0891 ••• 
(0 0252) (0 0471) (0 0208) (0 0340) (0 0121) (0 0269) 
lp4ly2 -0 0323 0 185** -0 0137 -0 110*** 0 0322*** -0 103*** 
(0 0406) (0 0730) (0 0338) (0 0342) (00119) (0 0276) 
lp4ly3 0 0151 -0 123 0 00211 
(0 0575) (0 lll) (0 0487) 
lp2t 0 0140*** 0 00255 0 0132*** 
(0 00431) (0 00360) (0 00352) 
lp3t -0 00390*** 0 00305 -0 00228* -0 00236* 0 00425*** -0 000825 
(0 00150) (000319) (0 00126) (0 00141) (0 00133) (000116) 
lp4t 0000611 -0 00791*** 0 000586 0 00885 0 000449 0 0168*** 
(0 00307) (0 00287) (0 00255) (0 00636) (0 00152) (0 00521) 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, Pl=price of deposits, p2= price of fixed 
assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable disdnguishing between banks that merged (value= 0) 
and those that d1d not (value= 1), tgroup = mteractlon between tlme trend and group dummy variable, 
own2 = dummy variable distinguishing between publiC and private sector banks, own3 = dummy 
vanable distinguishing between public and fore~gn sector banks, HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
of concentration. 
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Table Fl: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles Random Effects Retail Banks 
Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel 3 
lylt -0 00980 0 0454** -0 0136* -0 00766 0 00870* -0 0134*** 
(0 00861) (0 0184) (0 00713) (0 00534) (0 00520) (0 00431) 
ly2t -0 00102 0 0712*** -0 00296 0 00248 -0 00910* 0 00512 
(0 0106) (0 0228) (0 00873) (0 00527) (0 00526) (0 00431) 
ly3t 0 00714 -0 112*** 0 0123 
(0 0154) (0 0341) (0 0128) 
t 0 0972*** -0 121*** -0 00579 0 0780*** -0 0415*** 0 0279*** 
(0 0156) (0 0228) (0 0121) (0 0107) (0 00750) (0 00857) 
tsq 0 00380*** 0 00152*** 
0 00145** 0 00117** 0 00356*** 0 00337*** 
(0 000650) (0 00102) (0 000547) (0 000609) (0 000462) (0 000507) 
lnprovs -0 00547 -0 0544*** -0 00324 0 00790 -0 000770 0 00838 
(0 0107) (0 0200) (0 00858) (0 00978) (0 00795) (0 00760) 
group 0 363*** 0 266*** -0 0433 0 431*** -0 00389 -0 0227 
(0 0648) (0 0850) (0 0451) (0 0572) (0 0333) (0 0360) 
!group -0 000763 0 00190 -0 0430*** 0 00371 0 000705 
0 0451*** 
(0 00626) (0 00944) (0 00472) (0 00575) (0 00373) (0 00427) 
own2 -0 0952** -0 335*** -0 0603* -0 0740** -0 0892*** -0 0550** 
(0 0398) (0 0585) (0 0323) (0 0341) (0 0236) (0 0240) 
own3 -0 0475 -0 473*** 0 00981 0 0122 -0 0921*** 0 0938*** 
(0 0437) (0 0710) (0 0360) (0 0392) (0 0289) (0 0295) 
Constant -0 333*** 0 968*** 0 0879 -0 586*** 0 118* -0 133** 
(0 102) (0 164) (0 0786) (0 0906) (0 0662) (0 0658) 
* s•gnificant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
ly1~ total advances, ly2 ~total investments, ly3~ total deposits, PI ==price of deposits, p2~ price of 
fiXed assets, p3 ~price of borrowings, p4 ~price of Iahore, 
lnprovs ~provisions, group ~dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value~ 
0) and those that did not (value~ 1), tgroup ~ mteraction between time trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 = dummy vanable distinguishing between pub/le and pnvate sector banks, own3 = 
dummy variable distmguishmg between public and foreign sector banks, HH1 ~ Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of concentration. 
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Table Fl: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles Fixed Effects Retail Banks 
Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I 
lp2 0 131*** 0 0643*** 0 !59*** 
(0 0174) (0 0!33) (0 0147) 
lp3 0 0536*** 0 0641*** 0 0499*** 0 0323*** 0 0220*** 0 0328*** 
(0 00778) (0 0121) (0 00652) (0 00711) (0 00433) (0 00606) 
lp4 0 727*** 0 163*** 0 710*** 0 371*** 0 00982* 0 288*** 
(0 0181) (0 0152) (0 0145) (0 0588) (0 00586) (0 0489) 
ly1 0 0617 0 0323 0 125*** 0 467*** 0 345*** 0 471*** 
(0 0486) (0 0923) (0 0423) (0 0271) (0 0202) (0 0238) 
ly2 0 208*** 0348*** 0 171*** 0 437*** 0458*** 0 389*** 
(0 0540) (0 109) (0 0451) (0 0289) (0 0216) (0 0249) 
ly3 0 690*** 0436** 0 663*** 
(0 0917) (0 187) (0 0778) 
lp22 -0 0106 0 0445*** -0 00504 
(0 0114) (0 0128) (0 00864) 
lp33 0 00977*** -0 00300 0 00887*** 000411** 0 000640 0 00526*** 
(0 00!93) (0 00423) (0 00164) (000185) (0 00148) (0 00161) 
lp44 0 0662*** 0 0538*** 0 204*** -0 000541 0 136*** 
0 0170*** 
(0 00926) (0 00393) (0 00638) (0 0340) (0 00175) (0 0262) 
lyll 0 0470*** 0 123 0 0504*** 0 0903*** 0 0502** 0 0947*** 
(0 0102) (0 101) (0 00889) (0 00828) (0 0!99) (0.00736) 
ly22 -0 170*** -0 0363 -0 0743 0 101*** 0 0597** 0 0832*** 
(0 0647) (0 226) (0 0527) (0 0133) (0 0236) (0 0115) 
ly33 -0415*** -0 !44 -0 279*** 
(0 117) (0 335) (0 0963) 
lp2lp3 0 0137** -0 000548 0 0216*** 
(0 00677) (0 00688) (0 00572) 
lp2lp4 -0 0429* 0 0367*** -0.0617*** 
(0 0246) (0 0112) (0 0206) 
lp3lp4 -0 0319*** -0 00909 -0 0344*** 0 0120 0 00743** 0 0309*** 
(0 00652) (0 00830) (0 00551) (0 0130) (0 00330) (0 0113) 
• Significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl~ total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, Pl=price of deposits, p2~ price of fixed 
assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 = pr1ce of Iahore, 
lnprovs ~provisions, group ~dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 0) and 
those that did not (value= 1), tgroup = interachon between time trend and group dummy variable, own1 = 
dummy varzable for publ1c and private sector banks, own3 ~dummy variable for public and foreign sector 
banks •• 
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Table Fl: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles Fixed Effects Retail Banks 
Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel 2 Pane13 Panel I Panel 2 Pane13 
lylly2 -0 201 ••• -0 153 -0 202*** -0 I 70*** -0 0987** -0 184*** 
(0 0567) (0 I 72) (0 0486) (0 0223) (0 0431) (0 0198) 
lylly3 0 0884 -0 0859 0 0854* 
(0 0574) (0 292) (00491) 
lp2ly1 0 0622*** 0 0348* 0 0155 
(0 0209) (0 0197) (0 01 77) 
lp21y2 -0 0166 -0 0240 
0 0658*** 
(0 0208) (0 0216) (0 0177) 
ly21y3 0 665*** 0 254 0 404*** 
(0 167) (0 507) (0 136) 
lp31y1 0 0197 -0 0482 0 0236* 0 00152 -0 00938 0 0147* 
(0 0153) (0 0380) (0 0130) (0 0103) (0 00757) (0 00880) 
lp31y2 0 0535*** -0 164** 0 0263 -0 000675 0 00731 -0 0107 
(0 0189) (0 0655) (0 0160) (0 00988) (0 00820) (0 00851) 
lp31y3 -0 0785*** 0 224** -00517** 
(0 0274) (0 0987) (0 0236) 
lp4lyl -0 0515** -0 0924** -0 0144 0 0544* 0 0650** 
0 0404*** 
(0 0243) (0 0463) (0 0202) (0 0320) (0 0106) (0 0274) 
1p41y2 -0 0366 0 142** -0 0140 -0 0821** 0 0398*** -0 116*** 
(0 0378) (0 0718) (0 0321) (0 0320) (0 0104) (0 0283) 
lp4ly3 0 0603 -0 0523 0 0158 
(0 0543) (0 109) (0 0466) 
lp2t 0 0153*** 0 0121 ••• 0 0159*** 
(0 00383) (0 00329) (0 00342) 
lp3t 0 000648 -0 00229* 0 00141 -0 00156 
0 00485*** 0 00250** 
(0 00144) (0 00327) (0 00125) (0 00126) (0 00120) (0 001 13) 
lp4t 0 00419 0 000478 0 00452 0 00192 0 0109** 
0 00901*** 
(0 00285) (0 00287) (0 00249) (0 00593) (0 00138) (0 00507) 
• stgnificant at 10% 
** szgnificant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments, ly3= total deposits, Pl=price of deposits,p2= przce of 
fzxed assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, 
/nprovs = provzszons, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 
0) and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup = mteractzon between time trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 =dummy variable for public and private sector banks, own3 = dummy variable for 
public and foreign sector banks.. 
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Table Fl: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles Fixed Effects Retail Banks 
Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel] Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
lylt -0 00980 0 0554*** -0 0147** -0 00890* 0 00231 -0 00920** 
(0 00808) (0 0194) (0 00690) (0 00490) (0 00493) (0 00428) 
ly2t 0 00286 0 0700*** -0 000832 -0 000644 -0 00468 0 00633 
(0 00997) (0 0240) (0 00845) (0 00496) (0 00509) (0 00442) 
ly3t -0 00405 -0 117*** 00130 
(0 0140) (0 0341) (0 0117) 
tsq 0 00237*** 0 00259*** 0 000908*** 
0 00323*** 0 00149*** 0 00106*** 
(0 000556) (0 000979) (0 000449) (0 000481) (0 000341) (0 000397) 
DT2 0 221 ••• -0 121 0.150*** 0 213*** 0 00286 0 183*** 
(0 0726) (0 128) (0 0558) (0 0640) (0 0453) (0 0503) 
DT3 -0 0714 -0 183 -0 0276 0 0208 -0 0743 -0 00595 
(0 0998) (0 130) (0 0588) (0 0872) (0 0455) (0 0528) 
DT4 -0 0399 -0 270** -0 108* 0 0335 0 0721 -0 0683 
(0 0899) (0 122) (0 0559) (0 0796) (0 0441) (0 0513) 
DT5 -0 00635 -0431*** -0 0863 0 141* -0 0789 0 00571 
(0 0952) (0 137) (00618) (0 0826) (0 0488) (0 0556) 
DT6 00926 -0 606*** -0 0391 0 253*** -0 0528 00767 
(0 0896) (0 121) (0 0579) (0 0775) (0 0454) (0 0523) 
DT7 -0 0103 -0 544*** -0 0822 0 161** -0 0696 0 0558 
(00861) (0.119) (0 0568) (0 0750) (0 0442) (0 0516) 
DT8 0 0409 -0 344*** -0 00575 0 199*** -0 0771* 0 122** 
(0 0842) (0 124) (0 0584) (0 0733) (0 0442) (0 0527) 
DT9 00424 -0 384*** -0 0334 0 200*** -0 0479 0 107* 
(0 0835) (0 129) (0 0605) (0 0729) (0 0458) (0 0546) 
DTIO 0 245*** -0 285** 0 0288 0 280*** -00617 0 128** 
(0 0829) (0 136) (0 0639) (0 0722) (00481) (0 0575) 
DTII 0 172** -0 169 0 0599 0 258*** -0 155*** 0 134** 
(0 0878) (0 144) (0 0710) (0 0766) (0 0508) (0 0638) 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, PI =price of deposits, p2= price offzxed 
assets, p3 = pnce of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, DT =per annum flme dummy, GDT = interaction 
between merger group dummy and per annum time dummy. 
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Table Fl: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles Fixed Effects Retail Banks 
Data set 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel 3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
DTI2 0 0520 -0 124 0 0339 0 121 -0 0391 00872 
(0 0909) (0 !54) (0 0786) (0 0793) (0 0540) (0 0705) 
DTI3 00244 -0 I28 -0 0443 0 068I -0 0490 -0 0103 
(0 0947) (0 I61) (0 0826) (0 0825) (0 0564) (0 0740) 
DTI4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
groupDT2 -0 I80** 0 IIO -0 105* -0 189*** -0 046I -0 143*** 
(0 0739) (0 I31) (0 0572) (0 0650) (0 0463) (0 0515) 
groupDT3 0 000284 -0 00670 -0 0302 -0 II3 0 0305 -0 0460 
(0 IOI) (0 137) (0 06II) (0 0883) (0 0477) (0 0548) 
groupDT4 -0 I26 OOIII -0 0107 -0 209** -0 0807* -0 0285 
(0 0932) (0 130) (0 0587) (0 0822) (0 0456) (0 0535) 
groupDT5 -0 138 0 II2 0 OI81 -0 205** 0 0993* 00232 
(0 0985) (0 I47) (0 0630) (0 085I) (0 0507) (0 0564) 
groupDT6 -0 I 75* 0 336** 0 0525 -0 296*** 0 00193 0 00900 
(0 0931) (0 133) (0 0587) (0 0803) (0 0472) (0 0527) 
groupDT7 -0 147 0 249* 0 0826 -0 270*** 0 0232 00258 
(0 0927) (0 I32) (0 0586) (0 0802) (0 0466) (0 0526) 
groupDT8 -0 232** 0 05I7 0 0231 -0 338*** 00017I -0 Oil I 
(0 0928) (0 I36) (0 0607) (0 0803) (0 0476) (0 0544) 
groupDT9 -0 349*** 0 I 53 0 OI40 -0 452*** -0 0304 -0 0346 
(0 0930) (0 I37) (0 0623) (0 0807) (0048I) (0 0557) 
groupDTIO -0 583*** 0 I II 0 OOI94 -0 576*** -0 009I9 -0 02I 7 
(0 0934) (0 I44) (0 0652) (0 08I2) (0 0502) (0 0584) 
• s1gmjicant at 10% 
•• significant at 5% 
*** s1gnijicant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total depoSits, Pl=price of deposits, p2= price of fu:ed 
assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, DT =per annum time dummy, GDT =interaction 
between merger group dummy and per annum flme dummy. 
419 
AppendzxF2 
Table Fl: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles Fixed Effects Retail Banks 
Data set 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
groupDTII -0 559*** 0 00745 -0 00719 -0 618*** 0 0524 -0 0135 
(0 0978) (0 153) (00718) (0 0846) (0 0529) (0 0643) 
groupDT12 -0 570*** -0 0855 -0 0179 -0 652*** -0 0865 -0 0393 
(0 0983) (0 162) (0 0771) (0 0848) (0 0564) (0 0689) 
groupDTJ3 -0 707*** -0 0652 0 00173 -0 772*** -0 0424 -0 0247 
(0 0990) (0 163) (0 0779) (0 0855) (0 0565) (0 0695) 
groupDT14 -0 747*** -0 0822 -0 0169 -0 813*** -0 0736 -0 0559 
(0 100) (0 166) (0 0792) (0 0868) (0 0574) (0 0706) 
Constant -0 0678* 0 534*** 0 0791** -0 117*** -0 102*** -0 0199 
(0 0412) (0 0702) (0 0367) (0 0360) (0 0263) (0 0321) 
• significant at I 0% 
•• significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, PI =price of deposits, p2= price of 
fu:ed assets, p3 = pr~ce of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, Pl=pr~ce of deposzts,p2= price of 
fzxed assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, DT =per annum time dummy, GDT = 
interaction between merger group dummy and per annum time dummy 
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Table Fl: Parameter Estimates, Battese and Coelli, 1992 Retail Banks Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH 
lp2 
lp3 
lp4 
lyl 
ly2 
ly3 
lp22 
lp33 
lp44 
ly11 
ly22 
ly33 
lp2lp3 
lp2lp4 
lp3lp4 
Panel! 
0 0566*** 
(0 00699) 
0 711*** 
(0 0167) 
0 145*** 
(0 0512) 
0.249*** 
(0 0511) 
0 560*** 
(0 0897) 
0 00979*** 
(0 00186) 
0 0816*** 
(0 00902) 
0 0489*** 
(0 00945) 
-0 166*** 
(0 0628) 
-0 486*** 
(0 119) 
-0 0345*** 
(0 00661) 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
Panel2 
0 0852*** 
(0 0106) 
0 162*** 
(0 0135) 
-0 0829 
(0 0826) 
0 337*** 
(0 0946) 
0 745*** 
(0 !55) 
0 00135 
(0 00390) 
-0 0192*** 
(0 00364) 
0139 
(0 0872) 
-0 112 
(0 204) 
0 0205 
(0 302) 
0 0107 
(0 00780) 
Panel 3 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I 
0 142*** 
(0 0177) 
0 0295*** 
(0 00636) 
0456*** 
(0 0518) 
0489*** 
(0 0260) 
0428*** 
(0 0262) 
0 00366 
(00115) 
0 00439** 
(000183) 
0 245*** 
(0 0330) 
0 0924*** 
(0 00786) 
0 0978*** 
(0 0133) 
0 0123* 
(0 00691) 
-0 0822*** 
(0 0248) 
0 00880 
(0 0132) 
Panel2 Panel3 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposlls, Pl=price of deposits,p2= price of 
fu:ed assets, p3 =price of borrowmgs, p4 = pr~ce of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group= dummy var~able distmguishmg between banks that merged (value= 0) 
and those that d1d not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 =dummy variable for public and pnvate sector banks, own3 =dummy vanable for 
public and forelgn sector banks .. 
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Table Fl: Parameter Estimates, Battese and Coelli, 1992 Retail Banks Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel 2 
lylly2 -0.234*** -0 110 
(0 0563) (0 153) 
lylly3 
ly2ly3 
lp2lyl 
lp2ly2 
lp2ly3 
lp3lyl 
lp3ly2 
lp3ly3 
lp4ly1 
lp4ly2 
lp4ly3 
lp2t 
lp3t 
lp4t 
0 139** 
(0 0586) 
0 699*** 
(0 166) 
00137 
(0 0152) 
0 0525*** 
(0 0181) 
-0 0710*** 
(0 0270) 
-0 0325 
(0 0230) 
-00617* 
(0 0368) 
0 0718 
(0 0522) 
-0 00152 
(0 00144) 
-0 00172 
(0 00280) 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
-0 222 
(0 258) 
0264 
(0 463) 
-0 0476 
(0 0346) 
-0 224*** 
(0 0596) 
0 269*** 
(0 0896) 
-0 0606 
(0 0429) 
0 177*** 
(0 0665) 
-0 119 
(0 101) 
0 00297 
(0 00301) 
-0 00600** 
(0 00268) 
Panel3 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel 2 
-0 173*** 
(00210) 
0 0480** 
(0 0208) 
-0 0597*** 
(0 0208) 
0 00369 
(0 0103) 
-0 00151 
(0 00991) 
0 0867*** 
(0 0310) 
-0 109*** 
(0 0326) 
0 0171*** 
(0 00388) 
-0 00158 
(0 00125) 
0 00303 
(0 00596) 
Panel3 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, PI =price of deposits,p2= price of 
fu:ed assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable dishnguishmg between banks that merged (value= 0) 
and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 = dummy variable for public and private sector banks, own3 = dummy variable for 
public and fore~gn sector banks •• 
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Table Fl: Parameter Estimates, Battese and Coelli, 1992 Retail Banks Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH 
Panel! 
lylt -0 0155* 
(0 00803) 
ly2t 0 00836 
(0 00948) 
ly3t 0 00110 
(0 0141) 
0 123*** 
(0 0152) 
tsq -0 00225*** 
(0 000658) 
In pro vs -0 0232** 
(0 0100) 
group 0 0901 
(0 0755) 
tgroup -0 0333*** 
(0 00659) 
own2 00447 
(0 0401) 
own3 -0 0240 
(0 0432) 
eta 0 0434*** 
(0 00874) 
* sigmficant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel3 
0 0466*** 
(0 0172) 
0 0496** 
(00215) 
-0 0876*** 
(0 0321) 
-0 0704** 
(0 0278) 
0 00321 ••• 
(0 00105) 
-0 0634*** 
(0 0187) 
0 219** 
(0 0982) 
-0 00311 
(0 00870) 
-0 290*** 
(0 0631) 
-0 381*** 
(0 0747) 
0 0506*** 
(0 0135) 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel 2 
-0 0128*** 
(0 00481) 
0 00796 
(0 00494) 
0 119*** 
(0 0130) 
-0 0048*** 
(0 000675) 
-0 00346 
(0 00902) 
0 0398 
(0 0694) 
-0 0333*** 
(0 00709) 
0 0794** 
(0 0369) 
0 0439 
(0 0392) 
0 0360*** 
(0 00970) 
Panel3 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, Pl=price of deposits, p2= price of 
fzxed assets, p3 =price of bo"owmgs, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group= dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 
0) and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup = interaction between tlme trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 =dummy variable for public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy variable for 
public and foreign sector banks •• 
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Table Fl: Parameter Estimates, Reifschneider and Stevenson Retail Banks Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH 
Panel 1 Panel 2 
lp2 
lp3 
lp4 
lyl 
ly2 
ly3 
Jp22 
lp33 
lp44 
lyll 
ly22 
ly33 
lp2lp3 
lp2lp4 
lp3lp4 
* s1gmjicant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
Panel3 
0 0366*** 
(0 00584) 
0 754*** 
(0 0103) 
0 411*** 
(0 0380) 
0 348*** 
(0 0374) 
0 250*** 
(0 0659) 
0 00706*** 
(0 00163) 
0 0940*** 
(0 00436) 
0 0578*** 
(0 0165) 
0 0163 
(0 0940) 
-0 147 
(0 163) 
-0 0410*** 
(0 00591) 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
0 143*** 
(0 0109) 
0 0194*** 
(0 00437) 
0 459*** 
(0 0275) 
0 542*** 
(0 0153) 
0445*** 
(0 0145) 
-0 0148* 
(0 00840) 
0 00392*** 
(0 00143) 
0 189*** 
(0 0210) 
0 109*** 
(0 0140) 
0 0947*** 
(0 0182) 
0 00907 
(0 00638) 
-0 143*** 
(0 0184) 
-0 0136 
(0 0121) 
lyl= total advances, /y2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, PI =price of deposlls,p2= price of 
fu:ed assets, p3 =price of bo"owmgs, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable chsdngUishing between banks that merged (value= 
0) and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 =dummy variable for publ1c and private sector banks, own3 = dummy variable for 
public and foreign sector banks .. 
424 
AppendzxF2 
Table Fl: Parameter Estimates, Reifschneider and Stevenson Retail Banks Data set 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel 2 
lylly2 
lylly3 
ly2ly3 
lp2lyl 
lp2ly2 
lp2ly3 
lp3lyl 
lp3ly2 
lp3ly3 
lp4lyl 
lp4ly2 
lp4ly3 
lp2t 
lp3t 
lp4t 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
Panel3 
-0 156 
(0 I 01) 
0 0644 
(0 0910) 
0 167 
(0 243) 
-0 0271 
(0 0171) 
0 00989 
(0 0221) 
0 0167 
(0 0349) 
0 0284 
(0 0288) 
0 0992*** 
(0 0355) 
-0 168*** 
(00561) 
0 000150 
(0 00141) 
-0 0126*** 
(0 00272) 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel 2 Panel3 
-0 198*** 
(0.0317) 
0 0583*** 
(0 0225) 
-0 0424* 
(0 0241) 
-0 00743 
(0 00845) 
0 00702 
(0 00833) 
-0 0211 
(00301) 
-0 000917 
(0 0300) 
0 0102*** 
(0 00360) 
-0 00227** 
(0 00112) 
0 00670 
(0 00557) 
lyl= total advances,lyZ =total mvestments,ly3= total deposits, Pl=price of deposits,pZ= price of fixed 
assets, p3 =price of borrowmgs, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 0) 
and those that d1d not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy variable, 
own2 =dummy variable for public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy variable for public and 
foreign sector banks.. 
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Table Fl: Parameter Estimates, Reifschneider and Stevenson Retail Banks Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH 
Panel 1 
lylt 
ly2t 
ly3t 
tsq 
Constant 
lnprovs 
group 
!group 
own2 
own3 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel3 
-0 0387*** 
(0 0108) 
-0 0412*** 
(0 0112) 
0 0755*** 
(0 0194) 
0 0340*** 
(0 00988) 
-0 00316*** 
(0 000591) 
-0.398*** 
(0 0424) 
-0 286*** 
(0 0931) 
-0 183*** 
(0 0443) 
-0 868** 
(0 347) 
0 101** 
(0 0476) 
0 317** 
(0 151) 
2 252*** 
(0171) 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel 1 Pane12 Panel3 
-0 00699 
(0 00459) 
0 000920 
(0 00447) 
0 0302*** 
(0 00720) 
-0 00396*** 
(0 000434) 
-0 212*** 
(0 0319) 
-0 224*** 
(0 0526) 
-0 337 
(0 288) 
0 00850 
(0 0286) 
0 304 
(0 228) 
2 786*** 
(0 229) 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposzts, PI =price of deposits,p2= price offu:ed 
assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 0) 
and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy variable, 
own2 =dummy variable for public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy varzable for public and 
foreign sector banks .. 
426 
AppendzxF2 
Table Fl: Parameter Estimates, Battese and Coelli, 1995 Retail Banks Dataset 
VARIABLE PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Pane12 Panel 3 Panel I Panel 2 Panel 3 
LP2 0 1092*** 0 0378** 0 15778*** 
0 0225 0 0154 0 0067 
LP3 0 0630*** -0 3322 0 0307*** 0 3009*** 0 01292 0 01694*** 
0 0079 0 5826 0 0050 0 0176 0 0098 0 0029 
LP4 0 8409*** 2 07663*** 0 8622*** 0 5286*** 0 0174 0 6760*** 
0 0098 0 7196 0008 0 0247 0 0232 0 0210 
LY1 0 470*** -4 0979 0 4340*** 0 16781*** 0 4491 ••• 0 55488*** 
0 03481 5 5202 0 0225 0 0234 0 0357 0 0129 
LY2 0 4058*** 0 5941 0 2855*** 0 7789*** 0 55219*** 0 4326*** 
0044 5 3579 0 0346 0 0326 0 037 0 012 
LY3 0 0503 4467 0 2660*** 
0068 100881 0 0524 
LP22 0 8528*** 0 0083 -0 0227*** 
0 045 0 0222 0 0053 
LP33 0 0094*** -0 1855 0 0057*** 0 06947*** 0 0016 0 00378*** 
0 0022 0 2126 0 0011 0 0041 0 0047 0 00081 
LP44 0 1709*** -0 5020** 0 1276*** -0 0306*** -0 0044 0 3317*** 
0 0047 0 198 0 0034 00044 0 0053 0 0174 
LY11 0 0570*** -19.202*** 0 0698*** 0 019*** 0 0588 0 1103*** 
0 0188 5 687 0 0073 0 0170 0 0483 0 0033 
LY22 -0 0173 -0 8697 -0 1589** 0 0265*** 0 0256 0 09626*** 
0 0700 13 050 0 0760 0 0208 0 0656 0 0080 
LY33 -0 4785*** -44 499 -0 23345* 
0 1326 32 020 0 1201 
LP2LP3 -0 4458*** -0 0206 0 00496*** 
0 0262 0 0137 0 004 
LP2LP4 -0 5495*** -0 014 -0 162*** 
0 036 0035 0009 
LP3LP4 
-0 0634*** -1 030*** -0 0341*** -0 0003*** -0 0005 -0 0256*** 
0 0057 0 256 0 0043 0 011 00074 0 008 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances,ly2 =total investments,ly3= total deposits, PI =price of deposits, p2= price of 
ftxed assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 
0) and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 =dummy variable for public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy vanable for 
public and forezgn sector banks .. 
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Table Fl: Parameter Estimates, Battese and Coelli 1995 Retail Banks Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION 
VARIABLE APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
LYILY2 -0351*** -19 442 -0 1338*** -0 029*** -0 0834 -0 205*** 
0 0833 15 327 0 0437 0 0360 01148 0 0115 
LYILY3 0 3131*** 61 652*** -0 007 
0 061 23 816 0 0384 
LY2LY3 0 47344** 22 0838 0 4620** 
0 2050 40 2843 0 1888 
LP2LYI 0 0647*** 0 038 0 0954*** 
0 0264 0 057 0 015 
LP2LY2 -0 056*** -0 052 -0 085*** 
0 0270 0 0712 0 0181 
LP2LP3 
LP3LYI -0 0038 -4 6809** 0 0043 -0 009*** 0 0052 0 0041*** 
0 0211 2 014 0 0107 0 0175 0 0157 0 0079 
LP3LY2 0 052 -3 7561 0 0553*** 0 060*** -0 003 0 0054*** 
0 040 3 088 0 016 0 019 0 0173 0 008 
LP3LY3 -0 0573 11 226** -0 061*** 
0 0531 5 0598 0 0225 
LP4LYI 0 05681 4 909 0 0227* 0 1857*** 0 0006 0 0438*** 
0 036 3 6107 0 013 0 019 0 0295 0 0159 
LP4LY2 0 0648 7 219* 0 0008 0 1929*** -0 003 0 0583*** 
0 0600 4 395 0020 0020 0 0271 0 0138 
LP4LY3 0 1430*** -12 383* -0 0211 
0 0876 6 6862 0 026 
LP2T 0 0252*** 0 0032 0 0127*** 
0 0099 00076 0 0022 
LP3T 0 0008 -1 240*** 0 00168 0 0239*** 
0 0017 01788 0 0010 0 0039 0 002738 00007 
LP4T 0 0059* -0 373*** 0 0030** 0 0597*** 0 0051 0 0091*** 
0 003 0 0824 0 0014 0 0038 0003 00027 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, Pl=pTlce of deposits, p2= 
price of fiXed assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group= dummy variable distmgwshmg between banks that merged 
(value= 0) and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and 
group dummy varlable, own2 =dummy variable for public and private sector banks, own3 
=dummy variable for publzc and foreign sector banks •• 
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Table Fl: Parameter Estimates, Battese and Coelli 1995 Retail Banks Dataset 
VARIABLE PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
LYIT -0 0291 *** -2 695** 0 01828 -0 0026*** 
0 01208** 0 08287*** 
0 010 I 1183 0 005 0 010 0 0104 0002 
LY2T -0 0430*** 0 3866 0 084*** -0 014 -0 0017*** 
0 01331 ** 
0 0132 I 0225 0 006 0 01341 0011 0 002 
LY3T 0 0658*** 2 8347 0 0185** 
0 0199 I 885 0 009 
T 0 0541 *** 14 99*** 0 0257*** 0 0202*** 0 02888*** 
0 0428*** 
0 015 2 093 0 0084 0 045 0 0151 0 005 
TSQ -0 00274*** -0 882*** -0 0075*** 0 00147* -0 0038*** 
0 0028*** 
0 000961 0135 0 0005 0 002 0 0009 0 0003 
Constant -0 5844*** -0 3122*** -0 0291 *** 
57 467*** 0 3586*** 0 2397*** 
0 0650 5924 0 036 0 2602 0 0650 0 0234 
GROUP 0 4595*** 85 305 0 3527 I 2603*** -2 3923 -0 6245*** 
0 1660 10760 41 2 2734 0 169 146 23 I 981 
GROUPT -0 01785 43 1634 -0 0016 0 0931*** 0 0527 0 0323*** 
0 0!22 773 87 0 2267 0 0206 7 4672 0140 
LNTA -0 045*** -119 55 -0 2746* -0 0001 *** -0 8644 
0 15510*** 
0 0146 85 813 0 1537 0 021 21962 0729 
LNPROVS -3223 0 69454 - 6566D -0 0008*** 0 0008 -0 0004*** 
0 0061 4 257 0 1083 0 009 I 0369 04894 
OWN2 -0 2418*** -334 708 0 659 -0 373*** 14283 0 7279*** 
0 017 238 44 I 1567 0 0344 40 827 2 2419 
OWN3 0 2506*** -154 811 2 4916 -I 6041*** 4 8335 I 9832*** 
0 0240 Ill 2091 I 9723 0 109 127 457 4656 
T -0 03728*** -53 5028 0 0243 
00115 37 680 0 2313 
Constant 4 1603*** I 87579** I 8554 2 77556*** 4 2439 0 2484*** 
0 3564 52 888 2 298 0 264 92 362 3 787 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, Pl=price of deposits,p2= price of 
fzxed assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group= dummy vanable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 0) 
and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup = mteraction between tlme trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 =dummy variable for public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy vanable for 
publzc and foreign sector banks. 
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Table Fl: Parameter Estimates, TSFA RE Retail Banks Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel! 
LP2 
LP3 0 0895*** 
0 0024 
LP4 0 2727*** 
0 0043 
LY1 -0 1189*** 
0 0173 
LY2 0 1745*** 
0 0209 
LY3 0 8795*** 
0 0329 
LP22 
LP33 0 00124 
0 0009 
LP44 -0 0319*** 
0 00118 
LY11 -0 0138 
0 0205 
LY22 -0 7683*** 
0 0592 
LY33 -0 675*** 
0 0893 
LP2LP3 
LP2LP4 
LP3LP4 -0 0115*** 
0 0021 
* Slgnificant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
Pane12 Panel3 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
0 1107*** 0 14757*** 
0 0142 0 0059 
0 0244*** 0 0335*** 
0 0052 0 0021 
0 0066 0 2802*** 
0 0062 0 014 
0 4660*** 0 5429*** 
0 0211 0 009 
0 5193*** 0 436*** 
0 0225 0 0085 
0 028** -0 0207*** 
0 013 0 003 
0 0017 0 01208*** 
0 002 0 00049 
0 0007 0 087*** 
0 0018 0 011 
0 1031*** 0 1025*** 
0 020 0 0029 
0 08785*** 0 1083*** 
0 0266 0 00493 
0 0089 0 0041* 
0 0085 0 0025 
0 083*** -0 086*** 
0 009 0 0076 
0 0120*** 0 0081** 
0 0033 0 0041 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposzts, Pl=price of deposits, p2= 
price offu:ed assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs = provistons, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged 
(value = 0) and those that dzd not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and 
group dummy variable, own2 =dummy variable for public and private sector banks, own3 = 
dummy variable for public and foreign sector banks. 
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Table Fl: Parameter Estimates, TSFA RE retail Banks Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I 
LY1LY2 0 0637* 
0 0368 
LY1LY3 0 0295 
0 0597 
LY2LY3 1 3693*** 
0 13791 
LP2LY1 
LP2LY2 
LP2LY3 
LP3LY1 -0 1113*** 
0 0086 
LP3LY2 -0 1620*** 
0 01387 
LP3LY3 0 30187*** 
0 0210 
LP4LY1 -0 10362*** 
0 0124 
LP4LY2 0 1923*** 
0 0223 
LP4LY3 -00911*** 
0 0312 
LP2T 
LP3T -0 0006 
0 00081 
LP4T -0 0037*** 
0 0006 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel 3 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
0 1839*** -0 1853*** 
0 0466 0 0078 
0 0077 0 050*** 
0 020 0 0077 
0 0079 -0 0166** 
0 0235 0 0072 
0 0040 -0 007** 
0 0088 0 0038 
-0 0052 -0 005 
0 010 0 0037 
-0 0142 0 032*** 
0 009 0 0096 
0 0185* -0 0853*** 
0 0098 0 0096 
-0 0009 0 0211*** 
0 003 0 0014 
0 0035** 0 0024*** 
0 0014 0 0004 
-0 0017 0 037*** 
0 0013 0 0020 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, PI =price of depostts,p2= 
price offued assets, p3 = pnce of bo"owings, p4 =price oflabore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy vanable distinguishing between banks that merged 
(value= 0) and those that dtd not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and 
group dummy variable, own2 =dummy variable for public and private sector banks, own3 = 
dummy variable for public andforezgn sector banks. 
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Table Fl: Parameter Estimates, TSFA RE Retail Banks Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH 
VARIABLES Panel I 
LY1T 0 0308*** 
0 0049 
LY2T 0 1348*** 
0 0052 
LY3T 0 16063*** 
0 00846 
TT 
TSQ -0 0022*** 
0 0001 
GROUP 0 5257*** 
0 0189 
GROUP1T -0 0253*** 
0 0022 
OWN2 -0 4002*** 
0 0095 
OWN3 -0 7326*** 
0 0119 
LNPROVS -0 0018 
0 0039 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
Pane12 Pane13 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Pane12 Pane13 
0 0065 0 02436*** 
0 00476 0 00187 
-0 0076 0 007*** 
0 0052 0 0018 
0 0486*** 0 0295*** 
0 0090 0 003 
0 0014*** -0 0030*** 
0 00054 0 0002 
-0 0201 0 0974*** 
0 038 0 0156 
0 0072 -0 0162*** 
0 0048 0 00196 
0 0782*** -0 0875*** 
0 0213 0 0085 
0 1435*** 0 0519*** 
0 0288 0 0115 
-0 0066 0 0286*** 
0 0087 0 0026 
lyl= total advances,ly2 =total investments,ly3= total deposits, Pl=price of deposits, p2= 
przce of ftxed assets, p3 =price of borrowmgs, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =proviSions, group =dummy vanable distmguishmg between banks that merged 
(value = 0) and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between tlme trend and 
group dummy variable, own2 =dummy variable for public and private sector banks, own3 = 
dummy variable for public and foreign sector banks. 
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Table F2: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles, Random Effects Banking 
System Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lp2 0 169*** 0 120*** 0 223*** 
(0 0164) (0 0124) (0 0150) 
lp3 0 0748*** 0 0843*** 0 0795*** 0 0336*** 0 0315*** 0 0594*** 
(0 0116) (0 0103) (0 00663) (0 00666) (0 00467) (0 00625) 
lp4 0 223*** 0 196*** 0 638*** 0 0560*** 0 0243*** 0 377*** 
(0 0156) (0 0138) (0 0137) (0 00938) (0 00646) (00317) 
lyl 0 228*** 0 132** 0 !51*** 0465*** 0428*** 0 406*** 
(0 0471) (0 0607) (0 0286) (0 0200) (0 0176) (0 0227) 
ly2 0464*** 0.343*** 0 265*** 0497*** 0 513*** 0 517*** 
(0 0708) (0 0746) (0 0333) (0 0206) (0 0176) (0 0220) 
ly3 0 259*** 0.523*** 0 524*** 
(0 0989) (0 116) (0 0475) 
lp22 0 00105 0 0430*** 0 0365*** 
(0 0166) (0 0127) (0 00842) 
lp33 -0 00364 -0 000590 0 00875*** 0 00182 -0 000692 0 00954*** 
(0 00374) (0 00385) (0 00176) (0 00217) (0 00173) (0 00173) 
lp44 0 0773*** -0 00130 0 00377** 0 0966*** 
0 0221*** 0 0213*** 
(0 00401) (0 00381) (0 00684) (0 00242) (0 00190) (00221) 
ly11 0 00662 0 211*** 0 0336*** 0 0270*** 0 0533*** 0 0585*** 
(0 00849) (0 0380) (000631) (0 00500) (0 00783) (0 00601) 
ly22 -0 267*** -0 232** 00247 0 0472*** 0 0664*** 0 0449*** 
(0 102) (0 108) (0 0157) (0 00921) (0 0123) (0 0100) 
ly33 -0 380*** 0 0649 0 0744*** 
(0 112) (0 161) (0 0125) 
lp2lp3 -0 00874 0 0224*** 0 0175*** 
(0 00995) (0 00793) (0 00661) 
lp2lp4 0 0225* 0 0802*** -0 0815*** 
(0 0130) (0 0106) (0 0162) 
lp3lp4 -0 00726 0 00191 -0 0342*** 0 00320 0 0146*** -0 00467 
(0 00845) (0 00807) (0 00562) (0 00495) (0 00375) (0 0105) 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, Pl=pnce of deposits, p2= price 
of fJXed assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =proviSIOns, group =dummy variable dzshnguishing between banks that merged 
(value = 0) and those that d1d not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and 
group dummy var~able, own2 = dummy variable for public and private sector banks, own3 = 
dummy variable for public and foreign sector banks. 
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Table F2: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles, Random Effects (Cont'd 
)Banking System Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
lylly2 -0 0485 0 0906 -0 0237 -0 104*** -0 0822*** 
0 0585*** 
(0 0316) (0 0734) (0 0196) (0 0116) (0 0189) (00156) 
lylly3 0 0702* -0 526*** -0 0567*** 
(0 0369) (0 115) (0 0145) 
ly2ly3 0 611*** 0 383 -0 0291 
(0 210) (0 250) (0 0248) 
lp2lyl -0 0223 0 0651*** -0 00182 
(0 0158) (0 0164) (00131) 
lp2ly2 0 0459** 0 00474 
0 0557*** 
(0 0194) (0 0186) (0 0134) 
lp2ly3 
lp3lyl -0 00377 0 0428 0 0479*** -0 00501 -0 0130 0 0259*** 
(0 0132) (0 0274) (0 00872) (0 00743) (0 00880) (0 00767) 
lp31y2 -0 0619 -0 0446 0 0202* 0 00354 0 0139 -0 0263*** 
(0 0420) (0 0478) (0 0110) (0 00873) (0 00952) (0 00747) 
1p31y3 0 0609 -0 00786 -0 0677*** 
(0 0511) (0 0670) (0 0111) 
1p4lyl 0 0374*** 0 00445 -0 0105 -0 000218 0 0364* 
0 0446*** 
(0 0121) (0 0340) (0 0165) (0 00740) (0 0101) (0 0197) 
1p41y2 0 332*** 0 272*** 0 0404** 0 0308*** -0 00573 -0 0564*** 
(0 0506) (0 0552) (00199) (0 0101) (0 0105) (0 0190) 
1p41y3 -0.373*** -0 286*** -0 0458* 
(0 0574) (0 0780) (0 0271) 
1p2t 0 00332 0 00511 0 00514* 
(0 00420) (0 00332) (0 00298) 
lp3t 0 00135 0 00145 0 000964 -0 00145 
0 00627*** 000319*** 
(0 00295) (0 00290) (0 00120) (0 00174) (0 00133) (0 00112) 
1p4t -0 00238 0 00199 -0 00235 -0 00714 
0 0102*** 0 00895*** 
(0 00305) (0 00269) (0 00234) (0 00202) (0 00147) (0 00437) 
• stgnificant at 10% 
•• significant at 5% 
*** s1gnijicant at 1% 
lyl= total advances,ly2 =total investments,ly3= total deposits, Pl=price of deposits,p2= prtce 
offu:ed assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged 
(value= 0) and those that dtd not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and 
group dummy variable, own2 =dummy variable for public and private sector banks, own3 = 
dummy variable for public and foreign sector banks. 
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Table F2: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles, Random Effects (Cont'd) 
Banking System Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lylt -0 00435 0 0350*** -0 00270 -0 00465 -0 00592 
0 00788*** 
(0 00312) (0 0112) (0 00484) (0 00301) (0 00361) (0 00383) 
ly2t 0 0277* 0 0482*** 0 0129** 0 00460 0 00371 0 000523 
(0 0159) (0 0159) (0 00592) (0 00372) (0 00376) (0 00381) 
1y3t -0 0202 -0 0779*** -0 0154** 
(0 0179) (0 0220) (0 00721) 
-0 135*** -0 126*** 0 0173 -0 0686*** -0 0555*** 0 0189* 
(0 0280) (0 0224) (0 0135) (0 0114) (0 00767) (0 00975) 
tsq 0 00366*** 0 00297*** 0 00342*** 0 00248*** 
0 00291*** 0 00344*** 
(0 000927) (0 000916) (0 000538) (0 000608) (0 000446) (0 000524) 
lnprovs -0 0151 -0 0179 0 0246*** -0 00720 0 00435 0 0343*** 
(0 0176) (00171) (0 00819) (0 0102) (0 00771) (0 00838) 
group 0110 0 161* -0 0179 0 0278 0 00467 -0 00729 
(0 109) (0 0838) (0 0536) (0 0603) (0 0372) (00518) 
tgroup 0 0104 0 00886 0 00148 0 00158 0 00284 0 00157 
(0 0122) (0 00945) (0 00554) (0 00680) (0 00421) (0 00570) 
own2 -0 299*** -0 293*** 0 00878 -0 109*** -0 0990*** -0 0130 
(0 0684) (0 0598) (0 0386) (0 0343) (0 0274) (0 0367) 
own3 -0 493*** -0 488*** 0 0302 -0 108*** -0 133*** -0 00237 
(0 0729) (0 0653) (0 0423) (0 0379) (0 0298) (0 0409) 
Constant 0 805*** 0 783*** -0 383*** 0 392*** 0 109 -0 353*** 
(0 165) (0 147) (0 0805) (0 0930) (0 0667) (0 0785) 
• significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** srgnificant at 1% 
ly1= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, PI =price of deposits,p2= price of 
fu:ed assets, p3 =price of borrowmgs, p4 =price oflabore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distingu1shmg between banks that merged (value= 
0) and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 =dummy vanable for public and private sector banks, own3 = dummy variable for 
public and fomgn sector banks. 
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Table F2: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles Fixed Effects (Cont'd) Banking 
System Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lp2 0 135*** 0 0985*** 0 219*** 
(0 0188) (0 0131) (0 0156) 
lp3 0 0673*** 0 0676*** 0 0760*** 0 0406*** 0 0368*** 0 0572*** 
(0 0123) (0 0109) (0 00777) (0 00705) (0 00470) (0 00726) 
lp4 0 232*** 0 202*** 0 651*** o 0505*** 0 0184*** 0 361*** 
(0 0160) (0 0143) (0 0160) (0 0100) (0 00652) (0 0368) 
lyl 0 252*** 0 186*** 0 156*** 0 399*** 0 361*** 0 422*** 
(0 0485) (0 0638) (0 0309) (0 0219) (0 0179) (0 0235) 
ly2 0 475*** 0 387*** 0 223*** 0427*** 0 469*** 0 464*** 
(0 0777) (00801) (0 0366) (0 0275) (0 0201) (0 0241) 
ly3 0 0832 0 360*** 0 566*** 
(0 Ill) (0 133) (0 0529) 
lp22 0 0250 0 0499*** 0 0176** 
(0 0166) (0 0121) (0 00817) 
lp33 -0 00648* -0 00273 0 00836*** -0 000454 -0 00222 0 00865*** 
(0 00371) (0 00383) (0 00194) (000218) (0 00165) (0 00176) 
lp44 0 0841*** -0 00133 0 00175 0 190*** 
0 0190*** 0 0182*** 
(0 00408) (0 00383) (0 00691) (0 00252) (000185) (0 0190) 
lyll 0 0102 0 225*** 0 0295*** 0 0271*** 0 0442*** 0 0503*** 
(0 00902) (0 0388) (0 00644) (0 00494) (0 00757) (0 00550) 
ly22 -0 244** -0 156 0 0229 0 0800*** 0 0778*** 0 0379*** 
(0 101) (0 105) (00160) (0 0102) (0 0124) (0 00796) 
ly33 -0 392*** 0 146 0 114*** 
(0 Ill) (0 160) (0 0204) 
lp2lp3 -0 00606 0 0203*** 0 0130** 
(0 00936) (0 00682) (0 00626) 
lp2lp4 0 0175 0 0754*** -0 0818*** 
(0 0125) (0 00985) (0 0158) 
lp3lp4 -0 0129 -0 00725 -0 0299*** 0 00711 0 0174*** 0 00787 
(0 00840) (0 00794) (0 00586) (0 00496) (0 00359) (0 0103) 
* significant at I 0% 
** Significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, PI =price of deposits,p2= price offu:ed 
assets, p3 = pTlce of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisions, Dt =per annum time dummy, grouptDT =merger group and oer annum time 
dummies interactions, 
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Table F2: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles, Fixed Effects (Cont'd) Banking 
System Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lylly2 -0 0354 0 122* 0 00907 -0 0919*** 
0 0657*** 0 0512*** 
(0 0321) (0 0725) (00211) (00111) (0 0186) (0 0137) 
lylly3 0 0518 -0 590*** -0 0810*** 
(0 0374) (0 116) (0 0214) 
ly2ly3 0 572*** 0 211 -0 0546* 
(0 208) (0 244) (0 0294) 
lp2ly1 -0 0375** 0 0776*** 0 0259** 
(0 0146) (0 0154) (0 0127) 
lp2ly2 0 0575*** -0 0677*** -0 0125 
(0 0194) (0 0180) (0 0126) 
lp2ly3 
lp3ly1 -0 00618 0 0439* 0 0398*** -0 00965 -0 0189** 0 0195*** 
(0 0137) (0 0259) (0 0107) (0 00702) (0 00771) (0 00741) 
lp3ly2 -0 0654 -0 0339 0 0209* 0 00521 0 0143* 
0 0234*** 
(0 0411) (0 0459) (0 0124) (0 00828) (0 00844) (0 00725) 
lp3ly3 0 0729 -0 0108 -0 0615*** 
(0 0500) (0 0640) (0 0160) 
lp4ly1 0 0485*** -0 00874 -0 0101 -0 0156 0 0307* 
0 0462*** 
(0 0127) (0 0330) (0 0168) (0 00685) (0 00950) (0 0185) 
lp4ly2 0 394*** 0 297*** 0 0793*** 0 0444*** 0 0170* 
0 0549*** 
(0 0499) (0 0539) (00211) (00102) (0 0100) (00173) 
lp4ly3 -0 452*** -0 303*** -0 0880*** 
(0 0566) (0 0761) (0 0287) 
lp2t 0 00517 0 00929*** 0 00677** 
(0 00432) (0 00320) (0 00290) 
lp3t -0 00203 -0 00137 -0 0067*** -0 00176 -0 0034*** 
0 0029*** 
(0 00296) (0 00293) (0 00132) (0 00175) (0 00129) (0 00109) 
lp4t -0 0133*** -00117*** -0 00138 0 000127 -0 00282** -0 00553 
(0 00313) (0 00272) (0 00250) (0 00207) (0 00142) (0 00414) 
* sigmficant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl~ total advances, ly2 ~total investments, ly3~ total deposrts, PI ==price of deposrts,p2~ price of 
fu:ed assets, p3 ~price of borrowings, p4 ~price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisions, Dt =per annum time dummy, grouptDT =merger group and oer annum time 
dummies interacflons, 
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Table F2: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles, Fixed Effects (Cont'd) Banking 
System Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
lylt -0 00244 0 0339*** -0.00224 -0 00266 -0 000406 -0.00176 
(0 00328) (0 0109) (0 00499) (0 00292) (0 00337) (0 00357) 
ly2t 0 0213 0 0431*** 0 0166*** -0 00695* -0 00409 -0 00856** 
(0 0158) (0 0157) (0 00634) (0 00407) (0 00385) (0 00352) 
ly3t -0 00853 -0 0637*** -0 0241*** 
(0 0176) (00211) (0 00788) 
tsq -0 0034*** -0 0044*** -0 0012** 0 0010 0 00035 -0 0014*** 
(000111) (0 000907) (0 000558) (0 000649) (0 000390) (0 000513) 
DT2 -0 0684 -0 0483 0 137* -0 0862 -0 0310 0 118* 
(0 116) (0 121) (0 0730) (0 0682) (0 0520) (0 0682) 
DT3 -0 248* -0 169 0 0251 -0 103 -0 116** -0 0422 
(0 138) (0 128) (0 0801) (0 0790) (0 0544) (0 0746) 
DT4 -0 350*** -0 196 -0 0363 -0 137* 0 0469 -0 104 
(0 133) (0 120) (0 0753) (0 0779) (00517) (0 0705) 
DTS -0 303** -0 343*** 0 0223 -0 211*** -0 0794 0 00486 
(0 120) (0 117) (0 0783) (0 0709) (0 0502) (0 0727) 
DT6 -0 509*** -0 586*** 0 0470 -0 128* -0 0586 0 0386 
(0 129) (0 118) (0 0771) (0 0774) (0 0523) (0 0716) 
DT7 -0 798*** -0 576*** -0 00222 -0 441*** -0 101* 0 0155 
(0 130) (0 117) (0 0757) (0 0778) (0 0514) (0 0705) 
DT8 -0 385*** -0 356*** 0 0787 -0 0951 -0 0879* 0 0884 
(0 140) (0 121) (0 0780) (0 0806) (0 0520) (0 0726) 
DT9 -0 439*** -0 388*** 0 0604 -0 125 -0 0443 0 0814 
(0 141) (0 129) (0 0807) (0 0836) (0 0554) (0 0752) 
DTIO -0 369** -0 295** 0 103 -0 140 -0 0608 0 0957 
(0 151) (0 137) (0 0854) (0 0892) (0 0588) (0 0797) 
DT11 -0 178 -0 115 0 0643 -0 201** -0 185*** -0 0429 
(0 164) (0 145) (0 0919) (0 0958) (0 0621) (0 0855) 
DT12 -0 0640 -00718 0118 -0 0704 -0 0591 0 115 
(0 166) (0 !56) (0 101) (0 0970) (0 0670) (0 0940) 
DT13 -0 108 -0 102 -0 00194 -0 0840 -0 0655 000316 
(0 172) (0 164) (0 105) (0 100) (0 0702) (0 0982) 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** Slgnijicant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total mvestments,ly3= total deposits, Pl=price of depoSits,p2= price of 
fu:ed assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisions, Dt =per annum time dummy, grouptDT =merger group and oer annum time 
dummies znteractions, 
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Table F2: Parameter Estimates, Schmidt and Sickles, Fixed Effects (Cont'd) Banking 
System Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Pane12 Pane13 Panel I Panel2 Panel 3 
DT14 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
groupDT2 0 0963 0 0421 -0 0873 0 0226 -0 0321 -0 104 
(0 121) (0 124) (0 0750) (0 0709) (0 0532) (0 0700) 
groupDT3 0 0432 -0 0705 -0 0839 -0 00468 0 00245 -0 0919 
(0 146) (0 134) (0 0833) (0 0838) (00571) (0 0779) 
groupDT4 0 0984 -0 0886 -0 0939 0 0503 -0 128** -0 0854 
(0 142) (0 127) (0 0793) (0 0821) (0 0542) (0 0744) 
groupDT5 00449 00562 -0 0400 0 123 0 0321 -0 0507 
(0 131) (0 124) (0 0804) (0 0755) (0 0523) (0 0750) 
groupDT6 0 292** 0 330*** -0 0173 -0 0334 -0 0626 -0 0467 
(0 142) (0 127) (0 0794) (0 0835) (0 0546) (0 0743) 
groupDT7 0 562*** 0 315** 0 0334 0 272*** -0 0118 -000518 
(0 145) (0 126) (0 0791) (0 0846) (0 0543) (0 0740) 
groupDT8 0 167 0 121 0 0330 -0 122 -00617 -0 0273 
(0 156) (0 131) (0 0821) (0 0892) (0 0559) (0 0767) 
groupDT9 0 244 0 187 -0 0158 -0 0807 -0 0914 -0 0579 
(0 161) (0 135) (0 0845) (0 0937) (0 0576) (0 0789) 
groupDTIO 0 226 0 142 -0 0321 -0 0509 -0 0533 -0 0570 
(0 172) (0 142) (0 0886) (0 0998) (0 0604) (0 0827) 
groupDTII 0 0850 0 00272 -0 0208 -0 00682 0 0496 0 0994 
(0 186) (0 150) (0 0941) (0 107) (0 0637) (0 0879) 
groupDT12 -0 0683 -0 0652 -0 113 -0 188 -0 120* -0 128 
(0 202) (0 160) (0 100) (0 118) (0 0682) (0 0936) 
groupDT13 -0 00267 0 00221 -0 0739 -0 120 -0 0303 -0 0875 
(0 202) (0 160) (0 101) (0 118) (0 0685) (0 0940) 
groupDT14 0 0366 0 0505 -0 0461 -0 189 -0 0673 -0 103 
(0 204) (0 163) (0 102) (0 119) (0 0694) (0 0949) 
Constant 0470*** 0 555*** -0 274*** 0 112*** -0 0929*** -0 169*** 
(0 0648) (0 0565) (0 0394) (0 0383) (0 0262) (00341) 
• significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, /y2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, Pl=price of deposits, p2= price offu:ed 
assets, p3 = przce of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisions, Dt =per annum time dummy, grouptDT =merger group and oer annum time 
dummies interactions, 
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Table F2: Parameter Estimates, Battese and Coelli (1992) Banking System Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION 
APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 
lp2 0 229*** 
(0 0147) 
lp3 0 0749*** 0 0826*** 0 0695*** 0 0542*** 
(0 0114) (0 00993) (0 00682) (0 00640) 
lp4 0 224*** 0 193*** 0 667*** 0 412*** 
(0 0151) (0 0133) (0 0147) (0 0338) 
ly1 0217*** 0 129** 0 161 ••• 0 410*** 
(0 0469) (0 0601) (0 0288) (00221) 
ly2 0483*** 0 385*** 0 251 ••• 0 506*** 
(0 0688) (0 0719) (0 0317) (00218) 
ly3 0 232** 0 482*** 0 545*** 
(0 0975) (0 114) (0 0465) 
lp22 0 0350*** 
(0 00825) 
lp33 -0 00286 -0 00101 0 00710*** 0 00847*** 
(0 00365) (0 00369) (0 00172) (0 00170) 
lp44 -0 0218*** -0 0220*** 0 0740*** 0 114*** 
(0 00391) (0 00362) (0 00687) (0 0230) 
lyll 0 00651 0 208*** 0 0322*** 0 0576*** 
(0 00840) (0 0362) (0 00589) (0 00583) 
ly22 -0 269*** -o zoo•• 0 0165 0 0489*** 
(0 0982) (0 102) (0 0154) (0 00964) 
ly33 -0 385*** 0 0878 0 0783*** 
(0 107) (0 152) (0 0119) 
lp2lp3 0 0160** 
(0 00631) 
lp2lp4 -0 0808*** 
(0 0161) 
lp3lp4 -0 00259 0 00622 -0 0298*** -0 00528 
(0 00819) (0 00766) (0 00558) (0 0102) 
• significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
ly1= total advances, ly2 =total investments, /y3= total deposits, P1=price of deposrts,p2= price of 
fu:ed assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisiOns, group =dummy variable dishngUlshing between banks that merged (value 
= 0) and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 =dummy variable for public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy variable for 
pub/re and foreign sector banks. 
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Table F2: Parameter Estimates, Battese and Coelli (1992) Banking System Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION 
APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel 3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
lylly2 -0 0358 0 0980 -0 00671 -0 0796*** 
(0 0306) (0 0692) (0 0196) (0 0154) 
lylly3 0 0627* -0 533*** -0 0688*** 
(0 0356) (0 108) (0 0151) 
ly2ly3 0 606*** 0 320 -0 0299 
(0201) (0 236) (0 0239) 
lp2lyl 0 00814 
(0 0128) 
lp2ly2 -0 00336 
(0 0129) 
lp2ly3 
lp3lyl -0 00505 0 0380 0 0443*** 0 0239*** 
(00131) (0 0257) (000851) (0 00744) 
lp31y2 -0 0776* -0 0703 0 0196* -0 0250*** 
(0 0406) (0 0451) (0 0103) (0 00723) 
lp3ly3 0 0737 0 0189 -0 0658*** 
(0 0495) (0 0630) (0 0108) 
lp4lyl 0 0353*** -0 00473 -0 0284* 0 0434** 
(0 0118) (00319) (0 0164) (0 0193) 
lp4ly2 0 343*** 0 282*** 0 0269 -0 0642*** 
(0 0488) (0 0517) (00197) (0 0186) 
lp4ly3 -0 381*** -0 284*** -0 0168 
(0 0549) (0 0729) (0 0269) 
lp2t 0 00671** 
(0 00286) 
lp3t 0 00137 0 00116 -0 00285*** 
0 00428*** 
(0 00287) (0 00277) (0 00135) (0 00106) 
lp4t -0 00346 -0 00525 
0 0100*** 000831*** 
(0 00306) (0 00258) (0 00238) (0 00431) 
* significant at I 0% 
•• Significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances,ly2 =total investments,ly3= total deposits, Pl=pnce of deposits,p2= price 
offu:ed assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 = pnce oflabore, 
lnprovs = prov1s1ons, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged 
(value = 0) and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and 
group dummy variable, own2 =dummy variable for public and private sector banks, own3 = 
dummy variable for public and foreign sector banks_ 
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Table F2: Parameter Estimates, Battese and Coelli (1992) Banking System Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH 
Panel! 
lylt -0 00552* 
(0 00318) 
ly2t 0 0202 
(0 0155) 
ly3t -0 00952 
(0 0178) 
-0 0737** 
(0 0373) 
tsq 0 00292*** 
(0 00102) 
lnprovs -0 0168 
(0 0173) 
group 0 0423 
(0 115) 
tgroup 0 00980 
(0 0118) 
own2 -0 301 *** 
(0 0723) 
own3 -0 428*** 
(0 0766) 
Constant -I 213 
(I 144) 
eta 0 0280** 
(0 0138) 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel3 
0 0312*** -0 0106** 
(0 0106) (0 00537) 
0 0358** 0 0120** 
(0 0153) (0 00559) 
-0 0598*** -0 00763 
(0 0213) (0 00710) 
-0 0999*** 0 0209 
(0 0255) (0 0129) 
0 00282*** 
0 00288*** 
(0 000891) (0 000519) 
-0 0222 0 0267*** 
(0 0164) (0 00810) 
0 125 -0 0204 
(0 0922) (0 0495) 
0 00724 0 00247 
(0 00879) (0 00520) 
-0 255*** 0 0249 
(0 0651) (0 0388) 
-0 380*** -0 0121 
(0 0718) (0 0443) 
-0 0339 -0 727*** 
(0 252) (0 0846) 
0 0294** 0 0243* 
(0 0121) (0 0125) 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
-0 00496 
(0 00367) 
-0 00244 
(0 00370) 
00220 
(0 0137) 
-0 00325*** 
(0 000505) 
0 0336*** 
(0 00815) 
-0 0239 
(0 0556) 
0 000799 
(0 00546) 
-0 00928 
(0 0401) 
-0 0253 
(0 0432) 
-1 585*** 
(0 352) 
0 00243 
(0 00777) 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, PI=price of deposits, p2= price 
of fixed assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy varzable distlnguishmg between banks that merged (value 
= 0) and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup = interactwn between time trend and group 
dummy variable, own2 =dummy variable for pub/le and private sector banks, own3 =dummy 
vanable for public and foreign sector banks-
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Table F2: Parameter Estimates, Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) Banking System 
Dataset 
VARIABLES ~~P~R~O~D~U~C~T~IO~N~AP~P~R~O~A~C~H~--~~~~~~~~~~~~--
Panel I Panel 2 Panel 3 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
lp2 
lp3 
lp4 
lyl 
ly2 
ly3 
lp22 
lp33 
lp44 
ly11 
ly22 
ly33 
lp2lp3 
lp2lp4 
lp3lp4 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
0 0519*** 
(0 00620) 
0684* .. 
(0 00985) 
0 387*** 
(0 0260) 
0 359*** 
(0 0299) 
0 268*** 
(0 0444) 
0 00514*** 
(0 00179) 
0 0885*** 
(0 00440) 
0 0568*** 
(0 00774) 
0 0978*** 
(0 0159) 
0 115*** 
(0 0137) 
-0 0477*** 
(0 00552) 
0 0923*** 0 197*** 
(0 00956) (0 0108) 
0 0264*** 0 0318*** 
(0 00387) (0 00485) 
-0 00547 0490*** 
(0 00565) (0 0234) 
0 485*** 0 499*** 
(0 0137) (0 0156) 
0 543*** 0 508*** 
(0 0128) (0 0152) 
-0 00187 0 0100 
(0 0107) (0 00730) 
0 00126 0 00402*** 
(0 00154) (0 00154) 
0 000870 0 173*** 
(0 00174) (0 0178) 
0 0654*** 0 0574*** 
(0 00803) (0 00828) 
0 0822*** 0 0213* 
(0 0120) (00118) 
0 0134* 0 0257*** 
(0 00756) (0 00602) 
0 0659*** -0 101*** 
(0 0121) (0 0132) 
0 0113*** -0 0277*** 
(0 00399) (0 00960) 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, PI =price of deposzts,p2= price of 
fu:ed assets, p3 =price of borrowmgs, p4 = pr1ce of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value 
~ 0) and those that did not (value~ 1), tgroup ~interaction between time trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 =dummy variable for public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy variable for 
public and foreign sector banks. 
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Table F2: Parameter Estimates, Reifschneider and Stevenson, Banking System 
Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH 
Panel! 
lylly2 
lylly3 
ly2ly3 
lp2ly1 
lp2ly2 
lp2ly3 
lp3ly1 
lp3ly2 
lp3ly3 
lp4ly1 
lp4ly2 
lp4ly3 
lp2t 
lp3t 
lp4t 
1ylt 
ly2t 
ly3t 
* significant at 10% 
** s1gnijicant at 5% 
*** s1gnijicant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel3 
-0 0401 
(0 0249) 
-0 0606*** 
(0 0140) 
-0 165*** 
(0 0263) 
0 00412 
(0 00850) 
0 0120 
(0 0129) 
-0 0136 
(0 0138) 
0 0149 
(0 0183) 
0 0646*** 
(0 0242) 
-o 105••• 
(00317) 
-0 00522*** 
(0 00120) 
-0 0178*** 
(0 00247) 
-0 0167*** 
(0 00565) 
-0 0172*** 
(0 00621) 
0 0328*** 
(0 00680) 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
-0 147*** -0 0776*** 
(0 0194) (0 0191) 
0 0427** 00267 
(0 0178) (0 0186) 
-0 0393** -0 0203 
(0 0180) (0 0198) 
0 00108 -0 00334 
(0 0107) (0 00779) 
0 00112 0 00562 
(0 0106) (0 00780) 
0 0221* -0 00986 
(0 0119) (0 0188) 
-0 0122 0 00208 
(0 0114) (0 0196) 
0 000747 0 0158*** 
(0 00299) (0 00309) 
0 000281 -0 00606*** 
(0 00126) (0 00108) 
-0 00224* -0 0194*** 
(000131) (0 00446) 
-0 00132 -0 00563 
(0 00372) (0 00448) 
0 00264 0 00490 
(0 00367) (0 00435) 
lyl- total advances, ly2 =total m vestments, ly3= total deposits, Pl=price of deposits,p2= price of 
fzxed assets, p3 =price of bo"owings, p4 =price of tabor, lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy 
vanable dtstinguishing between banks that merged (value= 0) and those that dtd not (value= 1), 
tgroup =interaction between time trend and group dummy varzable, own2 =dummy variable for 
public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy variable for public and foreign sector banks 
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Table F2: Parameter Estimates, Reifschneider and Stevenson, Banking System 
Dataset 
VARIABLES PRODUCTION APPROACH 
Panel I 
tsq 
Constant 
T 
lnprovs 
group 
tgroup 
own2 
own3 
Constant 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** srgm.ficant at 1% 
Panel2 Panel3 
0 0435*** 
(0 00943) 
-0 00429*** 
(0 000542) 
-0 512*** 
(0 0411) 
-0 246** 
(0 0988) 
-0 240*** 
(0 0350) 
-0 762** 
(0 346) 
0 0978* 
(0 0501) 
0 387** 
(0 !53) 
2 053*** 
(0 !53) 
-0 476 
(0 395) 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
-0 0594*** 0 0498*** 
(0 00619) (0 00779) 
0 00218*** 
0 00526*** 
(0 000402) (0 000457) 
0 0627** -0 424*** 
(0 0253) (0 0328) 
-0 451*** -0280 ... 
(0 0805) (0 0357) 
-I 570*** -0 370* 
(0 322) (0 225) 
0 !50*** -0 0275 
(0 0324) (0 0189) 
0 0812 0 736*** 
(0 326) (0 188) 
I 973*** 2 652*** 
(0 280) (0 188) 
-1 139** -I 516*** 
(0 525) (0 317) 
ly1~ total advances, ly2 ~total investments, ly3~ total deposits, P1~price of deposits, p2~ price of 
ftxed assets, p3 ~price of borrowings, p4 ~price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =proviSions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value 
~ 0) and those that did not (value ~ 1), tgroup ~interaction between time trend and group 
dummy vanable, own2 =dummy vanable for public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy 
variable for public andfore~gn sector banks. 
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Table F2: Parameter Estimates, Battese and Coelli (1995) Banking System Dataset 
[Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel! Panel2 Panel3 
LP2 0 1094*** 0 3134*** 0 1625*** 
0 0226 0 0551 0 0114 
LP3 0 5321 I 4649*** 0 0540*** 0 3008*** 0 2682*** 0 048*** 
0 4397 0 3948 0 0074 0 0174 0 0152 0 0052 
LP4 I 316* 0 8975*** 0 8122*** 0 5299*** 0 5314*** 0 7038*** 
0 757 0 3360 0 0137 00245 0 0160 0 0248 
LYl 2 3420* -4 8028*** 0 4709*** 0 1629*** 0 2940*** 0 4745*** 
I 3751 I 2858 0 0318 00242 0 0915 0 0231 
LY2 -8 1061*** -3 9584** 0 2704*** 0 78421*** 0 6036*** 0 484*** 
2 0170 I 662 0 0423 0 0278 0 1232 0 0222 
LY3 5 6133* 8 4380*** 0 2273*** 
2 9919 2 6184 0 0625 
LP22 0 8489*** 0 6009*** 0 0274*** 
0 0436 0 0565 0 0079 
LP33 0 1547 -04911*** -3668 0 0690*** 0 0903*** 0 0058*** 
0 1151 0 1053 0 0018 0 0041 0 0055 0 0019 
LP44 -0 1446 -0 0070 0 1709*** -0 0304*** 0 33041*** 
0 0784*** 
0 1687 0 0915 00040 00046 00042 0 015 
LY11 0 280 -0 7304 0 0629*** 0 0160 -0 0399 0 057*** 
0 5220 I 6146 0 0061 0 0184 0 0512 0 00518 
LY22 -2 535 -1 2663 0 0962*** 00254 00274 0 0280*** 
3 3371 3 4932 0 0323 0 0217 00944 0 0075 
LY33 -1 324 2 5743 0 0815*** 
3 836 6 9277 0 0143 
LP2LP3 -0 4445*** 0 0035 
0 4583*** 
00267 0 0347 0 0064 
LP2LP4 -0 5505*** -0 1968*** 
0 5354*** 
0 0365 00344 0 0153 
LP3LP4 -1 0007** -0 8669*** -0 0460*** -0 0006 -0 001 -0 053*** 
0 3974 0 3057 0 0067 00110 0 0174 0 0089 
* significant at 10% 
•• significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, Pl=price of deposits,p2= price 
of fiXed assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 =price oflabore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy vanable distinguishmg between banks that merged (value 
= 0) and those that did not (value = 1}, tgroup =interaction between time trend and group 
dummy variable, own2 =dummy variable for public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy 
variable for public and foreign sector banks. 
446 
AppendzxF2 
Table F2: Parameter Estimates, Battese and Coelli (1995) Banking System Dataset 
!Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Pane12 Panel3 Panel I Pane12 Pane13 
LYILY2 -0 2573 2 7574 -0 0497* -0 0218 0 0336 -0 0730*** 
I 6968 2 925 0028 0 0383 0 1395 0 0120 
LYILY3 0 2171 -2 7436 -0 037* 
20020 5 7584 0 02034 
LY2LY3 3 8738 -0 661 -0 137*** 
7 2485 8 9304 00424 
LP2LYI 0 0701*** -0.3660*** -0 0277*** 
0 0271 0 1093 0 0087 
LP2LY2 -0 0602** 0 4350*** 0 0312*** 
0026 0 1118 00089 
LP2LY3 
LP3LYI -0 001 -2 1367*** 0 0163 -0 009 0 2403*** 001714** 
0 7755 0 6492 0 0129 0 0187 0 0386 0 0074 
LP3LY2 -I 0848 -0 6129 0 0095 0 0598*** -0 1739*** -0 014* 
I 3960 I 707 0 0140 0 0206 00462 0 0078 
LP3LY3 I 7131 3 4369* -0 027* 
2 0075 2 0941 0 01568 
LP4LYI 04775 3 0957** 0 0796*** 0 188*** -0 1080*** -0 0005 
0 8962 I 2802 0 0289 0 019 0 036 0 017 
LP4LY2 2 9314** 4 4799** 0 0965*** -0 1967*** 0 1382*** -0 009 
I 4501 I 800 0 0294 0 021 0 0355 0 0177 
LP4LY3 -3 5183** -7 9990*** -0 1700*** 
I 8639 2 876 0 03804 
LP2T 0 0271*** 0 0110 -0 0001 
0 0104 0 0132 00022 
LP3T -0 3270*** -0 8091*** -0 0051*** 0 0243*** 0 033*** -0 006*** 
0 0922 0 1447 0 0015 0 0041 0 006 0 0013 
LP4T -0 1324 0 5736*** 0 0078*** 0 0602*** 0 054*** -0 0247*** 
0 1078 0 0982 0 0028 0 0038 0 0038 0 0036 
• significant at I 0% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
lyl~ total advances,ly2 ~total znvestments, ly3~ total deposits, PJ~price of depos1ts, p2~ price of 
fiXed assets, p3 = pr1ce of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy vanable distinguishing between banks that merged (value 
~ 0) and those that did not (value~ 1), tgroup ~interaction between time trend and group 
dummy variable, own2 =dummy variable for publzc and private sector banks, own3 =dummy 
variable for public and foreign sector banks. 
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Table F2: Parameter Estimates, Battese and Coelli (1995) Banking System Dataset 
!Variable PRODUCTION APPROACH INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
LYIT -001196 -0 8412** -0 0024 -0 0852*** 0 01630 -0 0037 
0 266 0 3986 0 0055 0 0100 0 0265 0 0035 
LY2T I 1106* I 0227** 0 01146 0 0854*** -0 0153 0 0014 
0 6048 0 4850 0 0081 0 01265 0 0273 0 0035 
LY3T -0 741 01153 -0 0135* 
0 7533 0 6652 0 0082 
T 10 756*** 0 0442*** 0 0252 -0 0104 0 062*** 
0 926 0 0147 0 0428 0 0406 0 0091 
TSQ -0 528*** -0 743*** -0 0043*** -0 0079*** -0 004* -0 0056*** 
0 0653 0 099885 0 00084 00026 00022 0 0005 
Constant -52 572*** -63 356*** -0 5483*** -0 285 -I 9975*** 0 0224 
3 1140 4 938334 0 063 0 1841 0 1513 00460 
GROUP 81 604 81 1982 -0 8391 I 2603*** I 0125 0 351*** 
1776 561 26061.89 6 5293 0 1747 0 796 0 065 
GROUPT 28 7203 I 85129 0 5825 0 1019*** 0 0264 -0 0148*** 
198 759 1466 98 0 9994 0 0217 00404 0 0047 
LNPROVS 0 0955 -0 0598 -0 0009 -0 0008 -0 0002 -0 0008 
124 9807 597 0316 0 1069 0 0089 00448 0 0057 
OWN2 -5 6706 -47 712 0 5995 -0 3757*** -0 5214** 4 0053*** 
265 9066 19709 53 I 102 0 0359 02400 0 2577 
OWN3 -0 5051 -Ill 573 2 0724 -1.722*** -0 7894*** 9 1863*** 
904 7201 47300 84 2 8194 0 11841 02994 0 5028 
T -106 6 -0 5702 
!55 7664 0 982 
Constant I 846 I 8478 -I 2733 2 7755*** I 1646** 0 757*** 
9543518 5933 254 6 7004 0 2386 0 5549 0 1601 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, Pl=price of deposits, p2= price of 
fzxed assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 =price of Iahore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value= 
0) and those that did not (value= 1), tgroup = znteraction between time trend and group dummy 
variable, own2 =dummy variable for public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy variable for 
public and foreign sector banks. 
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Table F2: Parameter Estimates, TSFA RE Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH 
VARIABLE Panel I Panel 2 Panel 3 
LP2 
LP3 
LP4 
LY1 
LY2 
LY3 
LP22 
LP33 
LP44 
LY11 
LY22 
LY33 
LP2LP3 
LP2LP4 
LP3LP4 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
0 0877*** 
0 0119 
0 2713*** 
0 0116 
0 0774 
0 0613 
0 1508* 
0 0815 
0 6986*** 
0 1182 
0 0015 
0 0036 
-0 0289*** 
0 0034 
0 2447*** 
0 0321 
-0 363*** 
0 1199 
-0 0563 
0 1854 
-0 0137** 
0 0054 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
0 1308*** 
0 0118 
0 0303*** 
0 0045 
0 0127** 
0 006 
0 466*** 
0 0157 
0 506*** 
0 015 
0 019* 
0 011 
0 0001 
0 0015 
0 003** 
0 001 
0 056*** 
0 004 
0 070*** 
0 009 
0 0169** 
0 007 
0 0971*** 
0 009 
0 0130*** 
0 0035 
lyl~ total advances, ly2 ~total investments, ly3~ total depos1ts, PI~price of depos1ts,p2~ price 
offo:ed assets, p3 ~price of borrowings, p4 ~price oflabore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value 
~ 0) and those that d1d not (value~ 1), tgroup ~ interactwn between time trend and group 
dummy variable, own2 = dummy variable for public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy 
variable for public and fore~gn sector banks. 
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Table F2: Parameter Estimates, TSFA RE Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH 
VARIABLE Panel I 
LY1LY2 
LY1LY3 
LY2LY3 
LP2LY1 
LP2LY2 
LP2LY3 
LP3LY1 
LP3LY2 
LP3LY3 
LP4LY1 
LP4LY2 
LP4LY3 
LP2T 
LP3T 
LP4T 
* szgnificant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
Pane12 Pane13 
0 0272 
0 0782 
-0 5312*** 
0 1110 
0 6799** 
0 2920 
0 0450 
0 0292 
0 0634 
0 0470 
-0 1072* 
0 0691 
0 0249 
0 0240 
0 1647*** 
0 0456 
-0 2070*** 
0 0596 
-0 0019 
0 0031 
-0 0081*** 
0 0020 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Pane12 Pane13 
~o 117*** 
0 0127 
0 0534*** 
0 0132 
-0 0252* 
0 0155 
-0 0093 
0 008 
0 0103 
0 0088 
0 0085 
0 007 
-0 006 
0 0081 
-0 0017 
0 0028 
-0 0001 
0 0012 
-0 0035*** 
0 0013 
lyl~ total advances, ly2 ~total mvestments, ly3~ total deposits, PI~price of deposzts, p2~ price 
of fixed assets, p3 ~price of borrowings, p4 ~price oflabore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged (value 
~ 0) and those that dzd not (value~ 1), tgroup ~ mteractwn between llme trend and group 
dummy variable, own2 =dummy variable for public and private sector banks, own3 =dummy 
variable for publzc and foreign sector banks. 
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Table F2: Parameter Estimates, TSFA RE Banking System Dataset 
PRODUCTION APPROACH 
VARIABLE Panel! Panel2 Panel 3 
L Y1T 0 0392*** 
0 0106 
LY2T 
LY3T 
TT 
TSQ 
GROUP 
GROUP1T 
OWN2 
OWN3 
LNPROVS 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
0 0901 *** 
0 0153 
-0 1225*'' 
0 0208 
-0 0023'" 
0 0007 
0 4484'" 
0 0760 
-0 0215'" 
0 0110 
-0 3964'" 
0 0505 
-0 7601'" 
0 0544 
0 0113 
0 0164 
INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
Panel I Panel2 Panel3 
-0 0068" 
0 0028 
0 0040 
0 0029 
-0 0653'" 
0 0085 
0 002'" 
0 0004 
-0 034 
0 0402 
0 0086' 
0 0049 
-0 075*" 
0 022 
-0 1524*" 
0 0256 
0 0046 
0 0071 
lyl= total advances, ly2 =total investments, ly3= total deposits, Pl=price of deposits,p2= pnce 
of fiXed assets, p3 =price of borrowings, p4 =price oflabore, 
lnprovs =provisions, group =dummy variable distinguishing between banks that merged 
(value= 0) and those that did not (value = 1), tgroup =interaction between time trend and 
group dummy variable, own2 = dummy vanable for publ1c and private sector banks, own3 = 
dummy variable for public and foreign sector banks. 
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